DocketNumber： Docket No. 7061-15S
Judges： GUY
Filed Date： 9/15/2016
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 11/20/2020
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
GUY,
Respondent determined a deficiency of $7,147 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2011 and an accuracy-related penalty of $1,429 pursuant to section 6662(a). Petitioner filed a timely petition for redetermination with the Court pursuant to section 6213(a). At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in California.
After concessions,*57 section 6662(a).
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioner immigrated to the United States from the Philippines in 1982. Before moving to the United States, she obtained a master's degree in physical education from the University of the Philippines.
Petitioner has been employed by the Hayward Unified School District (Hayward USD), part of the California public school system, for 31 years as an adapted physical education teacher. Her primary responsibilities include planning, developing, and implementing physical education programs for students with special needs.
On an average day, petitioner drove her personal vehicle from her home to several schools where she used specialized physical education equipment, portable*58 sound systems, and other devices (which she transported in her car) to engage students with special needs in appropriate physical education activities. At the end of the day, petitioner returned home where she prepared various reports (e.g., progress and time and attendance reports) that she submitted to Hayward USD. In 2011 petitioner was the sole adapted physical education teacher in Hayward USD, and she instructed as many as 96 students weekly.
Petitioner paid health, dental, and vision insurance premiums of $7,511, $1,353, and $79, respectively, in 2011. She also paid $275 for prescription copays (i.e., expenses not covered by insurance). Although petitioner testified that she paid additional amounts for medical care in 2011, she did not provide any documents or records to substantiate medical expenses beyond those listed above.
Hayward USD reimbursed petitioner for vehicle expenses of $920 in 2011. Petitioner asserted that Hayward USD did not reimburse her for numerous trips that she made to attend meetings to arrange individualized education plans for students. Although petitioner testified that she maintained a mileage*59 log in 2011, she did not produce any mileage records at trial.
In November 2011 petitioner traveled to Long Beach, California, to attend a conference for educators working with children with disabilities. Before the trip, she had been informed by a Hayward USD representative that she would not be reimbursed for her travel expenses because of budget constraints. Petitioner paid $297 for a two-night hotel stay during the conference. Other than her own handwritten notes, however, petitioner did not produce any records or receipts showing the amounts she paid for meals or travel expenses (e.g., commercial airfare and shuttle service) to attend the conference. Hayward USD reimbursed petitioner for the conference registration fee of $170.
Petitioner lives in a two-story residence with a two-car garage comprising a total of approximately 1,462 square feet of space. In 2011 petitioner used an upstairs bedroom (80 square feet of space) as an office where she prepared routine reports and performed other administrative tasks related to her work for Hayward USD, and she devoted approximately one-half of her garage (144 square feet of space) to storing*60 physical education equipment owned by Hayward USD. The record includes a letter from Hayward USD acknowledging that since 1996 petitioner has provided storage space in her home for specialized equipment that it owns.
In 2011 petitioner paid approximately $3,420, $876, and $888 for homeowners association dues, utility charges, and trash collection fees, respectively.
Petitioner paid $147 monthly for cellular phone service for four cellular phones. Petitioner testified that she used her personal cellular phone approximately 40% of the time for business purposes.Other Business Expenses Petitioner testified that she purchased a number of items for work including a computer, instructional equipment, clothing, a portable sound system, prescription sunglasses, and books. Petitioner did not produce receipts or records to properly substantiate these purchases. Hayward USD maintained an*61 employee reimbursement policy under which employees normally could request reimbursement for travel, conference registration, and other expenses. To be eligible for reimbursement for conference expenses, employees were required to submit a preauthorization form and an estimate of expenses. Eligible employees were reimbursed at a per diem rate for meals, and it was not necessary for employees to submit receipts. On occasion, Hayward USD paid employee expenses directly. As noted above, Hayward USD reimbursed petitioner for vehicle expenses and for the educators conference registration fee. She was also reimbursed $89 for membership dues. Petitioner filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2011 reporting wage income of $106,229, total income of $119,133, and an above-theline deduction of $250 for educator expenses,*62 $13,699 (before the application of the 7.5% limitation prescribed in section 213(a)),*63 and meals and entertainment expenses (before the application of the 50% limitation prescribed in section 274(n)(1)) of $800. In claiming vehicle expenses of $10,650, petitioner elected to use the applicable standard mileage rates,Discussion As a general rule, the Commissioner's determination of*64 a taxpayer's liability in a notice of deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. Rule 142(a); Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. Rule 142(a); Expenses paid during the taxable year for medical care of the taxpayer, not compensated for by*65 insurance or otherwise, are allowed as a deduction to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income. Sec. 213(a). Expenses for medical care include premiums paid for an insurance policy covering medical care. Sec. 213(d)(1)(D). A taxpayer who claims a deduction under section 213 must "furnish the name and address of each person to whom payment for medical expenses was made and the amount and date of the payment thereof in each case." Petitioner paid health, dental, and vision care insurance premiums of $7,511, $1,353, and $79, respectively, in 2011. She also paid $275 for prescription copays (i.e., expenses not covered by insurance). In the absence of records or receipts showing that petitioner paid additional amounts for medical care in 2011, she is entitled to a deduction for medical expenses to the extent that the items summarized above exceed 7.5% of her adjusted gross income for 2011. Under section 162(a), a deduction is allowed for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. The determination of whether an expenditure satisfies the requirements for*66 deductibility under section 162 is a question of fact. The term "trade or business" includes performing services as an employee. When a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a deductible expense but fails to establish the amount of the deduction, the Court normally may estimate the amount allowable as a deduction. Section 274(d) prescribes strict substantiation requirements for deductions for expenses related to travel (including meals and lodging), entertainment, and gifts, and with respect to "listed property". For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009, cellular phones are no longer included in the definition of listed property in section 280F(d)(4), which was amended by the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, sec. 2043(a), 124 Stat. at 2560. As a result of this change, cellular phone use is no longer subject to the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). Petitioner did not produce any records of her vehicle expenses (including*68 parking fees and tolls) that would satisfy the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). Therefore, on the record presented, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to a deduction for vehicle expenses, parking fees, or tolls. Petitioner traveled to the educators conference in November 2011. Although Hayward USD had informed petitioner in advance that she would not be reimbursed for her travel expenses, she did receive reimbursement for the conference registration fee. Other than her hotel charges of $297, however, petitioner failed to substantiate any expenses, such as airfare and meal expenses, for which she was not reimbursed by Hayward USD. Consequently, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of only $297 for travel expenses. Petitioner claimed a deduction for other unreimbursed employee expenses that she attributed to items that she purchased for her work including electronics, instructional materials, and physical education equipment. Although she offered some bank records indicating that she made purchases at various retail stores, we are unable to discern from these records*69 that the expenditures in question constitute ordinary and necessary business expenses. A taxpayer generally is not entitled to deduct any expenses related to a dwelling unit used as a residence during the taxable year. Sec. 280A(a). Expenses attributable to a home office are excepted from this general rule, however, if the expenses are allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis as the principal place of business for the taxpayer's trade or business. Sec. 280A(c)(1); *70 Petitioner claims that she is entitled to a deduction for the business use of her home. On the record presented, we conclude that petitioner used two spaces in her home (a small office and a portion of her garage--approximately 15% of her living space) on a regular and exclusive basis to conduct administrative and management activities related to her work and for the convenience of her employer, Hayward USD. Given the nature of petitioner's employment, there was no other fixed location where petitioner was able to conduct these activities. Petitioner established that she paid approximately $3,420, $876, and $888 annually for home owner's association dues, utility charges, and trash collection fees, respectively.*71 Accordingly, we con clude (subject to the limitation of section 280A(c)(5), if applicable) that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of $778 for the business use of her home (i.e., 15% of the total of the expenses listed above). Petitioner paid $147 monthly for cellular phone service for four cellular phones. Petitioner testified credibly that she used one of the cellular phones approximately 40% of the time for business purposes. Although the record is unclear as to the precise allocation of the monthly charges, there is sufficient evidence to justify dividing the charges equally among the four cellular phones. As previously mentioned, cellular phone use is no longer subject to the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). On this record, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of $176 (representing 40% of the annual charges for one cellular phone) for the business use of her cellular phone during the year in issue. Section 167(a) allows a depreciation deduction for exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property if the taxpayer uses such property in a trade or business or other income-producing activity. Petitioner failed to identify the equipment underlying the deduction for depreciation that she claimed on her tax return. It follows that respondent's determination disallowing a deduction for depreciation is sustained. Petitioner conceded at trial that the deduction of $500 that she claimed for tax return preparation fees was overstated. Although petitioner testified that she used TurboTax software to prepare her tax return, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount she paid, if any, for the software. On this record, we are unable to estimate the amount of an allowable deduction and instead must sustain respondent's determination disallowing the deduction in its entirety. Petitioner claimed a deduction for investment advisory, IRA custodial, and safe deposit box fees. She failed, however, to offer any documents or records to substantiate these expenses. It follows that respondent's determination disallowing a deduction for these expenses is sustained. Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes a penalty equal to 20% of the amount of any underpayment of tax that is attributable to, among other things: (1) negligence or disregard of rules or regulations or (2) any substantial understatement of income tax. The term "negligence" includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with tax laws, and "disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(c). An understatement means the excess of the amount of the tax required to be shown on the tax return over the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the tax return, reduced by any rebate. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A). An understatement is substantial in the case of an individual if the amount of the understatement for the taxable year exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the tax return or $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A). With respect to an individual taxpayer's liability for any penalty, section 7491(c) places on the Commissioner the burden of production, thereby requiring the Commissioner to come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty if the taxpayer establishes that there was reasonable cause for, and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to, the underpayment. Respondent discharged his burden of production as to negligence under section 7491(c) by showing that petitioner failed to keep adequate records or properly substantiate expenses underlying many of her claimed deductions. Petitioner did not offer a defense to the imposition of an accuracy-related penalty other than to assert that she is not well versed in tax matters and made a mistake in attempting to prepare her tax return without assistance. On this record, we*75 cannot say that petitioner had reasonable cause with respect to her negligence or any understatement, and, therefore, respondent's determination that she is liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) is sustained. To reflect the foregoing,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), as amended and in effect for 2011, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.↩
2. The parties agree that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of $975 for charitable contributions.↩
3. Respondent allowed petitioner deductions for medical and dental expenses of $275 and unreimbursed employee business expenses of $1,078 (the latter amount representing petitioner's union dues paid in 2011).↩
4. Although petitioner also paid for a single residential telephone landline and Internet service, the record does not reflect the amount that petitioner paid for these services or the percentage, if any, of her use of these services for business purposes.↩
5. Respondent made no adjustment to this item in the notice of deficiency.↩
6. Sec. 213(a) was amended in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 9013(a), 124 Stat. at 868 (2010) (effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012), to allow a deduction to the extent that eligible medical expenses exceed 10% of adjusted gross income.↩
7. Other business expenses appear to relate to purchases of physical education equipment that petitioner purportedly made in 2011. There is no documentation in the record to substantiate these expenses.
8. The Commissioner generally updates the optional standard mileage rate annually.
9. For the sake of completeness, we note that we have not included among these expenses the property taxes and mortgage interest that petitioner paid in respect of her residence in 2011 because she claimed and was allowed deductions for those expenses on Schedule A, lines 6 and 10, respectively.
Podems v. Commissioner ( 1955 )
Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 1930 )
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering ( 1934 )
W. Horace Williams, Sr., and Viola Bloch Williams v. United ... ( 1957 )
William F. Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 1969 )
Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner ( 1992 )
Frank J. Hradesky v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 1976 )
Commissioner v. Heininger ( 1943 )
Sanford v. Commissioner ( 1968 )
Primuth v. Commissioner ( 1970 )