Karen Y. Nielsen v. Commissioner

114 T.C. No. 10
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KAREN Y. NIELSEN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 1435-98. Filed March 8, 2000.
P’s residential property was condemned by the
State of South Dakota for purposes of a federally aided
highway construction project. In settlement of the
ensuing condemnation proceedings, P received $65,000.
Subsequently, P and the State became involved in
negotiations and litigation regarding P’s entitlement
under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-
646, 84 Stat. 1894 (Relocation Act), to additional sums
enabling her to purchase a comparable replacement
dwelling. This suit was settled for $100,000. P,
relying on a provision of the Relocation Act exempting
payments thereunder from income, reported no capital
gain on the disposition of her home. R determined a
deficiency for taxes attributable to the amount by
which the $65,000 payment to petitioner exceeded her
basis in the property taken.
Held: The $65,000 received by P in condemnation
of her residence is not exempted from taxation by the
Relocation Act.
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Richard Hopewell, for petitioner.
Albert B. Kerkhove, for respondent.
OPINION
NIMS, Judge: Respondent determined a Federal income tax
deficiency for petitioner’s 1992 taxable year in the amount of
$7,022. The sole issue for decision is whether proceeds received
by petitioner from the condemnation of her residence are subject
to taxation as capital gain to the extent that they exceeded her
basis in the property.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
This case was submitted fully stipulated pursuant to Rule
122. The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying
exhibits, are incorporated herein by this reference.
Background
Karen Y. Nielsen, formerly known as Karen Y. Mundt, resided
in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, at the time of filing her petition
in this case. More than 1 year prior to 1989, petitioner had
obtained title to a home located at 222 North Cliff Avenue in
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Sioux Falls. This residence had previously been a church and
contained approximately 8,130 square feet with 18 rooms. Her
cost basis in the property was $25,000.
During 1989, the State of South Dakota, acting through the
South Dakota Department of Transportation and the South Dakota
Transportation Commission, contacted petitioner and informed her
that acquisition of her property would be necessary for purposes
of a federally aided highway construction project. The State
then initiated civil condemnation proceedings in May of 1990 by
filing a Petition and Declaration of Taking with a South Dakota
trial court.
In June of 1992, a relocation agent for the State, Clayton
R. Sonnenschein, inspected petitioner’s property and met with
petitioner’s attorneys to discuss the Federal Relocation
Assistance Program. He also provided a brochure explaining the
program entitled “South Dakota Relocation Assistance Brochure:
Your Rights and Benefits as a Displaced Person Under the Federal
Relocation Assistance Program”. The brochure indicated that
displaced persons might be eligible for moving cost reimbursement
and for replacement housing payments. For homeowners of 180 days
or more, the replacement housing payment was defined as a
purchase supplement which included (1) the price differential
between the cost of a replacement dwelling and the acquisition
cost of the displacement dwelling, (2) increased mortgage
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interest costs, and (3) incidental expenses. The brochure
further specified that the replacement housing payment or
purchase supplement was an amount “in addition to the fair market
value of your property”.
On October 14, 1992, petitioner and the State executed a
Stipulation for Settlement and for Entry of Judgment in
Condemnation, in which they agreed to settle the pending
condemnation action as follows:
1. Purchase of the entire lot and house is agreed in
the amount of $65,000.00, inclusive of deposit in
court. Defendant will provide a deed for said
transfer.
2. Possession by the State will be arranged by the
parties in determining Relocation Assistance.
3. Relocation Assistance is separate and apart from
this agreed compensation and is treated as a separate
proceeding.
Pursuant to this stipulation, the court entered a Judgment in
Condemnation granting the State’s petition and providing in
relevant part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendants have deficiency judgment against the State
of South Dakota for the difference between $65,000.00
determined as just compensation, and $4,620.00, having
been deposited with the Court for the use of the
Defendants, being in the ammount [sic] of $60,380.00.
* * * * * * *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
possession by the State will be arranged by the parties
in determining Relocation Assistance.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Relocation Assistance is separate and apart from this
agreed compensation and is treated as a separate
proceeding.
Shortly thereafter, on October 21, 1992, the State delivered
to petitioner a Relocation Assistance Written Offer based on
relocation agent Sonnenschein’s previous inspection of
petitioner’s property. Having concluded that the actual living
space in petitioner’s home consisted of approximately 1,500
square feet, Sonnenschein had researched the real estate market
for similar residences and had determined that the price of a
comparable replacement would be $64,900. Given that the amount
already awarded to petitioner in the condemnation action exceeded
this figure, the relocation assistance offer stated:
A. Replacement Housing Payment/Supplement $ 00.00
Comparable Replacement $64,900.00
Displacement Property $65,000.00
Difference-Supplement/RHP $ 00.00
B. Incidental Expenses: Estimated at $300.00
Claim to be based on actual allowable expenses
C. Moving Expense Payment:
1. Actual, Reasonable & Necessary Cost to Move
2. Self-move based on Departments Room County
Schedule: 18 rooms $1,600.00
MOVING OPTION TAKEN: 1( ) 2( )
By early November, petitioner had received payments from the
State totaling $65,000 and had authorized the trial court to
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enter a Satisfaction of Judgment in the condemnation action. A
warranty deed conveying petitioner’s property to the State was
recorded on November 17, 1992.
In December of 1992, petitioner’s husband provided
relocation agent Sonnenschein with a floor plan of the North
Cliff property which indicated that a portion greater than 1,500
square feet was being utilized as living space. Sonnenschein
then revisited the property and prepared a revised relocation
assistance offer using residences comparable to a home of
approximately 2,800 square feet. The amended offer reflected
that the cost of a comparable replacement would be $99,900 and
that, after subtraction of the $65,000 paid for the displacement
property, the Replacement Housing Payment/Supplement would be
$34,900.
Subsequently, in May of 1993, petitioner filed a
counterclaim with the trial court seeking additional funds and
asserting, among other things, that the State had failed to
comply with the provisions of Federal law governing the
Relocation Assistance Program. The matter was eventually
resolved in August of 1996 by a Stipulation for Settlement and
Dismissal of All Causes of Action Pending. The parties
stipulated that “Relocation assistance payment is agreed to be
$100,000.00 in addition to the $65,000.00 previously paid for
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this property.” All claims were then dismissed with prejudice,
and, in September of 1996, payment of the $100,000 was made by
the State.
Discussion
We must decide whether the $65,000 received by petitioner in
condemnation of her residence is taxable to the extent that the
payment exceeded her basis in the property.
Petitioner contends that the condemnation proceeds are
exempt from taxation pursuant to the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894, presently codified at 42 U.S.C.
secs. 4601-4655 (1994) (Relocation Act). According to
petitioner, the Relocation Act mandates that relocation payments
shall not be treated as income for tax purposes, and the $65,000
at issue is in fact a portion of the relocation assistance she
received from the State. Hence, in petitioner’s view, the
subject funds can have no tax consequences.
Conversely, respondent asserts that the Relocation Act does
not exempt from Federal income tax the $65,000 received by
petitioner. Respondent maintains that the Relocation Act neither
applies to nor addresses the tax treatment of amounts
representing the acquisition cost or just compensation paid when
property is taken for public use. Rather, respondent interprets
the Relocation Act to remove only payments which are in addition
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to acquisition cost from the ambit of the Internal Revenue Code.
Therefore, because respondent also contends that the $65,000 was
not such a supplemental relocation assistance payment,
respondent’s position is that to the extent the $65,000 exceeded
petitioner’s basis in her residence, the difference is taxable as
capital gain. Respondent additionally argues that the $65,000
fails to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under the
involuntary conversion or residential rollover provisions set
forth in sections 1033 and 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code.
(Section 1034 was repealed by section 312(b) of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 839, generally
effective for sales and exchanges of principal residences after
May 6, 1997. The section 1034 rollover provision was replaced by
a revised and expanded section 121.)
We agree with respondent that the $65,000 received by
petitioner in condemnation of her residence is not a payment of a
type exempted from taxation by the Relocation Act. Furthermore,
because petitioner apparently does not contend that
nonrecognition treatment pursuant to section 1033 or 1034 is
warranted, we need not reach respondent’s position thereon.
Petitioner made no attempt at trial or on brief to establish her
entitlement to benefit from these sections and instead
characterized respondent’s argument regarding nonrecognition
under the Internal Revenue Code as “immaterial in the Court’s
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adjudication of the action at bar”. In light of this posture, we
also sustain petitioner’s evidentiary objections to certain of
the stipulated facts and exhibits. The contested evidence
addresses only the reinvestment of the condemnation proceeds, and
while such information would have been relevant to applicability
of sections 1033 and 1034, it has no bearing upon our analysis of
the Relocation Act.
I. Internal Revenue Code
As a general rule, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a
Federal tax on the taxable income of every individual. See sec.
1. Section 61(a) defines gross income for purposes of
calculating such taxable income as “all income from whatever
source derived” and further specifies that gains from dealings in
property are included within this broad definition. See sec.
61(a)(3). Section 1001(a) then explains that “gain from the sale
or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis”. The basic
principles of tax law would thus require petitioner to recognize
as income the amount, $40,000, by which the $65,000 she received
from the condemnation of her residence exceeded her $25,000
basis.
II. Uniform Relocation Assistance Act
The Relocation Act, however, provides contrasting treatment
for certain payments received in conjunction with Government
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acquisition of private property and raises the question of
whether a different result is compelled in the matter at hand.
This question, in turn, presents two subinquiries upon which its
resolution depends. The first, a legal question, asks what is
meant by the term “payment” as used in and exempted from taxation
by the statute. The second, a factual question, asks whether the
$65,000 received by petitioner is indeed such a payment.
A. Meaning of Payment for Purposes of the Relocation Act
To ascertain the meaning of “payment” as used in the
Relocation Act, we consider the historical context in which the
statute was drafted, the language and structure of the statute
itself, and the interpretations thereof offered by case law.
From these sources, we conclude that “payment” for purposes of
the exemption treatment afforded by the Relocation Act refers
only to amounts received as relocation assistance in excess of
the just compensation paid for the property.
At the time the Relocation Act was promulgated, payment of
just compensation upon the taking of private property for public
use had long been mandated by the Federal Constitution and by the
constitutions of individual States, including that of South
Dakota. See U.S. Const. amend. V; S.D. Const. art. VI, sec. 13.
Just compensation had also been further defined, at both the
Federal and State levels, as fair market value, what a willing
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buyer would pay a willing seller, at the time of the taking. See
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10
(1984); Rapid City v. Baron, 227 N.W.2d 617, 620 (S.D. 1975).
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Relocation Act
of 1970 for the purpose of ensuring that displaced persons “shall
not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs and
projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole”. 42
U.S.C. sec. 4621(b). The Relocation Act was then amended in
1987, see Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. 100-
17, 101 Stat. 246, and is presently codified at chapter 61 of
title 42 of the United States Code. Chapter 61 is divided into
three subchapters: Subchapter I--General Provisions, Subchapter
II--Uniform Relocation Assistance, and Subchapter III--Uniform
Real Property Acquisition Policy.
The provision addressing taxation is contained in subchapter
II and reads:
No payment received under this subchapter shall be
considered as income for the purposes of title 26; or
for the purposes of determining the eligibility or the
extent of eligibility of any person for assistance
under the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.]
or any other Federal law (except for any Federal law
providing low-income housing assistance). [42 U.S.C.
sec. 4636.]
Also within subchapter II, three sections direct that
payments be made to persons displaced in conjunction with Federal
or federally assisted programs. See 42 U.S.C. secs. 4622, 4623,
and 4624. Payments for moving and related expenses, see 42
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U.S.C. sec. 4622, for replacement housing for homeowners, see 42
U.S.C. sec. 4623, and for replacement housing for tenants and
certain others, see 42 U.S.C. sec. 4624, are the three categories
of payments so authorized. The section relevant to the instant
case, addressing replacement housing for homeowners, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 4623. REPLACEMENT HOUSING FOR HOMEOWNER * * *
(a)(1) In addition to payments otherwise
authorized by this subchapter, the head of the
displacing agency shall make an additional payment not
in excess of $22,500 to any displaced person who is
displaced from a dwelling actually owned and occupied
by such displaced person for not less than one hundred
and eighty days prior to the initiation of negotiations
for the acquisition of the property. Such additional
payment shall include the following elements:
(A) The amount, if any, which when added to the
acquisition cost of the dwelling acquired by the
displacing agency, equals the reasonable cost of a
comparable replacement dwelling.
(B) The amount, if any, which will compensate such
displaced person for any increased interest costs and
other debt service costs which such person is required
to pay for financing the acquisition of any such
comparable replacement dwelling. Such amount shall be
paid only if the dwelling acquired by the displacing
agency was encumbered by a bona fide mortgage which was
a valid lien on such dwelling for not less than 180
days immediately prior to the initiation of
negotiations for the acquisition of such dwelling.
(C) Reasonable expenses incurred by such displaced
person for evidence of title, recording fees, and other
closing costs incident to the purchase of the
replacement dwelling, but not including prepaid
expenses.
* * * * * * *
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The $22,500 monetary limitation may also be exceeded on a case-
by-case basis for good cause. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 4626(a).
Hence, we are faced with a statute which by its terms
exempts from taxation “payment received under this subchapter”
and which is contained in a subchapter that explicitly authorizes
three types or categories of payment. It is therefore reasonable
to infer that a “payment received under this subchapter” is one
of the types of payment that the subchapter enables a displaced
person to receive. Yet it is not this subchapter but rather
independent constitutional mandates that enable one whose private
property is taken for public use to receive just compensation.
Moreover, the language employed in the provision dealing
with replacement housing assistance for homeowners states that
the displaced homeowner’s entitlement is to “The amount, if any,
which when added to the acquisition cost of the dwelling acquired
by the displacing agency, equals the reasonable cost of a
comparable replacement dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. sec. 4623(a)(1)(A).
Nowhere, however, does the statute elaborate upon this concept of
acquisition cost or specify how it is to be calculated. Since in
the context in which the law was written, the cost to a
governmental entity of acquiring private property was just
compensation or fair market value, we must assume that
acquisition cost as used in the Relocation Act denotes this
constitutionally required just compensation. Therefore, because
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other law is both the source and the sole explanation of a
displaced person’s right to acquisition cost or just
compensation, to say that such payments are “received under”
subchapter II of the Relocation Act would defy logic. We
conclude instead that just compensation is not relocation
assistance and should not be governed by the tax rules applicable
thereto, but it continues to exist as an independent requirement
in no way eliminated by the statute under consideration.
Case law emanating from Federal and State courts further
supports this interpretation. For instance, the California Court
of Appeal explained the relationship between just compensation
and relocation assistance as follows:
“The ‘just compensation’ which a condemnee may recover
from the condemnor when his property is acquired for a
public use pursuant to the eminent domain law, as
contemplated by the Constitution and that law alike, is
the ‘value’ (or ‘actual value,’ or ‘fair market
value’), measured at a pertinent time * * * ”. * * *
Other amounts which may be “compensable” by the public
entity under the CRAL [California Relocation Assistance
Laws] or the URA [Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970] result
from statutory provisions and are independent of the
constitutional requirement of “just compensation” * * *
[City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 132 Cal. Rptr. 188, 193
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting City of Mountain View v.
Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (Ct. App.
1975)).]
A similar view of the Relocation Act’s role was taken by the
Kansas Court of Appeals, which stated that “the purpose of
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federally authorized payments is to supplement traditional
eminent domain compensation, not to create an additional element
of full compensation.” Spackman v. Spackman, 595 P.2d 748, 750
(Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
The U.S. Claims Court likewise emphasized the distinctness
and self-contained nature of the Relocation Act when faced with
construing the meaning of “payment” for tax-exemption purposes.
See Strogoff v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 584 (1986), affd.
without published opinion 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Although taxpayers argued that, in the exemption section,
“Congress used the term in a sense which is broader than the
cumulative uses found in the other sections”, the court declared
that “the least strained reading of the provision is that,
following a string of references to payments by government
entities, * * * use of the term ‘payments’ [sic] was intended
merely as a shorthand incorporation of the previous references in
the statute.” Id. at 589.
As regards application and how these legally distinct rights
to payment should interact in a factual scenario involving
condemnation, the Missouri Court of Appeals summarized:
In April, 1973, the Commission commenced an action
to condemn and acquire appellants’ residence and 7.99
acres of ground. That suit, no longer the subject of
any dispute, was concluded by entry of a consent
judgment in the amount of $38,100.00. Also available
to appellants, and conceded by the Commission to be
due, is a relocation assistance payment pursuant to the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
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Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-
4655 (1976) applicable to state highway projects by
reason of the contribution of federal funds. This
relocation payment is defined by statute as that amount
which, when added to the acquisition cost of the
dwelling taken, equals the cost of a comparable
replacement dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (1976).
To compute the appropriate sum of relocation
assistance, which is subject to a maximum of $15,000.00, it
is necessary to determine how much was paid in the
condemnation of the property owner’s former dwelling and to
deduct that amount from the ascertained cost of a
replacement dwelling. * * * [Tonnar v. Missouri State
Highway & Transp. Commn., 640 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982).]
Therefore, given the history, language, and interpretations
of the statute, we hold that only payments expressly authorized
by subchapter II and in excess of the just compensation paid for
taken property are exempted from taxation by the Relocation Act.
B. Nature of $65,000 Payment Received by Petitioner
Having determined that the Relocation Act will exempt
petitioner’s $65,000 payment from taxation only if it is in the
nature of relocation assistance rather than just compensation or
acquisition cost, we turn to the question of how these proceeds
should be characterized. Contrary to petitioner’s averments that
the $65,000 was a portion of her relocation assistance, however,
we find that the documentary evidence presented indicates
otherwise.
First, as a general proposition, the evidence suggests that
the policy of the State of South Dakota was to maintain a
distinction between fair market value paid for property and
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assistance under the Relocation Act. The South Dakota Relocation
Assistance Brochure, prepared for and used by the South Dakota
Department of Transportation, explicitly states that the purchase
supplement for which a homeowner might be eligible under the
statute would be “in addition to the fair market value of your
property” and would be calculated based on the price differential
between acquisition cost and the cost of a replacement dwelling.
Second, as pertains specifically to petitioner’s case, the
record produced in the condemnation action reflects that the
State in fact followed this general policy of awarding relocation
assistance independent and apart from fair market value or
acquisition cost. The Stipulation for Settlement and for Entry
of Judgment in Condemnation signed by petitioner in October of
1992 states that “Purchase of the entire lot and house is agreed
in the amount of $65,000.00”. The Judgment in Condemnation
entered pursuant thereto likewise refers to judgment for the
“$65,000.00 determined as just compensation”. Yet both documents
contain language expressly declaring that “Relocation Assistance
is separate and apart from this agreed compensation and is
treated as a separate proceeding.”
The ensuing Relocation Assistance Written Offers made to
petitioner are consistent with the position that the $65,000
already paid was not considered such assistance. The initial
offer computed petitioner’s Replacement Housing
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Payment/Supplement at “$00.00” because the cost of a comparable
replacement exceeded the sum paid for the displacement property.
The revised offer similarly deducted the acquisition cost of
$65,000 from the replacement cost of $99,900 to reach a $34,900
Replacement Housing Payment/Supplement. Hence, subchapter II
authorizes “Replacement Housing for Homeowner”, and the only
amounts designated by these offers as such a Replacement Housing
Payment exclude the $65,000.
Moreover, in eventual resolution of the litigation between
petitioner and the State, the parties stipulated that “Relocation
assistance payment is agreed to be $100,000.00 in addition to the
$65,000.00 previously paid”. Again, the $100,000, and not the
$65,000, is the figure specifically labeled as relocation
assistance.
Taken together, the above documents support a finding that
the relocation assistance in petitioner’s case was in fact the
$100,000 sum negotiated separate and apart from the $65,000
received pursuant to the condemnation judgment. We further note
that to accept petitioner’s characterization of the $65,000 as an
advance payment of her total relocation assistance would be to
say that no just compensation whatsoever was paid by the State.
We believe it highly unlikely that the State would so disregard
an entrenched constitutional mandate.
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In addition, we reject petitioner’s apparent contention that
the real property acquisition policies set forth in 42 U.S.C.
sec. 4651 can or should have a bearing upon our decision.
Petitioner alleges that the condemnation proceedings were
initiated in violation of these policies, stating on brief that
the States’s action
to condemn Petitioner’s house and therewith pay her
“market value” of the house as just compensation under
state law, rather than negotiate compensation equal to
the cost of a “comparable replacement dwelling” as was
her federal entitlement, was ultra vires and the state
condemnation action was thereby void ab inito [sic].
She then goes on to assert that tax-exempt replacement housing
compensation should not be transformed into taxable compensation
by reason of such an ultra vires action. In response, we observe
that the Relocation Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 4602(a), declares
specifically that “The provisions of section 4651 of this title
create no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity
of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation.”
We therefore hold that the $65,000 received by petitioner is
not a relocation assistance payment exempted from taxation by the
Relocation Act but is just compensation taxable to the extent the
amount paid exceeded her basis in the condemned property.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.