DocketNumber: No. 16342-04
Citation Numbers: 2009 T.C. Memo. 22, 97 T.C.M. 1090, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 20
Judges: Holmes
Filed Date: 1/29/2009
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HOLMES,
Rodriguez's entrepreneurial talents showed up early. While still in college, he began a landscaping and irrigation business under the name of Waterfowl. In 1998, he became an independent contractor selling and managing parcels of land for SunTex-Fuller Corporation in a new development *21 called Montgomery Trace, near Conroe, Texas. That prompted him to shift Waterfowl's focus away from irrigation and into real-estate development.
During all the years in question, Rodriguez had a bank account under the name Waterfowl with the First Bank of Conroe. He often used this account, though it was in his business's name, to pay his personal expenses. He also mixed business and personal expenses on his credit card.
The parties agree that in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, Rodriguez earned income from his sales manager job; and in 1998, he also made money selling real estate:
Tax Year | Sales Manager Job | Sale of Real Estate |
1998 | $ 14,138 | $ 137,900 |
1999 | 139,324 | -0- |
2000 | 93,653 | -0- |
2001 | 125,825 | -0- |
Because Rodriguez didn't file returns for these years, the Commissioner prepared SFRs in April 2004 and issued notices of deficiency in June 2004. The notices of deficiency determined that he owed more than $ 150,000 on this income, plus additions for failure to timely file his returns and timely pay the tax owed, and penalties for under withholding.
Rodriguez was a resident of Texas when he filed his petition, and we tried his case in Houston.
Though Rodriguez is represented by counsel, *22 the parties were able to settle very few issues, so we begin by reviewing some of the basics of substantiation. The most important is that taxpayers have to keep records.
As a general rule, we presume the Commissioner's determination in the notice of deficiency is correct. Because the taxpayer is usually in a better position to show what he earned and what he spent, it is he who generally has the burden of proof. At least for tax years after 1998, that burden can shift to the Commissioner, but only if a taxpayer produces credible evidence meeting the requirements of
Rodriguez objects to the Commissioner's decision to prepare SFRs for his missing returns. But
Rodriguez next argues that the best evidence rule somehow lets his 1040s trump the SFRs. He argues that when both parties produce evidence to support their claims, the best evidence rule determines whose evidence should prevail.
But that's not what it means.
Rodriguez's 1040s are good evidence of one thing -- they may be admissions of his income. See
Rodriguez pecks away at the flock of disallowed deductions with ledgers that he created in 2005 -- he kept no contemporaneous books or other accounting of his business expenses during the years in question. Many of the expenses in these ledgers are not substantiated with other evidence. We treat them then as argument -- not evidence -- and use them only to guide us to the appropriate canceled check or credit-card statement. We rely on those checks and statements, as well as Rodriguez's testimony to the extent we find it credible, to decide what deductions he has adequately substantiated.
Rodriguez claimed costs of goods sold (COGS) of:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 3,728 | $ 8,756 | $ 20,383 | $ 34,823 |
A taxpayer engaged in a manufacturing or merchandising business can subtract the COGS from gross receipts to arrive at gross income.
Rodriguez's first problem is that he's not clear about what he's claiming as COGS; his accountant testified that Rodriguez classified the amounts listed above in his ledger only after he had received the notices of deficiency. The only entries that seem to correspond with claimed COGS are entries for "payroll expenses" in 2000 and 2001, and entries for "bonus expenses" in 1999.
For 1998, there are no journal entries matching the amounts claimed as COGS on Rodriguez's 1040. The canceled checks for that year and the testimony offered at trial give us no additional information. We therefore disallow the 1998 COGS.
For 1999, the amounts Rodriguez lists as "bonus expenses" in his ledger matches amounts claimed as COGS on his 1040. These turn out to be sales incentive trips, one to Las Vegas and several others dealing somehow with water sports. They also include a $ 150 entry for a "Cook Off Team" and "boxing" expenses totaling $ 620, substantiated by an entry on a credit card statement for the purchase of "sporting good/equip." One journal entry is for $ 280 from a liquor store. Drinking, sparring, fishing, and gambling *27 are not properly categorized as COGS. Although they may have been business entertainment under
For 2000 and 2001, the "payroll expenses" entries for 2000 and 2001 consist largely of checks made out to specific individuals, at least hinting that they may be labor expenses. Though we can verify some of the other individual expenses that make up his cumulative COGS using their date, amount, or location from canceled checks or credit card statements, there is no evidence to substantiate their business purpose. Rodriguez credibly testified that he would occasionally have laborers work on his home property -- a personal expense, of course -- and sometimes they would work on his investment property. Checks indicate they also sometimes worked on property owned by a partnership he formed.
But *28 even if the amount spent on improving the investment property was adequately substantiated, it would still be a capital expense and not part of COGS. See
When asked at trial about advertising expenses, Rodriguez stated, "There is a huge amount of money spent by the developer. On my personal items, I would advertise, but I didn't, we would run little line ads to our cell phones * * * but the major expense was taken on by the developer." Rodriguez certainly claimed more than personal ads on his Schedule C:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
$ 4,465 | $ 3,173 | $ 3,473 |
Below is Rodriguez's list of advertising expenses for 1998 from his ledger:
Date | Name | Note | Amount | Substantiated |
1/27 | Davy Roberts | For pens | $ 70.00 | Check No. 2436 |
5/15 | Fed-Ex | Messenger fee | 41.00 | No |
7/09 | George R.B. | Seminar | 40.00 | No |
7/12 | George Self | Referral fee | 597.00 | Check No. 2562 |
7/21 | Walmart | Prop. owner picnic | 43.21 | No |
8/15 | Furrow's | Lumber for signs | 66.89 | No |
8/15 | Labor | Built signs | 475.00 | No |
8/15 | Labor | Put out signs | 100.00 | No |
8/22 | Labor | Put out signs | 100.00 | No |
8/29 | Labor | Put out signs | 100.00 | No |
9/02 | Sam's | Labor Day picnic | 1,158.91 | Check No. 2600 |
9/25 | Louisiana P | Lumber | 42.36 | No |
10/06 | Ducks Unlimited | Sponsorship | 250.00 | Check No. 2627 |
10/13 | Ducks Unlimited | Ticket-Brandon | 40.00 | Check No. 2630 |
10/14 | Ducks Unlimited | Banquet | 300.00 | Check No. 2633 |
10/14 | Ducks Unlimited | Banquet | 970.00 | No |
10/24 | Walmart | Prop. owner picnic | 57.22 | No |
11/07 | Texas Lotto | Lotto | 3.00 | No |
12/18 | Amer. Inst. | Donation | 10.00 | No |
For *29 this year, Rodriguez produced canceled checks as evidence for some of his claimed deductions. However, referral fees, charitable donations, and picnics don't qualify as advertising expenses without evidence to substantiate that they were ordinary and necessary business expenses under
We find Rodriguez's testimony concerning signs to be credible, however. We treat his testimony as an invocation of the rule of
For 1999, Rodriguez claimed deductions for gifts, donations, and even a $ 1 losing Texas lottery ticket, among other things, as advertising expenses without providing evidence or testimony of how they were ordinary and necessary business expenses. *30 We sustain the Commissioner's disallowance of all these expenses for 1999.
For 2000, Rodriguez listed as advertising expenses in his ledger:
Date | Name | Note | Amount | Substantiated |
3/7 | Sign It | 7.5 AC & 10 AC | $ 1,585.86 | Check No. 3296 |
3/25 | Collin McGee | Signs 10 AC | 73.20 | Check No. 3309 |
4/24 | Excel Signs | Sign 19.78 AC | 1,302.00 | Check No. 3318 |
5/6 | Collin McGee | - | 126.00 | Check No. 3323 |
5/15 | Collin McGee | 10 AC | 21.00 | Check No. 3342 |
7/10 | Collin McGee | 10 AC | 106.00 | Check No. 3381 |
12/31 | Newspapers | Various ads | 259.00 | Credit cards |
We are satisfied that these expenses were ordinary and necessary. Rodriguez provided copies of canceled checks or credit-card statements for all of them with specific notations as to their advertising purpose. We therefore allow Rodriguez to deduct $ 3,473 for advertising expenses in 2000.
Rodriguez claimed home mortgage interest deductions in his Schedule A for 1999 and 2000, and the Commissioner allowed his itemized deductions for those years. However, Rodriguez also claimed the following interest deductions on his Schedule C:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 3,168 | $ 6,509 | $ 4,882 | $ 31,332 |
Interest is defined as "compensation for the use or forbearance of money."
For tax year 1998, Rodriguez claims a deduction for interest of $ 3,168. Of this amount, he claims $ 1,500 in the ledger as interest on car payments and labels $ 1,357 as finance charges for his position as sales manager; for his position at Waterfowl, he claims $ 311. Rodriguez provided no evidence to substantiate what proportion of his car payments represented business interest and what represented payments of principal *32 or other fees. We have no basis to estimate any amount using the
The $ 1,357 that he listed as finance charges from his job as a sales manager were calculated from his credit cards and checking account with the First Bank of Conroe. The alleged finance charges include maintenance fees, ATM fees, returned check fees, and other charges. We categorically deny these, which means Rodriguez gets no interest deduction for 1998.
However, for tax years 1999-2001, we are able to determine some valid interest deductions. For 1999, Rodriguez deducted $ 6,509 for interest, but accounts for only $ 4,899 in the ledger. 4 Disregarding the numerous bank fees that are not interest, we find that there are monthly finance charges that are legally deductible interest. Sifting through the record, we determine that for tax year 1999, Rodriguez incurred $ 1,515.43 of interest in the form of credit card finance charges. We can't entirely disentangle the pervasive intermingling of personal and business expenses on the cards, and it appears that Rodriguez did not pay some of this interest but let his credit card balances accrue, so we apply
For 2000, the ledger once again fails to tell us how Rodriguez could have possibly arrived at his claimed deduction of $ 4,882 (especially since the ledger itself says there is zero interest for the year). Instead, using the same method as used for tax year 1999, we allow Rodriguez a deduction of $ 438.24, or 40 percent of the $ 1,095.60 worth of combined finance charges, a number we obtained again by looking through credit-card statements.
For 2001, Rodriguez deducted $ 31,332, listed as mortgage interest on line 16(a) of his Schedule C. We have verified the amount directly from record evidence, but it is only by inference that we can determine the purpose of the mortgaged property. We agree with the Commissioner that the record clearly identifies other mortgages on Rodriguez's personal real estate and his partnership's property. By process of elimination we find that the interest Rodriguez *34 paid was on the mortgage for property he was holding for resale.
This means that Rodriguez cannot claim a deduction for investment interest for any year that is greater than his investment income that year. There is no evidence that Rodriguez received any income in 2001 from his investment property, so he may not claim the $ 31,332 deduction for interest in 2001, but may be able to carry it forward as allowed by
Rodriguez claimed deductions for legal expenses:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 1,777 | $ 7,902 | $ 10,830 | $ 7,509 |
Rodriguez testified that these expenses arose from two controversies. The first, which appears to have been conducted in 1999, was a lawsuit filed after *35 he allegedly bought property from an individual who had already contracted to sell it to a third party.
The second suit, which he apparently filed in 2000, was to win reimbursement from Bennett Ebner, the general contractor and developer for all of Montgomery Trace, for some expenses that Rodriguez incurred in sprucing up the grounds at the development. According to Rodriguez, Ebner offered to reimburse Rodriguez for his costs in an effort to increase sales. Rodriguez understood that he wouldn't profit directly, but he believed that beautifying Montgomery Trace would increase *36 sales of the parcels that he managed himself. The agreement did not end well when Ebner allegedly failed to pay Rodriguez for his expenses.
The test for deductibility here is whether Rodriguez's legal expenses had a sufficiently close relationship to his trade or business. The controlling criteria are the origin and character of the controversy. See
Rodriguez still has to substantiate, or at least give us enough to estimate, the amounts that he paid in legal fees. The substantiating checks and statements often do not indicate which lawsuit they cover. But Rodriguez credibly testified that it was at most his 2000 legal fees that paid for his litigation with Ebco. We therefore find that the Ebco litigation did not commence until 2000.
For 2000, the ledger lists professional fees going to William Fowler, S. Patrick Rhodes, Jeffery Moon & Associates, and J. Patrick Roeder. The record is clear that Rhodes and Roeder are architects, and therefore these fees are not "legal"; who Jeffery Moon is remains unclear. Checks made out to Fowler, however, are frequently made out to the "Law Offices of William T. Fowler" and indicate legal purposes in the memo lines. Therefore, we look to checks numbered 3265, 3328, and 3429 made out to William Fowler totaling roughly $ 750. None of these checks indicate whether they paid for Ebco litigation or title litigation; we find that some of them did go to the former and, *38 applying
For 2001, the "professional expenses" category includes checks to Fowler, "DCC," and "McCathern Moody." The memo on the check for DCC bears no indication of legal purpose. The check for "McCathern Mooty Buffington LLP" indicates that it is for a partnership agreement. We ignore both of these and consider only the checks made out to Fowler. These two total $ 6,977.08 but bear no indication of whether they were for the Ebco litigation. We therefore estimate under Cohan and allow $ 4,700 in legal-fee deductions for 2001.
Certain categories of deductions have enhanced substantiation requirements under
For the years in issue, Rodriguez offered no evidence to substantiate the *39 amount, time and place, or business purpose of his claimed deductions for car and travel. Rodriguez and his accountant testified that they used estimates of mileage to calculate deductions, but that Rodriguez kept no travel log. The strict substantiation requirements of
For tax year 1998, there is no substantiating evidence for Rodriguez's claimed deductions for supplies:
Waterfowl | Sales Manager |
$ 6,930 | $ 9,937 |
The credit-card statements and checks do not match entries in the ledger for the most part, and when they do, there is no indication that they are purchases for a business purpose. Rodriguez may not deduct any expenses for supplies for 1998.
For 1999-2001, Rodriguez claimed these amounts as deductions for supplies:
1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 8,237 | $ 12,856 | $ 3,906 |
Most of these purchases can be verified in *40 their amount and location by credit-card statements and canceled checks. However, there is nothing in the record to support a finding that the expenses at Home Depot, Walmart, Best Buy, etc., were business and not personal. Rodriguez's pervasive intermingling of business and personal expenses means that we can not allow him all of his claimed deductions. But we can apply the Cohan rule to estimate a reasonable amount. See
1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 3,295 | $ 5,142 | $ 1,562 |
The enhanced substantiation requirements of
The next category was a catch-all for "Other Expenses" of:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 27,803 | $ 10,481 | $ 10,078 | $ 8,718 |
The bulk of this category consists of three types of expenses: security, telephone and contract-labor charges. There were also tolls, subscriptions, dues, and miscellaneous expenses that were not substantiated. The second Schedule C for 1998 showed an "other" expense of $ 168 for bank charges, which we disallow; Rodriguez has not shown whether they are nondeductible finance charges or unsubstantiated "other" bank charges, but neither characterization would make them deductible. The rest of these "other expenses" we look at one by one.
The 1998 and 1999 security expenses of:
1998 | 1999 |
$ 1,546 | $ 7,115 |
are, we find, for the grooming and veterinary care of two dogs that Rodriguez kept on a piece of property where he stored his equipment and a trailer. Deductibility of such expenses depends on a showing that the expenses are "directly connected" with a trade or business.
Rodriguez had both a home phone and a cell phone, neither of which was a dedicated business line. He did not provide any breakdown of the personal-versus-business use of either phone. His claimed deductions:
1998 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 841 | $ 4,035 | $ 6,218 |
Cell phones are also listed property under
Rodriguez also claimed deductions for labor costs:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 24,697 | $ 3,269 | $ 5,875 | $ 2,350 |
He claimed that these costs were wages which he paid to day laborers to clean up around the investment properties. However, Rodriguez could not provide any information *44 about these workers -- either their names or contact information. He did not produce Forms 1099 for them. He did not establish that these costs did not duplicate at least in part the labor costs he claimed as COGS on his Schedule C. He did testify credibly that laborers sometimes worked at his personal house, and his checks show that they sometimes worked on his partnership's property; but there are no checks made out to laborers working specifically on investment properties. Even the ledgers are unclear as to which labor expenses were for what properties. We have no way to estimate these expenses, so we disallow them.
Rodriguez also claimed deductions for depreciation:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 1,626 | $ 27,074 | $ 10,256 | $ 6,936 |
For tax years 1999 and 2000, Rodriguez attempted to elect to expense depreciation under
Rodriguez did not. His descriptions of the property are wholly insufficient, limited to general terms like "Equipment", "Office Equipment", and "Furniture and Fixtures." He failed to introduce any records that substantiate individual purchases of depreciable assets or their bases. He also failed to specify what individual items he chose to expense. See
Rodriguez claimed home-office expenses of:
1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 936 | $ 17,676 | $ 3,070 | $ 2,968 |
o used for a trade or business; o used exclusively for that purpose; and o his principal place of business.
According to Rodriguez, he set aside two of the five rooms in his house for business. He put a drafting table and filing cabinet in a small bedroom. He also enclosed the center atrium of the home with drywall and created an office with a desk and computer. He claimed that he conducted "all" of his personal business at the house by making keep-in-touch calls and calls involving buying and selling properties, and also kept private investment records there. He made at least ten sales calls per night except on Tuesday and Thursday nights when he was usually at Montgomery Trace. He also stated that he was unable to conduct his personal business at the sales offices at Montgomery Trace because it was against *47 the developers' policy. We do find Rodriguez credible on this point, and so find that he did conduct personal real-estate business in his home office.
We also find him credible in claiming that his home office was the principal place for his personal real-estate business. Rodriguez worked as a sales manager for several real-estate developers in sales offices from which he supervised personnel and conducted sales. At the same time, he also conducted personal real-estate business at home. Compare
However, we do not find Rodriguez to be credible in allocating 40 percent of his house to his home office.
We are uncertain how he arrived at his calculation of five rooms; during trial, Rodriguez mentioned a master bedroom, a small bedroom in which he initially put his office, and a living room in which he kept his television. We assume that his house also had a bathroom and a kitchen, which would total five rooms. But Rodriguez also divided an atrium into *49 two rooms so that he could have a larger office. It is unclear from the record whether the atrium encompasses any of the other rooms already mentioned. If it does, the division of the atrium would give Rodriguez's house six rooms, bringing his business percentage to 33 percent. If the atrium doesn't, Rodriguez would have seven rooms in his home, making his business percentage 28.5 percent. The Commissioner does not challenge Rodriguez's allocation, and therefore we presume the rooms are of roughly similar size. Under
Rodriguez claims net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards:
1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
$ 26,678 | $ 24,881 | $ 40,996 |
The IRS disallowed the NOLs because Rodriguez failed to provide sufficient substantiation of the amount of the losses. Rodriguez also did not file any election to carry the losses forward without carrying them back first.
Under
Rodriguez failed to give us any evidence of either the amount of NOLs he was claiming or whether he had income available in years before 1999 to carry his NOLs back. We are thus unable to find there was any loss available in 1999, 2000, or 2001 and therefore deny his claimed NOLs for each of those years.
In 1998, Rodriguez sold three parcels of land. The documents refer to the first two parcels, Lots 10 and 11, by the numbers assigned to them in the original development survey for Montgomery Trace. The property those documents call "5 Acres" apparently is a plot in Montgomery County. We'll follow the parties in discussing Lots 10 and 11 together, and 5 Acres separately. We compute gain or loss on *51 the sale of property by subtracting basis from sale price.
We start with Lots 10 and 11. The parties have not stipulated to the basis, but did stipulate that Rodriguez could include in basis a $ 34,661.04 first mortgage and a $ 8,028.96 second mortgage, and both lots secured these mortgages. So we have a basis of at least $ 42,690. The taxpayer bears the burden of substantiating basis, see
As for 5 Acres, Rodriguez proved that he bought it for $ 25,000. We find that he sold it for $ 25,000. He therefore had no gain or loss on the sale.
This all means that Rodriguez had basis of $ 67,690 in the three properties, sold them for $ 137,900, and had a total gain of $ 70,210.
For 1999, 2000, and 2001, Rodriguez went several creative, but losing, rounds with the Commissioner *52 regarding rents claimed on Schedules C and E. For each year, Rodriguez, doing business as Waterfowl, claimed to pay rent to a partnership which owned an office building called 101 West Phillips. He deducted that rent on his Schedule C. Rodriguez was also a partner in this partnership. He then claimed the rents he paid to 101 West Phillips as partnership income on his Schedule E.
Rodriguez loses his Schedule C rent deduction because he failed to provide credible substantiation. Rodriguez did not provide a lease for the 101 West Phillips building. He testified that he made out his rent checks to either partner Brandon Creighton or to 101 West Phillips. A scan of the checks in evidence shows several checks made out to Brandon Creighton, and a few more made out to Brandon Creighton and Matt Rodriguez. (Rodriguez often goes by his middle name.) Unlike normal rent payments, the "rent" amounts vary and the payments do not occur at regular intervals. With few exceptions, the memo lines on the checks do not indicate a reason for the payments or indicate unclear reasons (such as "chambers"). Even more damning is the fact that Rodriguez himself appears able to cash some of these checks, implying *53 that he never truly lost control of the money.
Given the possibility of a related-party transaction and the sketchy facts above, we doubt that these payments were actually "rent," but we need not reach this issue. We find that Rodriguez did not credibly substantiate or explain his rent deductions, foreclosing the possibility of a
We next turn to whether Rodriguez properly accounted for the partnership "rent" income to 101 West Phillips on his Schedule E. The Commissioner makes several claims about the Schedules E for 1999, 2000, and 2001: (1) Rodriguez misreported the rental income on his Schedule E; (2) Rodriguez could not use Creighton's statement of partnership expenses as substantiation for his own Schedule E items; and (3) Rodriguez is not entitled to the deductions from partnership income reflected on his Schedules E. We address these points in order.
First, we find that Rodriguez did miscalculate his partnership's rental income. He included all of the "rent" he paid to the partnership as income on his Schedule E, which is an admission. However the partnership agreement confirms that Rodriguez is merely a 35-percent *54 partner, though in his interrogatory responses Rodriguez claimed that he is a 45-percent partner. And his accountant asserted that Rodriguez is a 50-percent partner. We'll go with the partnership agreement, and find that Rodriguez should have included only 35 percent of the rental income on his Schedule E.
Next, we find that the document proffered as Creighton's statement of partnership expenses is insufficient substantiation. It is not even clear that this statement is in fact Brandon Creighton's. It does not appear to be a contemporaneous log of expenses as they were incurred and has no substantiating receipts or cashed checks. On this point it is immaterial whether Rodriguez and Creighton were in fact 50-percent partners; the evidence is just not sufficient to prove the existence or amount of these expenses regardless of Rodriguez's partnership share.
We therefore find that Rodriguez failed to substantiate his partnership expenses, and so he loses the deductions on his Schedule E. The Commissioner should recalculate Rodriguez's partnership income to reflect his partnership percentage, but not reduce this income by any of the claimed partnership expenses.
Rodriguez *55 did not report owing any self-employment tax from 1998 through 2001. We agree with the IRS that Rodriguez's submission of Schedules C reporting income from a trade or business is an admission. Rodriguez is thus subject to the self-employment tax for each of the years at issue. See
The last contested items are the additions to tax that the Commissioner determined against Rodriguez for failure to timely file his returns and failure to timely pay the tax owed. On these, the Commissioner has the burden of production.
The first is the
We likewise sustain the Commissioner's assertion of a
The
1. Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Rodriguez mischaracterizes
3. And for expenses listed in
4. Rodriguez has another ledger entry for 1999 related to interest claimed as a deduction for a home office on his Form 8829, Expenses for Business Use of Your Home. We treat this as a home-office expense, which we analyze
5. "A taxpayer may elect to treat the cost of any
Wheeler v. Commissioner , 521 F.3d 1289 ( 2008 )
William F. Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 412 F.2d 201 ( 1969 )
Herbert G. Whyte v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 852 F.2d 306 ( 1988 )
Ira S. Feldman and Susan B. Feldman v. Commissioner of ... , 791 F.2d 781 ( 1986 )
Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 39 F.2d 540 ( 1930 )
Welch v. Helvering , 54 S. Ct. 8 ( 1933 )
United States v. Gilmore , 83 S. Ct. 623 ( 1963 )
Commissioner v. Soliman , 113 S. Ct. 701 ( 1993 )
Keith v. Commissioner , 115 T.C. 605 ( 2000 )
Mendes v. Comm'r , 121 T.C. 308 ( 2003 )
Sanford v. Commissioner , 50 T.C. 823 ( 1968 )
Curphey v. Commissioner , 73 T.C. 766 ( 1980 )
Millsap v. Commissioner , 91 T.C. 926 ( 1988 )
Dellacroce v. Commissioner , 83 T.C. 269 ( 1984 )