McGuire v. Aberle

#26205-rem-SLZ
2013 S.D. 5IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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MARCELINE MCGUIRE, CHARLOTTE
HARTEL, VIRGINIA STOREY,
PATRICIA SIMMERS, DONNA
BOWKER, CAROLINA BECKER and
DONALD BECKER, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
PATRICK ABERLE and
CARLETTA ABERLE, Defendants and Appellants,
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DEWEY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE JOHN W. BASTIAN
Judge
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PATRICIA A. MEYERS
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorney for plaintiffs
and appellees.
STEVEN C. EMERY
Eagle Butte, South Dakota
and
GEORGE J. NELSON of
Abourezk Law Firm, PC
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendants
and appellants.
****
ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2012
OPINION FILED 01/16/13
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker’s eight children each inherited
an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the exterior
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers
are Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her undivided one-eighth
interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick is a member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe. Carletta is a non-Indian. Patrick subsequently conveyed his interest
to his son. 1 Before this suit, Patrick’s son transferred the property back to Patrick.
2 As a result, Patrick and Carletta each own an undivided one-sixteenth interest.
[¶2.] Sometime after Patrick and Carletta initially acquired their interests,
a dispute arose between the Aberles and the Becker children who still retained an
interest in the property. The Becker children commenced this action in circuit
court, seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for
partition. Patrick also moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Patrick argued that because he was a member of the Tribe, and because he had
become an owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest in property on the
Reservation, the circuit court possessed no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
1. There is some uncertainty regarding this transfer. The record suggests that
Patrick may have owned the property for approximately four months before
he transferred it to his son. At oral argument, however, the Becker children
contended that Patrick only owned the property for one day before the
transfer to his son. The Becker children also argued that Patrick’s son is not
a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
2. The record does not disclose the reason for Patrick’s reacquisition of the
property.
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the dispute between the parties. 3 Aberles contended the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Court had jurisdiction.
[¶3.] The court denied the motion, determining that the “ownership of
fifteen-sixteenths of the property has continually been in the possession of [non-
Indians,]” and therefore, state jurisdiction did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty.
After a trial, the circuit court ordered a sale of the entire property. Aberles appeal,
contesting both South Dakota courts’ subject matter jurisdiction and the order of
sale. 4 The jurisdiction question must be resolved before addressing the merits.
[¶4.] Both the Aberles and the Tribe argue that the jurisdiction question is
controlled by Williams v. Lee: “[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S. Ct.
269, 271, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1959). As a threshold matter in state-tribal jurisdiction
disputes, courts often examine Acts of Congress and treaties to determine the status
3. Patrick also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. That motion
was not ruled upon by the circuit court and Patrick has not appealed the
issue of personal jurisdiction. The issue has been waived.
4. The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, through its counsel Steven C. Emery,
appears as amici in support of the Aberles’ appeal. Shortly before oral
argument, Emery also entered a notice of appearance on behalf of the
Aberles. Emery argued the jurisdiction issue and George J. Nelson argued
the sale/partition issue.
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of the land at issue and its alienability, 5 especially when the land was alienated by
allotment acts during the allotment era. 6
5. See Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 146-50, 27 S. Ct. 48, 49, 51 L. Ed. 130(1906) (holding that a county’s assessment of ad valorem tax on land owned
by an Indian was permissible because the land was freely alienable under a
federal treaty and subsequently, the General Allotment Act and a state Act);
Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514, 524, 527-33 (6th Cir.
2006) (finding no state jurisdiction to assess ad valorem tax on reservation
lands allotted by treaty prior to allotment era because the treaty placed
restriction on alienation of the land); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty.,
5 F.3d 1355, 1356-59 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding state jurisdiction for ad valorem
taxation of land acquired by a tribe because the land was originally allotted
under a treaty and restrictions on alienation were lifted). See also South
Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 507-08, 106 S. Ct.
2039, 2044-46, 90 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1986) (deciding that although a federal Act’s
explicit incorporation of state law controlled, also stating that “[w]e have long
recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by Indians,
state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claims[ ]”); Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 675-76, 94 S. Ct. 772, 781-82, 39
L. Ed. 2d 73 (1974) (considering a claim of a right to possession of land,
stating that “[o]nce patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most
part, matters of local property law to be vindicated in local courts . . . [ ]”).
Although many of these cases involved the question whether a state had
jurisdiction to tax land, the cases necessarily involved the broader question
whether the state had jurisdiction because of the land’s status.
6. See Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 106-
15, 118 S. Ct. 1904, 1906-11, 141 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1998) (finding state
jurisdiction for ad valorem taxation of reservation land that was alienated
during the allotment period and reacquired by the Tribe); Cnty of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253-68,
270, 112 S. Ct. 683, 685-94, 116 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1992) (finding state
jurisdiction for ad valorem taxation of reservation land that was previously
allotted to Indians and non-Indians under the General Allotment Act). See
also Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 435-36, 438-39, 48 S. Ct. 366, 367-68, 72
L. Ed. 640 (1928) (reviewing state court adjudication of competing claims
between a non-Indian and heirs of Indian allottee, stating that “[w]ith the
issue of the patent, the title not only passed from the United States, but the
prior trust and the incidental restriction against alienation were terminated.
This put an end to the authority theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the
Interior by reason of the trust and restriction—so that thereafter all
(continued . . . )
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[¶5.] The Supreme Court has identified the relevant allotment acts affecting
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation lands that were alienated during the allotment
era. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 682-83, 692-93, 113 S. Ct. 2309,
2313, 2318, 124 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1993) (discussing the General Allotment Act of 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (amended by the Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906)); the
Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888; and the Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35
Stat. 460). 7 Additionally, in a different jurisdictional context, the Supreme Court
has discussed the effects of various allotment acts on Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation lands. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,
554 U.S. 316, 128 S. Ct. 2709, 171 L. Ed. 2d 457 (2008). “[T]he effect of the [General
Allotment] Act [and its successor Acts] was to convert millions of acres of formerly
tribal land into fee simple parcels, ‘fully alienable,’ and ‘free of all charge or
incumbrance whatsoever.’” Id. at 328, 128 S. Ct. at 2719 (internal citations
omitted) (citing F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 16.03[2][b], 1041-42
(2005 ed.)). The Supreme Court further stated that “once tribal land is converted
into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it.” Id. “As a general rule,
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( . . . continued)
questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and
determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska [state court],
the land being there[ ]”). Similar to footnote 4, two of these cases involved
the question whether a state had jurisdiction to tax land, but the cases
necessarily involved the broader question whether the state had jurisdiction
because of the land’s status.
7. The Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 369, 36 Stat. 602, also authorized the sale of
unalloted lands on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. That Act was not
at issue in Bourland.
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then, ‘the tribe has no authority itself, by way of tribal ordinance or actions in the
tribal courts, to regulate the use of fee land.’” Id. at 329, 128 S. Ct. at 2719 (quoting
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 430, 109
S. Ct. 2994, 3008, 106 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1989)). Bourland stated that the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe’s loss of lands through other Acts of Congress may also eliminate
tribal jurisdiction: “[A]n abrogated treaty right of unimpeded use and occupation of
lands ‘can no longer serve as the basis for tribal exercise of the lesser included
power’ to regulate.” 508 U.S. at 691, 113 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 424, 109 S. Ct. at 3004). 8
[¶6.] Although Plains Commerce Bank did not involve land in which a tribal
member owned an interest, the Supreme Court cited three cases generally finding
state jurisdiction over patented fee lands; i.e. those that had been alienated from
tribes by the General Allotment Act:
See County of Yakima, [502 U.S. at 267-68, 112 S. Ct. at 683]
(General Allotment Act permits Yakima County to impose ad
valorem tax on fee land located within the reservation); Goudy v.
Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149-150, 27 S. Ct. 48, 51 L. Ed. 130 (1906)
(by rendering allotted lands alienable, General Allotment Act
exposed them to state assessment and forced sale for taxes); In
re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 502-503, 25 S. Ct. 506, 49 L. Ed. 848(1905) (fee land subject to plenary state jurisdiction upon
issuance of trust patent (superseded by the Burke Act, 34 Stat.
182, 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000 ed.))).
554 U.S. at 328-29, 128 S. Ct. at 2719. The Supreme Court’s language in all of the
foregoing cases suggests that if the Becker/Aberle patented fee land was alienated
8. We acknowledge the distinction between cases involving state jurisdiction
over Reservation land and tribal authority to regulate the conduct of
individuals on land within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.
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under “allotment acts,” the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court may not have
exclusive jurisdiction.
[¶7.] But the problem in this case is that the record does not reflect how and
under what authority the land in question was initially alienated. That is
significant because counsel for the Tribe and Aberles contended at oral argument
that this land could not have been alienated under the General Allotment Act of
1887 (the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was not created until 1889). 9 Counsel
also argued that we should read the 1908 Act differently than the General
Allotment Act. 10 Moreover, counsel for the Becker children agreed that the nature
9. “[T]he Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation[ ] [was] established by Congress in
the Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 405, § 4, 25 Stat. 889.” Solem v. Bartlett, 465
U.S. 463, 465, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 1163, 79 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984). Nevertheless,
the 1887 General Allotment Act and its amendments affected tribal lands
after 1887. Aberles and the Tribe should clarify their position on remand.
10. Counsel mentioned the Supreme Court’s holding in Solem v. Bartlett, a case
involving the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. We acknowledge that in
Solem, the Supreme Court stated:
Congress passed a series of surplus land acts at the turn of the
century to force Indians onto individual allotments carved out of
reservations and to open up unallotted lands for non-Indian
settlement. Initially, Congress legislated its Indian allotment
program on a national scale [e.g. through the General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 et seq.], but by the time of the
Act of May 29, 1908, Congress was dealing with the surplus land
question on a reservation-by-reservation basis, with each
surplus land act employing its own statutory language, the
product of a unique set of tribal negotiation and legislative
compromise.
465 U.S. at 466-67, 104 S. Ct. at 1164 (footnote omitted). Solem, however,
was a diminishment case. The circuit court should determine the validity of
counsel’s argument on remand.
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of the patent and the Act under which it was granted is important to the
jurisdiction question. But that information is not reflected in this record.
[¶8.] In light of the status of the record, we remand this matter to the circuit
court to reconsider the jurisdiction question after further development of a factual
record and consideration of the land alienation cases. The factual record should
include: identification of the Act of Congress under which the land was alienated;
when the land was patented; to whom it was patented; the subsequent history of
title showing the extent of Indian and Tribal ownership; and the circumstances
under which Patrick transferred his ownership interest to his son and subsequently
reacquired that interest. To clarify all potential questions, the parties may present
new evidence and the court may reconsider all issues in this case.
[¶9.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, SEVERSON, and
WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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