DocketNumber: Docket No. 27103-84
Judges: Clapp
Filed Date: 5/7/1987
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024
*66
Petitioners filed their returns for the years 1976 and 1978 in 1980 and 1982, respectively. In 1982, respondent determined additions to tax pursuant to
*1176 By notice *68 of deficiency dated May 1, 1984, respondent determined, pursuant to Taxable year Addition 1976 $ 778.68 1978 949.87
Subsequently, respondent amended his answer to place in dispute additions to tax pursuant to
The issues for decision are:
(1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction over additions to tax under
(2) Whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax pursuant to
(3) Whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax pursuant to
*1177 (4) Whether petitioners are liable for an addition to tax pursuant to
(5) Whether petitioners are liable for additions to tax pursuant to
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioners William F. and Joan M. Judge resided in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, at the time of the filing of the petition in this case.
Petitioners' Federal individual income tax return, Form 1040, for the year 1976 was signed by their return preparer on August 31, 1979. This Form 1040 was filed with the Internal Revenue Service on January 7, 1980, and shows adjusted gross income of $ 25,255.61. Petitioners' total corrected income tax liability for 1976 was $ 3,110.70. Petitioners' Form 1040 for 1978 was filed on*70 August 25, 1982, and shows adjusted gross income of $ 188,191.81. Petitioners' total corrected income tax liability for 1978 was $ 55,594.47.
On November 22, 1982, respondent assessed petitioners an addition to the tax under
Petitioners' Forms 1040 for the years 1971, 1972, and 1973, were filed on March 14, 1980. Petitioners' Form 1040 for 1971 was signed by a return preparer on August 19, 1976. Petitioners' Forms 1040 for 1972 and 1973 were signed by petitioner on April 26, 1978. Petitioners' Forms 1040 for 1974 and 1975 were filed on February 13, 1980, although they had been signed by petitioner on May 30, 1978.
On October 5, 1979, the Kansas City Service Center mailed Form 4901 to petitioner which informed him that the Kansas City Service Center had no record of receiving his Form 1040 for the year 1977. It also advised him that if he had not filed his return, he should file it within the following 2 weeks. Petitioners failed to file a return for 1977. A Form 1040 for 1977 was completed for petitioners on May 14, 1982, by their accountant and was signed by petitioners.
On December 4, 1976, a U.S. Partnership*72 Return of Income, Form 1065, for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1976, was filed for the One Hour Martinizing partnership (One Hour). This return was signed by petitioner. A Form 1065 for the year 1976 for the Hillcrest Apartments partnership (Hillcrest) was signed by petitioner on May 2, 1978, and filed on August 28, 1978. A Form 1065 for 1977 for Hillcrest was signed by petitioner on January 5, 1979.
A Form 1065 for 1975 for the Fred Harwood Joint Venture (Fred Harwood), was signed by a return preparer on April 12, 1976. This Form 1065, signed by petitioner, was filed on July 21, 1980. A Form 1065 for 1976 for Fred Harwood was signed by a return preparer on May 19, 1979. This Form 1065, signed by petitioner, was filed on July 14, 1980.
Petitioner was furnished with Forms K-1 for Storybook Enterprises partnership for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, and a Form K-1 for Meadows of Brookfield partnership for 1978 shortly after the end of each of those years.
*1179 Petitioner underwent coronary bypass surgery in January of 1976. After his surgery, petitioner went back to work on a part-time basis. Petitioner's doctor prescribed an antidepressant for him. The prescription*73 for the antidepressant was discontinued by the end of 1976, and petitioner's doctor did not treat him for depression after December 1976.
Petitioner employed Eleanore Gafney as a general secretary and daily bookkeeper in his office from 1975 through June 1, 1978. The books and records of Meadows of Brookfield and Storybook Enterprises were primarily maintained by third parties located outside of petitioner's office. The tax returns of Storybook Enterprises and Meadows of Brookfield were prepared based upon such books and records. During the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, petitioner had numerous business checking accounts upon which he signed checks. During 1976, petitioner signed 25 documents relating to real estate transactions such as disclosure-settlement statements, closing statements, and mortgage loan settlements. During 1977, petitioner signed 4 documents relating to real estate transactions such as disclosure-settlement statements and closing statements. During 1978, petitioner also signed a closing statement.
On April 14, 1976, petitioner signed a Wisconsin Real Estate Transfer Return. On April 18, 1977, petitioner signed a claim release with respect to a debt owed to*74 him. On April 30, 1976, petitioner signed two agreements relating to the transfer of certain real property by petitioner to another party. Petitioner prepared warranty deeds that were filed with county offices in Wisconsin on June 1, 1976, July 29, 1976, and June 15, 1977. Petitioner also prepared a satisfaction of mortgage that was filed with a county office in Wisconsin on July 29, 1976.
Late in 1979, a criminal investigation of petitioner was opened by the Criminal Investigation Division, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978. The initial contact with petitioner by the special agent assigned to the case was on December 21, 1979. By letter dated October 31, 1981, petitioner was informed by the Criminal Investigation Division that he was no longer the subject of investigation.
On June 16, 1983, petitioner signed a Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, agreeing to the Commissioner's *1180 determination of deficiencies in tax for the years 1976 and 1978, but objecting to the additions to tax pursuant to
Petitioners made no deposits of estimated income tax for the year 1978. Petitioners did not pay the income tax of $ 51,795 shown*75 on their 1978 income tax return prior to November 1983.
OPINION
A brief synopsis of the facts which brought this case before us is as follows. Petitioners filed their returns for the years 1976 and 1978, in 1980 and 1982, respectively. In 1982, respondent determined additions to tax pursuant to
The first issue for decision is whether this Court has jurisdiction over the additions to tax which are the subject of petitioners' amended petition.
As we have often stated, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.
Respondent asserts that, based on our holding in (1) The additions to the tax, additional amounts, and penalties provided by this chapter shall be paid upon notice and demand and shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes; (2) Any reference in this title to "tax" imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to the tax, additional amounts, and penalties provided by this chapter.
(b) Procedure For Assessing Certain Additions to Tax. -- For purposes of subchapter B of chapter 63 (relating to deficiency procedures for income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes), subsection (a) shall not apply to any addition to tax under (1) in the case of an addition described in (2) to an addition described in
*78 Pursuant to the above provisions, the deficiency procedures applicable to income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes are also generally applicable to additions to tax.
*79 *1182 In
(1) Jurisdiction to Determine. -- Except as provided by paragraph (2) and by section 7463, if the Tax Court finds that there is no *1183 deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax for the same taxable year, * * * in respect of which the Secretary determined the deficiency, or
*82 A literal reading of
*1184 In
In
*1185 Because of the broader scope of
In reaching the conclusion in
We noted that in interpreting
Further, while the term "overpayment" is not statutorily defined, the Treasury Department has interpreted the term in providing regulations for the administration of section 6611 (relating to interest on overpayments). Section 301.6611-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides, in part:
there can be no overpayment of tax until the entire tax liability has been satisfied. Therefore, the dates of overpayment of any tax are the date of payment of the first amount which (when added to the previous *1186 payments) is in excess of the tax liability (
The interpretation given the term*88 overpayment by the Treasury Department is, therefore, consistent with the assumption that
Finally, in reaching the conclusion that we do have jurisdiction over the additions to tax here in issue, we reiterate certain of our statements made in
Prior opinions on this issue have focused on the Tax Court's role in providing a prepayment forum for taxpayers. They myopically see this purpose along with the statutorily limited jurisdiction as reasons to be extra conservative in determining the Tax Court's jurisdiction. But these opinions have failed to recognize that Congress has legislatively provided for the exceptional situation where, after a deficiency has been determined and the taxpayer has petitioned the Tax Court, an overpayment results. Although there is no legislative history to assist us, it is hard to imagine that Congress could have intended to bifurcate an "overpayment" by limiting the taxpayer's refund to "tax" only. It is equally hard to imagine that an "overpayment" has a different meaning depending upon the forum. Either of those approaches would force some taxpayers*89 to resolve a single tax controversy in two different forums. * * * [
The above statements are strongly compelling with respect to the additions to tax which are at issue in this case. The additions to tax under
*1187 Accordingly, we hold that*90 we have jurisdiction to determine overpayments of additions to tax under
*91
Petitioners assert that their failure to timely file returns from 1970 through 1978, and their failure to make timely payment of their 1978 tax liability and estimated taxes resulted from: (1) Their accountant's suffering personal problems*93 which caused the late filing of the returns in the early 1970's; (2) petitioner's heart problems and surgery, and continued neurological and psychological problems, which prevented gathering and coordinating necessary data concerning work performed by others on his behalf; and (3) the criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service which caused additional delays. Petitioners have not disputed that they failed to timely file returns for the years 1976 and 1978. Nor have petitioners disputed that they failed to make required estimated tax payments in 1978, and timely payment of their tax liability for 1978. Petitioners contend, however, that such failures were due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, and that therefore they are not liable for the additions to tax.
We note initially that during the year 1978,
With respect to the additions to tax under
Petitioners' Forms 1040 for the years 1970 through 1978 were filed with the Internal Revenue Service as follows:
Date signed | Date signed | ||
Year | by petitioner | by preparer | Date filed |
1970 | 10/23/74 | 10/30/74 | |
1971 | 8/19/76 | 3/14/80 | |
1972 | 4/26/78 | 4/25/78 | 3/14/80 |
1973 | 4/26/78 | 4/25/78 | 3/14/80 |
1974 | 5/30/78 | 5/20/78 | 2/13/80 |
1975 | 5/30/78 | 5/30/78 | 2/13/80 |
1976 | 8/31/79 | 1/07/80 | |
1977 | 5/14/82 | ||
1978 | 8/16/82 | 8/25/82 |
Petitioners' Form 1040 for 1970 was filed on October 30, 1974, following petitioner's request for an extension of the time to file the return, which resulted in the filing date being extended to June 15, 1971. None of petitioner's returns for the years 1971 through 1976 were filed prior to 1980, even though petitioner's return preparer had signed the 1971 and 1976 Forms 1040 in 1976 and 1979, respectively, and petitioner had signed the Forms 1040 for 1972 through 1975 in 1978. As respondent points out, the sudden *96 filing of the previously prepared returns in 1980 followed, within about 3 or 4 months, the notification of petitioners that the Internal Revenue Service had commenced a criminal investigation into petitioners' 1976, 1977, and 1978 taxable years. Petitioners failed to file a return for the year 1977, even after having been notified by respondent of their failure to file. Petitioners' return for the year 1978 was not filed until 1982.
Petitioner signed numerous Forms 1065 for partnership businesses in which he was involved during the period in which he failed to timely file his Forms 1040. The partnership *1190 returns were filed with the Internal Revenue Service as follows:
Date signed Date signed | ||||
Partnership | Taxable year | by petitioner | by preparer | Date filed |
One Hour | FY 8/31/76 | 11/15/76 | 12/04/76 | |
Hillcrest | 1976 | 5/2/78 | 5/02/78 | 8/28/78 |
Hillcrest | 1977 | 1/5/79 | ||
Fred Harwood | 1975 | 4/12/76 | 7/21/80 | |
Fred Harwood | 1976 | 5/19/79 | 7/14/80 |
*97 Petitioner's coronary bypass surgery occurred in January of 1976. During 1976, however, petitioner signed 25 documents relating to real estate transactions such as disclosure-settlement statements, closing statements, and mortgage loan settlements. On April 14, 1976, petitioner signed a Wisconsin Real Estate Transfer Return. On April 30, 1976, petitioner executed two agreements relating to the transfer of certain real property by petitioner to another party. Petitioner prepared warranty deeds that were filed with county offices in Wisconsin on June 1, 1976, and July 29, 1976, and a satisfaction of mortgage that was filed with a county office in Wisconsin on July 29, 1976.
During 1977, petitioner signed four documents relating to real estate transactions such as disclosure-settlement statements and closing statements. On April 18, 1977, petitioner executed a claim release with respect to a debt owed to him. On June 15, 1977, petitioner prepared a warranty deed that was filed with a county office in Wisconsin. Petitioner also signed a closing statement during 1978.
Based on the above facts, we find it impossible to accept the contention that petitioner's coronary surgery and *98 accountant were responsible for his failure to file returns on a timely basis for the years 1976 and 1978, and make timely payment of his tax liability for the year 1978. Petitioner was actively involved in the preparation and execution of business related documents and returns during the years in issue. There is no reason to believe that his surgery prevented him from filing his personal income tax returns while he was capable of continuing his involvement in such *1191 business activities. Rather, his failure to file returns appears to be a continuation of his ongoing pattern of delinquent return filing.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are liable for the additions to tax under
We will not again review the facts which have been established in this case. The facts as discussed above demonstrate that petitioner was aware of his duty to file returns and was capable of filing such returns. Petitioners' failure to file their returns was the continuation of an ongoing pattern of delinquent filing. The record clearly establishes that petitioners' failure to timely file returns for the years in issue was due to negligence or intentional disregard of the rules and regulations.
Accordingly, petitioners are liable for the additions to tax under
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect during the years in issue.↩
2. By letter dated Nov. 21, 1983, respondent notified petitioners of their entire liability for taxes, additions to tax, and interest determined up to that time for the year 1978. This letter included the additions under
3. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 redesignated
4.
(1) the sum of (A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus (B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over -- (2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection (b)(2), made.↩
5. In this case, respondent concedes that we do have jurisdiction over the addition to tax determined under
6. In response to our holding in
"The Tax Court has held that it does not have jurisdiction over the addition to tax for failure to pay the amount of tax shown on the taxpayer's return, even though it has jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency in tax with respect to that return (
* * * *
"[The bill provides that] the Tax Court has jurisdiction over this addition to tax for failure to pay an amount shown on the return where the Tax Court already has jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency in tax with respect to that return.
"[H. Rept. 99-841 (Conf.), at II-804 (1986).]"
While the above language reflects Congress' intent that we take jurisdiction over the addition to tax dealt with in
7. The provisions of
8. Our jurisdiction to determine overpayments of these additions is of course further limited by the provisions of
9.
(1) to file any return * * * on the date prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;↩
10.
(2) to pay the amount shown as tax on any return specified in paragraph (1) on or before the date prescribed for payment of such tax (determined with regard to any extension of time for payment), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount shown as tax on such return 0.5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate; * * *↩
11.
Subsec. (d) of
12. Petitioner had signed all five of the Forms 1065, but only the Hillcrest returns were dated by petitioner.↩
13.
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