Consolidated Manufacturing, Inc., M. P. Long Living Trust, Merl Philip Long, Trustee, Tax Matters Person v. Commissioner

111 T.C. No. 1UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CONSOLIDATED MANUFACTURING, INC., M. P. LONG LIVING TRUST, MERL
PHILIP LONG, TRUSTEE, TAX MATTERS PERSON, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 6176-96. Filed July 20, 1998.
Company C (C), an automobile parts remanufacturer
required to take inventories pursuant to sec. 471,1
elected under sec. 472 to apply the last-in, first-out
(LIFO) inventory method of accounting with respect to
certain raw materials (raw materials one), labor, and
overhead included in its inventories, but not with
respect to certain other raw materials (raw materials
two) included therein as to which C continued to use
the first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory method and the
lower of cost or market (LCM) basis of valuation (C's
method of valuing raw materials two).
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the years at
issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
-2-
Respondent determined that C's method of reporting
only raw materials one, labor, and overhead on the LIFO
inventory method (C's LIFO method) does not clearly
reflect income because it is contrary to the require-
ments of sec. 472 and the regulations thereunder and
that therefore C's election to use that method should
be terminated.
Respondent further determined that C's method of
valuing raw materials two did not reflect the proper
amounts for those raw materials under the FIFO
inventory method and the LCM basis of valuation
permitted by sec. 471.
Held: Respondent did not abuse respondent's
discretion in determining that C's LIFO method does not
clearly reflect income because it is contrary to the
requirements of sec. 472 and the regulations thereunder
and that therefore C's election to use that method
should be terminated.
Held, further: Respondent did not abuse
respondent's discretion in determining that C's method
of valuing raw materials two does not clearly reflect
income because it did not reflect the proper amounts
for those raw materials under the FIFO inventory method
and the LCM basis of valuation permitted by sec. 471.
Eric S. Namee and James Scott MacBeth, for petitioner.
Michael J. O'Brien, David G. Hendricks, Karen J. Goheen, and
Jeffery G. Mitchell, for respondent.
CHIECHI, Judge: Respondent determined the following S
corporation adjustments to the ordinary, distributable net, or
taxable income of Consolidated Manufacturing, Inc.
(Consolidated):
-3-
Adjustments to Ordinary,
Distributable Net, or
Year Taxable Income
1990 $3,730,862
1991 123,596
The issues remaining for decision are:
(1) Did respondent abuse respondent's discretion in
determining that Consolidated's method of reporting certain raw
materials, labor, and overhead on the LIFO inventory method and
certain other raw materials on the FIFO inventory method does not
clearly reflect income because it contravenes the requirements of
section 472 and the regulations thereunder and that therefore
Consolidated's election to use that method should be terminated?
We hold that respondent did not.
(2) Did respondent abuse respondent's discretion in
determining that Consolidated's method of valuing certain raw
materials does not clearly reflect income because it did not
reflect the proper amounts for those raw materials under the FIFO
inventory method and the LCM basis of valuation permitted by
section 471? We hold that respondent did not.
FINDINGS OF FACT2
Most of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
2
Unless otherwise indicated, our Findings of Fact and
Opinion pertain to 1990 and 1991, the years at issue.
-4-
Consolidated, an S corporation, had its principal place of
business in Hutchinson, Kansas, at the time the petition was
filed. The M.P. Long Living Trust is Consolidated's tax matters
person.
Consolidated's Business
Consolidated engaged in the recovery, reconditioning, and
restoration to salable condition of used and worn automobile
parts, including engines, crankshafts, cylinder heads,
transmissions, and various smaller parts, which it sold as
remanufactured automobile parts to its customers. (We shall
refer to the foregoing activities in which Consolidated engaged
as remanufacturing.) Consolidated was authorized by Ford Motor
Company (Ford) to produce specified remanufactured automobile
parts and sell them within certain counties in Kansas, Missouri,
and Arkansas to Ford-authorized dealers (Consolidated's Ford
customers) as Ford remanufactured automobile products.
Consolidated's Ford customers sold the remanufactured automobile
parts that they had purchased from Consolidated to wholesale and
retail consumers.
Consolidated also produced and sold remanufactured engines,
crankshafts, and cylinder heads under its own private label known
as Four Star Engine & Parts (Four Star label) to certain
warehouse distributors and to Ford-authorized dealers
(Consolidated's Four Star label customers). Consolidated's Four
Star label customers sold the remanufactured automobile parts
-5-
that they had purchased from Consolidated to jobbers and garages
who, in turn, sold such products at retail. (We shall refer
collectively to Consolidated's Ford customers and Consolidated's
Four Star label customers as customers.)
In addition, Consolidated served as a Ford-authorized
distributor of Ford-authorized remanufactured automobile parts
produced by other automobile parts remanufacturers, including
clutch discs and pressure plates. Consolidated did not use any
of the used and worn clutch discs and pressure plates that it
obtained in its capacity as a Ford-authorized distributor to
produce remanufactured clutch discs and pressure plates, but
instead delivered those used and worn parts to the remanufac-
turers of those products.
The portion of a used and worn automobile part that is
utilized to produce a remanufactured automobile part is known in
the automobile parts remanufacturing industry as a core (core).
In order to recondition and restore to salable condition a used
and worn engine, transmission, cylinder head, crankshaft, or
small automobile part, Consolidated needed a used and worn engine
(engine core), transmission (transmission core), cylinder head
(cylinder head core), crankshaft (crankshaft core), or small
automobile part (small part core) to place into the
remanufacturing process.
Consolidated's remanufacturing business depended on a supply
of two materials: cores and new parts. It maintained inventories
-6-
of, inter alia, cores (unprocessed cores raw material inventory)
and new parts (unprocessed new parts raw material inventory) upon
which it drew throughout the remanufacturing process.
During Consolidated's remanufacturing process, Consolidated
incurred expenditures for labor and overhead and transformed
those raw materials into its finished goods or products (viz,
remanufactured automobile parts). During that process for
certain automobile parts, new parts were physically affixed to
and incorporated into a core in order to produce a remanufactured
automobile part. The new parts used by Consolidated in the
remanufacturing process included pistons and rings, rockers and
lifters, springs, bearings, chains, gears, plugs, pins, and other
miscellaneous assembly parts. Consolidated purchased the new
parts that it used in its remanufacturing business from the
manufacturers of such parts.
Consolidated generally obtained cores from two sources.
Consistent with customary and established practice in the
automobile parts remanufacturing industry, Consolidated acquired
most of its cores from its customers (customer cores), whose
source for those cores was their respective customers.
Consolidated also acquired cores, except small part cores,
from persons engaged in the business of selling cores and known
in the automobile parts remanufacturing industry as core
suppliers or core brokers (core suppliers). (We shall refer to
the cores obtained from core suppliers as core supplier cores.)
-7-
Consolidated obtained core supplier cores only on a special order
basis in order to satisfy a specific or temporary demand that had
arisen for a particular remanufactured automobile part. Although
there were hundreds of individuals and businesses operating as
core suppliers, Consolidated purchased core supplier cores from
six major core suppliers, one of which was Bishop Engine and
Automatic, Inc. (Bishop Engine).
Bishop Engine was Consolidated's largest core supplier from
which it purchased 44 percent and 38 percent of its core supplier
cores during 1990 and 1991, respectively. Bishop Engine acquired
80 percent of the cores that it sold to automobile parts
remanufacturers from salvage yards (salvage yard cores). Bishop
Engine acquired the balance of such cores from individual
peddlers and from manufacturers of automobile parts (e.g.,
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) which sold Bishop Engine
automobile parts that had been returned to them pursuant to the
warranties they had issued to their respective customers. Bishop
Engine acquired approximately 20 percent of its salvage yard
cores from bins that it placed in salvage yards in its local area
and in which salvage yard employees placed cores (bin salvage
yard cores). Bishop Engine acquired the balance of its salvage
yard cores by sending its employees to salvage yards throughout
the United States for the purpose of inspecting the cores in
those yards and buying those cores that those employees believed
were in rebuildable condition (non-bin salvage yard cores).
-8-
Bishop Engine determined the amounts that it was willing to
pay for non-bin salvage yard cores and reflected those amounts in
price sheets (price sheets) provided to its employees and
distributed to salvage yards approximately every 3 months.
Bishop Engine paid the same amounts for bin salvage yard cores
that passed inspection at its place of business and for cores
acquired from individual peddlers as those listed in the price
sheets for the same types of cores. Bishop Engine adjusted those
price sheets weekly as necessary to reflect any changing market
conditions, such as an increase in prices due to increased demand
from automobile parts remanufacturers and a decrease in prices,
but in no event below scrap value, due to decreased demand from
those remanufacturers. Bishop Engine distributed those weekly
adjusted price sheets every Monday morning to its employees, who
informed the salvage yard operators of changes in the price
sheets. (We shall refer to the amounts that Bishop Engine paid
for non-bin salvage yard cores and for bin salvage yard cores
that passed inspection at its place of business as the salvage
yard cost.) Bishop Engine paid scrap value for the bin salvage
yard cores that did not pass inspection at its place of business
and for the types of cores acquired from individual peddlers that
were not listed on the price sheets.
Bishop Engine generally paid the cost of shipping the
salvage yard cores that it had purchased to its place of
business. At Bishop Engine's place of business, its employees
-9-
reinspected the non-bin salvage yard cores, inspected the bin
salvage yard cores, and removed any unwanted components of such
cores. As a result of the inspection process at Bishop Engine's
place of business, Bishop Engine determined that 15 to 20 percent
of the non-bin salvage yard cores and approximately 80 percent of
the bin salvage yard cores which it had purchased were not in
rebuildable condition. Bishop Engine sold the salvage yard cores
that did not pass inspection at its place of business as scrap
metal and offered the balance of its salvage yard cores that did
pass such inspection for sale to, inter alia, automobile parts
remanufacturers.
Bishop Engine determined the amounts to charge automobile
parts remanufacturers for the various types of core supplier
cores that it offered for sale to them by taking account of the
amounts being charged by its competitors for those types of core
supplier cores and market factors relating to supply and demand.
Whenever Consolidated purchased core supplier cores from Bishop
Engine, it paid the amounts that Bishop Engine was charging for
those cores.
Bishop Engine and the other core suppliers from which
Consolidated purchased core supplier cores guaranteed those cores
to be in rebuildable condition (core supplier guarantee). If
Consolidated discovered during the remanufacturing process that a
core supplier core had to be scrapped because it was not in
rebuildable condition, that core was removed from that process
-10-
and returned to the core supplier, and Consolidated received a
credit from that core supplier for the amount that Consolidated
had paid for that core. Approximately 3 percent of the cores
sold by Bishop Engine to automobile parts remanufacturers were
not in rebuildable condition and were subsequently returned by
them to Bishop Engine in return for which they received such
credits.
Core supplier cores purchased by Consolidated entered into
its production line almost immediately upon acquisition and
remained in its unprocessed cores raw material inventory for only
a brief period of time. As a consequence, that inventory
consisted almost entirely of customer cores, and not core
supplier cores.
By way of illustration of the remanufacturing process by
which Consolidated produced reconditioned engines in salable
condition, engine customer cores were torn down, stored in its
unprocessed cores raw material inventory, and subsequently placed
into production. If a customer had delivered to Consolidated a
short-block engine customer core, which was an engine customer
core without the heads, Consolidated's employees cleaned off the
casting number, consulted the identification manual to determine
the engine type and core lot number, wrote the core lot number on
the top of that core, and wheeled it into the yard (core yard)
where Consolidated stored its unprocessed cores raw material
inventory. If a customer had delivered to Consolidated a long-
-11-
block engine customer core, which was a short-block customer core
with the heads, that core underwent some initial disassembly by
Consolidated's employees in order to convert it into a short-
block engine customer core (i.e., the cylinder heads, related
valve train assembly, and the oil pump were removed), at which
point it was marked and wheeled into the core yard. Short-block
engine customer cores that were not sufficiently stripped down so
as to permit detection of irreparable latent defects remained in
the core yard until they were brought into production, at which
time they were further disassembled, inspected for defects, and
reconditioned into salable condition. During the disassembly and
cleaning process, engine customer cores and engine core supplier
cores were subjected to numerous visual and mechanical
examinations and procedures. Only if an engine core passed all
of those examinations and procedures could it become a remanu-
factured automobile engine.
During the disassembly process, the cylinder heads, the
crankshaft, the camshaft, and rods were removed from the engine
core, retained by Consolidated, and subjected to separate
remanufacturing processes. These parts were, if in usable
condition, remanufactured in separate areas of Consolidated's
remanufacturing facility. Those remanufactured automobile parts
were then incorporated into remanufactured engines and, in the
case of crankshafts, heads, and rods, were sold as separate
remanufactured automobile parts.
-12-
The following tables show the number of remanufactured
automobile parts produced by Consolidated, the number of such
remanufactured automobile parts produced from customer cores, and
the number of such remanufactured automobile parts produced from
core supplier cores:
1990
Total Total
Type of Production Production
Automobile Total From Customer From Core
Part Production Cores Supplier Cores
Engines 26,864 20,407 6,457
Transmissions 1,549 1,220 329
Crankshafts 22,029 18,004 4,025
Cylinder heads 39,365 30,011 9,354
Small parts 103,537 103,537 -0-
1991
Total Total
Type of Production Production
Automobile Total From Customer From Core
Part Production Cores Supplier Cores
Engines 21,360 15,559 5,801
Transmissions 1,818 1,326 492
Crankshafts 19,942 16,211 3,731
Cylinder heads 34,785 25,047 9,738
Small parts 91,286 91,286 -0-
Consolidated's Sale of Remanufactured
Automobile Parts and Acquisition of Customer Cores
Consistent with standard and customary practice in the
automobile parts remanufacturing industry, Consolidated sold each
remanufactured automobile part for, and each of its customers was
obligated to pay, an amount (remanufactured automobile part sales
price) that consisted of an exchange amount and a core amount.
The remanufactured automobile part sales price was determined by
-13-
market-related factors, including supply and demand. The
exchange amount, the core amount, and the total of those two
amounts (i.e., the remanufactured automobile part sales price)
for each remanufactured automobile part sold by Consolidated were
separately stated on each of Consolidated's sales invoices for
each such sale (remanufactured automobile part sales invoice).
Each automobile parts remanufacturer established its own
remanufactured automobile part sales price consisting of an
exchange amount and a core amount. Consolidated determined the
exchange amount that it charged as part of its remanufactured
automobile part sales price based on market-related factors. In
making that determination, Consolidated, inter alia, examined the
jobber price exchange amounts for remanufactured automobile parts
(i.e., the exchange amounts that automobile retail parts stores
determined should be part of the total prices charged their
respective customers for remanufactured automobile parts) that
were produced by those competitors of Consolidated which were
comparable to it in terms of, inter alia, quality of products and
service and warranty policy.
The core amount included as part of the remanufactured
automobile part sales price charged for any given remanufactured
automobile part varied among remanufacturers. Consolidated
determined that core amount based on several market-related
factors, including the supply and demand of customer cores. One
such factor was the location of the customer core within its
-14-
anticipated life cycle as conceptualized by Consolidated.
Consolidated viewed the life cycle of a core as consisting of
three phases. Throughout the first phase of that cycle during
which new automobile parts were being introduced into the market,
customer cores were scarce; Consolidated might have purchased
those parts from manufacturers and cores from core suppliers in
order to have cores from which it was able to produce an
inventory of finished goods; and Consolidated's core amounts
generally were increasing. Throughout the second phase of the
life cycle of a core as conceptualized by Consolidated, customer
core availability increased; Consolidated's inventory need for
customer cores was satisfied through transactions with its
customers and on a special order basis from core suppliers; and
Consolidated's core amounts leveled out and remained relatively
constant. Throughout the third phase of that life cycle,
customer core availability was at its maximum; Consolidated
regularly sold as scrap metal overstocked customer cores in its
unprocessed cores raw material inventory; and Consolidated's core
amounts ordinarily were decreasing.
Other market-related factors that Consolidated considered in
determining the core amount which was part of the remanufactured
automobile part sales price that it charged a customer for a
remanufactured automobile part included the supply of a
particular type of customer core in Consolidated's inventories,
the probability that its customers would decide to provide it
-15-
with customer cores, the ratio between sales of a particular type
of remanufactured automobile part and acquisitions of the
corresponding type of customer core, and the amounts that core
suppliers were charging for certain types of core supplier cores
that Consolidated anticipated purchasing in order to satisfy a
specific or temporary demand for particular types of automobile
parts.
At the time Consolidated sold each remanufactured automobile
part to each of its customers, it offered to purchase from each
such customer, subject to the requirements established by
Consolidated for its acceptance of a customer core
(Consolidated's requirements for acceptance of a customer core),
a customer core of the same type as each such part sold.
Consolidated offered to purchase each such customer core for an
amount (customer core purchase offer amount) that generally was
equal to the core amount which was separately stated on the
remanufactured automobile part sales invoice as part of the
remanufactured automobile part sales price for each such part.
The customer core purchase offer amount was, like the core
amount, based on market-related factors, including supply and
demand. The customer core purchase offer amount could have been
less than the core amount shown on the remanufactured automobile
part sales invoice. That could have occurred because of the
condition of the customer core upon its delivery to Consolidated.
For example, Consolidated's customer core purchase offer amount
-16-
for an engine core with a hole in it was equal to 50 percent of
the core amount which was separately stated on the remanufactured
automobile part sales invoice as part of the remanufactured
automobile part sales price for a corresponding remanufactured
automobile engine. The customer core purchase offer amount for
each customer core was set at an amount that the marketplace in
which Consolidated acquired customer cores demanded.
At no time were Consolidated's customers under any
obligation to accept Consolidated's offer to purchase customer
cores from them or otherwise to provide such cores to
Consolidated. However, most of those customers did decide to
accept Consolidated's offer and provided it with customer cores.
In the event that a customer of Consolidated decided to accept
Consolidated's offer to purchase a customer core and that
customer met Consolidated's requirements for acceptance of a
customer core, instead of that customer's receiving a check or
cash from Consolidated in the customer core purchase offer amount
for that customer core, that customer became entitled to a credit
by Consolidated in that amount (core credit amount) against the
amount which was due from that customer (viz, the remanufactured
automobile part sales price) for such customer's purchase of a
remanufactured automobile part from Consolidated and which was
reflected in Consolidated's books as an account receivable from
that customer. (We shall refer to such an account receivable in
Consolidated's books as the customer account receivable.) Like
-17-
the customer core purchase offer amount on which it was based,
the core credit amount generally was equal to the core amount and
was based on market-related factors, including the supply and
demand of customer cores, although, as discussed above, the
customer core purchase offer amount and therefore the core credit
amount could have been in an amount less than the core amount
because of the condition of the customer core upon its delivery
to Consolidated. The core credit amount for each customer core
was set at an amount that the marketplace in which Consolidated
acquired customer cores demanded.
Consolidated's customers did not guarantee the cores that
they decided to provide to it. However, Consolidated's
requirements for acceptance of a customer core had to be
satisfied before Consolidated was willing to accept a customer
core. Those requirements were: (1) The customer desiring to
deliver the customer core had purchased a remanufactured
automobile part from Consolidated; (2) the remanufactured
automobile part sales price charged for that part included a core
amount; (3) the customer core satisfied Consolidated's customer
core policy (Consolidated's customer core policy) relating to,
inter alia, the type and condition of the core that Consolidated
was willing to accept (e.g., Consolidated's customer core policy
for Four Star label cylinder head cores stated that those cores
were not acceptable if they were "obviously broken, cracked, or
welded"); and (4) the customer followed Consolidated's procedures
-18-
for delivery of a customer core to Consolidated (Consolidated's
procedures for delivery of a customer core).
The following table shows the aggregate number of the
different types of Ford-authorized and Four Star label
remanufactured automobile parts sold by Consolidated and the
aggregate number of the different types of corresponding Ford-
authorized and Four Star label customer cores that Consolidated's
customers decided to provide to Consolidated and that were
delivered to it:
1990 1991
Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate
Type of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Remanufactured Remanufactured Customer Remanufactured Customer
Automobile Part Automobile Cores Automobile Cores
Sold Parts Sold Delivered Parts Sold Delivered
Engines 26,677 24,391 22,130 20,534
Transmissions 1,572 1,365 1,793 1,505
Crankshafts 24,050 23,425 19,658 19,088
Cylinder heads 6,928 5,188 7,172 5,603
Small parts 90,128 75,450 89,040 76,356
In anticipation that Consolidated's customers would decide
to accept its offer to purchase and deliver customer cores to it,
even though they were under no obligation to do so, Consolidated
provided each of those customers with a form known as a request
for core credit at the time that it delivered to them the
remanufactured automobile parts that they had purchased. The
request for core credit was a preprinted form generally con-
sisting of three copies: One for Consolidated's customer, a
transportation copy, and a copy that was to be returned to
Consolidated in the event and at the time that a customer
-19-
delivered customer cores to it. In the case of Four Star label
remanufactured engines, the request for core credit preprinted
form consisted of the foregoing three copies and a fourth copy
for the person, usually a jobber, who purchased such an engine
from Consolidated's customer.
Consolidated's customer core policy established a period of
time during which any of its customers who decided to provide it
with customer cores was required to deliver such cores (delivery
period). That period commenced on the date of the installation
of the remanufactured automobile part sold by Consolidated. The
delivery period varied depending on the type of customer core
from 30 days for Consolidated's Four Star label customer
crankshafts to 2 years for Consolidated's Ford customer small
automobile parts. Despite Consolidated's policy regarding the
delivery period, Consolidated accepted customer cores from its
customers after that period had expired, even if those cores were
determined not to be in rebuildable condition, and credited each
customer account receivable with the core credit amounts.
Consolidated followed this practice regardless whether the
customer cores provided by its customers after the delivery
period had become overstocked or obsolete due to the passage of
time or whether the core amounts that were part of the
remanufactured automobile parts sales prices that those customers
were charged had changed.
-20-
Consolidated's procedures for delivery of a customer core
were: (1) The customer presented the transportation copy of the
request for core credit to the person who picked up the core from
the customer's place of business and who usually was an employee
of Consolidated making a delivery of remanufactured automobile
parts to that customer (Consolidated's driver); (2) a copy of the
request for core credit was physically tagged to the customer
core that Consolidated's driver picked up from that customer; and
(3) Consolidated's driver made a visual inspection of that core
and, based solely on that inspection, determined whether the
customer was in compliance with Consolidated's customer core
policy, including the requirements, if any, in that policy that
the type and style of the customer core delivered to Consolidated
correspond to the type and style of the remanufactured automobile
part purchased by that customer.
In addition to accepting customer cores from its customers
that corresponded to the remanufactured automobile parts that
those customers had purchased from Consolidated, Consolidated
also accepted delivery from those customers of customer cores
that did not correspond to those parts. In the latter event, for
each such customer Consolidated credited the customer account
receivable in an amount that was less than the core amount which
was part of the remanufactured automobile part sales price for
each of the remanufactured automobile parts purchased by that
customer.
-21-
In the event that one of Consolidated's customers decided to
accept its offer to purchase and delivered customer cores to it,
Consolidated generated and provided to each such customer a sales
invoice (customer core sales invoice) at or about the time of the
delivery of those cores. That invoice was prepared from
information in a file that Consolidated maintained for each of
its customers with respect to sales to each such customer of its
remanufactured automobile parts. The customer core sales
invoice, inter alia, identified the type and the number of
customer cores of each type that each of Consolidated's customers
delivered to it. That invoice also had, inter alia, a column
headed "CORES", and under that column was, inter alia, a column
headed "PRICE EACH". Listed under the column headed "PRICE EACH"
on the customer core sales invoice was the core credit amount for
each of the customer cores identified on that invoice as having
been delivered to Consolidated. (We shall refer to the column on
the customer core sales invoice reflecting the price of each
customer core that a customer decided to deliver to Consolidated
as the column headed "Cores--Price Each".) Attached to each
customer core sales invoice was a completed copy of a request for
core credit and a document generated by Consolidated's customer
showing the date on which such customer received from such
customer's customer the core that it decided to deliver to
Consolidated.
-22-
A customer core could have remained in Consolidated's
unprocessed cores raw material inventory for months or years
before Consolidated drew upon it for use in Consolidated's
remanufacturing process. When demand for a type of
remanufactured automobile part was sufficiently limited (e.g., if
the vehicle for which such a type of part was to be used was an
obsolete, early model vehicle), the customer core corresponding
to that type of remanufactured automobile part might have been
put out for bid as scrap metal and sold by Consolidated at scrap
metal prices without ever having entered into production.
The following percentages of customer cores that were
delivered to Consolidated and that entered into its
remanufacturing process were subsequently determined not to be in
rebuildable condition and were scrapped:
1990 Percentage of 1991 Percentage of
Customer Cores Not Customer Cores Not
Type of in Rebuildable in Rebuildable
Customer Core Condition Condition
Engine cores 16.44 18.45
Transmission cores 14.34 23.38
Crankshaft cores 37.97 37.59
Cylinder head cores 19.00 26.13
Small part cores 10.06 6.46
Consolidated's Accounting
Consolidated used the calendar year and the accrual and
inventory methods of accounting for financial and Federal income
tax (tax) reporting purposes. Until the close of its taxable
year 1980, Consolidated reported its inventories (at least for
-23-
tax purposes) by using the FIFO method of inventory accounting,
and it chose to apply the LCM basis of valuation.
Consolidated submitted Form 970, Application to Use LIFO
Inventory Method, with its 1980 tax return (1980 Form 970). As
completed by Consolidated, the 1980 Form 970 stated in pertinent
part:
The taxpayer named above [Consolidated] hereby
applies to adopt and use the LIFO inventory method
provided by section 472. This method is to be applied
for the first time as of the close of the taxable year
ending December 31, 1980, to the following specified
goods * * *: Reconditioning costs[3] and new parts
inventories, not including the cost of used core
inventory.
* * * * * * *
4. (a) List goods subject to inventory but which are
not to be inventoried under the LIFO method
Used engines and parts (cores).
* * * * * * *
7. Method used in valuing LIFO inventories
9 Unit method : Dollar-value method
8. (a) If pools are used, list and describe the
contents of each pool
One pool consisting of raw material,
purchased parts and remanufacturing costs.
* * * * * * *
(c) Method used in computing LIFO value of dollar-
value pools
3
As we understand it, the term "reconditioning costs" as
used in the 1980 Form 970 means the costs of direct labor and of
overhead incident to and necessary for the production of
remanufactured automobile parts that Consolidated incurred in
remanufacturing those parts. We shall refer to Consolidated's
reconditioning costs as labor and overhead.
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* * * * * * *
The index method has been used by the company
in computing the value of the dollar value
pool. * * *
(We shall refer to the LIFO inventory method that Consolidated
elected in the 1980 Form 970 as Consolidated's LIFO method.)
Consolidated submitted another Form 970 with its 1982 tax return
(1982 Form 970). As completed by Consolidated and as pertinent
here, the 1982 Form 970 differed from the 1980 Form 970 only with
respect to the following questions and answers:
8. (a) If you use pools, list and describe contents of
each pool[:] Two pools are used; motor vehicle parts;
and machine shop products. Pools include raw material,
purchased parts and remanufacturing costs.
* * * * * * *
(c) Method used in computing LIFO value of dollar-
value pools
* * * * * * *
Simplified LIFO per Reg. Sec. 1.472-8(e)(3) [i.e.,
inventory price index (IPI) computation method]
* * * * * * *
Taxpayer initially elected LIFO for the tax year ending
December 31, 1980. Form 970 was timely filed for such
election and the taxpayer consistently followed such
dollar value method. However, due to changes made by
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which allows a
change to the use of published indexes, taxpayer hereby
elects to compute LIFO inventories by using such
Government published indexes as prescribed in Reg.
1.472-8(e)(3). Per Reg. 1.472-8(e)(3)(v), prior
consent of the Commissioner is not required if the
change is made for the first or second taxable year
ending after 1981.
* * * * * * *
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Taxpayer elects to use the October Producer Price Index
report as a representative month for selecting indexes.
Such election is allowed under Reg. 1.472-
8(e)(3)(iii)(C).
Except for the IPI computation method that Consolidated
elected to use in the 1982 Form 970 in calculating its dollar-
value LIFO pools since the end of its taxable year 1982,
Consolidated has consistently applied Consolidated's LIFO method
(i.e., the LIFO inventory method described in the 1980 Form 970)
during all relevant periods.
At the time of a sale of remanufactured automobile parts to
one of its customers, for each such part, Consolidated made an
entry increasing (1) its "sales (exchange amount)" by the
exchange amount that was part of the remanufactured automobile
part sales price, (2) its "sales (core amount)" by the core
amount that was the remaining part of that sales price, and
(3) its "customer account receivable" by the remanufactured
automobile sales price (i.e., the sum of those two amounts). At
the time at which that customer decided to and did deliver
customer cores to Consolidated, for each such core, Consolidated
made an entry decreasing its "sales (core amount)" and its
"customer account receivable" by the core credit amount.
At the time Consolidated purchased a core supplier core, it
charged the cost of that core directly to cost of goods sold.
Deloitte & Touche and Pierce, Faris & Co., Chartered audited
Consolidated's 1990 financial statements and 1991 financial
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statements, respectively, and issued unqualified opinions that
those respective financial statements presented fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position of Consolidated and the
results of its operations and cash flows for 1990 and 1991 in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
For financial reporting purposes, Consolidated calculated
its inventories by using LCM and (1) the LIFO method for new
parts, labor, and overhead and (2) the FIFO method for customer
cores. For such purposes, Consolidated reflected customer cores
in its inventories at the amounts (core supplier amounts) that
core suppliers were charging for similar types of core supplier
cores.
For tax purposes, in determining its yearend inventories,
Consolidated included (1) customer cores in its finished goods
inventory at the core supplier amounts and (2) customer cores in
its unprocessed cores raw material inventory and its goods in
process inventory at scrap value (Consolidated's FIFO-LCM
method).
For purposes of this case, both cores and new parts used by
Consolidated to produce remanufactured automobile parts are
treated as raw materials under GAAP and subchapter E, chapter 1,
subtitle A of the Code relating to accounting periods and methods
of accounting, and they shall be referred to herein as raw
materials.
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Respondent's Determinations
Respondent mailed notices of final S corporation
administrative adjustment (notices) for 1990 and 1991,
respectively, to Merl Philip Long, grantor and trustee of the
M.P. Long Living Trust, the tax matters person. Respondent
determined in the notices that Consolidated improperly excluded
customer cores from the calculation of its inventories under
Consolidated's LIFO method for each of those years and that,
consequently, Consolidated's LIFO election should be terminated.
Respondent also determined in the notices that Consolidated did
not reflect the proper amounts for customer cores in its
inventories under Consolidated's FIFO-LCM method for each of
those years.4
OPINION
This case presents several inventory accounting issues that
implicate sections 446, 471, and 472. Section 446 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.--Taxable income shall be
computed under the method of accounting on the basis of
which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions.--If no method of accounting has
been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as,
in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income.
4
Petitioner conceded the remaining determination in the
notice for 1990.
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Section 471(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.--Whenever in the opinion of the
Secretary the use of inventories is necessary in order
clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer,
inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such
basis as the Secretary may prescribe as conforming as
nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the
trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the
income.
Section 1.471-2(c) and (d), Income Tax Regs., provides in
pertinent part:
(c) The bases of valuation most commonly used by
business concerns and which meet the requirements of
section 471 are (1) cost and (2) cost or market,
whichever is lower. * * *
(d) * * * Goods taken in the inventory which have
been so intermingled that they cannot be identified
with specific invoices will be deemed to be the goods
most recently purchased or produced * * *. But see
section 472 as to last-in, first-out inventories. * * *
Section 472(a) and (b) provides:
(a) Authorization.--A taxpayer may use the method
provided in subsection (b) (whether or not such method
has been prescribed under section 471) in inventorying
goods specified in an application to use such method
filed at such time and in such manner as the Secretary
may prescribe. The change to, and the use of, such
method shall be in accordance with such regulations as
the Secretary may prescribe as necessary in order that
the use of such method may clearly reflect income.
(b) Method Applicable.--In inventorying goods
specified in the application described in subsection
(a), the taxpayer shall:
(1) Treat those remaining on hand at the
close of the taxable year as being: First,
those included in the opening inventory of
the taxable year (in the order of
acquisition) to the extent thereof; and
second, those acquired in the taxable year;
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(2) Inventory them at cost; and
(3) Treat those included in the opening
inventory of the taxable year in which such
method is first used as having been acquired
at the same time and determine their cost by
the average cost method.
Sections 446 and 471 and the regulations thereunder vest the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) with wide
discretion in determining whether a method of inventory
accounting should be disallowed because it does not clearly
reflect income. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S.
522, 532-533 (1979); Hamilton Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 97
T.C. 120, 128 (1991). The Commissioner's interpretation of the
clear-reflection standard under sections 446 and 471 may not be
disturbed unless it is clearly unlawful or plainly arbitrary.
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra; Hamilton Indus., Inc.
v. Commissioner, supra at 129. The Commissioner's discretion
under sections 446 and 471 is not unbridled, however. Thor Power
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 533; Hamilton Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 128. We must decide whether respondent
abused respondent's discretion in determining (1)(a) that
Consolidated's LIFO method for 1990 and 1991 does not clearly
reflect income because that method pertained only to new parts,
labor, and overhead, and not also to customer cores, and (b) that
therefore Consolidated's election to use that method should be
terminated and (2) that Consolidated's FIFO-LCM method for the
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years at issue does not clearly reflect income because that
method did not reflect the proper amounts for customer cores.5
Before turning to the issues presented in this case, we note
that we have given due consideration to all of the parties'
arguments and contentions with respect to those issues, even
though we do not attempt to address each of them herein.
Consolidated's LIFO Method
For all relevant periods until the close of its taxable year
1980, Consolidated chose to report its inventories in its tax
returns on the basis of the FIFO inventory method and LCM. In
the 1980 Form 970 that it filed, Consolidated elected to apply
the LIFO inventory method as of the close of its taxable year
1980 to "Reconditioning costs and new parts inventories, not
including the cost of used core inventory" and to use the dollar-
value LIFO inventory method.6 In the 1982 Form 970 that it
5
Respondent does not object to Consolidated's method of
accounting for core supplier cores. We shall address only
Consolidated's inventory method of accounting for customer cores.
6
Sec. 1.472-8(a), Income Tax Regs., provides in pertinent
part:
Any taxpayer may elect to determine the cost of his
LIFO inventories under the so-called "dollar-value"
LIFO method, provided such method is used consistently
and clearly reflects the income of the taxpayer in
accordance with the rules of this section. The dollar-
value method of valuing LIFO inventories is a method of
determining cost by using "base-year" cost expressed in
terms of total dollars rather than the quantity and
price of specific goods as the unit of measurement.
Under such method the goods contained in the inventory
(continued...)
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filed, Consolidated elected under section 472 to apply as of the
close of its taxable year 1982 the IPI computation method in
calculating its dollar-value LIFO pools. Pursuant to that
method, Consolidated elected to use the October Producer Price
Index report as allowed by section 1.472-8(e)(3)(iii)(C), Income
Tax Regs.
Petitioner contends, and respondent does not dispute,
(1) that Consolidated's LIFO method conforms to GAAP and that it
therefore satisfies the requirement of section 471 and the
regulations thereunder that that method conform "as nearly as may
be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business" and
(2) that Consolidated has consistently applied that method. The
dispute between the parties with respect to Consolidated's LIFO
method is whether respondent abused respondent's discretion in
determining that that method does not clearly reflect income
because it contravenes the requirements of section 472 and the
regulations thereunder and that, consequently, Consolidated’s
election to use that method should be terminated.
We shall begin our consideration of the parties’ dispute by
summarizing the history of the inventory method of tax
(...continued)
are grouped into a pool or pools as described in para-
graphs (b) and (c) of this section. The term "base-
year cost" is the aggregate of the cost (determined as
of the beginning of the taxable year for which the LIFO
method is first adopted, i.e., the base date) of all
items in a pool. * * *
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accounting, the FIFO inventory method, and the LIFO inventory
method. The use of inventories was first required by the Revenue
Act of 1918 (1918 Act), ch. 18, sec. 203, 40 Stat. 1060,
whenever, in the opinion of the Commissioner, such use was
necessary in order to determine clearly the income of any
taxpayer.7 Where goods taken in inventory were so intermingled
that they could not be identified with specific invoices, Article
1582 of Regulations 45, promulgated under the 1918 Act, deemed
such goods to be the goods most recently purchased or produced.
In other words, in such circumstances, taxpayers were to use the
FIFO inventory method as a matter of convenience.8 See Ozark
Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1179, 1183-1184 (1927).
It was not until the Revenue Act of 1938 (1938 Act), ch.
289, 52 Stat. 447, that Congress first allowed certain taxpayers
(viz, producers and processors of certain nonferrous metals and
tanners) who were required to use the inventory accounting method
to elect the LIFO inventory method for certain goods included in
their inventories. 1938 Act, sec. 22(d)(1) through (3), 52 Stat.
459. Effective for taxable years that began after December 31,
1938, producers and processors of certain nonferrous metals
7
Sec. 203 of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, sec. 203, 40
Stat. 1060, was the original predecessor of sec. 471.
8
The FIFO inventory method is expressly permitted by sec.
1.471-2(d), Income Tax Regs., when goods taken in inventory are
so intermingled that they cannot be identified with specific
invoices.
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generally were permitted to elect the LIFO inventory method for
raw materials not yet included in goods in process or in finished
goods, i.e., for unprocessed raw materials, 1938 Act, sec.
22(d)(1) and (2), 52 Stat. 459, and tanners generally were
allowed to elect the LIFO inventory method for "raw materials
(including those included in goods in process and in finished
goods)", 1938 Act, sec. 22(d)(3), 52 Stat. 459. Section 22(d)(1)
through (3) of the 1938 Act was reenacted as section 22(d)(1)
through (3) of the 1939 Code. 1939 Code, ch. 2, sec. 22(d)(1)
through (3), 53 Stat. 11.
Congress amended section 22(d) of the 1939 Code, effective
for taxable years that began after December 31, 1938, to provide
in pertinent part:
(d)(1) A taxpayer may use the following method
* * * in inventorying the goods specified in the
application required under paragraph (2):
(A) Inventory them at cost;
(B) Treat those remaining on hand at the
close of the taxable year as being: First,
those included in the opening inventory of
the taxable year (in the order of
acquisition) to the extent thereof, and
second, those acquired in the taxable year;
and
(C) Treat those included in the opening
inventory of the taxable year in which such
method is first used as having been acquired
at the same time and determine their cost by
the average cost method.
(2) The method described in paragraph (1) may be
used--
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(A) Only in inventorying goods * * *
specified in an application to use such meth-
od filed at such time and in such manner as
the Commissioner may prescribe * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The change to, and the use of, such method
shall be in accordance with such regulations as the
Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may
prescribe as necessary in order that the use of such
method may clearly reflect income.
Revenue Act of 1939 (1939 Act), ch. 247, sec. 219, 53 Stat. 877.
(We shall refer to section 22(d) of the 1939 Code as amended by
section 219 of the 1939 Act as section 22(d) of the 1939 Code as
amended.)
The regulations promulgated under section 22(d) of the 1939
Code as amended provided in pertinent part:
Sec. 19.22(d)-1. Inventories under elective
method.--Any taxpayer permitted or required to take
inventories * * * may elect with respect to those goods
specified in his application and properly subject to
inventory to compute his opening and closing
inventories in accordance with the method provided by
section 22(d), as amended. * * *
* * * * * * *
Sec. 19.22(d)-2. Requirements incident to adoption
and use of elective method.--* * *
(1) The taxpayer shall file an
application to use such method specifying
with particularity the goods to which it is
to be applied;
Secs. 19.22(d)-1 and -2, Regs. 103. In 1943, sections 19.22(d)-1
and -2 of Regulations 103 were repromulgated with changes not
pertinent here as sections 29.22(d)-1 and -2 of Regulations 111.
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In 1944, section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111 was amended
to add in pertinent part the following language:
A manufacturer or processor who has adopted the
elective [LIFO] inventory method as to a class of goods
may elect to have such method apply to the raw
materials only (including those included in goods in
process and in finished goods) expressed in terms of
appropriate units. * * *
* * * * * * *
This election may also apply to any one raw
material, when two or more raw materials enter into the
composition of the finished product * * *
9 Fed. Reg. 12336, 12337 (Oct. 11, 1944). (We shall refer to the
amendment in 1944 to section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111 as the
1944 amendment to section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111.)
Section 22(d)(1) through (3) of the 1939 Code as amended was
reenacted with changes not pertinent here as section 472(a) and
(b) of the 1954 Code, ch. 736, sec. 472(a) and (b), 68A Stat.
159, and the latter section was reenacted with no changes as
section 472(a) and (b) of the 1986 Code, see Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 2, 100 Stat. 2095. Sections 29.22(d)-
1 and -2 of Regulations 111, including the 1944 amendment to
section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111, were repromulgated with
changes not pertinent here as regulations under section 472.
With this history as background, we shall address the
disagreement between the parties over whether Consolidated's LIFO
method contravenes the requirements of section 472 and the
regulations thereunder and therefore does not clearly reflect
-36-
income. Consolidated’s remanufacturing business depended on a
supply of two raw materials: cores and new parts. During the
remanufacturing process, Consolidated incurred expenditures for
labor and overhead and transformed those raw materials into its
finished goods or products (viz, remanufactured automobile
parts). Thus, cores, new parts, labor, and overhead all entered
into the production of those finished goods or products.
Pursuant to section 1.471-1, Income Tax Regs., Consolidated
maintained inventories for each of the two unprocessed raw
materials that it used in its remanufacturing business, for
partly finished goods, i.e., goods in process of remanufacture
(goods in process), and for finished remanufactured goods
(finished goods).9 Virtually all of the cores included in
Consolidated’s inventories were, and we shall hereinafter refer
to them as, customer cores. See supra note 5.
Consolidated elected in the 1980 Form 970 to use the LIFO
inventory method with respect to new parts, labor, and overhead,
but not customer cores. Thus, under Consolidated's LIFO method,
Consolidated used (1) the LIFO inventory method for (a) new parts
that were included in its inventories for unprocessed new parts,
9
Although it is not altogether clear from the record, it
appears that Consolidated maintained separate unprocessed new
parts raw material inventories, unprocessed cores raw material
inventories, goods in process inventories, and finished goods
inventories in respect of the different types (e.g.,
remanufactured automobile engines) of goods or products that it
produced (viz, remanufactured automobile parts).
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for goods in process, and for finished goods and (b) labor and
overhead that were included in Consolidated's inventories for
goods in process and for finished goods and (2) the FIFO
inventory method for customer cores that were included in its
inventories for unprocessed customer cores, for goods in process,
and for finished goods.
Respondent contends that section 472 and the regulations
thereunder require a taxpayer who wants to elect the LIFO
inventory method (1) to make that election with respect to a good
or goods subject to inventory and specified in the application
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) for
electing that method (viz, Form 970) and (2) to make that
election with respect to such entire good or goods and not a
portion thereof.10 According to respondent,
It is critical to note that the statute and the
regulations specify that the election is to be made as
to "goods". The goods produced by Consolidated are
remanufactured automobile parts, such as remanufactured
engines. Under the general rule, if Consolidated
elected LIFO as to remanufactured automobile engines,
the LIFO election would apply to raw materials, i.e.
cores and new parts, and the reconditioning costs, i.e.
labor and overhead. However, Consolidated elected as
to only a portion of each type of good by excluding
cores. * * * For each type of goods, such as
remanufactured engines, this left a portion of the
10
Respondent concedes that a taxpayer may elect the LIFO
inventory method with respect to a type or class of goods, such
as remanufactured automobile engines, but contends that that
election must be as to the "entire good", and not a portion of a
good, within a type or class of goods. For convenience,
generally we shall refer only to a good or goods, and not to a
type or class of goods.
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goods (new parts and reconditioning costs) on LIFO, and
a portion of the goods (cores) on FIFO.
A permissible variance to the inclusion of the
total goods in LIFO is provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.472-
1(c) which allows the LIFO election to be restricted to
raw materials. * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * Consolidated has fashioned a method of accounting
that factors out inflationary price increases for part
of a particular good (labor, overhead and a secondary
raw material--new parts) and takes into account
inflation and changes in market value for the remaining
portion of the goods (the principal raw material--the
core). This is inconsistent with the plain language of
§ 472 and the purpose of the LIFO method. A taxpayer
must decide in toto for a type or class of goods whe-
ther it will use either the LIFO method to currently
deduct inflationary price increases or the LCM method
to currently deduct decreases in the market value of
production costs. A taxpayer is not permitted to use a
hybrid of these two methods for a single type or class
of goods.
In support of respondent’s position, respondent points,
inter alia, to section 472(a) and section 1.472-1(a), Income Tax
Regs. Section 472(a) provides in pertinent part: "A taxpayer may
use the [LIFO inventory] method * * * in inventorying goods
specified in an application to use such method". Section 1.472-
1(a), Income Tax Regs., elaborates on section 472(a), in
pertinent part, as follows:
Any taxpayer permitted or required to take inventories
pursuant to the provisions of section 471, and pursuant
to the provisions of §§ 1.471-1 to 1.471-9, inclusive,
may elect with respect to those goods specified in his
application and properly subject to inventory to
compute his opening and closing inventories in
accordance with the method provided by section 472,
this section, and § 1.472-2. * * *
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Petitioner concedes in its opening brief that "Section 472
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder are worded in terms of
electing to value "goods" under the LIFO method". However,
according to petitioner:
Treasury Regulation Section 1.471-3(c) is clear that
the "cost" of finished and partly finished goods
consist [sic] of the "cost" of raw materials, labor and
overhead. * * * Thus, * * * the finished and partly
finished goods included in such an [LIFO] election
necessarily consist of the cost attributable to raw
materials, labor, and overhead.
Petitioner elaborates on the foregoing argument in its answering
brief, as follows:
Treasury Regulation Section 1.472-1 provides that
"[a]ny taxpayer permitted or required to take
inventories pursuant to the provisions of section 471,
and pursuant to the provisions of §§ 1.471-1 to 1.471-
9, inclusive, may elect with respect to those goods
specified in his application and properly subject to
inventories to compute his opening and closing
inventories in accordance with" the LIFO method.
Treas. Reg. §1.472-1(a). The cost of raw materials,
the cost of labor, and the cost of overhead are
expressly identified as inventoriable costs in Treasury
Regulation Section 1.471-3(c). Hence, such costs are
included within the specified provisions identified in
Treasury Regulation Section 1.472-1(a) for which the
LIFO inventory method is expressly made available.
Respondent may not, therefore, deny Petitioner's right
to elect the LIFO method for labor and overhead costs
or condition its right to make such an election on
electing LIFO for the "good" produced by such labor and
overhead.
We agree with respondent. We find petitioner's
interpretation of sections 1.471-3(c) and 1.472-1(a), Income Tax
Regs., on which it relies to be strained, and its reliance on
-40-
those regulations to be misplaced.11 The latter regulation,
section 1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs., merely provides that a
taxpayer who is allowed or required to use the inventory
accounting method as provided by section 471 and the regulations
thereunder may elect the LIFO inventory method under section 472,
but only "with respect to those goods specified in his
application and properly subject to inventory". The cross-
reference in section 1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs., to all the
regulations promulgated under section 471, including section
1.471-3(c), Income Tax Regs., that were extant when section
1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs., was promulgated is of no relevance,
let alone significance, in deciding whether section 472(a) and
the regulations thereunder mean what they say when they permit a
taxpayer to elect the LIFO inventory method in inventorying goods
specified in an application filed by such taxpayer.
The former regulation, section 1.471-3(c), Income Tax Regs.,
on which petitioner relies and to which section 1.472-1(a),
Income Tax Regs., inter alia, refers, merely defines the term
"cost", one of the two commonly used bases of inventory valuation
11
We also find petitioner’s reliance on Rev. Rul. 60-321,
1960-2 C.B. 166, to be misplaced. Petitioner argues that,
because that ruling permitted a dealer in securities, which are
intangibles, to account for such securities under the LIFO
inventory method, Consolidated should be permitted to elect the
LIFO inventory method for the inventoriable costs of its labor
and overhead, which also are intangibles, even though they are
not goods. Rev. Rul 60-321, supra, holds only that a taxpayer is
permitted to elect the LIFO inventory method for the intangible
goods, securities.
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that satisfy the requirements of section 471, to mean in the case
of inventories for goods in process and for finished goods--
(1) the cost of raw materials and supplies entering
into or consumed in connection with the product,
(2) expenditures for direct labor, and (3) indirect
production costs incident to and necessary for the
production of the particular article * * *
The foregoing definition of the term "cost" does not transform
the latter two items in that definition (viz, in the instant case
labor and overhead) into goods subject to inventory as to which a
taxpayer may elect the LIFO inventory method under section 472.
In other words, just because the costs of the labor and overhead
involved here are two of the three basic elements of cost that
were reflected in Consolidated’s inventories for goods in process
and for finished goods, see sec. 1.471-4(a), Income Tax Regs.,
does not convert labor and overhead into goods themselves as to
which Consolidated could have elected the LIFO inventory method
under section 472.
Nor does the fact that the cost of Consolidated’s new parts,
one of the two raw materials used by Consolidated in its
remanufacturing business, is a third basic element of cost that
also was reflected in Consolidated’s inventories for goods in
process and for finished goods, see id., mean that its labor and
overhead, when combined with its new parts, become goods as to
which Consolidated could have elected the LIFO inventory method
under section 472. As stated above, the goods produced by
Consolidated are remanufactured automobile parts or a type or
-42-
class of such goods (e.g., remanufactured automobile engines).
Although Consolidated’s new parts, labor, and overhead enter into
the production, and thus are components, of those goods, another
raw material, indeed the principal raw material, that enters into
the production, and thus is a component, of the goods produced by
Consolidated is the customer cores. The labor and overhead
involved in this case are not goods. The new parts, labor, and
overhead involved in this case, when taken together but without
customer cores, do not constitute goods. However, the new parts,
labor, overhead, and customer cores involved in this case, when
taken together, do constitute goods and are included in and
comprise Consolidated's inventories for goods in process and for
finished goods.
Section 472(a) allows a taxpayer to elect the LIFO inventory
method in inventorying goods specified in the taxpayer's
application. That section does not state that a taxpayer may
elect the LIFO inventory method in inventorying other than a
good. Nor does that section state that a taxpayer may elect the
LIFO inventory method in inventorying a portion of a good. The
labor and overhead involved here are not a good, let alone the
entire good, of Consolidated subject to inventory, even though
they (1) enter into the production of Consolidated’s finished
goods (viz, remanufactured automobile parts) by transforming
Consolidated’s customer cores and new parts into such goods and
(2) are included, along with customer cores and new parts, in
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Consolidated’s inventories for goods in process and for finished
goods. Nor do the labor and overhead involved here become a
good, let alone the entire good, of Consolidated subject to
inventory when the new parts involved here are combined with
them. The goods of Consolidated subject to inventory as to which
it was permitted by section 472(a) and the regulations thereunder
to elect the LIFO inventory method are the remanufactured
automobile parts produced by Consolidated, a type or class of
those goods (e.g., remanufactured automobile engines), and, if
Consolidated had made the election permitted by section 1.472-
1(c), Income Tax Regs., which it did not, its raw material goods
(i.e., customer cores and/or new parts).
We conclude that section 472(a) requires a taxpayer who
wants to elect the LIFO inventory method (1) to make that
election with respect to a good or goods, which are subject to
inventory and specified in a Form 970 and which could include one
or more raw material goods used by a manufacturer or processor
that will become part of the merchandise intended for sale, see
sec. 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., and (2) to make that election
with respect to such entire good or goods. That section does not
permit, and we do not construe it to allow, a taxpayer to make
such an election (1) with respect to other than such a good or
goods or (2) with respect to a portion thereof. If Congress had
intended to permit such an election under section 472, it would
have so provided in that section. It did not.
-44-
Petitioner also relies on section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., to support the validity of Consolidated’s LIFO method.
Petitioner asserts:
Respondent apparently believes that Treasury
Regulation 1.472-1(c) supports her position in this
matter. To the contrary. Treasury Regulation Section
1.472-1(c) contradicts her argument that the LIFO
inventory method may only be elected with respect to
goods. Under the raw material content method, a
taxpayer's LIFO election is limited to the cost of raw
materials, including the cost of the raw material
content of work-in-progress and finished goods. Treas.
Reg. § 1.472-1(c). The Regulation describes the manner
in which a taxpayer may segregate the cost of one or
more raw materials from work-in-progress and finished
goods and value those costs using LIFO, while all other
costs associated with work-in-progress and the finished
good are valued under the FIFO convention. Thus, a
taxpayer using the raw material content method elects
to value the cost of raw materials (including the cost
of raw materials incorporated into work-in-progress and
finished goods) using the LIFO convention, not the raw
material themselves. Rather than support her position
in this matter, Treasury Regulation Section 1.472-1(c)
provides further evidence of the validity of
Petitioner's [sic] LIFO election. In addition,
Respondent's attempt to characterize the raw material
content method as the single "permissive variance to
the inclusion of the total goods in LIFO" is not an
accurate statement of the law. * * *
We disagree with the foregoing contentions of petitioner as
to what section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., which permits a
taxpayer to elect what we shall refer to as the raw material
content LIFO inventory method, provides and allows. We reject
petitioner’s position that that regulation "contradicts * * *
[respondent’s] argument that the LIFO inventory method may only
be elected with respect to goods." Section 1.472-1(c), Income
Tax Regs., which is virtually identical to the 1944 amendment to
-45-
section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111, provides in pertinent
part:
(c) A manufacturer or processor who has adopted
the LIFO inventory method as to a class of goods may
elect to have such method apply to the raw materials
only (including those included in goods in process and
in finished goods) expressed in terms of appropriate
units. If such method is adopted, the adjustments are
confined to costs of the raw material in the inventory
and the cost of the raw material in goods in process
and in finished goods produced by such manufacturer or
processor and reflected in the inventory. * * *
Section 1.472-1(j), Income Tax Regs., as did the 1944 amendment
to section 29.22(d)-1 of Regulations 111, states that the
election under section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., may "apply
to any one raw material, when two or more raw materials enter
into the composition of the finished product". We disagree with
petitioner’s assertions that, under section 1.472-1(c), Income
Tax Regs.,
a taxpayer’s LIFO election is limited to the cost of
raw materials, including the cost of the raw material
content of work-in-progress and finished goods. * * *
[A] taxpayer using the raw material content [LIFO
inventory] method elects to value the cost of raw
materials (including the cost of raw materials
incorporated into work-in-progress and finished goods)
using the LIFO convention, not the raw materials
themselves. * * *[12] [Emphasis added.]
12
Petitioner also contends that, because the examples in
sec. 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., illustrate the manner in which
a raw material may be accounted for on the raw material content
LIFO inventory method and labor and overhead on the FIFO
inventory method,
It is not logical to conclude that when LIFO is elected
for one raw material, together with labor and overhead,
(continued...)
-46-
Pursuant to section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., a manufacturer
or processor "may elect to have such [LIFO inventory] method
apply to the raw materials only (including those included in
goods in process and in finished goods)"; such an election is not
made with respect to the costs of such raw materials. Petitioner
takes the reference in section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., to
"costs of the raw material" out of context and misstates the
reason for that reference in that regulation. Once a manu-
facturer or processor has elected the raw material content LIFO
inventory method as to one or more raw materials (including those
included in goods in process and in finished goods), such a
taxpayer is required by section 472(b)(2) to inventory such raw
material(s) at cost. That is why section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., states:
If such method [the raw material content LIFO inventory
method] is adopted, the adjustments are confined to
costs of the raw material in the inventory and the cost
of the raw material in goods in process and in finished
(...continued)
that a second raw material cannot be valued under FIFO
* * *
We disagree. The examples in sec. 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs.,
merely illustrate how the adjustments should be made under the
raw material content LIFO inventory method. Even if a taxpayer
were to rely on those examples in calculating the adjustments
under such taxpayer's LIFO inventory method, that taxpayer would
not be able to use such a method unless it were permitted by or
not inconsistent with sec. 472 and the regulations thereunder.
-47-
goods produced by such manufacturer or processor and
reflected in the inventory. * * *[13] [Emphasis added.]
We also disagree with petitioner's contention that section
1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., "provides * * * evidence of the
validity of Petitioner's [sic] LIFO election." As discussed
above and as made clear by that regulation, a manufacturer or
processor may elect to apply the LIFO inventory method to one or
more raw materials only, including those included in goods in
process and in finished goods. Consolidated could have elected,
but did not elect, to apply the raw material content LIFO
inventory method to its new parts and/or its customer cores.
Sec. 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs. It could not have elected to
apply that method to its new parts, labor, and overhead only or
to its labor and overhead only. Id. We conclude that section
1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., does not permit Consolidated's LIFO
method and does not provide "evidence of the validity of * * *
[Consolidated's] LIFO election."14
13
Under the raw material content LIFO inventory method,
"The only adjustment to the closing inventory is the cost of the
raw material [for which a taxpayer elects the raw material
content LIFO inventory method]; the processing costs and overhead
cost are not changed." Sec. 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs.,
Example (1) (last sentence).
14
Although petitioner concedes that it may not be used or
cited as precedent, sec. 6110(j)(3), petitioner relies on Tech.
Adv. Mem. 94-45-004 (Apr. 25, 1994) in an effort to show that
respondent has permitted a taxpayer to account for one or more,
but less than all, of its raw materials and all of its labor and
overhead under the LIFO inventory method. It is not at all clear
from Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-45-004 what, if any, of the labor and
(continued...)
-48-
To the contrary, we find section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., to be consistent with respondent’s position regarding
Consolidated's LIFO method. The Secretary promulgated that
regulation under the authority granted by section 472(a) to
prescribe regulations "as necessary in order that the use of such
[LIFO inventory] method may clearly reflect income".15 As
discussed above, the raw material content LIFO inventory method
authorized by section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., permits a
manufacturer or processor who has adopted the LIFO inventory
method with respect to a class of goods to apply that method to
"the raw materials only (including those included in goods in
process and in finished goods)". Raw materials are goods.
(...continued)
overhead in question ultimately were allowed to be on, or
ultimately were disallowed from being on, the LIFO inventory
method upon examination of the income tax returns of the
taxpayer. To the extent that Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-45-004 may be
read to suggest that a taxpayer may validly elect the LIFO
inventory method with respect to all of its labor and overhead,
but not all of its raw materials, that enter into the production
of a good or type or class of goods, we reject any such
suggestion as contrary to sec. 472 and the regulations
thereunder.
15
The position of the Secretary in sec. 1.472-1(c), Income
Tax Regs., is identical to the position taken by the Commissioner
and approved by the Secretary under the original predecessor of
sec. 472 (viz, sec. 22(d)(2) of the 1939 Code as amended), which
was set forth in the 1944 amendment to sec. 29.22(d)-1 of
Regulations 111. We have found nothing in sec. 472, its
predecessor provisions, or their legislative history which
establishes that sec. 1.472-1, Income Tax Regs., and its
predecessor regulations, as they relate to the raw material
content LIFO inventory method, were intended to be anything other
than a proper interpretation of the statutory language under
which those regulations were promulgated.
-49-
Section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., is consistent with section
472(a) and section 1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs., which require a
taxpayer who wants to elect the LIFO inventory method to make
that election with respect to a good or goods, which are subject
to inventory and specified in a Form 970, and with respect to
such entire good or goods. When a manufacturer or processor
elects the raw material content LIFO inventory method under
section 1.472-1(c), Income Tax Regs., the good or goods specified
in a Form 970 to which that method applies are one or more raw
materials, and not the goods produced or processed by such a
taxpayer, and that method must be applied to such entire raw
material goods. See sec. 1.472-1(c), (j), Income Tax Regs.
Respondent also points to section 472(b) in support of
respondent’s position that Consolidated's LIFO method is contrary
to the requirements of section 472 and the regulations
thereunder. We agree. Section 472(b) states: "In inventorying
goods specified in the application described in subsection (a),
the taxpayer shall * * * (2) Inventory them at cost". Section
472(b) thus requires a taxpayer who has elected the LIFO
inventory method under section 472(a) to inventory the good or
goods specified in a Form 970 at cost. That section does not
permit, and we do not construe it to allow, a taxpayer to
inventory at cost (1) other than such a good or goods or (2) a
portion of such a good or goods.
-50-
As further support for respondent’s position that
Consolidated’s LIFO method contravenes the requirements of
section 472 and the regulations thereunder, respondent directs
our attention to section 1.472-8, Income Tax Regs., the
regulations under section 472 relating to the dollar-value LIFO
inventory method. According to respondent, Consolidated’s LIFO
method contravenes those regulations.16 We agree. Regardless of
the different types of pools that a taxpayer may use if such
taxpayer elects the dollar-value LIFO inventory method (e.g.,
natural business unit pools, multiple pools, or pools established
under the IPI computation method), that method must be used with
respect to a good or goods subject to inventory and specified in
a Form 970 and with respect to such entire good or goods. See
sec. 1.472-8(b), (e), Income Tax Regs.
16
Petitioner argues that respondent's contention that
Consolidated’s LIFO method contravenes the dollar-value LIFO
inventory method regulations under sec. 472 is a new matter in
respect of which the burden of proof is on respondent under Rule
142(a). We disagree. The determinations in the 1990 notice and
the 1991 notice are stated quite broadly, and we construe them to
encompass respondent’s contentions relating to Consolidated’s
dollar-value LIFO inventory method. Respondent determined in the
1990 notice: "Since you did not include the cost of yard cores in
the LIFO calculation of inventory for taxable year 1990 as
required in accordance with your LIFO election, taxable income is
increased by the amount of your LIFO reserve". An identical
determination for 1991 appears in the 1991 notice. Even if we
were not to address respondent's argument under the regulations
relating to the dollar-value LIFO inventory method because it is
a new matter, our holding regarding Consolidated's LIFO method
would not change.
-51-
To illustrate, pursuant to the rules for establishing
natural business unit pools, a pool is to consist of all items
entering into the entire inventory investment for a natural
business unit of a business enterprise,17 unless the taxpayer
elects to use the multiple pooling method provided in section
1.472-8(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. If a business enterprise is
comprised of only one natural business unit, one pool is to be
used for "all of its inventories, including raw materials, goods
in process, and finished goods". Sec. 1.472-8(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs. If a business enterprise is composed of more than one
natural business unit, more than one pool is required. Id.To illustrate further, a taxpayer may elect to establish
multiple pools for inventory items that are not within a natural
business unit as to which the taxpayer has adopted the natural
business unit method of pooling as provided in section 1.472-
8(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Sec. 1.472-8(b)(3)(i)(a), Income Tax
Regs. In the event of such an election, each such pool is
ordinarily to consist of a group of inventory items that are
substantially similar, which is to be determined based on all the
17
Whether an enterprise consists of more than one natural
business unit is a matter of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances. Sec. 1.472-8(b)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. In the
case of a manufacturer, like Consolidated, a natural business
unit "ordinarily consists of the entire productive activity of
the enterprise within one product line or within two or more
related product lines including * * * the obtaining of materials,
the processing of materials, and the selling of manufactured
* * * goods." Id.-52-
facts and circumstances. Id. Pursuant to the rules for
establishing multiple pools, unprocessed raw materials which are
substantially similar are to be pooled together, and goods in
process and finished goods in the inventory are to be placed in
pools classified by major types or classes of goods.18 Sec.
1.472-8(b)(3)(i)(b) and (c), Income Tax Regs.
In the face of various provisions in section 472 and the
regulations thereunder that respondent contends, and we agree,
are contrary to Consolidated’s LIFO method, petitioner argues
that taxpayers are afforded great flexibility with respect to the
dollar-value LIFO inventory method and computational procedures
under that method. Consequently, according to petitioner,
Consolidated should be afforded great flexibility with respect to
Consolidated's LIFO method. In support of that position,
petitioner cites section 1.472-1(a), (l) and section 1.472-
8(b)(3)(i)(d), Income Tax Regs.
Section 1.472-1(a), Income Tax Regs., provides in pertinent
part:
18
The requirement in sec. 1.472-8(b)(3)(i)(b) and (c),
Income Tax Regs., that a taxpayer establish pools by major types
of materials or major classes of goods does not preclude the
establishment of a miscellaneous pool. Because a taxpayer may
elect the dollar-value LIFO inventory method with respect to all
or any designated goods in such taxpayer’s inventory, there may
be a number of such inventory items covered in the election. A
miscellaneous pool is to consist only of items that are rela-
tively insignificant in dollar value when compared to other
inventory items in the particular trade or business and that are
not properly includible as part of another pool. Sec. 1.472-
8(b)(3)(i)(d), Income Tax Regs.
-53-
The LIFO inventory method is not dependent upon the
character of the business in which the taxpayer is
engaged or upon the identity or want of identity
through commingling of any of the goods on hand, and
may be adopted by the taxpayer as of the close of any
taxable year.
The foregoing regulation does not permit a taxpayer flexibility
to elect a LIFO inventory method that is contrary to the
requirements of section 472 and the regulations thereunder.
Section 1.472-1(l), Income Tax Regs., provides:
If a taxpayer uses consistently the so-called "dollar-
value" method of pricing inventories, or any other
method of computation established to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner as reasonably adaptable to the
purpose and intent of section 472 and this section, and
if such taxpayer elects under section 472 to use the
LIFO inventory method authorized by such section, the
taxpayer's opening and closing inventories shall be
determined under section 472 by the use of the
appropriate adaptation. * * *
Petitioner directs us to the reference in the foregoing
regulation to "any other method of computation". Consolidated
elected the dollar-value LIFO inventory method in the 1980 Form
970 and the 1982 Form 970. It did not elect "any other method of
computation" referred to in the foregoing regulation. Even if
Consolidated had used any such other method, it would have been
required to establish to the satisfaction of respondent that such
other method is "reasonably adaptable to the purpose and intent
of section 472 and" the regulations thereunder. Consolidated has
failed to make such a showing to respondent or to the Court.
Petitioner also argues that section 1.472-8(b)(3)(i)(d),
Income Tax Regs., supports its position that Consolidated should
-54-
be afforded great flexibility regarding its LIFO method. That
regulation provides in pertinent part that "a taxpayer may elect
the dollar-value LIFO inventory method with respect to all or any
designated goods in his inventory". Contrary to petitioner's
argument, we find that the foregoing language in section 1.472-
8(b)(3)(i)(d), Income Tax Regs., supports respondent's position
and is consistent with section 472(a) which requires a taxpayer
who elects the LIFO inventory method to make that election with
respect to a good or goods subject to inventory and specified in
a Form 970.19
The issue relating to Consolidated’s LIFO method is one that
is answered by the requirements of section 472 and the
regulations thereunder. The Court has no flexibility to rewrite
section 472. Our flexibility to reject the legislative
regulations under section 472 that are implicated here is quite
limited; those regulations must be upheld unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to section 472.
19
Petitioner also cites the following cases in support of
its contention that this Court has shown a willingness to allow
flexibility with respect to the dollar-value LIFO inventory
method and computational matters relating thereto: Richardson
Invs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 736 (1981); Fox Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 708, 727 (1981); and Amity Leather
Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 726, 734 (1984). In each of
those cases, the taxpayer elected the LIFO inventory method as to
a good or goods or a type or class of goods and as to such entire
good or goods or type or class thereof. In none of those cases
was the Court presented with the issue that we now are
addressing.
-55-
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Petitioner also contends that section 472 and its
predecessor provisions in the Internal Revenue laws have been
interpreted broadly and that the Court should interpret that
section broadly in this case and find that Consolidated's LIFO
method does not contravene it or the regulations thereunder. In
support of that contention, petitioner cites several cases,
including Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 14, 29
(1947). We find all of those cases to be distinguishable and
petitioner's reliance on them to be misplaced. In the interest
of brevity, we shall discuss only the Hutzler Bros. Co. case.
Because of the number and diversity of the goods of the
taxpayer involved in Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, supra,
the taxpayer, a department store retailer, devised a LIFO
inventory method that reduced the goods to their lowest common
denominator, viz, a dollar figure. That method, which is now
known as the dollar-value LIFO inventory method, was not
expressly permitted by regulation for the year before the Court
in the Hutzler Bros. Co. case. Hutzler Bros. Co. v.
Commissioner, supra at 24. The only method for that year that
was permitted by the regulations under section 22(d) of the 1939
Code as amended, a predecessor of section 472, was a method that
required the identification of specific goods in a taxpayer’s
inventory, a method known as the specific goods LIFO inventory
-56-
method, see sec. 1.472-2, Income Tax Regs. The Court in Hutzler
Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, supra, reviewed the legislative
history of not only section 22(d) of the 1939 Code as amended,
which was applicable to the year at issue, but also section 22(d)
of the 1938 Act, 52 Stat. 459, and concluded that "the purpose of
the lawmakers was to have it [the LIFO inventory method] apply in
general terms to all those coming within its provisions." Id. at
29. The Court explained that, in contrast to the determination
under the LIFO inventory method of the merchandise to which a
cost is to be attributed in the case of a manufacturer, the
determination under the LIFO inventory method of the merchandise
to which a cost is to be attributed "becomes difficult in the
case of a retail merchant primarily because of the complications
of the retail method itself." Id. at 30. The Court added:
The * * * process engaged in by petitioner [a retail
merchant] is to reduce the price level of the retail
stock to that prevailing as of the opening inventory,
and thereby to identify the merchandise remaining in
inventory at the close of the year as that constituting
inventory at the beginning of the year to the extent of
the size of the opening inventory. That this is done by
dealing with the merchandise stated in terms of dollars
rather than of numbers or quantities is a requisite of
the aspect of department store accounting which relies
for its inventory volume on a statement in dollars
alone. [Id.]
The Court rejected respondent's contention that stating inventory
in terms of "dollars instead of other measures of quantity has
the effect of distorting the inventory content", pointing out
that the "retail method has been used with respondent's complete
-57-
approval for too long a time for the assumption to be permissible
that the contents of an inventory can not be satisfactorily
represented for all purposes by its expression in dollars only".
Id. The Court then examined the LIFO inventory method used by
Hutzler Brothers Company and held that that method was permitted
by section 22(d) of the 1939 Code as amended and clearly
reflected income even though it was not expressly permitted by
the regulations under that section. Id. at 28-31.
Although we find Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, supra,
to be distinguishable from the instant case, the following
explanation by the Court in that case of the LIFO inventory
method is instructive and rejects petitioner's position here:
The process envisaged by Lifo involves not so much
the ascertainment of cost as the ascertainment of what
it is of which we are to discover the cost. The last
in, first out formula assumes that the merchandise
remaining in inventory is that which was first
purchased. * * *
* * * * * * *
If we were dealing with a fabricator or
manufacturer, the first step would be to determine
which merchandise it is to which a cost is to be
attributed, and the second, to determine that cost.
* * * [Emphasis added.]
Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 30. We see no reason
to elaborate further on the foregoing succinct explanation in the
Hutzler Bros. Co. case regarding what the "process envisaged by"
the LIFO inventory method is.
-58-
We conclude that petitioner has not shown that respondent
abused respondent’s discretion in determining that Consolidated's
LIFO method is contrary to the requirements of section 472 and
the regulations thereunder and that therefore that method does
not clearly reflect income.
We shall next address the parties' dispute over whether
respondent abused respondent's discretion in terminating
Consolidated's election to use Consolidated's LIFO method because
that method does not clearly reflect income. Petitioner contends
that in the event that the Court were to find that Consolidated's
LIFO method does not clearly reflect income, respondent would not
be permitted to terminate Consolidated's election to use that
method provided that Consolidated agrees to account for its
customer cores under the LIFO inventory method and to make any
necessary adjustments resulting therefrom.20 Petitioner asserts:
20
In conceding that Consolidated would have to make "any
necessary adjustments", we believe that petitioner is
acknowledging that Consolidated would be required to produce the
books and records needed to make such adjustments. However,
petitioner did not produce at trial any of Consolidated's books
and records that would be required to make "any necessary
adjustments". Instead, without even indicating on brief whether
or not Consolidated has the books and records to make "any
necessary adjustments", petitioner takes the position that
respondent must establish that Consolidated does not have such
books and records because whether or not it does is a new matter
on which respondent has the burden of proof. We disagree. It is
petitioner who is claiming that Consolidated should be permitted
to modify its LIFO election to include customer cores provided
that, inter alia, Consolidated establishes that it can, and does,
make "any necessary adjustments". Petitioner has failed to
establish its ability to make such adjustments.
-59-
It would be unreasonable, unduly punitive, and
constitute an abuse of her discretion for Respondent to
terminate * * * [Consolidated's] LIFO election because
Petitioner has sought judicial review of her
determination that it is essential to a clear
reflection of income that its [customer] core inventory
be included in the LIFO election.
In support of its position, petitioner cites, inter alia, Rev.
Proc. 79-23, 1979-1 C.B. 564, and section 1.472-3(c), Income Tax
Regs.21
We first turn to Rev. Proc. 79-23, supra, on which
petitioner relies. Petitioner contends that Rev. Proc. 79-23,
supra, "provides that a termination of a taxpayer's LIFO election
may be warranted only where one of four specified circumstances
exists". Petitioner maintains that the present case does not
involve any of those four situations.22 We note initially that
21
Petitioner also cites Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-47-001 (July
25, 1979) to show "that Respondent has previously recognized that
a taxpayer may contest her determination regarding LIFO inventory
matters without the threat of having its LIFO election
terminated." Petitioner's reliance on Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-47-001
is misplaced. Tech. Adv. Mem. 79-47-001, which has no
precedential value, sec. 6110(j)(3), involved an adjustment
proposed by the District Director pursuant to sec. 1.472-4,
Income Tax Regs., to "perfect the [taxpayer's] LIFO election",
and not a termination of that election. To the extent that Tech.
Adv. Mem. 79-47-001 may be read to suggest that respondent does
not have the authority in this case to terminate Consolidated's
election to use Consolidated's LIFO method, such a reading is
wrong. See sec. 446(b); sec. 1.472-3(d), Income Tax Regs.
22
Petitioner further contends that the exclusion of
customer cores from Consolidated's LIFO pools fits within one or
both of the following situations described in sec. 3.02(b) and
(d) of Rev. Proc. 79-23, 1979-1 C.B. 564, 565, as to which
respondent has indicated termination of a LIFO election is not
warranted:
(continued...)
-60-
Rev. Proc. 79-23, supra, does not provide the only circumstances
in which respondent will, in respondent's discretion, terminate a
taxpayer's LIFO election. In any event, one of the four
situations described in Rev. Proc. 79-23, supra, in which
respondent will, in respondent's discretion, terminate such an
election is found in section 3.01(b) of that revenue procedure,
viz, "Failure by the taxpayer to properly elect the LIFO method".
That situation exists in the instant case. We have held that,
contrary to the requirements of section 472 and the regulations
thereunder, Consolidated's LIFO election did not apply to an
entire good or goods subject to inventory and specified in a Form
970. Consequently, Consolidated failed "to properly elect the
22
(...continued)
(b) Selection by the taxpayer of a fewer or
greater number of inventory pools than those determined
by an examining agent;
* * * * * * *
(d) The taxpayer improperly including (or
excluding) a specific item in a particular inventory
pool * * *
We do not believe that the situation presented here is described
in sec. 3.02(b) or (d) of Rev. Proc. 79-23, supra. Respondent
does not take the position that Consolidated selected too few or
too many inventory pools, nor does respondent take the position
that Consolidated improperly included or excluded a specific item
in a particular inventory pool. Respondent is arguing, inter
alia, that, regardless of the different types of pools that a
taxpayer may use if such taxpayer elects the dollar-value LIFO
inventory method, that method must be used with respect to a good
or goods subject to inventory and specified in a Form 970 and
with respect to such entire good or goods.
-61-
LIFO method" when it filed the 1980 Form 970 and the 1982 Form
970.23
We now turn to section 1.472-3(c), Income Tax Regs., on
which petitioner relies. That regulation provides:
As a condition to the taxpayer's use of the LIFO
inventory method, the Commissioner may require that the
method be used with respect to goods other than those
specified in the taxpayer's statement of election if,
in the opinion of the Commissioner, the use of such
method with respect to such other goods is essential to
a clear reflection of income.
Petitioner contends that in the instant case the foregoing
regulation "does not authorize Respondent to terminate a
taxpayer's LIFO election". Petitioner's reliance on section
1.472-3(c), Income Tax Regs., is misplaced. That regulation
authorizes respondent to require a taxpayer who has elected the
LIFO inventory method with respect to an entire good or goods
subject to inventory and specified in a Form 970 to apply the
LIFO inventory method to any other such good or goods but not
specified in that form. In the present case, respondent is not
seeking to require Consolidated, which did not elect the raw
material content LIFO inventory method, to apply the LIFO
inventory method to a good or goods subject to inventory but not
specified in the 1980 Form 970 and the 1982 Form 970. Conse-
23
We reject the suggestion of petitioner that sec. 3.01(b)
of Rev. Proc. 79-23, supra at 564, applies only to the procedural
requirements for electing the LIFO inventory method. See Rev.
Proc. 76-28, 1976-2 C.B. 645.
-62-
quently, section 1.472-3(c), Income Tax Regs., is not apposite
here.
The pertinent authority governing disposition of the issue
regarding respondent's termination of Consolidated's LIFO
election is section 446(b) and section 1.472-3(d), Income Tax
Regs. Section 446(b) provides:
(b) Exceptions.--If no method of accounting has
been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as,
in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income.
The foregoing section permits respondent to terminate a
taxpayer's method of accounting that does not clearly reflect
income (here, Consolidated's LIFO method) and to require the
taxpayer to use a method (here, the FIFO inventory method) that
does clearly reflect income.
Section 1.472-3(d), Income Tax Regs., provides:
(d) Whether or not the taxpayer's application for
the adoption and use of the LIFO inventory method
should be approved, and whether or not such method,
once adopted may be continued, and the propriety of all
computations incidental to the use of such method, will
be determined by the Commissioner in connection with
the examination of the taxpayer's income tax returns.
Under the foregoing regulation, it is within respondent's
discretion to determine whether or not a "taxpayer's application
for the adoption and use of the LIFO inventory method should be
approved * * * and * * * continued".
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We conclude that petitioner has not shown that respondent
abused respondent's discretion in terminating Consolidated's
election to use Consolidated's LIFO method.
Amounts at Which Customer Cores Should Be Reflected in Inventory
As permitted by section 1.471-2(c), Income Tax Regs.,
Consolidated chose to apply the LCM basis of valuation in
accounting for its customer cores under the FIFO inventory
method. In applying LCM in its returns for the years at issue,
Consolidated reflected the customer cores (1) in its finished
goods inventory at core supplier amounts and (2) in its unpro-
cessed cores raw material inventory and its goods in process
inventory at scrap value. Respondent determined that Conso-
lidated's FIFO-LCM method did not reflect the customer cores in
its inventories at the proper amounts. We must decide whether
respondent abused respondent's discretion in making that
determination. That inquiry requires us, inter alia, to
determine the cost and the market for Consolidated's customer
cores for purposes of section 471.
As we understand it, it is petitioner's position that
Consolidated's FIFO-LCM method conforms to GAAP and clearly
reflects income. Respondent disagrees. For financial reporting
purposes, Consolidated reflected its customer cores in all of its
inventories at core supplier amounts. However, for tax purposes,
Consolidated reflected customer cores in its finished goods
inventory at core supplier amounts; it reflected customer cores
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in its unprocessed cores raw material inventory and its goods in
process inventory at scrap value. On the record before us, we
find that petitioner has not met its burden of establishing that
Consolidated's FIFO-LCM method conforms to GAAP or that that
method otherwise satisfies the requirement in section 471 that it
conform "as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in
the trade or business".
We shall now consider whether Consolidated's FIFO-LCM method
satisfies the requirement under section 471 that that method
clearly reflect income. In support of that position, petitioner
contends that Consolidated obtained customer cores in exchange,
and not purchase, transactions and that therefore the cost and
the market for those cores for purposes of section 471 are to be
determined on the basis of the respective fair market values of
those cores. According to petitioner, those values were either
the salvage yard cost for non-bin salvage yard cores or the scrap
value for bin salvage yard cores that did not pass inspection at
Bishop Engine's place of business.24
24
Petitioner asserts on brief:
[T]he price paid [the salvage yard cost] by core
suppliers to purchase cores from salvage yards on an
individual basis [non-bin salvage yard cores] should be
determinative of the actual value of cores received by
* * * Consolidated from its customers. In this regard,
at trial Mr. Bishop, the President of one of the
largest core suppliers in the country, testified that
the cores received by remanufacturers from their
customers are the cores [bin salvage yard cores which
(continued...)
-65-
Petitioner further asserts that even if the Court were to
find that the transactions by which Consolidated acquired
customer cores were purchases, and not exchanges, only the
respective fair market values of those cores are the cost and the
market for purposes of section 471 and that the alleged excesses
24
(...continued)
did not pass inspection at Bishop Engine's place of
business] that core suppliers do not ordinarily
purchase from salvage yards, except at scrap value.
Thus, for a substantial number of the cores received by
* * * Consolidated from its customers, the fair market
value of such cores is, as correctly reported on its
1990 and 1991 federal income tax returns, scrap value.
* * * [Citations omitted.]
Assuming arguendo that fair market value were the proper
criterion under sec. 471, petitioner's position regarding what
the fair market values of its customer cores were appears to be
inconsistent. On the one hand, petitioner contends that the
salvage yard cost for non-bin salvage yard cores "should be
determinative of the actual value of" Consolidated's customer
cores. On the other hand, petitioner asserts that "Mr. Bishop
* * * testified that the" customer cores of the type acquired by
Consolidated are comparable to bin salvage yard cores which did
not pass inspection at Bishop Engine's place of business and
which were purchased by core suppliers from salvage yards at
scrap value. Consequently, according to petitioner "for a
substantial number of" Consolidated's customer cores, the fair
market value was scrap value. In any event, even assuming
arguendo that we were to agree with petitioner that either the
salvage yard cost for non-bin salvage yard cores or the scrap
value for bin salvage yard cores which did not pass inspection at
Bishop Engine's place of business is the determinant of the cost
and the market for customer cores for purposes of sec. 471, which
we do not, petitioner has not established either what those
amounts were or that, "for a substantial number" of customer
cores, those amounts did not exceed scrap value. Moreover,
petitioner concedes that at least with respect to other than "a
substantial number" of Consolidated's customer cores,
Consolidated erred when it included in its returns those cores in
its unprocessed raw materials inventory and in its goods in
process inventory at scrap value.
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over such cost and market that Consolidated credited to each
customer account receivable are deductible expenses under section
162.
In support of respondent's position that Consolidated's
FIFO-LCM method does not clearly reflect income, respondent
contends that Consolidated acquired customer cores in purchase,
and not exchange, transactions and that therefore the cost and
the market for those cores for purposes of section 471 are to be
determined by reference to the invoice prices that were shown on
the customer core sales invoices. According to respondent, those
invoice prices are the amounts (viz, the core credit amounts)
that Consolidated credited to each customer account receivable
and that were shown on those invoices under the column headed
"Cores--Price Each".25
Respondent further asserts that even if the Court were to
find that the transactions by which Consolidated acquired
customer cores were exchanges, and not purchases, respondent's
25
On brief respondent uses the term "core amount" when
refer-ring to the amount that Consolidated credited to each
customer account receivable for each core that it acquired. In
fact, the amount of such a credit was generally equal to the core
amount, and we assume that respondent uses the term "core amount"
for convenience. However, because of, inter alia, the condition
of each customer core that a customer decided to deliver to
Consol-idated, it was possible that Consolidated sometimes
credited to a customer account receivable an amount that was less
than the core amount. Unless we are quoting from the briefs of
the parties, we shall refer to the amounts that Consolidated
credited to each customer account receivable as the core credit
amounts.
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position as to what are the cost and the market for Conso-
lidated's customer cores for purposes of section 471 would not
change.
Purchase vs. Exchange Transactions
In support of petitioner's position that Consolidated
acquired customer cores in exchange transactions, petitioner
asserts:
Petitioner's method of obtaining cores from its
customers is, at its root, an exchange of a remanu-
factured automobile part for a sum of money (the
exchange amount) plus the customer's core. * * *
Respondent's attempt to characterize the core
deposit[26] as the "cost" to Petitioner of a core
provided to it by a customer is apparently founded in
Treasury Regulation 1.471-3(b) and assumes that the
core deposit is the "invoice price" of the core.
Respondent's position ignores both the absence of an
"invoice" or "invoice price" relating to a customer
core and the fundamental nature of the transaction
between Petitioner and its customer.
Petitioner's customers do not issue invoices to
Petitioner. On the sale of a remanufactured automobile
part, Petitioner issues an invoice to its customer that
reflects an exchange amount and a core deposit. * * *
The core deposit is reflected on the invoice with the
understanding that the customer can return his or her
core and receive back from Petitioner the full amount
of the core deposit shown. * * * The recording of the
core deposit on Petitioner's invoice is, therefore,
simply the posting of a customer deposit to secure the
return of the customer's core. Further, the refunding
of the core deposit and the issuance of a credit
invoice by Petitioner to a customer simply documents
26
Petitioner uses the term "core deposit" on brief
presumably because it contends that the core amount for a
customer core represents a deposit made by Consolidated's
customer to secure "the return of the customer's core", which was
to be refunded at the time that customer decided to deliver a
customer core to Consolidated.
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the refunding of that deposit. Finally, the credit
invoice [customer core sales invoice] issued by
Petitioner to its customers relates to the sale of the
remanufactured automobile part to the customer, not the
purchase of a core by Petitioner. The absence of an
invoice or invoice price regarding customer cores is
not surprising when the transaction between Petitioner
and its customer is analyzed for what it is: an
exchange in which the customer's core is received by
Petitioner as partial payment for the remanufactured
automobile part sold.
When a customer purchases one of Petitioner's
remanufactured automobile parts, the customer must
either provide to Petitioner a core, corresponding in
type and style to the remanufactured automobile part
purchased, or post a core deposit with the under-
standing that the deposit will be refunded when the
customer returns his or her core. * * * If a customer
were to provide a core to Petitioner at the time of
sale, the existence of the exchange would be indis-
putable: the customer receives a remanufactured
automobile part in exchange for cash (the exchange
amount) and the customer's core. See Treas. Reg. §
1.1002-1(d)(exchange defined as a reciprocal transfer
of property, as distinguished from a transfer of
property for a money consideration only). The fact
Petitioner's customers do not generally provide a core
to it at the time of sale does not, as Respondent would
have this Court hold, transform the transaction into
two separate sales.
It is well established "that an integrated
transaction may not be separated into components for
the purposes of taxation by either the Internal Revenue
Service or the taxpayer." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 1968); see also
Kanawha Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954) * * *
* * * * * * *
In Burrell v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 682 (10th
Cir. 1968), affirming 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1967), a
case factually indistinguishable from the one at bar,
the exchange * * * analysis set forth above * * * [was]
recognized by both the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
-69-
In support of respondent's position that Consolidated
acquired customer cores in purchase transactions, respondent
asserts:
The parties have stipulated that when Consolidated
sells a remanufactured automobile part to a customer,
it receives a total sales amount. * * * The total sales
amount, consisting of the exchange amount plus core
amount, is taken into income as a cash/credit
transaction. * * * A customer core may or may not
subsequently be acquired by Consolidated at the core
amount. If it is, this is a separate cash/credit
transaction whereby Consolidated is out-of-pocket the
core amount. * * * The [customer core sales] invoices
* * * use the term "price each", not "refund" or
"deposit" when referring to the value given up by
Consolidated for cores provided to Consolidated by its
customers. These stipulated facts are not indicative
of an "exchange transaction" as advocated by
petitioner. These facts also do not support the
proposition that the customer cores are obtained by
Consolidated at little or no out-of-pocket cost.
* * * * * * *
Petitioner acknowledges that Consolidated's
customers do not generally provide a core to
Consolidated at the time a remanufactured part is sold.
In fact, an entire year may go by before a customer
provides a core. Nevertheless, petitioner presents a
scenario in support of the exchange argument in which
the core is provided simultaneously. Petitioner has
not established in the record that such a scenario is
treated any differently than a normal core acquisition.
It is instructive to consider the scenario wherein
Consolidated knows, at the time that a remanufactured
part is sold, that the customer cannot provide a core.
The stipulated facts indicate the customer would still
pay the core amount although there is no possible core
return to be "secured".
Petitioner's argument that it acquires cores in an
integrated transaction does not comport with the facts.
Consolidated's customers are not required to provide a
core. The remanufactured part is not sold to the
customer contingent upon a core being provided. There
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is no evidence that any negotiation whatsoever is
permitted regarding the price of the remanufactured
part. The customer must pay the stated or list price
of the remanufactured part, even if Consolidated knows
that the customer will not provide a core.
We have found the following facts on the instant record:
At the time a customer purchased a remanufactured automobile part
from Consolidated, (1) that customer became obligated to pay
Consolidated the remanufactured automobile part sales price
which consisted of the exchange amount and the core amount and
which, along with the exchange amount and the core amount,
Consolidated reflected on the remanufactured automobile part
sales invoice that it generated for that sale and (2) Consoli-
dated offered to purchase from that customer a customer core
corresponding to that part for the customer core purchase offer
amount. There was no obligation on the part of that customer to
deliver a customer core to Consolidated as part of that sale.
The remanufactured automobile part sales price, the customer core
purchase offer amount, and the core credit amount were determined
on the basis of market-related factors, including supply and
demand. Consolidated accounted for each remanufactured
automobile part that it sold to a customer by making entries
increasing (1) "sales (exchange amount)" by the exchange amount
that was part of the remanufactured automobile part sales price
for each such part, (2) "sales (core amount)" by the core amount
that was part of that price for each such part, and (3) "customer
account receivable" by that price for each such part. If a
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customer, even though under no obligation to do so, decided to
accept Consolidated's offer to purchase and delivered a customer
core to Consolidated and if that core satisfied Consolidated's
requirements for acceptance of a customer core, Consolidated
(1) purchased that core for a price which generally was equal to
the core amount (i.e., the core credit amount) and which was
shown on the customer core sales invoice under the column headed
"Cores--Price Each" and (2) paid for it by crediting that
customer's customer account receivable in an amount equal to that
price (viz, the core credit amount). The customer core purchase
offer amount and the core credit amount for each customer core
were set at an amount that the marketplace in which Consolidated
acquired customer cores demanded.
The facts that we have found on the record in this case and
the issue under section 471 that is presented to us distinguish
this case from Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652(5th Cir. 1968), and Burrell v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 682 (10th
Cir. 1968), affg. T.C. Memo. 1967-160, the principal cases on
which petitioner relies to support its position that Consolidated
acquired customer cores in exchange, and not purchase,
transactions. Consequently, we find petitioner's reliance on
those cases to be misplaced.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit began its opinion
in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, supra, by framing the
issue presented to it as follows:
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This case involves another attempt by a taxpayer
to insulate himself from the incidence of taxation by
means of paper armor. The question presented is
whether a taxpayer may shape what is essentially an
integrated purchase and trade-in transaction of new and
used trucks into two separate transactions in order to
recognize an immediate gain at capital gains rates and
concomitantly to take a larger depreciation deduction
from ordinary income. * * * [Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, supra at 654.]
The Court of Appeals then recited certain facts relevant to its
resolving the foregoing issue, including the following, which it
characterized as "indicia of transactional unity". Id. at 655.
During 1958, 1959, and 1961, respectively, the taxpayer, a
profitable trucking concern and a prestigious account for General
Motors Corporation (G.M.C.) and White Motor Company (White),
transferred title to 27, 36, and 14 used trucks to G.M.C., and at
about the same time the taxpayer's wholly owned subsidiary
acquired 28, 36, and 14 new trucks from G.M.C. Id. During 1959,
transactions in like form were executed with White. Id. The
taxpayer was in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis G.M.C. and
White. Consequently, it succeeded in having the form of each
transfer by it of used trucks and each acquisition by its
subsidiary of new trucks cast as a sale and a purchase,
respectively. It also succeeded in having the aggregate price
for such alleged sales set at an amount in excess of the
aggregate fair market value of the used trucks that it
transferred to G.M.C. and White and the aggregate price for such
alleged purchases set at an amount in excess of the aggregate
-73-
fair market value of the new trucks that its subsidiary acquired
from those companies. Id. In negotiating the foregoing
transactions with G.M.C. and White, Charles E. Mendez (Mendez),
the president and chairman of the board of both the taxpayer and
its subsidiary, did not indicate to either G.M.C. or White which
corporation he was representing, and it made no difference to
G.M.C. or White whether they were dealing with the taxpayer or
with its subsidiary. Id. Both the taxpayer and its subsidiary
used the same address on the checks utilized in the transactions
in question even though they were located in different cities in
Florida and even though the taxpayer's subsidiary used a
different bank account for all of its business activities. Id.G.M.C. and White delivered most of the trucks acquired in the
alleged purchases by the taxpayer's subsidiary directly to the
taxpayer even though they were ostensibly being sold to that
subsidiary for resale to the taxpayer. Id.In addition to reciting the foregoing facts in Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, supra, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit observed that "a definite contractual inter-
dependency between the sale of new trucks and the trade-in of old
trucks" existed, id., in that there "would have been no purchase
by * * * [the taxpayer's subsidiary] of new trucks or tractors
without concurrent and binding agreements to purchase * * * [the
taxpayer's] used equipment", id. (quoting the U.S. District
Court's opinion in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 19 AFTR
-74-
2d 1253, 67-1 USTC par. 9392 (M.D. Fla. 1967)). The Court of
Appeals further noted that, because the aggregate price that
G.M.C. paid for the used trucks was in excess of their aggregate
fair market value, G.M.C. could have yielded a profit from the
transactions in question only by viewing the alleged purchases of
used trucks and the alleged sales of new trucks as one
transaction. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, the
transactions in question were
sculptured * * * so as to achieve the best possible tax
results for Redwing. Instead of obtaining customary
discounts from the retail price of the new trucks,
Mendez would insist that the manufacturers add the
discount amount to the price of the used trucks being
repurchased. The gain of the trade-in price over the
depreciated basis of the used trucks would be
recognized at capital gains rates, and the basis of the
new trucks for depreciation purposes would be inflated.
As a result, Redwing's depreciation deductions from
ordinary income would also be inflated, resulting in
considerable tax savings. [Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, supra at 655-656.]
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in the
Redwing Carriers, Inc. case that the transfers of used trucks by
the taxpayer and the acquisitions of new trucks by its subsidiary
were, in substance, like-kind exchanges. In so holding, the
Court stated:
As is obvious from the above facts, these Mendez-
dominated transactions were severable in form only. On
substance, the sale was in bondage to the purchase and
the purchase indissolubly dependent upon the sale. If
Redwing had not carried out the agreement to buy the
new trucks, the auto makers would have had no juristic
obligation to purchase the used trucks. The buying and
selling were synchronous parts meshed into the same
transaction and not independent transactions.
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* * * * * * *
Taxation is transactional and not cuneiform. Our
tax laws are not so supple that scraps of paper,
regardless of their calligraphy, can transmute trade-
ins into sales. Although [the taxpayer's] * * *
transfers may have been paper sales, they were actual
exchanges. A taxpayer may engineer his transactions to
minimize taxes, but he cannot make a transaction appear
to be what it is not. Documents record transactions,
but they do not always become the sole criteria for
transactional analysis. [Id. at 656, 659.]
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, supra, is distin-
guishable from the instant case for several reasons, including
the following. Unlike the case before us, the Redwing Carriers,
Inc., supra, case did not involve the inventory accounting issue
under section 471 that is presented here. In Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. Tomlinson, supra, the respective prices at which the old
trucks were transferred by the taxpayer and the new trucks were
acquired by its subsidiary were set for tax purposes in excess of
the aggregate fair market value of those trucks and were
therefore not determined on the basis of market-related factors,
such as supply and demand, and G.M.C. could have yielded a profit
from the transactions in question only by viewing the alleged
purchases of used trucks and the alleged sales of new trucks as
one transaction. In contrast, we have found in the instant case
that the remanufactured automobile part sales price (i.e., the
price that Consolidated charged a customer who purchased a
remanufactured automobile part) as well as the customer core
purchase offer amount and the core credit amount (i.e., the price
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that Consolidated paid to acquire a customer core) were
determined on the basis of market-related factors, such as supply
and demand. We conclude that Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968), does not control our
resolution of the issue presented here.
Nor does Burrell v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.
1968), govern our resolution of the inventory accounting issue
under section 471 that is involved in the instant case. In
Burrell v. Commissioner, supra, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, to which an appeal in this case would generally
lie, recited the facts on which it relied as follows:
In 1962, William P. Burrell,* * * as a sole
proprietor, was engaged in reboring automobile engine
blocks, called "cores," using them to rebuild
automobile engines which he sold to both retail and
wholesale customers. In order to maintain an inventory
of cores to be rebored, Burrell desired that each
customer to whom he sold a rebuilt engine with a
rebored core therein, deliver to him the old core in
the automobile engine which the rebuilt engine
replaced, or a like old core from an automobile engine
of the same make.
The amount of the bill which Burrell rendered to
customers who purchased from him rebuilt engines with
rebored cores was for a single amount, which, in fact,
was made up of two items. Such items were reflected
separately on an invoice furnished to the customer.
Item One on such invoice was for the rebuilt engine.
Item Two was for the core from the old engine, or a
substitute therefor, to be delivered to Burrell by the
customer.
* * * * * * *
When a new core was returned, Item Two was
cancelled, although the actual value of the old core
did not equal the amount of the Item Two charge. Such
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charge was purposely made higher than the value of the
old core to be returned, in order to induce customers
to return old cores and to enable Burrell to maintain a
needed inventory of old cores. Burrell did not
strictly enforce the 45-day limit, but accepted old
cores tendered to him for credit by customers a
considerable time after the 45-day period had expired.
The effect of a transaction between Burrell and a
customer was a charge against the customer in one
amount, reflected on the bill delivered to him, made up
of two items, one being Item One, the charge for the
rebuilt engine with a rebored core sold to the
customer, payable in cash, and which most customers
paid on receipt of the bill; and the other, Item Two,
to be paid by the return of a like core to Burrell
within 45 days, or if not returned within 45 days, to
be paid in full, in cash. The reason Burrell did not
strictly enforce the 45-day time limit was that he
preferred old cores to cash.
Burrell carried on his books an account referred
to as "Customer Core Deposits." It reflected the
amounts of Item Two charges which customers would have
to pay in cash if they failed to discharge them by the
return of an old core. * * *
On November 1, 1962, the Corporation [Engine
Rebuilders, Inc.] was organized under the laws of
Colorado. On that date, the Corporation, which was
wholly owned by the Burrells, took over the wholesale
business of Burrell. * * * The Corporation continued to
use the same billing and invoice procedures; the same
"Customer Core Deposits" account, and generally the
same bookkeeping methods that the Burrells had
followed.
Burrell v. Commissioner, supra at 683 (fn. ref. omitted). (We
shall refer to Burrell and the Corporation collectively as the
taxpayers.)
The issue in Burrell v. Commissioner, supra, was whether the
taxpayers were required to include the so-called item two charge
in income at the time they sold a rebuilt engine. Unlike the
-78-
instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the
Burrell case was not presented with the inventory accounting
question under section 471 of the proper amounts at which the
taxpayers were required to reflect the cores that they acquired
in their inventories, and that Court did not decide that issue.
The Court of Appeals in Burrell v. Commissioner, supra at 685,
held that the item two charges should have been included in
income at the time the rebuilt engines were sold by the
taxpayers. In dictum, that court suggested that
there might be some basis for the contention that the
amount thereof [the item two charge] did not accrue
until the expiration of 45 days from the date of the
sale and unless the customer during such period failed
to return the replacement core, and that the value of
the core returned should be accrued on the date of its
return within the 45-day period. [Id.]
However, the Court of Appeals did not apply the foregoing dictum
because "the taxpayers' books were so lacking in completeness,
that it would have been impossible to determine the amount the
taxpayers should have accrued on that basis." Id. Even assuming
arguendo that we were to find the above-quoted dictum to be a
correct statement of the tax law, we reject petitioner's
contention that that dictum controls our resolution of the
inventory accounting issue involving Consolidated's customer
cores that is presented here.
The facts involved in Burrell v. Commissioner, supra,
although they might appear to be facially similar to the facts
involved here, are different from the facts established by the
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record in the present case. For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit stated that the item two charge "was
purposely made higher than the value of the old core to be
returned, in order to induce customers to return old cores and to
enable Burrell to maintain a needed inventory of old cores." Id.
at 683. It is not clear what the Court of Appeals meant by the
term "value". In any event, in the instant case, we have found
on the record presented to us that Consolidated determined the
price that it was willing to pay to acquire customer cores on the
basis of market-related factors, including supply and demand, and
that it did not pay more to acquire customer cores than the
marketplace in which it acquired those cores demanded. The Court
in Burrell v. Commissioner, supra at 683, also indicated that the
taxpayers' books reflected an account called "Customer Core
Deposits" which "reflected the amounts of Item Two charges which
customers would have to pay in cash if they failed to discharge
them by the return of an old core." In the present case, we have
found that at the time of each sale of a remanufactured auto-
mobile part the core amount, which was part of the remanufactured
automobile part sales price for each such sale, was reflected in
Consolidated's books as an entry increasing "sales (core amount)"
and as part of an entry (i.e., the remanufactured automobile part
sales price) increasing "customer account receivable"; the core
amount was not shown in those books as a deposit.
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Based on our examination of the entire record in this case,
we reject petitioner's position that Consolidated acquired
customer cores in exchange transactions in which Consolidated's
customers purchased remanufactured automobile parts from it in
exchange for the payment by them of the exchange amounts and
delivery by them of customer cores to Consolidated. On that
record, we find that the substance of the transactions by which
Consolidated acquired customer cores were purchases in which
Consolidated purchased customer cores for the prices that were
shown in the customer core sales invoices under the column headed
"Cores--Price Each".
We shall now address what the cost and the market are for
purposes of section 471 for the customer cores that Consolidated
acquired.27
The Cost for Consolidated's Customer Cores
For purposes of inventory accounting under section 471, the
cost of merchandise purchased is determined under section 1.471-
3, Income Tax Regs. That section provides in pertinent part:
Cost means:
* * * * * * *
27
Assuming arguendo that we were to have found that
Consolidated’s acquisitions of customer cores were exchanges, and
not purchases, our findings below as to the cost and the market
for Consolidated's customer cores for purposes of sec. 471 would
not change.
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(b) In the case of merchandise purchased
since the beginning of the taxable year, the
invoice price * * *
Although petitioner disputes that the transactions by which
Consolidated acquired customer cores constituted purchases,
petitioner agrees with respondent that if the Court were to find
that such transactions were purchases, the term "merchandise
purchased" in section 1.471-3(b), Income Tax Regs., includes raw
materials purchased by a manufacturer, such as the customer cores
purchased by Consolidated. However, petitioner contends that
that regulation does not apply in determining the cost of the
customer cores acquired by Consolidated because there was no
invoice issued by any of Consolidated's customers and no invoice
price for any of those cores. On the record before us, we reject
petitioner's contention. We have found that at or about the time
that a customer delivered a customer core to Consolidated,
Consolidated prepared a sales invoice28 (viz, the customer core
sales invoice) which identified the type and the number of
customer cores of each type that each of its customers delivered
to it. We find no significance for purposes of section 471 and
section 1.471-3(b), Income Tax Regs., in the fact that it was
Consolidated, and not its customers, that generated the customer
core sales invoices. We also have found that the price which
28
Indeed, petitioner stipulated that the customer core
sales invoice prepared by Consolidated was a "sales invoice".
Attached to each customer core sales invoice was, inter alia, a
completed copy of a request for core credit.
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Consolidated paid for each customer core delivered to it by a
customer (viz, the core credit amount) was shown on each of the
customer core sales invoices under the column headed "Cores--
Price Each".
Petitioner further contends that section 1012 and the
regulations thereunder relating to the cost basis of property
require Consolidated to ascertain the respective fair market
values of the customer cores that it acquired in determining the
cost of those cores for purposes of section 471. According to
petitioner, the core credit amount for each customer core which
Consolidated acquired exceeded its fair market value, and the
aggregate amount of such alleged excesses is deductible under
section 162 as an amount expended to protect and promote
Consolidated's supply of raw materials. We disagree with
petitioner's position that section 1012 and the regulations
thereunder are determinative of the cost of Consolidated's
customer cores for purposes of section 471. Those provisions do
not control the determination of the proper amounts at which
property must be reflected in a taxpayer's inventories for
purposes of section 471. The regulations under section 1013
relating to the basis of property included in inventory make it
clear that the amounts at which property must be reflected in a
taxpayer's inventories are controlled by section 471 and the
regulations thereunder. Section 1.1013-1, Income Tax Regs.,
provides:
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The basis of property required to be included in
inventory is the last inventory value of such property
in the hands of the taxpayer. The requirements with
respect to the valuation of an inventory are stated in
subpart D (sections 471 and following), part II,
subchapter E, chapter 1 of the Code, and the
regulations thereunder.
We also reject petitioner's position that the aggregate
amount of the alleged excesses of the core credit amounts over
the alleged fair market values of Consolidated's customer cores
is deductible under section 162. In support of that position,
petitioner asserts:
Even if one regards the refund of the core deposit as
"payment" for the core, an artificially or unnecessarily
high payment does not change the "cost" of property under
the Code. Rather, when a taxpayer pays more than the fair
market value for the purchase of an asset and the excess
payment is for a purpose other than the acquisition of the
property or the transaction is based upon peculiar
circumstances which influence the purchaser to pay more than
fair market value, the excess amount is excluded from the
"cost" of the property. Jordan v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
872, 879 (1973), aff'd 514 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1975);
Majestic Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 12, 14-
15 (8th Cir. 1941), affirming 42 B.T.A. 698 (1940); New
Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 708,
724 (1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1945). Instead,
under such circumstances, cost is determined with reference
to the fair market value of the property received. Lemmen
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326, 1348 (1981), acq. 1983-1 C.B.
1.
As illustrated above, Respondent cannot reasonably
dispute that the core deposit for any particular
remanufactured automobile part is greatly in excess of the
fair market value of the core. In Burrell, the Tenth
Circuit found that the core deposit was purposely set higher
that [sic] the value of the core "in order to induce the
customers to return the old cores and to enable Burrell to
maintain a needed supply of cores." Burrell, 400 F.2d at
683. The same is true in the present case.
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We find the foregoing cases on which petitioner relies to be
distinguishable from the instant case and petitioner's reliance
on them to be misplaced. None of those cases involved the issue
of the proper amounts at which a taxpayer must reflect property
in such taxpayer's inventories. Moreover, unlike the cases (viz,
Majestic Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941),
affg. 42 B.T.A. 698 (1940); Lemmen v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326(1981); and New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.
708 (1943), affd. 146 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1945)) on which
petitioner relies in which the respective purchasers involved
there paid more than fair market value for the assets that they
purchased, we have found on the record before us that the amounts
for which Consolidated acquired customer cores were based on
market-related factors, including supply and demand, and were set
at amounts that the marketplace in which Consolidated purchased
those cores demanded.
On the record before us, we find that for purposes of
section 471 the cost for each of the customer cores that
Consolidated acquired is the price (viz, the core credit amount
for each such core) which it paid for each such core and which is
shown under the column headed "Cores--Price Each" on the customer
cores sales invoice that was prepared at or about the time a
customer delivered such a core to Consolidated.
The Market for Consolidated's Customer Cores
Petitioner contends that, as a result of "extraordinary
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facts and circumstances", section 1.471-4(b), Income Tax Regs.,
and not section 1.471-4(a), Income Tax Regs., applies in
determining the market for Consolidated's customer cores for
purposes of section 471. In support of that contention,
petitioner asserts that, unlike the manner in which prices are
set under normal market conditions with numerous buyers and
sellers operating at arm's length to achieve for themselves the
best economic bargain possible, Consolidated intentionally set
the core amounts, and consequently the customer core purchase
offer amounts and the core credit amounts, at amounts greater
than the core supplier amounts that it was paying its core
suppliers to purchase core supplier cores which had core supplier
guarantees and were of higher quality than customer cores of the
same types.29 As we understand it, petitioner also contends that
section 1.471-4(b), Income Tax Regs., and not section 1.471-4(a),
Income Tax Regs., applies because Consolidated did not purchase
customer cores in an open market.
Respondent contends that the market for Consolidated's
customer cores for purposes of section 471 is determined under
section 1.471-4(a), Income Tax Regs. Respondent further asserts
29
We are not persuaded on the record before us that Bishop
Engine and other core suppliers would not have increased their
prices (i.e., the core supplier amounts) for core supplier cores
in the event that Consolidated and/or other automobile parts
remanufacturers had decided to fill more of their respective core
inventory requirements from those core suppliers, rather than
from those remanufacturers' customers.
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that, pursuant to that section, as interpreted by Thor Power Tool
Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979), and Bamert v.
Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 1099 (1927), the market for each of
Consolidated's customer cores is the current bid price (i.e., the
replacement cost) for a customer core of the same type that was
prevailing at the respective dates of Consolidated's inventory in
the marketplace in which Consolidated actually participated and
that that marketplace is the marketplace in which it obtained
customer cores from its customers. According to respondent, the
current bid price or replacement cost for a customer core that
was included in Consolidated's inventories at the end of each of
the years at issue is the core credit amount for a customer core
of the same type that was prevailing at the end of each of those
years.
Section 1.471-4(a) and (b), Income Tax Regs., provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Under ordinary circumstances and for normal
goods in an inventory, "market" means the current bid
price prevailing at the date of the inventory for the
particular merchandise in the volume in which usually
purchased by the taxpayer, and is applicable in the
cases--
(1) Of goods purchased and on hand, and
(2) Of basic elements of cost (materials
* * *) in goods in process of manufacture and
in finished goods on hand; * * *
(b) Where no open market exists or where
quotations are nominal, due to inactive market
conditions, the taxpayer must use such evidence of a
fair market price at the date or dates nearest the
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inventory as may be available, such as specific
purchases or sales by the taxpayer or others in
reasonable volume and made in good faith, or
compensation paid for cancellation of contracts for
purchase commitments. * * *
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
term "current bid price" used in section 1.471-4(a), Income Tax
Regs., is synonymous with the "replacement cost, that is, the
price the taxpayer would have to pay on the open market to
purchase or reproduce the inventory items." Thor Power Tool Co.
v. Commissioner, supra at 534. The current bid price is to be
determined based on prevailing prices in the market in which the
taxpayer actually participates. D. Loveman & Son Export Corp. v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C. 776, 799 (1960), affd. 296 F.2d 732 (6th
Cir. 1961); Bamert v. Commissioner, supra at 1100.
Based on our examination of the entire record before us, we
find that Consolidated acquired its customer cores under
ordinary, and not extraordinary, circumstances. In acquiring
customer cores, Consolidated participated in the marketplace in
which it purchased those cores from its customers, and not in the
marketplace in which it purchased core supplier cores from core
suppliers. We further find that petitioner has failed to
persuade us either that the marketplace in which Consolidated
acquired customer cores from its customers is not an open market
in which Consolidated participated within the meaning of section
1.471-4(b), Income Tax Regs., or that Consolidated did not
acquire its customer cores in an open market. On the instant
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record, we find that section 1.471-4(a), Income Tax Regs., and
not section 1.471-4(b), Income Tax Regs., applies in determining
the market for Consolidated's customer cores for purposes of
section 471. We further find that the market under section
1.471-4(a), Income Tax Regs., is the replacement cost and that
the replacement cost for each of the customer cores of
Consolidated that were included in its inventories at the end of
each of the years at issue is the core credit amount for a
customer core of the same type that was prevailing at the end of
each of those years.
Based on our examination of the entire record in this case,
we find that petitioner has not shown that respondent abused
respondent's discretion in determining that Consolidated's FIFO-
LCM method does not clearly reflect income because that method
did not reflect the proper amounts for customer cores.
To reflect the foregoing and the concession of petitioner
for 1990,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.