Estate of Emanuel Trompeter, Robin Carol Trompeter Gonzalez and Janet Ilene Trompeter Polacheck, Co-Executors v. Commissioner

111 T.C. No. 2UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF EMANUEL TROMPETER, DECEASED,
ROBIN CAROL TROMPETER GONZALEZ AND JANET ILENE TROMPETER
POLACHEK, CO-EXECUTORS, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent*
Docket No. 11170-95. Filed July 22, 1998.
E, an estate, is subject to the fraud penalty of
sec. 6663(a), I.R.C. R computes this penalty based on
E's underpayment as determined by taking into account
only the deductions which were included on E's Federal
estate tax return. E computes its underpayment by also
taking into account deductions for expenses, such as
professional fees and deficiency interest, which arose
after the filing of E's return.
Held: E's underpayment is determined by taking
into account all deductible expenses, including those
paid or incurred after the filing of the return.
Robert A. Levinson and Avram Salkin, for petitioner.
*
This opinion supplements our Memorandum Opinion in
Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-35.
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Irene Scott Carroll, for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
LARO, Judge: The dispute herein involves the Rule 155
computation mandated by the Court's Memorandum Opinion filed as
Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-35. The
issue before the Court is one of first impression; namely,
whether an estate's underpayment for purposes of computing the
fraud penalty is determined based solely on expenses which are
included on the Federal estate tax return, or based on all
deductible expenses including deficiency interest and
professional fees which arise after the filing of the return.
We hold that the underpayment is determined by taking into
account all expenses. Unless otherwise stated, section
references are to the applicable provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure. Estate references are to the Estate of
Emanuel Trompeter. Mr. Trompeter (the decedent) resided in
Thousand Oaks, California, when he died on March 18, 1992. The
estate's coexecutors, Robin Carol Trompeter Gonzalez and Janet
Ilene Trompeter Polachek, resided in Florida and California,
respectively, when the petition was filed.
In Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, supra, we held that
the estate was subject to the fraud penalty under section
6663(a). The estate computes the amount of this penalty based on
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an underpayment that takes into account all deductible expenses,
including expenses for trustee's fees, attorney's fees, and
deficiency interest that were incurred after the filing of the
estate tax return. Respondent challenges the estate's ability to
compute its underpayment by deducting the latter expenses.
Respondent asserts that the estate must compute its underpayment
based solely on the expenses which were reported on its estate
tax return.
We agree with petitioner. Section 6663(a) imposes a
75-percent penalty on the portion of "any underpayment of tax
required to be shown on a return [that] is due to fraud".1 The
term "underpayment" is defined by section 6664(a) to mean
the amount by which any tax imposed by this
title exceeds the excess of--
(1) the sum of--
(A) the amount shown as the
tax by the taxpayer on his return,
plus
(B) amounts not so shown
previously assessed (or collected
without assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.
1
Sec. 6663(a) provides:
SEC. 6663(a). Imposition of Penalty.--If any part of
any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a
return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax
an amount equal to 75-percent on the portion of the
underpayment which is attributable to fraud.
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In the case of the Federal estate tax, the "amount of tax imposed
by this title" refers to the tax that "is hereby imposed on the
transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen
or resident of the United States." Sec. 2001(a). This tax is
determined based on the value of the taxable estate, sec. 2001,
which, in turn, is determined by reducing the value of the gross
estate by the amount of any deduction set forth in sections 2053
through 2056. Sec. 2051. Section 2053 allows a deduction for
certain expenses, indebtedness, and taxes. Section 2054 allows a
deduction for certain losses. Section 2055 allows a deduction
for certain transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses.
Section 2056 allows a deduction for certain bequests to a
surviving spouse.
Nowhere in the Code or regulations thereunder does it say
that an estate's underpayment is based solely on deductions that
appear on its estate tax return. Respondent reaches this result
by analogy to a line of cases which hold that a net operating
loss (NOL) carryback will not reduce the amount of an income tax
underpayment for purposes of computing a penalty or an addition
to tax. In this Court's seminal opinion of C.V.L. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 812 (1951), we held that a delinquency
penalty applied to a year for which it was later determined that
no tax was due on account of an NOL carryback. In reaching this
result, we relied on Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S.
561 (1950), and the Senate Finance Committee report accompanying
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the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798. The Supreme
Court held in Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., supra, that an
NOL carryback eliminated a deficiency for a prior year, but did
not eliminate the interest that accrued thereon. The Senate
Finance Committee report stated that
A taxpayer entitled to a carry-back of a net
operating loss * * * will not be able to determine the
deduction on account of such carry-back until the close
of the future taxable year in which he sustains the net
operating loss * * *. He must therefore file his
return and pay his tax without regard to such
deduction, and must file a claim for refund at the
close of the succeeding taxable year when he is able to
determine the amount of such carry-back. * * *
[S. Rept. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 123 (1942),
1942-2 C.B. 504, 597.]
This Court subsequently extended the principle enunciated in
C.V.L. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, to an NOL that was carried
back to a year in which the taxpayer was subject to an addition
to tax for fraud. The Court held in Petterson v. Commissioner,
19 T.C. 486 (1952), that the original deficiency was the proper
base for computing the fraud penalty, and that the NOL carryback
did not reduce this deficiency for purposes of that computation.
This and every other Court that has considered whether an
NOL carryback reduces an underpayment for purposes of computing
a penalty or an addition to tax has concluded that the principle
expressed in C.V.L. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, is correct;
namely, that the NOL carryback may not reduce the underpayment.
See, e.g., Arc Elec. Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 1005,
1009 (2d Cir. 1991), affg. on this issue and revg. and remanding
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T.C. Memo. 1990-30; Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283,
287-288 (5th Cir. 1961); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869, 877
(8th Cir. 1957), affg. on this issue and revg. and remanding
U.S. Packing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1955-194; Nick v.
Dunlap, 185 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1950); Rictor v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 913, 914-915 (1956); Auerbach Shoe Co. v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 191, 196 (1953), affd. 216 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1954);
Blanton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-397; Pusser
v. Commissioner, a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated
Dec. 7, 1951, affd. per curiam 206 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1953);
see also United States v. Keltner, 675 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir.
1982). Respondent's reliance on this line of cases for a similar
result here, however, is misplaced. The ability to carry back an
NOL depends on the happenings in a taxable year after the taxable
year in which the underpayment is due to fraud, and the
subsequent year may be as far away as 3 years after the year of
the fraudulent underpayment. The principle of C.V.L. Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra, reflects the fact that each taxable year is
a separate year for income tax purposes, and that a taxpayer may
not reduce his or her liability for fraudulent conduct in one
year by virtue of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances that
happen to occur in a later year. See Paccon, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 45 T.C. 392 (1966).
In the case of the Federal estate tax, however, the same
rationale does not apply. The Federal estate tax is not
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calculated on an annual basis, but is a one-time charge or excise
that is computed on the value of a decedent's gross estate less
certain deductions which are specifically allowed by the Code.
Some of these deductions, like the ones at hand, cannot be
determined until after a return is filed. Unlike an NOL
carryback, these deductions do not depend on unrelated,
unforeseen, or fortuitous circumstances that may occur in later
years. These deductions are directly related to a determination
of an estate's tax liability. In contrast to the determination
of Federal income tax liability, a determination of Federal
estate tax liability is not made based solely on deductions that
are required to be reported on the appropriate tax return as
filed. Indeed, our rules explicitly recognize the fact that even
some expenses incurred at or after a trial are deductible in
determining an estate's Federal estate tax liability. See Rule
156; see also Estate of Bailly v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 246,
supplemented by 81 T.C. 949 (1983).
We also disagree with respondent's argument in this case
because it could possibly lead to the imposition of the fraud
penalty when the taxpayer/estate does not have an underpayment of
tax and, indeed, may even be entitled to an overpayment. Such a
result is inconsistent with jurisprudence. As this Court has
consistently held, the fraud penalty does not apply without an
underpayment because "[absent] an underpayment, there is nothing
upon which the fraud addition to tax [or penalty, as it is now
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known] would attach." See, e.g., Newman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-652; Lerch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-295,
affd. 877 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1989); Hamilton v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1987-278, affd. without published opinion 872 F.2d
1025 (6th Cir. 1989); Shih-Hsieh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1986-525, affd. without published opinion 838 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir
1987); Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-307;
Apothaker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-445; Boggs v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-429; Meredith v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1985-170; Stephens v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-449;
Phillips v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-133; see also Compton
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-642; Hansen v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1981-98; Nunez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-216;
Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1968-29, affd. per curiam
418 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1969). Moreover, as the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has stated in a similar setting:
The taxpayer sought to introduce evidence to show the
market value of the option at the time it was given.
This evidence was excluded in the court below. In
addition, the taxpayer attempted to show additional
costs incurred for the timber and not claimed on the
1949 return. Likewise, the court below excluded this
evidence. Also, with respect to the unreported sales,
the taxpayer proffered evidence as to alleged
additional costs incident to the sales not reported on
the 1949 return. Again, the court below excluded the
evidence as being irrelevant. This was error. Indeed,
the appellee, United States, confesses error as to the
exclusion of this evidence and concedes that the case
should be remanded for a new trial. This undoubtedly
is the correct view, for these alleged additional costs
and the reasonable market value of the option, if
proven, are relevant to the existence of a tax
deficiency. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §293(b).
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Since fraud on the part of the taxpayer as to the
alleged deficiencies is the issue in this case, it is
correct to state that if there is no deficiency, there
can be no fraud in connection with the alleged
deficiency. This evidence should have been received.
[Jenkins v. United States, 313 F.2d 624, 627 (5th Cir.
1963).]
We have also considered whether an estate may deduct the
items reported on its estate tax return, in order to determine
its underpayment for purposes of applying section 6663(a), as
well as any unreported item that is properly deductible as of the
date that the estate tax return is filed. Such a result would be
reached by interpreting the phrase "tax required to be shown on a
return", as it appears in section 6663(a), to mean that an estate
must determine the related underpayment for that section by
taking into account only those items that could have been
properly deducted from the gross estate on the date that the
return was filed. We reject this interpretation. Congress did
not intend for that phrase to be understood in a temporal sense,
but intended that the phrase serve as a rule of classification.
In other words, the phrase "tax required to be shown on a return"
merely refers to the type of tax that is subject to section
6663(a); namely, a tax payable with a return as opposed to, for
example, a tax payable by stamp. In addition to our literal
reading of section 6663(a), in the view of the text of section
6663 as a whole, we find Congress' intent for the relevant phrase
by examining the evolution of section 6663(a). Section 6663(a)
was added to the Code by section 7721(a) of the Omnibus Budget
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Reconciliation Act of 1989 (the 1989 Act), Pub. L. 101-239,
103 Stat. 2106, 2395-2398. Prior to the passage of the 1989 Act,
the fraud penalty (or addition to tax, as it was then known) was
contained in former section 6653(b) and (e). This former section
provided:
SEC. 6653(b). Fraud.--
(1) In general.--If any part of any
underpayment * * * of tax required to be
shown on a return is due to fraud, there
shall be added to the tax an amount equal to
75 percent of the portion of the underpayment
which is attributable to fraud.
* * * * * * *
(e) Failure To Pay Stamp Tax.--Any person * * * who
willfully fails to pay any tax imposed by this title
which is payable by stamp, coupons, tickets, books, or
other devices or methods prescribed by this title or by
regulations under authority of this title, or willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty of 50
percent of the total amount of the underpayment of the
tax.
Section 7721(a) of the 1989 Act amended former section 6653 to
read almost verbatim with former section 6653(e); i.e., section
6653 now applies only to a failure to pay tax by way of stamps,
coupons, tickets, books, or other devices or methods prescribed
by the Code or regulations thereunder. Section 7721(a) of the
1989 Act also created section 6663(a) to impose the fraud penalty
on "tax required to be shown on a return". Congress did not
intend for the 1989 Act, as it applied to the fraud and
accuracy-related penalties, to create a new body of law that
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applied thereto. The reason for the change, as stated by the
House Committee on the Budget, was:
The committee believes that the number of
different penalties that relate to accuracy of a tax
return, as well as the potential for overlapping among
many of these penalties, causes confusion among
taxpayers and leads to difficulties in administering
these penalties by the IRS. Consequently, the
committee has revised these penalties and consolidated
them. The committee believes that its changes will
significantly improve the fairness, comprehensibility,
and administrability of these penalties. [H. Rept.
101-247, at 2221 (1989).]
Our interpretation of the relevant phrase is also supported
by Congress' recognition of the fact that some taxes are payable
by return and that other taxes are payable by stamp. Section
6511(a), for example, provides different limitations for credit
or refund, depending on whether it is "in respect of which tax
the taxpayer is required to file a return * * * [or] which is
required to be paid by means of a stamp". Likewise, section
6601(a) imposes interest on "any amount of tax imposed by this
title (whether required to be shown on a return, or to be paid by
stamp or by some other method) [that] is not paid on or before
the last day prescribed for payment". Similarly, section 6501(a)
generally provides that "the amount of any tax imposed by this
title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed
* * * or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after such
tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the
date on which any part of such tax was paid".
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Respondent relies on the principles of cases such as
Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 401 (1984), and
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938), to the effect
that fraud is established upon the filing of a fraudulent return
and that the fraud penalty reimburses the Government for
detecting, investigating, and prosecuting fraud. Although we
have no qualms about respondent's recitation of this well-settled
law, whether the estate is liable for fraud is not at issue here.
We decided that issue in Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-35, where we found that the estate had committed
fraud when it filed its estate tax return. We disagree with any
implication, however, that this body of law supports an
interpretation of the phrase "tax required to be shown on a
return" contrary to that which we espouse. The relevant phrase
does not apply just to cases of fraud. The same phrase appears
in section 6662(a), which, among other things, imposes a
20-percent accuracy-related penalty on underpayments attributable
to negligence and substantial understatement.
We hold that an estate's underpayment is determined by
taking into account all amounts which it is allowed to deduct in
computing its Federal estate tax liability. Respondent is
concerned that our holding will lead to bad tax policy in that
the "government's reimbursement [through the fraud penalty] could
be consumed by the * * * [estate's] counsels' fees and fees being
paid to the trustees, who happen to be the beneficiaries of the
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estate". We are not as concerned. Although it is true that fees
for professionals such as attorneys and trustees may be
considerable expenses in the administration of an estate, only
those fees that are legitimate and reasonable are deductible.
We also note that respondent's policy argument is better aimed at
Congress.
We have considered all arguments by respondent for a holding
contrary to that which we reach herein, and, to the extent not
discussed above, have found those arguments to be irrelevant or
without merit. To reflect the foregoing
An appropriate order will
be issued.
Reviewed by the Court.
CHABOT, SWIFT, JACOBS, PARR, WELLS, COLVIN, FOLEY, VASQUEZ,
GALE, THORNTON, and MARVEL, JJ., agree with this majority
opinion.
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CHABOT, J., concurring: I join in the majority opinion, and
write separately merely to note a few additional considerations
in support of the majority opinion’s analysis and conclusions.
I. Treasury Regulations
Respondent argues that only those expenses which are
reported on the estate tax return may be deducted from the gross
estate in computing the amount of the underpayment.
Correspondingly, respondent further argues that expenses which
arise after the filing of the tax return may not be used to
reduce the underpayment of the estate tax.
However, section 2053(a), in determining the value of the
taxable estate, permits the deduction of claims against the
estate which are allowable by applicable State laws. There are
some types of claims whose effect on the decedent’s estate must
necessarily be determined by subsequent events, such as those
claims which require further action before they become a fixed
obligation of the estate. See cases discussed in Estate of Smith
v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 412, 418-419 (1997), supplemented by
110 T.C. 12 (1998); Estate of Kyle v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 829,
848-851 (1990); Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 769,
779-783 (1987), affd. in part and revd. in part 856 F.2d 1158,
1162-1163 (8th Cir. 1988); Estate of Van Horne v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 728, 735-738 (1982), affd. 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Section 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs.,1 forbids the deduction
on the estate tax return of an item unless the amount of the
liability “is ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and will
be paid.” The provision closes with the reassurance that, if the
matter is not resolved by the time of the final audit, then
relief would be available in the Tax Court or in a refund suit.
Respondent’s contentions in the instant case fly in the face
of this reassurance. Having forbidden by regulation the taking
of a deduction, even by way of estimate, on a timely filed estate
tax return, respondent in the instant case proposes to limit the
relief otherwise flowing from the deduction merely because the
1
SEC. 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs., provides as
follows:
SEC. 20.2053-1. Deductions for expenses, indebtedness, and
taxes; in general. * * *
* * * * * * *
(b) Provisions applicable to both categories.
* * * * * * *
(3) Estimated amounts. An item may be entered on
the return for deduction though its exact amount is not
then known, provided it is ascertainable with
reasonable certainty, and will be paid. No deduction
may be taken upon the basis of a vague or uncertain
estimate. If the amount of a liability was not
ascertainable at the time of final audit of the return
by the district director and, as a consequence, it was
not allowed as a deduction in the audit, and
subsequently the amount of the liability is
ascertained, relief may be sought by a petition to the
Tax Court or a claim for refund as provided by sections
6213(a) and 6511, respectively.
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taxpayer obeyed the regulation, waited until the event occurred,
and sought the promised relief at an appropriate time in the
instant Tax Court proceeding.
In United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S.
232, 236 (1955), the Supreme Court directed that “We can only
take the Code as we find it and give it as great an internal
symmetry and consistency as its words permit.” Thus, if the
phrase “tax required to be shown on a return” were to be
interpreted in a temporal sense in section 6663(a), then it ought
to have the same meaning wherever it appears. This means that it
would have the same meaning where it appears in section 6662(a),
and would have the same impact on those of the section 6662
additions that apply to the estate tax.
Respondent’s contentions in the instant case might well lead
prudent executors to load up estate tax returns with speculative
deductions in order to satisfy this newly proclaimed requirement,
that only items claimed on the estate tax return may be taken
into account in determining the base for additions to tax under
sections 6662 and 6663.
Thus, respondent’s contentions in the instant case appear to
conflict with Treasury regulations and may well complicate the
practical administration of the estate tax laws.
II. Legislative History
The majority opinion explains that the phrase “tax required
to be shown on a return” has a clear classification meaning in
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the places in the Code where the phrase appears, but a temporal
meaning which would support respondent’s position would not fit
in many such places. An examination of the legislative history
of the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, where this
phrase appears to have been introduced into the fraud provision,
lends further support to the majority opinion’s analysis and
conclusions.
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the civil fraud
addition to tax for income tax was imposed by section 293(b),
with a special rule in section 51(g)(6)(B) in certain joint tax
return situations; for gift tax by section 1019(b); and generally
for other taxes where tax returns or lists were filed by section
3612(d)(2). As to the applicability of section 3612(d)(2) to
estate taxes, see sec. 871(i). The civil fraud addition to tax
for various stamp taxes was imposed by section 1821(a)(3).
When the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted, the
foregoing 1939 Code provisions were replaced by the following:
SEC. 6653. FAILURE TO PAY TAX.
* * * * * * *
(b) Fraud.--If any part of any underpayment (as
defined in subsection (c)) of tax required to be shown
on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to
the tax an amount equal to 50 percent of the
underpayment. In the case of income taxes and gift
taxes, this amount shall be in lieu of any amount
determined under subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
(e) Failure To Pay Stamp Tax.--Any person (as
defined in section 6671(b)) who willfully fails to pay
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any tax imposed by this title which is payable by
stamp, coupons, tickets, books, or other devices or
methods prescribed by this title or by regulations
under authority of this title, or willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be liable to a penalty of 50 percent
of the total amount of the underpayment of the tax.
The text of these provisions as enacted is identical to the
text of these provisions as reported by the Senate Finance
Committee.
The Senate Finance Committee’s technical explanation of
these fraud provisions, S. Rept. 83-1622, at 591-592 (1954), is
as follows:
Section 6653. Failure to pay tax
For all taxes for which returns are required, this
section prescribes additions to the tax, corresponding
to those of existing law relating to the income tax,
for underpayments of tax resulting from fraud (50
percent of the underpayment). Existing law imposes a
50 percent addition in the case of fraud applicable to
all taxes, but, in the case of taxes other than income,
estate, and gift, that addition is based on the total
amount of tax imposed. This section further provides
that if the 50 percent penalty resulting from the fraud
is assessed, the addition to tax under section 6651 for
failure to file a return will not be assessed with
respect to the same underpayment. Another change
provided in this section is the substitution, for the
penalty provided in existing law of an amount equal to
the amount of any stamp tax evaded or not paid, of an
addition to the tax of 50 percent of the total amount
of the underpayment of such tax.
To the same effect is the House Ways and Means Committee’s
report. H. Rept. 83-1337, at A419 (1954).
Thus, it is clear that in 1954 the Congress intended to
consolidate and revise many of the 1939 Code fraud provisions.
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The phrase “tax required to be shown on a return” is described in
the committee report as “all taxes for which returns are
required”. S. Rept. 83-1622 at 591. That phrase is used to set
off the section 6653(b), I.R.C. 1954 rules from the rules
applying to “any tax imposed by this title which is payable by
stamp, coupons, tickets, books, or other devices”, which are
collectively referred to in the committee report as “any stamp
tax” S. Rept. 83-1622, at 591, and which appear in the statute at
section 6653(e), I.R.C. 1954.
The classification interpretation is clear from the
legislative events of 1954 and the committee reports. One
searches in vain for any legislative events of 1954 or
explanations in the course of the enactment of the 1954 Code that
suggests that the phrase in dispute should be given a temporal
interpretation, whether as to fraud or in general.
SWIFT, PARR, WHALEN, LARO, VASQUEZ, GALE, and MARVEL, JJ.,
agree with this concurring opinion.
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SWIFT, J., concurring: Judge Ruwe’s dissent acknowledges
that under section 2053(a) an estate, or a preparer of an estate
tax return, may estimate and claim on the estate tax return,
expenses not yet incurred if such expenses are reasonably
anticipated and an amount therefor can be reasonably estimated.
See sec. 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs.
In Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-35,
we found that the executor in this case “knowingly” filed a
fraudulent estate tax return. Because the fraud was “known” at
the time the estate tax return was filed, it would appear that it
would not have been unreasonable (albeit perhaps a poor strategy)
for the tax return preparer to have anticipated respondent’s
audit and the litigation that followed and, under section 2053,
to have estimated on the estate tax return a reasonable amount
for legal fees likely to be incurred in connection with the
litigation and to have claimed such expenses as deductions.
I note that under current law and ethical guidelines, tax
return preparers may no longer consider the audit lottery when
evaluating the “reasonableness” of tax return positions. See
Treas. Dept. Circular No. 230 (Regulations Governing the Practice
* * * Before the Internal Revenue Service); AICPA Statements on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 1, par. 03a and
Interpretation No. 1-1, par. 05; ABA Ethics Opinion 85-352.
Circular No. 230 at section 10.34(a)(4)(i) provides as
follows:
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The possibility that a position will not be
challenged by the Service (e.g., because the
taxpayer’s return may not be audited or
because the issue may not be raised on audit)
may not be taken into account.
In other words, in considering the “hazards of litigation”
or the reasonableness of a particular tax return position, tax
return preparers are now to assume that tax returns will be
audited by respondent and that questionable items reported and
claimed on the returns will be disallowed by respondent.
Accordingly, with regard to questionable items knowingly
reported on estate tax returns, taxpayers and tax return
preparers generally are to anticipate that an audit will occur
and that questionable items will be disallowed by respondent, and
they are to anticipate that the estate will incur additional
legal expenses associated with that disallowance. Thus, under
section 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs., it appears that legal
expenses likely to be associated with a disallowance by
respondent of questionable items reflected on estate tax returns
could be claimed on the returns when filed, based on reasonable
estimates therefor.
I have two further points.
If a taxpayer and a tax return preparer jointly and
knowingly participate in the preparation and filing of a grossly
fraudulent tax return to such an extent that the fraud -- when
first raised by respondent on audit -- should have been
- 22 -
immediately conceded by the taxpayer and by the taxpayer’s legal
representative, then the taxpayer should not have contested
either the resulting tax deficiency or the imposition of the
fraud penalty. A contest involving such a patently fraudulent
return would be frivolous.
Under the above approach, postaudit administrative hearings
and Tax Court litigation contesting an estate tax deficiency and
imposition of a fraud penalty ought to be regarded as unnecessary
and frivolous, and legal expenses relating thereto should be
disallowed under section 2053 and section 20.2053-3(a), Estate
Tax Regs., as unreasonable and as incurred not for the benefit of
the estate, but for the benefit of the beneficiaries (i.e., as
merely an attempt by the beneficiaries to postpone payment of the
proper estate tax and penalties due). See, for example, Hibernia
Bank, Admr. (Estate of Clark) v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 746
(9th Cir. 1978); Estate of Dutcher v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 918,
923 (1960); Estate of Bartberger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1988-21; and Estate of Pudim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-
606, affd. without published opinion 942 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir.
1983), each of which illustrates the disallowance, for estate tax
purposes, of legal and other fees and costs due to the fact that
the costs were not incurred in the good faith administration of
the estate but for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
- 23 -
I would think that the above authority would provide the
mechanism to handle the dissent’s hypothetical situation that
reflects bad faith and frivolous litigation.
Lastly, if, on policy grounds,1 expenses of the type in
dispute herein should be denied as a matter of law, it would
appear appropriate for Congress to do so by legislation, rather
than by opinion of this Court and by respondent’s strained
interpretation of the statutory provisions, under which the
expenses in dispute would be deductible under section 2053 for
civil tax deficiency purposes but, as a matter of law, would not
be deductible for purposes of the computation of the fraud
addition to tax. If Congress intends significant disparate
treatment in the allowance of identical expenses for two closely
related purposes, I would expect such disparate treatment to be
clearly set forth in the statutory scheme.
1
A strong policy argument certainly can be made that because
the items in question in this case were fraudulent they never
should have been claimed on the estate tax return in the first
place and the subsequent and related litigation expenses then
never would have been incurred.
- 24 -
HALPERN, J., concurring: The majority’s interpretation of
section 6663(a) leads to the conclusion that an executor who, in
anticipation of incurring future administration expenses, deducts
those expenses on the estate tax return, knowing full well that
such expenses are not deductible until incurred, will avoid any
section 6663(a) penalty with respect to his action even if the
Court finds that he acted with fraudulent intent, so long as the
expenses eventually are incurred. Cf. Summerill Tubing Co. v.
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 347 (1937) (fraud in corporate return on
account of fictitious purchases, which masked embezzlement;
statutory period of limitations extended on account of fraud; no
deficiency on which to base addition to tax for fraud because of
offsetting theft-loss deduction). As a matter of policy, I
question such result. Nonetheless, I think that it is compelled
because of the structure and historical development of the
section 6663(a) fraud penalty.
As a matter of arithmetic, section 6663(a) contains an
equation, in which the amount of the fraud penalty equals the
product of a multiplier (“75 percent”) and a multiplicand (“the
portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud”).
Section 6663(a) is ambiguous, however, as illustrated by the
debate between the majority and Judge Ruwe. The issue is whether
we are to determine one aspect of the multiplicand (the
underpayment) as of the time the return is filed or as ultimately
determined. Since the term “underpayment” is defined in section
- 25 -
6664(a) without any temporal qualification, the focus is on the
phrase “of tax required to be shown on a return”, which modifies
the term “underpayment” in section 6663(a).1 I am persuaded that
the majority has reached the right result on the basis of both
the history of section 6663 and a textual analysis.
The relevant history concerns the evolution of the 1939 Code
into the 1954 Code. An adequate summary of that history is
provided in Judge Chabot's concurring op. pp. 16-19. The
important point is that, in 1954, Congress’ purpose was to
consolidate and revise many of the 1939 Code fraud provisions.
Under the 1939 Code, as described in the report of the Committee
on Finance, see Judge Chabot's concurring op. p. 18, there were
two models for imposition of a fraud addition. For all taxes,
there was a 50-percent addition in the case of fraud. The base
1
In pertinent part, the term “underpayment”, as defined
in sec. 6664(a), is the difference between “the tax imposed by
this title” and “the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on
his return”. Notwithstanding that the majority says that the
issue before the Court is whether the underpayment “is determined
based solely on expenses which are included on the Federal estate
tax return, or based on all deductible expenses including
deficiency interest and professional fees which arise after the
filing of the return”, majority op. p. 2, the issue is plainly
whether sec. 6663(a) specifies a time (the time for filing the
return) for determining the minuend (i.e., the “the tax imposed
by this title”) in the sec. 6664(a) equation. With respect to
the question of statutory interpretation facing us, the
subtrahend (i.e., “the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on
his return”) is invariable. Thus, a taxpayer can reduce the
sec. 6663(a) fraud penalty by proving deductions available at the
time the return was filed but omitted therefrom. Cf. Summerill
Tubing Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 347 (1937) (discussed in
the text). The majority’s mischaracterization is of no
consequence in calculating the relevant difference.
- 26 -
(the multiplicand), however, differed as between the income,
estate, and gift taxes, on the one hand, and all other taxes on
the other hand. The multiplicand for the former group was the
amount of the deficiency in tax. See, e.g., 1939 Code sec.
293(b). For all other taxes, the multiplicand was the amount of
tax due. See sec. 3612(d)(2), I.R.C. 1939. For the 1954 Code,
as stated in the report of the Senate Finance Committee, Congress
chose the income tax model for all taxes for which returns are
due. The 1939 provision, section 293(b), provided as follows:
Fraud.--If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud
with intent to evade tax, then 50 per centum of the
total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such
deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected, and paid,
in lieu of the 50 per centum addition to the tax
provided in section 3612(d)(2).
The term “deficiency” was defined in section 271 of the 1939 Code
much as it is defined both in the 1954 Code and today, and much
as the term “underpayment” is defined in section 6664(a). I do
not read any temporal qualification into the multiplicand in the
1939 Code income tax fraud equation, and, for that reason, I do
not think that Congress intended one to exist today. Such a
qualification would have been a significant change, and I think
that the lack of any mention of such a change in the legislative
history is persuasive that one was not intended.
With respect to the text of section 6663, the object of the
adjectival prepositional phrase “of tax required to be shown on a
return” is the immediately preceding noun “underpayment”. The
phrase does not modify the second use of the noun “underpayment”
- 27 -
in subsection (a), which second use is in the actual penalty
equation, nor does it modify any use of the noun “underpayment”
in subsections (b) and (c). If Congress had intended the phrase
to be a temporal qualification on the term “underpayment” for
purposes of the penalty equation, then it is unlikely that
Congress would have merely implied such qualification in the
equation.
Also, Congress used the indefinite article “a”, supporting
the majority’s interpretation that the phrase “required to be
shown on a return” is a general qualification, rather than the
definite article “the”, which would support Judge Ruwe’s
interpretation that the phrase is a temporal requirement
regarding the return.
SWIFT, WHALEN, BEGHE, and GALE, JJ., agree with this
concurring opinion.
- 28 -
RUWE, J., dissenting: The majority holds that in
determining the "underpayment" on which the section 6663(a) fraud
penalty is imposed, petitioner is allowed to deduct expenses that
were incurred long after the fraudulent estate tax return was
filed. Although there is no dispute that reasonable postreturn
expenses are allowable for purposes of determining the ultimate
estate tax, section 6663(a) specifically provides that the fraud
penalty be imposed on "any part of any underpayment of tax
required to be shown on a return". (Emphasis added.) The
majority interprets the highlighted portion of the statutory
phrase as merely a classification of the type of tax to which
section 6663(a) applies. I believe that a more reasonable
interpretation is that section 6663(a) imposes the penalty on the
amount of the fraudulent underpayment of tax that was required to
be shown on a return at the time the fraudulent return was filed.
An estate tax return must be filed, and the tax must be
paid, within 9 months after the decedent's death.1 Secs.
6075(a), 6151. A deduction from the gross estate is allowed for
administration expenses. Sec. 2053(a). For expenses that are
not paid prior to filing the estate tax return, an estimated
amount may be deducted if it is known that such expenses will be
1
An extension up to 6 months may be obtained for filing.
Sec. 6081(a); sec. 20.6081-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.; see Estate of
La Meres v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 294, 320-321 (1992). The time
for payment of the estate tax may be extended for a period of 1
year past the due date. Sec. 6161(a)(1). For reasonable cause,
the time for payment may be extended for up to 10 years. Sec.
6161(a)(2).
- 29 -
paid and if they are ascertainable with reasonable certainty.
Thus, section 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs., provides:
An item may be entered on the return for deduction
though its exact amount is not then known, provided it
is ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and will be
paid. No deduction may be taken upon the basis of a
vague or uncertain estimate. If the amount of a
liability was not ascertainable at the time of final
audit of the return by the district director and, as a
consequence, it was not allowed as a deduction in the
audit, and subsequently the amount of the liability is
ascertained, relief may be sought by a petition to the
Tax Court or a claim for refund as provided by sections
6213(a) and 6511, respectively. [Emphasis added.]
While postreturn expenses can reduce the taxable estate, if they
are not ascertainable at the time the return is filed, such
expenses cannot be deducted on the estate tax return. See Estate
of Bailly v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 246, supplemented by 81 T.C.
949 (1983).
The amount of tax required to be shown on a return can only
be computed based on the facts and circumstances in existence
when the return is filed. Expenses for petitioner's subsequent
contest of the deficiency and fraud penalty had not been incurred
and could not have been ascertained at the time the return was
filed. Likewise, interest on the fraudulent underpayment had not
yet been incurred nor was it ascertainable. Petitioner's
postreturn expenses could not have been deducted on its estate
tax return, and hence, these expenses do not reduce the tax
liability that was required to be shown on the return. The
ability to adjust a tax liability after the return is due does
not relieve a taxpayer of the obligation to report the tax in
- 30 -
full when it is due, nor does it defer a taxpayer's duty to pay
the tax promptly. Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S. 561(1950).2
Any distinction between the calculation of an estate tax
liability and the calculation of an income tax liability has no
bearing on the taxpayer's statutory obligation to file an
accurate and timely return. The reasoning in the line of cases
holding that a net operating loss (NOL) carryback will not reduce
the amount of an income tax underpayment for purposes of
computing a penalty or an addition to tax was not based on the
unique nature of the income tax.
The rationale in C.V.L. Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 812(1951), is not based on the fact that each taxable year is a
separate year for income tax purposes as the majority claims.
Majority op. p. 6. In that case we upheld a delinquency penalty
even though the deficiency had been eliminated by an NOL
carryback because the obligation to file a timely return was
2
In Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S. 561, 565
(1950), the Court stated:
The problem with which we are concerned in this case is
whether the interest on a validly assessed deficiency
is abated when the deficiency itself is abated by the
carryback of a net operating loss.
* * * The subsequent cancellation of the duty to
pay this assessed deficiency does not cancel in like
manner the duty to pay the interest on that deficiency.
From the date the original return was to be filed until
the date the deficiency was actually assessed, the
taxpayer had a positive obligation to the United
States: a duty to pay its tax. * * * [Emphasis added.]
- 31 -
mandatory and subsequent events could not excuse that obligation.
Id. at 861. In Auerbach Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 191,
196 (1953), affd. 216 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1954), we held that
The taxpayer is required to report the correct
amount of his income in filing a return. Where this is
not done due to the taxpayer's fraudulent conduct,
liability for the 50 per cent addition to the tax for
fraud is incurred and the unforeseen circumstance that
a carry-back later arises to offset the deficiency
should not operate to relieve the taxpayer of the
addition imposed for the fraud. * * * The liability for
the additions to the tax for fraud existed from the
time of the filing of the false and fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax. The addition is to be
measured by the deficiency, undiminished by any
subsequent credit or carry-back. [Emphasis added.]
The key fact relied upon in both C.V.L. Corp. v. Commissioner,
supra, and Auerbach Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, supra, was that the
event which reduced the original "underpayment" occurred after
the return at issue was filed. The fact that each taxable year
is a separate year for income tax purposes was not discussed, nor
was it relied upon, in any of the other cases cited by the
majority.3 Consequently, the principle upon which these NOL
carryback cases are based is applicable to the present case.
3
The concept of separate taxable years is clearly not
determinative. We have stated that if the event creating the
deduction occurred in a separate prior year, the deduction would
be allowed to reduce the liability for the year at issue for
purposes of computing additions to tax. Blanton Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-397 ("The basic principle to be
found in prior case law would permit reduction for carryforward
loss deductions and credits, but prohibit carryback loss
deductions and credits, when computing additions to tax.").
- 32 -
Petitioner had a duty to file an estate tax return as of a
certain date and to pay the amount of the tax due on that date.
Like a taxpayer entitled to carry back an NOL, petitioner here,
did not incur, and therefore was not able to determine, the
subsequently incurred expenses until after the estate tax return
was required to be filed. Like the NOL carrybacks, these
expenses could not have been deducted in computing the tax
required to be shown on the estate tax return. Like NOL
carrybacks, these later incurred expenses can be deducted only
pursuant to proceedings subsequent to the filing of the return.
See sec. 20.2053-1(b)(3), Estate Tax Regs.1
The fraud that is being penalized by section 6663(a) is
complete when a fraudulent return is filed. In Badaracco v.
Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 394 (1984), the Supreme Court
explained that:
fraud was committed, and the offense completed, when
the original return was prepared and filed. * * * In
short, once a fraudulent return has been filed, the
case remains one "of a false or fraudulent return,"
1
This is the same situation recognized by the Senate Finance
Committee report that is quoted in the majority opinion p. 5.
A taxpayer entitled to a carry-back of a net
operating loss * * * will not be able to determine the
deduction on account of such carry-back until the close
of the future taxable year in which he sustains the net
operating loss * * *. He must therefore file his
return and pay his tax without regard to such
deduction, and must file a claim for refund at the
close of the succeeding taxable year when he is able to
determine the amount of such carry-back. * * * [S.
Rept. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 123 (1942), 1942-2
C.B. 504, 597; emphasis added.]
- 33 -
regardless of the taxpayer's later revised conduct, for
purposes of criminal prosecution and civil fraud
liability under § 6653(b). * * *
Since fraud is based on the facts and circumstances at the time
the fraudulent return was filed, it makes sense that the facts
and circumstances considered in determining the amount of the
resulting penalty should be the same. Courts addressing the
fraud penalty examine the facts and circumstances in a time-
specific manner, not only in determining if fraud existed, but
also in determining the amount of the associated penalty. See
Arc Elec. Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("A taxpayer who commits a fraud in reporting taxes in
one year may not, on account of a fortuitous carryback that later
develops which eliminates tax liability for that same year, claim
that the carryback wipes out the fraud as well. Once fraud is
demonstrated, it is, as it were, frozen in time, unaffected by
subsequent events."), affg. on this issue and revg. and remanding
T.C. Memo. 1990-30.
This same logic is reflected by the statutory language of
section 6663(a) that imposes the penalty on the fraudulent
"underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return." This
logic is also reflected in the legislative history of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, sec. 7721(a),
103 Stat. 2106, 2395-2398, which introduced section 6663 and
retained the provisions imposing interest on the fraud penalties
from the date the return was required to be filed.
- 34 -
The bill retains the general rule of present law
that interest on these penalties commences with the
date the return was required to be filed. The
committee believes this rule is appropriate because the
behavior being penalized is reflected on the tax
return, so that imposition of interest from this date
will reduce the incentives of taxpayers and their
advisors to 'play the audit lottery.' [H. Rept. 101-
247, at 2234 (1989).]
The majority states that Congress used the phrase "tax
required to be shown on a return" as a classification and did not
intend that the penalty be based on the specific tax required to
be shown on the fraudulent return on the filing date. See
majority op. p. 9. I disagree. The statutory classification of
situations covered by the section 6663(a) penalty is contained in
section 6664. Section 6664(b) provides that the accuracy-related
and the fraud penalties of sections 6662 and 6663, "shall apply
only in cases where a return of tax is filed". Section 6664(b)
specifically classifies the situations to which section 6663(a)
applies. If the phrase "tax required to be shown on a return" in
section 6663 only refers to the type of tax, as the majority
suggests, the phrase would be surplusage. In construing the tax
Code, words used should not be considered surplusage. D.
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (It is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that "effect shall be
given to every clause and part of a statute."); Arc Elec. Constr.
Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 1008.
The majority's interpretation will also produce an
unintended inconsistency between the way in which the fraud
- 35 -
penalties in sections 6663 and 6651 are computed. Prior to the
enactment of section 6663 in 1989, section 6653(b) imposed a
penalty for fraud, regardless of whether or not a return was
filed. When Congress enacted section 6663 imposing a fraud
penalty for fraudulent returns, it added section 6651(f) imposing
a separate penalty for any fraudulent failure to file a return.
The penalty for fraudulent failure to file is imposed by using
the following statutory language:
SEC. 6651(a) Addition to the Tax.--In case of failure--
(1) to file any return required under authority of
subchapter A of chapter 61 * * * there shall be added
to the amount required to be shown as tax on such
return * * * [15] percent of the amount of such tax if
the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an
additional * * * [15] percent for each additional month
or fraction thereof during which such failure
continues, not exceeding * * * [75] percent in the
aggregate; [Sec. 6651(a), (f); emphasis added.5]
The above-quoted language makes it clear that the section 6651
fraud penalty applies to the tax that was required to be shown on
a specific return on the specific date that such return was
required to be filed. This statutory language literally
precludes any allowance for expenses incurred after the return
due date in computing the fraud penalty. In 1989, when Congress
enacted separate fraud penalties for fraudulent returns and
fraudulent failures to file, there was nothing to indicate that
5
The bracketed percentages are substituted into sec. 6651(a)
pursuant to sec. 6651(f) in cases where the failure to file is
fraudulent.
- 36 -
Congress intended to allow events occurring after the return due
date to produce different results depending on whether or not a
return was filed.
In defining the meaning of "underpayment" for purposes of
this case, the majority holds that "the 'amount of tax imposed by
this title' refers to the tax that 'is hereby imposed on the
transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen
or resident of the United States.' Sec. 2001(a)." See majority
op. p. 4. But this can only be true if one looks at the tax
required to be shown on the tax return on its due date. Section
6664(a) defines "underpayment" generally to mean "the amount by
which any tax imposed by this title" exceeds the amount shown as
the tax by the taxpayer on his return. The isolated phrase "tax
imposed by this title" is much more inclusive than the majority
holds. For example, in the very next section of the Code,
section 6665(a)(2) provides:
any reference in this title to "tax" imposed by this
title shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to
the tax, additional amounts, and penalties provided by
this chapter. [Emphasis added.]
Likewise, section 6601(e)(1) provides:
(1) Interest treated as tax.-- * * * Any
reference in this title (except subchapter B of chapter
63, relating to deficiency procedures) to any tax
imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to
interest imposed by this section on such tax.
[Emphasis added.]
- 37 -
Pursuant to these sections, any computation of the "tax
imposed by this title" made without reference to the point in
time that the return was required to be filed, would have to
include both interest and penalties. The majority clearly does
not contemplate that interest and penalties be included in "tax
imposed by this title" for purposes of computing the
"underpayment" to which the fraud penalty applies. However, the
only way to avoid such a result is to interpret section 6663 as
imposing the fraud penalty on the underpayment of tax that was
required to be shown on the taxpayer's return at the time it was
filed.6 Prior to the 1989 enactment of sections 6663 and 6664,
the fraud penalty provided for by section 6653(b) was based on an
"underpayment" that was generally defined in section 6653(c) as a
"deficiency" within the meaning of section 6211. Neither the
fraud penalty nor interest is within the definition of a
"deficiency" pursuant to sections 6211 and 6601(e). See White v.
Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209 (1990); Estate of DiRezza v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19 (1982).
Finally, the purpose of the fraud penalty is to reimburse
the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the
loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud. Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938); Ianniello v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165,
180 (1992). The majority would allow a fraudulent taxpayer to
reduce the penalty by costs incurred to fight the Government's
6
The tax required to be shown on a timely filed return would
not include any interest or penalty.
- 38 -
attempt to detect and recover fraudulently omitted tax and by
interest charged for the period during which the fraudulently
omitted tax was not paid.1 This thwarts the very purpose of the
penalty.
Respondent's concern that the "government's reimbursement
[through the fraud penalty] could be consumed by the * * *
[estate's] counsels' fees and fees being paid to the trustees,
who happen to be the beneficiaries of the estate", majority op.
p. 12, should concern us as well. This case appears to have been
hotly contested. The Court's initial opinion depicts a massive
fraud that respondent proved by clear and convincing evidence.
See Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-35.
Under the majority's holding, for every dollar that the estate
incurs in unsuccessfully fighting the deficiency and fraud
penalty, it could potentially save more than $.96 in tax and
penalties!
A simple hypothetical may help explain this: Assume a 55-
percent tax rate and a timely filed fraudulent return showing a
taxable estate of $1,000.2 The estate reports and pays tax of
$550 with the return. Later, the value of the taxable estate
(before postreturn expenses) is determined by the Commissioner to
be $2,000. The total amount of tax that should have been shown
1
Petitioner is claiming postreturn administrative expenses
of $926,274 and interest expenses in the amount of $4,167,275.
2
This is just an example. The 55-percent rate is applied to
taxable estates exceeding $3 million. Petitioner was clearly in
the 55-percent bracket.
- 39 -
on the return was $1,100. This results in a $550 increase in tax
over the tax reported on the return. The Commissioner also
determines that the underpayment is due to fraud. Therefore, the
estate would be liable for the additional $550 tax plus the fraud
penalty in the amount of $412.50 (.75 x $550) for a total of
$962.50 ($550 + $412.50).
Now assume that in the resulting litigation, respondent's
determination is upheld on all points, but in contesting the
case, the estate incurs expenses of $1,000. These expenses
reduce the value of the taxable estate to $1,000, which in turn
results in a total tax liability of $550 ($1,000 x .55), the same
amount reported on the fraudulent return. Pursuant to the
majority opinion, the estate would pay no additional tax and no
fraud penalty. Even though the estate lost all of the issues in
litigation and spent $1,000, its real out-of-pocket costs would
not exceed $37.50.
The results that will occur under the majority's holding can
be avoided by a reasonable interpretation of section 6663(a).
Section 6663(a) should be interpreted as providing that the fraud
penalty be imposed on the difference between the amount of tax
that was required to be shown on the return and the amount that
was actually shown on the return. This interpretation is
supported by the words of section 6663, the language in related
sections of the Code, case law, and common sense. There is
simply no reason why we should interpret the statutory language
- 40 -
in a way that would produce a result contrary to the purpose of
the statute. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. at 398.
COHEN, C.J., agrees with this dissent.