James Luther Cochrane v. Commissioner

107 T.C. No. 2
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES LUTHER COCHRANE, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 2002-95. Filed August 7, 1996.
P was ordered to file responses to R's requests
for admission. P's subsequent responses to the
requests for admission were evasive and incomplete and
contained time-worn tax protester statements. R moved
for sanctions, asking that the matter in the requested
admissions be taken as established for purposes of this
case.
Rule 90(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure, generally requires that a party upon whom a
request for admission is served specifically admit or
deny the proposed admission. Rule 104(c), Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure, provides that the
Court may sanction a party who fails to obey an order
with respect to the provisions of Rule 90 by ordering
that the matter in the requested admissions be taken as
established for purposes of the case. Rule 104(d)
provides that an evasive or incomplete response to a
requested admission is to be treated as a failure to
respond.
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1. Held: Sanctions imposed; the matters
contained in R's requested admissions are established
for purposes of this case.
2. Held, further: P had unreported taxable
income as determined by R for each of the years in
issue. P is also liable for an addition to tax for
fraud under sec. 6653(b), I.R.C., for each of the years
in issue, an addition to tax for substantial
understatement of income tax under sec. 6661, I.R.C.,
for 1984, and an addition to tax for failure to pay
estimated tax under sec. 6654, I.R.C., for 1986.
James Luther Cochrane, pro se.
Karen N. Sommers, for respondent.
OPINION
RUWE, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in and
additions to petitioner's Federal income taxes as follows:
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(b)(1) Sec. 6653(b)(2) Sec. 6661
1983 $3,264 $1,632 50 percent of --
the interest due
on $3,264
1984 6,767 3,384 50 percent of $1,692
the interest due
on $6,767
1985 2,133 1,067 50 percent of --
the interest due
on $2,133
Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(b)(1)(A) Sec. 6653(b)(1)(B) Sec. 6654
1986 $2,884 $2,163 50 percent of the $139
interest due on
$2,884
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The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner
received taxable income as determined by respondent for each of
the years in issue; (2) whether petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for fraud under section 6653(b)1 for each of the
years in issue; (3) whether petitioner is liable for an addition
to tax for substantial understatement of income tax under section
6661 for 1984; and (4) whether petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for failure to pay estimated tax under section
6654 for 1986.
Prior to trial, the Court granted respondent's motion to
impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 104(c), as a result of
petitioner's failure to obey our order that he respond to
requests for admission. We ordered that the matter contained in
respondent's requests be taken as established for purposes of
this case. Because of the importance of this ruling to the
outcome of this case, we will explain the relevant procedural
history as well as the reasoning behind our imposition of
sanctions.
Procedural Background
From the inception of this case, petitioner demonstrated
that he intended to rely upon frivolous positions. For example,
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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attached to his amended petition was a document entitled
"Preliminary Statement and Refusal for Cause", in which
petitioner purports to reject respondent's notices of deficiency.
Among the reasons given were that petitioner was a "nontaxpayer
(i.e., not liable for any true tax class of taxable income)" and
that he was not a "U.S. person" but rather "a foreign person
residing in a foreign state (i.e., California Republic)." On May
15, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to review the sufficiency of
the notice of deficiency, in which he made essentially the same
arguments and also asserted that "studies also prove that a
shrewd and criminal Constructive Fraud has been slipped over
America by government under counterfeit 'color of law'", and that
he will "'squarely challenge' the fraudulent usurping and
octopus-like JURISDICTION AUTHORITY" asserted over him. The
record contains similar instances of petitioner's conduct, but
the above examples are sufficient to show the nature of
petitioner's approach in this case.
On March 18, 1996, respondent served petitioner with
requests for admission. The requests consisted of 41 paragraphs,
including 9 attached exhibits. Respondent's statements of fact
were clear, concise, and understandable. They were couched in
unequivocal terms, which facilitate unequivocal responses. On
April 22, 1996, petitioner filed an objection to respondent's
requests for admission.
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On May 6, 1996, respondent filed a motion to review the
sufficiency of petitioner's objections to respondent's requests
for admission. On May 9, 1996, this Court ordered petitioner to
respond to the requested admissions on or before May 20, 1996.
The order expressly warned petitioner that if he failed to
comply, the Court would be inclined to impose sanctions pursuant
to Rule 104(c), the provisions of which were quoted in the order.
On May 28, 1996, we granted petitioner's request for an extension
of time to June 10, 1996, in which to file his response.
On June 10, 1996, petitioner served respondent with
petitioner's supplemental response to the requests for admission.
In responses 31 through 33, petitioner admitted that the 1983,
1984, and 1985 Federal income tax returns attached as exhibits to
respondent's requests for admission "represent return information
filed by petitioner for 1983, 1984, and 1985". However,
petitioner qualified these admissions and noted an objection to
these exhibits "if they constitute improper forms to utilize for
his correct filing status during these periods."2
2
Each of petitioner's 1983, 1984, and 1985 returns reports
wages and includes a Form W-2 from his employer, General Dynamics
Corp. The 1983 return also includes a Form W-2 from petitioner's
employer, Rohr Industries, Inc. On each of those returns,
petitioner claimed that all his wage income was excludable from
taxable income as income earned for services performed in a
foreign country. On Forms 2555, attached to each return,
petitioner stated that he was physically present in a foreign
country for the entire 12-month period covered by each return.
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Petitioner's remaining answers were evasive and
unresponsive, as illustrated by the following examples:
(1) In request for admission (request) 1, respondent
asserted that during the years in issue, petitioner worked as an
engineering technician for General Dynamics Corp. and Rohr
Industries, Inc., in San Diego and Chula Vista, California,
respectively. In petitioner's response, he stated that he
is without knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of respondent's allegations.
Respondent has not identified the term "employed" to be
defined within the subject matter or scope of any
statute and implementing regulation.
In further reply, Petitioner had no contract of
employment with either General Dynamics Corporation or
Rohr Industries.
(2) In request 3, respondent asserted that petitioner
resided at 1655 Oleander Avenue, Chula Vista, California, during
the years in issue. In response, petitioner stated that he "is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of respondent's allegations. * * * [R]espondent has
not defined 'residing' under a statute or section of a statute
and its implementing regulations."
(3) In request 5, respondent asserted that petitioner did
not reside outside the United States at any time during the years
in issue. In response, petitioner again stated that he lacked
sufficient information to answer. In addition, he stated that
"respondent does not cite any statute * * * defining 'reside' or
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'United States' in order to specify any of several possible
definitions applicable to these terms."
(4) In request 6, respondent asserted that petitioner did
not receive any income from sources outside the United States
during the years in issue. In response, petitioner stated that
"respondent does not cite statute and its implementing regulation
defining the terms 'income' or 'United States' used in the
allegation."
(5) In request 10, respondent asserted that petitioner
reported on his tax returns for 1983 through 1985 that certain
wages were excluded from gross income as income earned while
physically present in a foreign country during the entire 12
months of the taxable year. In response, petitioner contended
that the "Statements are presumptive of law and are not facts
susceptible to admission or denial by petitioner." In addition,
petitioner stated that "respondent does not define the term
'wages' or the term 'taxable years' used in reference to
petitioner in this case" and that "respondent fails to identify
any * * * authority for establishing California [as a] state
under federal revenue jurisdiction."
(6) In requests 15 through 17, respondent asserted that
during 1984 through 1986, petitioner conducted a tax return
preparation and tax counseling business and that petitioner
received, but failed to report, fees in 1984, 1985, and 1986.
Respondent listed the names of specific payors and the amounts
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they paid to petitioner. In response, petitioner stated that
respondent failed to identify "by statute and regulation any
activity for which petitioner would receive income from 'fees',
or a statute and regulation identifying any amount in question as
a 'fee'."
(7) In requests 34 through 39, respondent attached copies of
canceled checks and asserted that petitioner received these
checks from clients of his tax return preparation and tax
counseling business in exchange for services rendered. In
requests 40 and 41, respondent attached a copy of a receipt given
by petitioner to John Morales and asserted that the receipt was
given by petitioner in exchange for payment by Mr. Morales for
petitioner's income tax services. Petitioner's response to each
of these requests was essentially the same: "petitioner objects
to respondent's exhibit * * * as inconclusive of income, and
respondent fails to identify as income under any statute and
regulation, and is not identified as any income item by tax class
or other identification."
(8) In request 18, respondent asserted that, when
interviewed by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) special agents
concerning his income tax liabilities for the years in issue,
petitioner told the agents that he was not in business, and did
not own any interest in a business. In response, petitioner
stated that he lacked "knowledge of any 'effectively connected
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income' or 'liability' under a revenue law for any calendar
year."
(9) In request 21, respondent asserted that petitioner
informed the IRS special agents that he earned no income in 1986
and was not required to file a return for that year. In
response, petitioner explained that he "did not state that he had
'earned no income', although this may be factual; but petitioner
had no 'earned income' or items amounting to income to the best
of his knowledge and belief."
(10) In requests 22 and 23, respondent asserted that
petitioner advised his clients to claim the foreign earned income
exclusion on their returns and that none of petitioner's clients
actually resided or worked outside the United States during 1984,
1985, or 1986. In response, petitioner stated that respondent
failed to define the terms "client", "resided", and "United
States".
On January 19, 1996, the parties were notified that this
case was scheduled for trial on June 17, 1996, in San Diego,
California. When the case was called on June 17, 1996,
petitioner made an oral motion for continuance for the purpose of
obtaining discovery, which was denied. Respondent then filed a
motion to impose sanctions upon petitioner, pursuant to Rule
104(c), for failure to comply with our May 9, 1996, order that
petitioner respond to the requests for admission. Petitioner
objected and argued against respondent's motion for sanctions.
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Petitioner's arguments were essentially the same as those
contained in his written responses to the requests for admission.
Petitioner did not deny the truth of the allegations contained in
the requests.
Rule 90(a) permits a party to serve upon any other party
written requests for admission of the truth of any matter that
relates to statements or opinions of fact or of the application
of law to fact. Rule 90(c) provides that each matter is deemed
admitted unless
within 30 days after service of the request or within
such shorter or longer time as the Court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the
requesting party (1) a written answer specifically
admitting or denying the matter involved in whole or in
part, or asserting that it cannot be truthfully
admitted or denied and setting forth in detail the
reasons why this is so, or (2) an objection, stating in
detail the reasons therefor. * * *
Rule 90(c) further provides that an
answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny
unless such party states that such party has made
reasonable inquiry and that the information known or
readily obtainable by such party is insufficient to
enable such party to admit or deny. * * *
In addition, Rule 104(c) provides:
If a party * * * fails to obey an order made by the
Court with respect to the provisions of Rule * * * 90,
then the Court may make such orders as to the failure
as are just, and among others the following:
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(1) An order that the matter regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken
to be established for the purposes of the case in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the
order.
Rule 104(d) provides that a party's evasive or incomplete
response is treated as a failure to respond for purposes of Rules
90 and 104.
Rule 104(c) provides authority for the imposition of
sanctions where a party who has been ordered to respond to
requests for admission files an evasive or incomplete response.
One of those potential sanctions is an order that the matter in
the requests for admission be taken as established for purposes
of the case. Petitioner failed to admit or deny the truth of the
specific requests for admission. Instead, his responses were
evasive and incomplete. He attempts to justify this tactic by
questioning the meaning of the common terms and language used in
the requests. We will not repeat the quibbles that petitioner
used to justify his evasive and incomplete responses. Suffice it
to say that they are based on time-worn tax protester arguments
that have been universally rejected by the courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Santangelo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-468 (and cases cited
therein), affd. without published opinion 87 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir.
1996).
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In interpreting and applying our Rules, we generally seek
guidance from judicial decisions interpreting the counterparts to
our Rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dusha v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 592, 599 (1984). The analog to Rule 90(a)-
(c) is rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Freedson v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 333, 334 (1975), affd. 565 F.2d
954 (5th Cir. 1978); Notes to Rule 90(a)-(c), 60 T.C. 1057, 1114-
1116.
In Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242,
1245 (9th Cir. 1981), the court upheld the propriety of imposing
the sanction of deeming certain matters admitted for violation of
rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In doing so,
the court stated, id. at 1246, that the discovery process is
subject to the "overriding limitation" of good faith, that
"callous disregard" of discovery responsibilities cannot be
condoned, and that:
The general power of the district court to control the
discovery process allows for the severe sanction of
ordering a matter admitted when it has been
demonstrated that a party has intentionally disregarded
the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a). [Id. at 1247.]
The court expressly stated:
It is also clear that an evasive denial, one that does
not "specifically deny the matter," or a response that
does not set forth "in detail" the reasons why the
answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the
matter, may be deemed an admission. * * * Since such
a response does not comply with the literal
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requirements of Rule 36(a), the district court may, in
its discretion, deem the matter admitted.* * * [Id. at
1245.3]
See also Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96-
97 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
The responses to the requests for admission that petitioner
provided pursuant to our order were evasive, incomplete, and not
made in good faith. We therefore ordered that the facts asserted
in respondent's requests be taken as established pursuant to Rule
104(c). No additional sanctions were imposed, and petitioner was
given the opportunity to present evidence at trial. Petitioner
chose not to testify and did not call any other witnesses.
3
In Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242,
1244 (9th Cir. 1981), the defendants responded to 18 of the
plaintiff's requests for admission as follows:
"Answering party cannot admit or deny. Said party has
made reasonable inquiry. Information known or readily
obtainable to this date is not complete. Investigation
continues."
The Court of Appeals rejected the view that a party can
avoid the admission or denial of a proper request for admission
simply by "tracking" the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a):
We are not persuaded that an answer to a request
for admission necessarily complies with Rule 36(a)
merely because it includes a statement that the party
has made reasonable inquiry and that the information
necessary to admit or deny the matter is not readily
obtainable by him. The discovery process is subject to
the overriding limitation of good faith. * * * [Id. at
1246.]
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Respondent announced that she would rely upon the deemed
admissions, which we incorporate herein by this reference.4
Discussion
Deficiencies for the Taxable Years in Issue
For purposes of convenience, we will combine our findings of
fact and opinion.
During the years in issue, petitioner resided in Chula
Vista, California, U.S.A. From 1983 through 1985, petitioner
worked as an engineering technician for General Dynamics Corp. in
San Diego, California. In 1983, petitioner worked for Rohr
Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, California. During 1983, 1984,
and 1985, petitioner received wages from General Dynamics Corp.
in the amounts of $4,729.40, $30,359.84, and $6,206.99,
respectively. Petitioner received $13,223.05 in wages from Rohr
Industries, Inc., in 1983.
On his Federal income tax returns for 1983 through 1985,
petitioner reported these wages and claimed that they were
excludable from gross income as foreign earned income. See sec.
911(a) and (b). Petitioner's apparent position is that the State
of California is not part of the United States. Courts have long
4
We have often decided cases on the basis of deemed
admissions. See, e.g., Marshall v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267,
271 (1985); Doncaster v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 334, 336 (1981);
Freedson v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 333, 335 (1975), affd. 565 F.2d
954 (5th Cir. 1978).
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rejected tax protester arguments of this sort. See, e.g., United
States v. Hanson, supra at 945; United States v. Studley, supra
at 937.
Petitioner also conducted a tax return preparation and tax
counseling business from 1984 through 1986. Petitioner advised
his clients to file Federal income tax returns claiming the same
foreign earned income exclusion that petitioner claimed on his
returns. None of petitioner's clients actually worked or resided
outside the United States at any time during 1984, 1985, or 1986.
Petitioner received fees of $1,800 in 1984, $6,190 in 1985, and
$12,790 in 1986.5 Petitioner failed to report these fees as
income on his 1984 and 1985 income tax returns, and he has not
yet filed a return for 1986.
When interviewed by IRS special agents on April 15, 1987,
petitioner stated that he had never received payment from anyone
in exchange for his tax return preparation and counseling
services. Petitioner also informed the agents that he had earned
no income in 1986 and was not required to file a return for the
5
In request 15, respondent lists the individuals who paid
petitioner for his tax return preparation and tax counseling
services plus the amount and year of payment. Request 15 asserts
that Barbara Gibson paid petitioner $2,108 in 1985. In request
38, respondent attached a copy of Barbara Gibson's canceled
check, which is dated Mar. 21, 1986, and payable to petitioner in
the amount of $2,108. We, therefore, find that petitioner
received this amount from Barbara Gibson in 1986 rather than
1985. With this adjustment, the amounts listed in request 15
correspond to the amount of tax return preparation fees listed in
the notices of deficiency for 1984, 1985, and 1986.
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year. When questioned regarding his Federal income tax
liabilities for each of the years in issue, petitioner stated
that he was not in business and had never had any interest in a
business.
During 1985, petitioner received $152 in interest on a
Federal income tax refund, $521.47 in interest earned on his Rohr
Federal Credit Union account, and $22.28 in interest earned on
his North Island Federal Credit Union account. Petitioner
improperly reported this interest on his 1985 return as "excluded
under Internal Revenue Code § 103(a)(1)".6
Petitioner understated his taxable income for 1983 through
1985 in the amounts of $19,609, $31,340, and $12,053,
respectively. Petitioner also failed to file his 1986 return and
had unreported taxable income for that year in the amount of
$11,710. Petitioner understated his income tax liabilities for
the years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 in the amounts of $3,264,
$6,564, $1,403, and $1,311, respectively.
Addition to Tax for Fraud Under Section 6653(b) for 1983-86
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for fraud for each of the years in issue.
6
Sec. 103(a)(1) excludes from gross income interest earned
on the obligations of a State, Territory, or possession of the
United States.
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Respondent bears the burden of proof on this issue. Sec.
7454(a); Rule 142(b).
For the taxable years 1983 through 1985, if any portion of
an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to
fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 50
percent of the underpayment, as well as an amount equal to 50
percent of the interest payable under section 6601 with respect
to the portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud. Sec.
6653(b)(1) and (2). For the taxable year 1986, the addition to
tax is equal to 75 percent of the portion of any underpayment
attributable to fraud, plus 50 percent of the interest due on
this portion. Sec. 6653(b)(1)(A) and (B). If respondent
establishes that any portion of the underpayment for 1986 is
attributable to fraud, then the entire underpayment is to be
treated as attributable to fraud, except with respect to any
portion of the underpayment that petitioner establishes is not
attributable to fraud. Sec. 6653(b)(2).
In order to discharge her burden, respondent must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) An underpayment exists
for the years in issue, and (2) some portion of the underpayment
is due to fraud. Sec. 7454(a); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.
661, 699 (1989). The facts contained in respondent's requests
for admission establish that there was an underpayment of tax for
each of the years in issue in the amounts determined by
respondent.
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Respondent must also show that petitioner intended to evade
taxes known to be owing by conduct designed to conceal, mislead,
or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes. Stoltzfus v.
United States, 398 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1968); Rowlee v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123 (1983). The existence of fraud
is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the
entire record. Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181, 199
(1976), affd. without published opinion 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir.
1978). Fraud is never imputed or presumed. Instead, it must be
affirmatively established by the Commissioner with clear and
convincing evidence. Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92
(1970). Since direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is rarely
available, fraud may be proven with circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from established facts. Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 500 (1943); Rowlee v. Commissioner,
supra at 1123.
Petitioner understated his taxable income for 1983 through
1985 and failed to file a return altogether for taxable year
1986. Such conduct constitutes strong evidence of fraud. Otsuki
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 107-108 (1969); Adams v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-38. On the tax returns that he did
file, petitioner falsely stated that his income was excludable
because he resided outside the United States. When interviewed
by IRS special agents concerning his Federal income tax
liabilities for the years in issue, petitioner stated that he was
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not in business and never had a business of his own or any
interest in a business. Petitioner also stated that he had never
prepared Federal income tax returns for others, or counseled or
advised anyone in the preparation of returns. The facts
established by the deemed admissions demonstrate that these
statements were untrue. Such failure to cooperate with tax
authorities is further evidence of fraud. Bradford v.
Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307-308 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1984-601.
We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing
evidence of petitioner's fraudulent attempt to evade income taxes
for each of the years in issue. Accordingly, we sustain the
additions to tax for fraud.
Addition to Tax for Substantial Understatement of Income Tax in
1984
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for substantial understatement of income tax
under section 6661(a) for 1984. Section 6661(a) provides for an
addition to tax equal to 25 percent of the amount of the
underpayment attributable to a substantial understatement of
income tax. Pallottini v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 498, 503 (1988).
An understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of
$5,000 or 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the
return. Sec. 6661(b)(1)(A). This amount may be reduced,
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however, if the taxpayer shows that there was substantial
authority for his treatment of an item, or that the relevant
facts affecting the tax treatment of the item are adequately
disclosed on the return or in a separate statement attached to
the return. Sec. 6661(b)(2)(B). Petitioner bears the burden of
proof. Rule 142(a); Hall v. Commissioner, 729 F.2d 632, 635 (9th
Cir. 1984), affg. T.C. Memo. 1982-337.
Petitioner has failed to offer any evidence on this issue,
and we sustain respondent's determination.
Addition to Tax for Failure To Pay Estimated Tax Under Section
6654 in 1986
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax for failure to pay estimated income tax under
section 6654(a) for 1986. Unless the taxpayer demonstrates that
one of the statutory exceptions applies, imposition of this
addition to tax is mandatory where prepayments of tax, either
through withholding or by making estimated quarterly tax payments
during the course of the taxable year, do not equal the
percentage of total liability required under the statute. Sec.
6654(a); Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 222 (1992);
Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20-21 (1980).
Petitioner bears the burden of proving his entitlement to any
exception. Habersham-Bey v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 304, 319-320
(1982).
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Petitioner has not filed his 1986 return or made any
estimated tax payments for the year, nor has he shown that any of
the statutory exceptions are applicable in this case. We,
therefore, sustain respondent's determination.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.