DocketNumber: Docket Nos. 24029-82, 24064-82
Citation Numbers: 90 T.C. 1090, 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 73, 90 T.C. No. 73
Judges: Whalen,Sterrett,Whitaker,Korner,Cohen,Clapp,Swift,Wright,Wells,Gerber,Nims,Chabot,Shields,Hamblen,Jacobs,Parr,Ruwe,Hamblen,Chabot,Nims,Jacobs,Parr,Ruwe,Ruwe,Chabot,Jacobs,Parr
Filed Date: 5/25/1988
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
*73
D and E are the transferees and former majority shareholders of S, a corporation that had been engaged in the business of farming row crops. S adopted a plan of complete liquidation and pursuant to that plan, distributed to its majority shareholders all its operating assets, including certain harvested and unharvested crops. Prior to the liquidation, S had deducted, pursuant to
*1091 OPINION
Respondent determined deficiencies in the Federal income tax of petitioner Schwartz Farms, Inc., in the following amounts:
TYE Jan. 31 -- | Deficiency |
1975 | $ 1,782 |
1977 | 742,222 |
1978 | 284,256 |
Total | 1,028,260 |
Respondent also determined that petitioners, Dorothy Schwartz Rojas and the estate of Charles R. Schwartz, deceased, were liable for such amount as transferees. 1
*75 These cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and opinion. After concessions, the only issue for decision is whether the tax-benefit rule requires Schwartz Farms, Inc., to report as income the amount which it deducted as expenses for materials and supplies which it used and consumed in connection with the cultivation of crops prior *1092 to its liquidation and the distribution of the crops to its shareholders.
All the facts have been stipulated. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. 2
Petitioner Dorothy Schwartz Rojas (Dorothy) resided in Ventura, California, at the time her petition in this case was filed. Dorothy is the surviving spouse of Charles R. Schwartz, deceased (decedent).
Petitioner Estate of Charles R. Schwartz, deceased, acting by and through Bank of America, *76 National Trust & Savings Association, administrator (estate), is the successor in interest to the decedent, who died on April 6, 1976. The estate maintained offices at Fresno, California, at the time its petition in this case was filed.
Decedent's will was admitted to probate in the Superior Court of California, for the County of Kings, on May 14, 1976. In accordance with the California Probate Code, Dorothy elected to subject her entire interest in the community property to administration in the estate. Consequently, the estate succeeded to the ownership of all the assets owned by decedent and Dorothy as their community property as of April 6, 1976. On June 12, 1984, the probate estate of decedent was distributed, approximately evenly between the Charles R. Schwartz Testamentary Trust (trust) and Dorothy. The estate is a transferee of petitioner Schwartz Farms, Inc. (corporation), and Dorothy and the trust are transferees of the estate. Respondent has not determined transferee liability against the trust.
The corporation was organized under the laws of California on April 8, 1954. The principal office of the corporation was in Fresno, California, at the time its petition in*77 this case was filed. For Federal income tax purposes, the corporation reported income on the basis of a fiscal year ending January 31, and consistently used the cash basis method of accounting. At all relevant times the corporation was engaged in the business of farming row crops, primarily cotton, barley, wheat, and lettuce.
*1093 On October 1, 1976, the corporation adopted a plan of complete liquidation under
Shareholder | Number of shares |
Charles R. Schwartz | 93,496 |
Dorothy Schwartz | 93,496 |
William Thornton | 4,104 |
Genevieve Thornton | 4,104 |
Charles R. Schwartz, Jr | 1,000 |
Diana J. Schneider | 800 |
Sylvia J. Thornton | 800 |
Claudia Thornton Whitener | 800 |
The shares which are listed as owned by Charles R. Schwartz and Dorothy Schwartz were the community property of decedent and Dorothy on April 6, 1976, and, pursuant to Dorothy's election, became a part of the estate, along with all of their*78 other community property.
The community property interest of Charles R. Schwartz in the corporation's common stock was included in decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes. On a timely filed estate tax return, the assets included in decedent's Federal gross estate were valued as of the alternate valuation date.
Pursuant to the plan of liquidation, cash distributions were made to the following shareholders:
Shareholder | Amount |
William Thornton | $ 91,806.48 |
Genevieve Thornton | 91,806.48 |
Charles R. Schwartz, Jr | 22,370.00 |
Diana J. Thornton | 17,896.01 |
Sylvia J. Thornton | 17,896.01 |
Claudia Thornton Whitener | 17,896.01 |
259,670.99 |
On October 26, 1976, all of the corporation's operating assets were distributed to the estate pursuant to the plan of liquidation. Such assets were assigned fair market values on October 26, 1976, as follows: *1094
Description of item | Fair market value |
Crops | |
Cotton -- lint total | $ 1,931,052 |
Cotton -- seed | 81,956 |
Less reported by corporation | (94,621) |
Less total harvest costs | (267,146) |
Plus harvest cost by corporation | 4,500 |
Total cotton | 1,655,741 |
Wheat crop | 41,552 |
Barley | 271,006 |
Lettuce | 108,622 |
Total crops | 2,076,921 |
Canal stock | 67,350 |
Prepaid rent | 2,100 |
Unamortized lease costs | 234,200 |
Cotton allotment | 0 |
Land | 432,320 |
Buildings -- net of depreciation | 261,226 |
Pipelines and sprinklers -- net | 86,391 |
Pumps and wells -- net | 52,211 |
Domestic water system -- net | 3,214 |
Drainage system -- net | 24,471 |
Machinery and equipment -- net | 68,627 |
Total | 3,309,031 |
*79 All the remaining assets of the corporation were thereafter distributed to the estate during 1977 and 1978, with a final distribution of $ 100 on January 31, 1979. 3 Pursuant to the plan of liquidation, all the outstanding shares of the corporation were surrendered and canceled.
As noted above, among the assets distributed by the corporation to the estate on October 26, 1976, were the following crops: harvested barley, harvested wheat, harvested cotton (lint and cotton seed), harvested lettuce, unharvested fall lettuce, and unharvested cotton. 4 The unharvested lettuce represented approximately 50 percent of the 1976 fall lettuce crop, and the unharvested cotton represented approximately 76 percent of the 1976 cotton crop.
*80 On the corporation's return for the taxable year ended January 31, 1977, the corporation deducted all the costs *1095 and expenses incurred in connection with the cultivation and harvesting of the crops that were distributed on October 26, 1976, pursuant to the plan of liquidation. The total expenses thus deducted for each crop and the portion thereof which respondent seeks to include in income are as follows:
Expenses deducted | 5 Income adjustment | |
Cotton | $ 739,479 | $ 692,379 |
Wheat and barley | 333,564 | 157,909 |
Lettuce | 59,616 | 59,616 |
Total | 1,132,659 | 909,904 |
All the crop costs deducted were incurred in the ordinary course of the corporation's business and represented expenditures for all costs incurred up to*81 the liquidation date in connection with the growing of the crops, including seed, fertilizer, water, labor, equipment rent and maintenance, pesticide, supervision, and general administrative overhead. All materials purchased in connection with each crop were used and applied in cultural practices prior to October 26, 1976, and no portion thereof was inventoried or distributed to the shareholders in liquidation.
After the liquidation distribution, the estate continued to use the operating assets which it received in the conduct of a farming operation similar to the operation conducted by the corporation before the distribution. The estate sold all of the crops that were distributed to it in liquidation in the ordinary course of such business.
As a result of the complete liquidation of the corporation, the estate and Dorothy realized a long-term capital gain of $ 681,514, measured by the difference between the fair market value of all the assets (net of liabilities) distributed to them in liquidation and the income tax basis of the corporation's stock in their hands.
Each of the assets received by the estate in the October 26, 1976, liquidation distribution had an income tax basis*82 in the hands of the estate equal to the fair market value of *1096 each such asset determined as of the date of distribution pursuant to section 334(a). 6
The notice of deficiency issued to the corporation determined that additional income should be included in the corporation's return for the year ending January 31, 1977, on the ground "that the accrual method of accounting clearly reflects your income." As an alternative*83 theory, respondent determined that, "if it is found that the accrual method of accounting does not clearly reflect income for the tax year ending January 31, 1977," then assignment of income principles required $ 628,217 of the crop income to be included in the corporation's income for the tax year ending January 31, 1978.
In its
The parties agree that the sole issue for decision by the Court is whether, under the tax benefit rule as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
In view of the fact that respondent abandoned application of the accrual method of accounting and application of the assignment of income doctrine in this case, we have not considered either such theory and limit our opinion to the application of the tax-benefit rule. 7
*84 *1097 The tax-benefit rule is a judicially created doctrine, embodied in part in section 111. It operates to rectify certain distortions which would be brought about by the inflexible application of the annual accounting system used in reporting Federal income taxes.
The above illustrates the application of the tax-benefit rule where the taxpayer has made an actual recovery of the amount previously deducted. As first formulated, such a recovery was required for application of the rule. See, e.g.,
The Supreme*86 Court refused to adopt a blanket rule for application of the tax-benefit rule but stated that it must be applied on a "case-by-case basis." It charged lower courts with the obligation of considering "the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of the purpose and function of the provisions granting the deductions."
The taxpayer in
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the tax-benefit rule in
The Court then reasoned that the distribution of the grain to the shareholders in liquidation of Bliss Dairy, Inc., was a nonbusiness use of the grain, analogous to personal consumption, explicitly made nondeductible by section 262. The Court held that the liquidation was "fundamentally inconsistent" *1099 with the earlier deduction of the cost of the grain because it converted the grain to a nonbusiness use and, thus, frustrated consumption of the grain in the business, the premise on which the deduction was allowed.
Like
The liquidation in
*90 The only significant difference between this case and
Petitioners note that the crop costs at issue consist of expenditures for seed, fertilizer, water, labor, equipment rent and maintenance, pesticide, supervision, and general and administrative overhead. They emphasize that all such materials and services were used and consumed in the ordinary course of the corporation's farming business prior to the liquidation and that no such materials and services were on hand at the time of the liquidation or distributed to the shareholders. In petitioners' view, therefore, such materials and services are similar to the cattle feed*91 which had been consumed by the dairy cows in
Respondent, on the other hand, also relies on
Respondent, therefore, asks us to go beyond
In support of its position, respondent asserts that the Court in
Taxpayers carrying materials and supplies on hand should include in expenses the charges for materials and supplies only in the amount that they are
To "consume" an asset means nothing more than to use it up. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 490 (1986). If an asset is used up in furthering the taxpayer's trade or business, as was the case with the materials and *1102 services at issue, then the predicate for deducting the cost of the asset under
*94 We are not at liberty to speculate about the meaning of the words "actually consumed" and "used" as applied to seed, fertilizer, and other farm supplies. Congress made the meaning of such words clear in the legislative history of section 464(a), which was originally enacted in 1976. That provision states as follows:
In the case of any farming syndicate (as defined in subsection (c)), a deduction (otherwise allowable under this chapter) for amounts paid for feed, seed, fertilizer, or other similar farm supplies shall only be allowed for the taxable year in which such feed, seed, fertilizer, or other supplies are
A farm business is normally entitled to use the cash method of accounting and to deduct seed, fertilizer, and other farm supplies under
This provision prevents a farm syndicate from obtaining current deductions for prepaid feed, seed, fertilizer, etc., except in situations where the feed, seed, fertilizer, or other supplies are
*1103 In other words, if such crop materials are not "on hand" at the end of the taxable year, then they have been consumed in the farm business and may be deducted by a "farming syndicate." Even in the case of a farming syndicate, therefore, Congress stated its intention to allow farm supplies to be deducted when they are no longer "on hand" and, in allowing such deductions, Congress made no reference to the sale of the crops produced.
A farmer who operates a farm for profit is entitled to deduct from gross income as necessary expenses all amounts
Once again, there is nothing, either explicit or by necessary implication, in this provision to suggest that the deduction of crop expenses is predicated on eventual sale of the crop. In fact, to the contrary, the general rule under that regulation is that crop expenses are to be deducted as the amounts are expended. It is only "with the consent of the Commissioner" that a farmer may adopt the so-called "crop method," which allows deductions to be taken in the taxable year in which the gross income from the crop has been realized.
The issue here is more than a semantic difference between the respondent and petitioners over the meaning of the word "consumed." Respondent's application of the tax-benefit rule in this case is a *97 significant expansion of the rule and, in our view, goes far beyond its intended scope. Under respondent's formulation, every business deduction under
Respondent relies on our decision in
Petitioners deducted the cost of young plants
The young plants at issue in
Our decision in
In
We agree with the Government*101 that distortion of income results from appellees' accounting method. The expense deduction as permitted by regulation is intended to reflect the cost of feed
Once again, the tax-benefit rule was applied only to the expensed assets which were on hand and not to materials and supplies which had been consumed.
Similarly, in
In
Lastly, in
It appears that the taxpayer in
The premise of a deduction under
It is clear that the court simply applied the logic of the Supreme Court in
Historically, farmers have had the option of using the cash method of accounting without the need to accumulate inventories or to use the inventory method of accounting. Sec. 39.22(c)-6(a), Regs. 118;
Farm investments offer an opportunity to defer taxes on nonfarm income where investors can take advantage of the special farm tax rules to deduct farm expenses in a year or years prior to the years when the revenue associated with such expenses is earned. This type of deferral can occur regardless of whether the proceeds from the later sale of the underlying products are taxed at ordinary income or capital gain rates. Generally, in farming operations tax losses can be shown in early years of an investment because of (1) the opportunity to deduct, when paid, costs which in nonfarm businesses would be inventoried and deducted in a later year, (2) the ability to deduct, when paid, costs which should properly be capitalized, and (3) the ability to claim depreciation deductions which exceed straight-line depreciation.
These tax losses may offset income from a taxpayer's other nonfarm occupations or investments on which he would otherwise have to pay tax currently. When*107 the income which is related to these deductions is reported, it will not be reduced by the amount of the deductions properly attributable to it (and will thus be greater in net amount than it otherwise would be). This lack of matching results in deferral of taxes from the years when the initial deductions were taken. If the related farm income is eventually realized as capital gain (as it may be where breeding animals or orchards are sold), conversion of ordinary income (against which the expenses were deducted) into capital gain may also result. Even without the possibility of conversion, however, the tax advantages of deferral alone are frequently sufficient to motivate many high-income taxpayers to engage in certain types of farming activities.
Through the years, Congress has imposed some limits on the use of the special farm accounting provisions in the case of farm syndicates and the like but, as recognized during passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, "Most farmers use the cash method of accounting, and therefore do not maintain inventories or capitalize preproductive period costs (i.e., costs incurred prior to the time a plant or animal *108 becomes productive)." H. Rept. 99-841 (Conf.), at II-112 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 112.
It would appear, therefore, that Congress intended to allow farm businesses, like Schwartz Farms, Inc., to deduct crop costs without the necessity of matching such costs against the income which would be realized from the sale of the crops themselves. Nevertheless, respondent's position in this case is that the crop costs which are otherwise *1109 deductible under
Nims,
*1110 In
By reading the facts of
The majority places more weight on the Supreme Court's use of the words "consumption of the asset" in
*1111 Our holding in
Unlike the situation in
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold for respondent.
Hamblen,
The majority suggests that respondent would have us go beyond
In
After noting the rule's rationale, the Supreme Court then examined the rule's application. The tax-benefit rule functions on a case-by-case basis. In applying the rule, "A court must consider the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of*115 the purpose and function of the provisions granting the deductions."
In the case before us, just as in
*117 *1113 A careful consideration of
Taxpayers carrying materials and supplies on hand should include in expenses the charges for materials and supplies only in the amount that they are actually consumed and used
Words of import in this regulation include the words "in operation during the taxable year" and those preventing double deductions. The phrase "in operation during the taxable year" necessarily entails the primary activity for which all trades and businesses are formed and managed -- the generation of income. 4 The language preventing double deductions inextricably ties a deduction to income -- to the extent an expense has reduced income generated in one taxable period, it may not reduce income generated in succeeding periods.
*118 Furthermore, we have clearly accepted this link between deduction and income generation. In
*119 *1114 The majority's reliance on "the consumption of the asset" as the overriding justification for the granting of a
*120 As a further comment, the majority's emphasis upon physical consumption of the exact item acquired through the expenditure is an exaltation of form over substance. Just because there has been a physical transformation of seed, fertilizer, water, etc. into an end product (whose value equals or exceeds the cost of production) is not a sound basis for disregarding the spirit of the tax-benefit rule. A requirement that the same physical items be distributed to shareholders is analogous to a requirement that there be an actual recovery of the items previously deducted. Such a requirement of sameness "would introduce an undesirable formalism into the application of the tax benefit rule." 7*1115
*121 I also note that the majority's holding fails to fully consider our decision in
the
* * * *
[Taxpayers] deducted the cost of young plants purchased for sale in their business*122 after the plants had grown to mature size. Instead of selling the plants in the ordinary course of their trade or business and
As this statement from
Moreover, the majority's holding fails to fully*124 consider the decision in
For the sake of argument, I find that the majority is wrong when its focuses on the sand deposit in place as the asset in
*127 Though the majority was wrong in focusing on the sand deposit in place as the item subject to consumption, the majority was very correct when it said, "It is clear that the [
*128 *1118 The majority opines that "Under respondent's formulation, every business deduction under
In the instant case, moreover, we are not faced with an unforeseen event. Schwartz Farms voluntarily decided to liquidate. In doing so, the liquidating farm chose not to subject its products to the risk of loss, whether that loss should occur in the market place or from an unforeseen event. It is in the context of this farm's voluntary action that we must consider respondent's argument and apply the tax-benefit rule.
At this point, I also find it necessary to respond to the*129 majority's reliance on section 464 and the special accounting provisions applicable to farmers. The majority's decision to turn to section 464 to add meaning to the term "consume" would suggest that in the future we must similarly search high and low for talismanic words to define the term "consume" within the context of different trades or businesses prior to our applying the majority's rule. That this seems to be the logical result of the majority's analysis should elicit at least a statement of concern from the majority. Furthermore, the majority's use of section 464 as a statutory tool which stymies the proper application of the tax-benefit rule in this case leads to a suggestion that Congress has acted where it indeed has not. Congress did not restrict the tax-benefit rule's application under section 464; it instead established that rule's exclusionary element in section 111. We should not legislate where Congress has *1119 not by implying that Congress did act in wholly unrelated provisions applicable to
In responding to the majority's use of the special accounting provisions applicable to farmers as a means of not applying the tax-benefit*130 rule in this case, I again find it instructive to turn to our decision in
[Section 352 of the Revenue Act of 1978 13*132 ] did not change the nature of deductions available to nurserymen, or the purpose and function of such deductions. The changes made by act section 352 were changes in timing;
The unquestionable consequence of this language and our final ruling in
*1120 As a further comment, I find it necessary to ask just what rule the majority is espousing in this case. To the extent the majority so heavily relies on section 464 and the special accounting provisions applicable *133 to farmers in deciding not to apply the tax-benefit rule, is it suggesting that its holding in this case has reference only to "farmers"? The majority's citing of cases which do not involve farmers, i.e.,
The majority notes in note 4 of its opinion that the parties to this case have made no suggestion that section 268 is applicable in this instance. However, it is interesting to note the application of this section and its related section 1231(b)(4). 15 If section 1231 applies, then a farmer, under the direction of section 268, must recapture deductions, in the form of "expenses, depreciation, or otherwise," which are attributable to the production of the unharvested crop. These recaptured deductions include those taken in a taxable year other than the year of sale. In applying the*134 tax-benefit rule to the case at hand, I would require of Schwartz Farms no greater burden of tracing and recapturing *1121 of expenses than that required by Congress under section 268.
*135 I also find it odd that the majority couches its discussion of
*136 In sum, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
*137 Correlatively,
Applying these elemental principles to the case before us, it is clear that the fundamentally inconsistent event of liquidation obviated the correlation of crop production expense to the generation of income from the crop. This distortion compels application of the tax-benefit rule in the instant case, as it did in
Because the majority opinion implicitly overrules
Ruwe,
The majority opinion appears to acknowledge that tax-benefit rule*138 principles apply even though the expenditures and liquidation occurred in the same taxable year. In note 8, the majority concedes that the Supreme Court in
*1123 The majority notes that neither party suggested the applicability of section 268. I feel that section 268 should be mentioned, however, because adoption of the majority opinion will cause different results depending upon whether the tax results of a liquidation are governed by section 336 or*139
*140 The unharvested crops in the instant case were disposed of at the same time as the land, and would have qualified as section 1231 property if a recognizable sale or exchange had occurred.
In
The*141 majority opinion states that the corporation adopted its plan of liquidation under
Application of tax-benefit rule principles to a section 336 liquidation produces the same result with respect to the unharvested crops that section 268 produces in a
*. By order of the Chief Judge, these cases were reassigned to Judge Whalen for decision and opinion.↩
1. Although the notice of deficiency relates to the 3 taxable years of Schwartz Farms, Inc., set out above, the notices of transferee liability relate only to the year ending Jan. 31, 1977. Neither party has provided any explanation for, or raised any question concerning, this apparent discrepancy.↩
2. Petitioners object, on the grounds of relevancy, to par. 10, 11, and 12, and the last sentence of par. 5 of the stipulation. We disagree and include them in our findings of fact.↩
3. No issue has been raised by the parties about the fact that the final distribution took place more than 12 months after the date on which the corporation adopted the plan of complete liquidation under
4. No suggestion has been made by the parties that sec. 268 ("sale of land with unharvested crop") is applicable in this case.↩
5. In calculating the amount of the adjustment, the parties agreed in the stipulation of facts to reduce the total expenses with respect to each crop by the same ratio which crop sales reported by the corporation on its return bears to the total proceeds from sales of the crops.↩
6. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect during the years in issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Sec. 334(a) provides:
SEC. 334(a). General Rule. -- If property is received in a distribution in partial or complete liquidation (other than a distribution to which section 333 applies), and if gain or loss is recognized on receipt of such property, then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the fair market value of such property at the time of the distribution.↩
7. We note that petitioners object to allegations by respondent in par. 8(u) of his
"No valid business reason existed to distribute the crops at this time as all the crops would have been harvested within 30 days. The reason for this distribution was to avoid the taxation on the proceeds from the crops."
Respondent has the burden of proving any new matter raised in his answer. Rule 142(a). Petitioners argue that respondent has failed his burden of proof on this issue. Respondent maintains that the timing of the distribution indicates that the corporation had no business reason other than tax avoidance for the distribution in this case.
However, neither party has shown, and we do not find, that the existence of a valid business reason or the lack thereof is relevant to the issue in this case, i.e., whether the tax-benefit rule requires that the corporation include in its income previously deducted expenses. The tax-benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion in income when events occur which are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction or when there has been a recovery of a previously deducted item. Because the existence or absence of a valid business reason for the liquidation is irrelevant to the determination of whether there has been an inconsistent event or a recovery in this case, we decline to find facts relating to the existence of a valid business reason for the liquidation.↩
8. The Supreme Court described the tax-benefit rule as "cancelling out" an earlier deduction and, presumably, agrees with the Ninth Circuit that it is of no consequence whether the cancelling out takes place by way of a reduction of the deduction or an increase in income.
9. Judge Nims, in his dissent, states that "the phrase 'actually consumed and used in operation in the taxable year' includes both consumption
10. It is not clear what relationship, if any, such amount bore to the costs of removal of the overburden which had been deducted.↩
1. The majority accurately notes that the purpose of the tax-benefit rule is "to achieve rough transactional parity in tax." Throughout their analysis, however, this same majority stresses the deduction of items at the expense of a fully developed discussion related to the second prong of transactional parity -- the generation of income. The majority's decision to ignore income generation obviates what in essence is the sine qua non of transactional parity -- the matching of income and expense. As such, the majority's failure to ask "Where's the income?" reminds one of a hamburger purchaser's failure to ask, "Where's the beef?"↩
2. This regulation was initially issued under the authority of sec. 7805.
3. That a longstanding link exists between a
4. In its opinion, the majority finds [ILLEGIBLE WORD] necessary to refer to the dictionary definition of "consume." I also find it necessary to [ILLEGIBLE WORD] the definition of "business" and "trade" as found in the Random House College Dictionary. There, "business" is defined as "the purchase and
With specific application to the case at hand,
5. In
"Respondent however contends that petitioners have lost sight of the fact that the deduction in the earlier year authorized by
6. No issue was raised in
7. The majority's emphasis on the term "consumption" may well instigate before our Court and others a future parade of experts in biology, chemistry, and physics, as both the Commissioner and taxpayers attempt to sway our decision and those of other courts that a particular asset has been fully consumed.↩
8. The young plants in
9. As a general rule, this Court will not look behind a notice of deficiency to examine the evidence used or the propriety of the Commissioner's motives or administrative policy or procedure in making the determination.
10. We have cited
11. The sand deposit in place in
Accepting the above proposition and utilizing the logic of the majority, we should hold in this case that, since the enhanced but unsold asset, unharvested crops, has not been "consumed" by its producer, then the costs directly attributable to this unconsumed asset should be recaptured under the tax-benefit rule.↩
12. The majority's statement that no authority has been offered to support respondent's position in this case is inaccurate. This inaccuracy is confirmed by the majority's attempt to cite and distinguish precedent which in actuality supports or in no way contradicts respondent's position. One example is the majority's citing of
Additionally, respondent has maintained since at least 1955 a position quite analogous to that which he argues here. In
"This has been done on the assumption that such costs have been a part of the costs incurred in the business of the taxpayer. When the goods become the subject of a contribution or gift they are in effect removed from the business operations of the taxpayer and such costs attributable thereto should likewise be eliminated from business costs."
We have cited
Finally, we should draw no conclusions from the Commissioner's failure in those cases cited by the majority to assert as deficient amounts items of a character similar to those amounts in question in the instant case. See note 9
13. Sec. 352 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2846-2847, provided as follows:
(a) Application of Section. -- This section shall apply to a taxpayer who -- (1) is a (2) is on an accrual method of accounting, and (3) is not required by
(b) Taxpayer May Not Be Required To Inventory Growing Crops. -- A taxpayer to whom this section applies may not be required to inventory growing crops for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1977.
(c) Taxpayer May Elect To Change To Cash Method.[0001]T0 -- A taxpayer to whom this section applies may, for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1977 and before January 1, 1981, change to the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting with respect to any trade or business in which the principal activity is growing crops.
(d) (1) shall not require the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, and (2) shall be treated, for purposes of
(e) Growing Crops. -- For purposes of this section, the term "growing crops" does not include trees grown for lumber, pulp, or other nonlife purposes.
[Emphasis added.]↩
14. Our action in
Moreover, in an instance tied to farmers/sharecrop landlords, we have described a special accounting procedure as "a rule of administrative convenience" but have gone on to state that this rule has "no bearing on the underlying question whether potentially taxable income exists."
15. Sec. 268 provides:
Where an unharvested crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 1231 as "property used in the trade or business," in computing taxable income no deduction (whether or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.
Sec. 1231(b)(4) states:
(4) Unharvested crop. -- In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted) at the same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as "property used in the trade or business." [The above language reflects this section as it appeared in 1975. Changes in the holding period were made for tax years 1977 and 1978.]↩
16. There we said:
"Although the [tax-benefit] rule is generally addressed to situations in which a deduction in an earlier taxable year is related to a recovery in a later taxable year, the same approach has been applied where both deduction and offsetting recovery occur in the same taxable year. See
Moreover, the Supreme Court has cited approvingly the cases listed in the above quotation. See
17. The Supreme Court has mentioned that a rancher, a taxpayer similar to a farmer, who uses the cash method possesses substantial flexibility in determining the year in which income is realized. However, the defect of this method is that it produces a bunching of income in the year of sale and "an inaccurate
1. Sec. 268 provides:
Where an unharvested crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 1231 as "property used in the trade or business," in computing taxable income no deduction (whether or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.
Sec. 1231(b)(4) provides:
(4) Unharvested crop. -- In the case of an unharvested crop on the land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted) at the same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as "property used in the trade or business."↩
Jack E. Golsen and Sylvia H. Golsen v. Commissioner of ... , 445 F.2d 985 ( 1971 )
Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal ... , 496 F.2d 520 ( 1974 )
Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner of ... , 582 F.2d 378 ( 1978 )
Marvin H. And Kathleen G. Teget v. United States , 552 F.2d 236 ( 1977 )
Frank E. Connery, in No. 19,432 v. United States of America.... , 460 F.2d 1130 ( 1972 )
Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corporation , 128 F.2d 208 ( 1942 )
Beauchamp & Brown Groves Co. v. Commissioner of Internal ... , 371 F.2d 942 ( 1967 )
Louis Spitalny and Betty Spitalny, His Wife v. United ... , 430 F.2d 195 ( 1970 )
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins , 63 S. Ct. 339 ( 1943 )
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner , 99 S. Ct. 773 ( 1979 )
United States v. Catto , 86 S. Ct. 1311 ( 1966 )
Nash v. United States , 90 S. Ct. 1550 ( 1970 )
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner , 103 S. Ct. 1134 ( 1983 )
Ballou Const. Co., Inc. v. United States , 611 F. Supp. 375 ( 1985 )