DocketNumber: Docket No. 15480-14.
Judges: LAUBER
Filed Date: 9/7/2017
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
Decision will be entered for respondent.
LAUBER,
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in California when he filed his petition.
Petitioner is a world-renowned scientist in the field of biotechnology. He received a bachelor of science degree from Harvard College, a master of science degree from the University of Utah, and a Ph.D. in biochemistry from the University of Illinois. He completed postdoctoral work at several universities, including the University of Wisconsin and the Nobel Institute*175 in Sweden.
In 1955 petitioner began his academic career as a professor of biochemistry at the University of Illinois. He moved to the University of Washington in 1965 and was subsequently recruited by the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF). He served there from 1969 to 1982 as the Herzstein professor and chair *176 of the biochemistry and biophysics department. He has published 400 scientific papers during his career and holds more than
Shortly before leaving UCSF petitioner formed Chiron Corp. (Chiron), one of the first publicly held biotechnology companies. Under his leadership Chiron made major contributions in the areas of vaccines and infectious diseases. These included: (1) sequencing the HIV genome; (2) discovering the Hepatitis C virus; (3) developing a diagnostic test to detect HIV and the Hepatitis B and C viruses; (4) developing the first vaccine for the Hepatitis B virus using recombinant DNA technology; and (5) codeveloping a method to clone human insulin genes to produce vaccines that are used throughout the world*176 today.
In 1995 Ciba-Geigy, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, acquired 49% of Chiron's outstanding stock. Ciba-Geigy had previously partnered with Chiron to produce vaccines using mass-production techniques. Ciba-Geigy subsequently merged with another company to form Novartis. Novartis purchased from petitioner the remaining 51% of Chiron's stock in 2006.
Following Ciba-Geigy's initial investment in Chiron, petitioner made other startup investments in the biotechnology field. In 1999 he formed Synergenics, a *177 service company that performed back-office support for the startup companies in which he invested. During 2009 Synergenics was a disregarded entity whose income and expenses petitioner reported on a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business.
Although petitioner created numerous startup companies, the focus of our interest is iMetrikus (originally called Healthvantage, Inc.), which petitioner acquired in 1999. In June 2002 he incorporated iMetrikus International (IM), and iMetrikus became its wholly owned subsidiary. For convenience, we will refer to these companies collectively as IM.
IM was a "telehealth" company that developed technology systems to enable remote monitoring*177 of patients' health. The products it developed included MediCompass and Metrilink. MediCompass was an application designed to access clinical data to help doctors improve patient compliance and optimize treatment plans. MetriLink was a device designed to upload data from end-user monitoring tools to a "personal health record" to help patients have better control over their health regimens.
IM had an unusual capital structure. Although petitioner was its driving force, he owned no common stock. IM had about 70 common shareholders, including *178 key employees and some of petitioner's family members. But common stock formed a minuscule portion of its capital structure. From the time petitioner incorporated IM through December 2009, IM's primary funding source took the form of cash advances from petitioner.*178 on these notes when due.
Between February 2002 and May 2005 petitioner advanced to IM another $22 million. Only $3.4 million of these advances was covered by promissory notes. For the remaining $18.6 million petitioner received no promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness. IM recorded all these advances as loans on its books, and these advances continued to accrue interest at 7%, the rate appearing on the last promissory note that petitioner and IM had executed. But after February 2002 IM paid no interest on any of this purported indebtedness.
*179 By May 2005 petitioner had advanced approximately $43.4 million to IM. That same month IM converted the entirety of this purported indebtedness to preferred stock as part of a "Series D Preferred Stock Financing." The May 2005 conversion gave petitioner preferred stock with a face value of $43.4 million. After this conversion roughly 78% of IM's capital structure consisted of preferred stock owned by petitioner.
Between May 2005 and December 2009 petitioner made additional cash advances to IM totaling $43.04 million. These advances were IM's sole source of funding during this period. Petitioner generally made these advances monthly or semimonthly*179 in amounts sufficient to cover IM's budgeted operating expenses for the ensuing period.
IM executed no promissory notes for these advances and furnished no collateral. As before, it recorded these advances on its books as loans and accrued interest at the 7% rate reflected on the promissory notes executed in 2002. But it never paid a penny of interest on any of this purported indebtedness. As of December 31, 2009, the balance of petitioner's open-account advances to IM, including accrued interest, was approximately $47.5 million. That sum, coupled with his $43.4 million of preferred stock, constituted roughly 92% of IM's capital structure as of that date.
*180 IM's business plan was to create pilot programs for telehealth products and services by seeking partnerships with pharmaceutical companies, healthcare providers, and technology companies. Its partners before 2009 included Yahoo, Web-MD, and Aetna. Although none of these ventures yielded profits, IM appeared to have better somewhat prospects in 2009. Early that year petitioner and IM officers held separate discussions with executives from General Electric (GE) and Google concerning a possible equity investment in IM. The discussions*180 with GE fizzled out early because GE acquired another business to develop this field.
IM's discussions with Google appeared more promising. Between July and October 2009 petitioner and Google personnel exchanged emails concerning a possible strategic partnership. Google was interested in integrating IM's devices into Google applications on cell phones, tablets, and personal computers.
Petitioner prepared a Powerpoint presentation highlighting the hoped-for benefits of pairing IM's advanced technology with Google's market share in the technology field. At the end of October, Cathy Gordon, a director of business development at Google, offered to connect petitioner with Google executives for further discussion of a partnership arrangement. In early December 2009 petitioner prepared another Powerpoint presentation emphasizing the large market *181 available for IM's devices (including patients with significant medical needs and thousands of medical professionals, insurance companies, and pharmacies).
The ensuing email correspondence suggests that Google was genuinely interested in integrating IM's products into its applications. In December 2009 petitioner emailed IM's employees to inform them*181 that "convergent forces" had "created great potential for change" and had "created an unusual opportunity for consumer oriented approaches." This upbeat assessment contrasted with his dour assessment at year-end 2008 when he informed IM's employees that the company was going through "a period of extreme financial and economic stress."
Discussions between IM and Google continued through January and February 2010. But in March 2010 the dialogue turned south. In an internal email dated March 22, 2010, Google executives stated that they "don't see * * * [a partnership with IM] being a cash infusion" because of concerns over IM's marketplace position and lack of success. After further internal discussions Google finally decided in June 2010 not to enter into a partnership with IM.
IM incurred substantial losses in most years of its existence. Its aggregate losses from 1999 through 2008 exceeded $75 million. For 2007 it had revenue of $1,480,138 and operating expenses of $10,612,411; for 2008 it had revenue of $383,090 and operating expenses of $9,750,156; and for 2009 it had revenue of *182 $482,036 and operating expenses of $8,174,559. It incurred additional net operating losses (NOLs) of about*182 $8 million during 2010 and carried over approximately $83 million in NOLs to 2011. All of this stood in stark contrast to IM's projections at year-end 2007 that its revenues would increase to $15 million in 2008, to $50 million in 2009, and to $197 million by 2012.
Because of IM's inability to form successful partnerships, petitioner began questioning the collectibility of his advances. Sometime in late 2009 he asked Laurence Bardoff, Synergenics' senior vice president, to evaluate IM's financial condition. Mr. Bardoff informed petitioner that its condition was precarious: Its 2008 revenue was 98% below target, and it had massive NOLs. Without petitioner's continued cash infusions the company would have to fold.
Between September and December 2009 petitioner discussed with Mr. Bardoff and with his personal accountant the possibility of claiming a bad debt loss deduction for some or all of his advances. In a series of emails Mr. Bardoff took the position that all of petitioner's advances were debt and that the advances should be written off individually under a "first-in, first-out" approach. Mr. Bardoff initially used $10 million as a placeholder number for the debt writedown.*183 At the end of December the writedown was lowered to $8.55 million.
*183 While Mr. Bardoff was preparing documents to implement the $8.55 million writedown, petitioner's personal attorney prepared a promissory note to consolidate the $34.5 million of advances that petitioner did not plan to write off. While these documents were being prepared, petitioner made additional monthly advances totaling $600,000 to IM. In March 2010 petitioner and IM executed a debt restructuring agreement, a consolidated promissory note for $34.5 million, and a certificate of debt forgiveness of $8.55 million. All of these documents were backdated to December 31, 2009.
IM continued to operate at least through 2013. Petitioner revised its business model to focus on product lines in social networking. He advanced another $37.75 million to IM during 2010-2013, again evidenced by no promissory notes.
Petitioner timely filed his 2009 Federal income tax return. He included in this return a Schedule C for Synergenics that reported (among other things) an $8.55 million business bad debt loss reflecting the writedown of his advances to IM. According to petitioner, this loss corresponded to advances he had*184 made during 2005 and 2006 after the conversion of his previous advances to preferred stock. No accrued interest was included in the $8.55 million writedown. Petitioner claimed this loss in full as a deduction against ordinary income.
*184 The IRS selected petitioner's 2009 return for examination. It disallowed the business bad debt deduction in full, made various computational adjustments, and determined an accuracy-related penalty. It issued petitioner a timely notice of deficiency, and he timely petitioned this Court.
At trial petitioner presented the report and testimony of Brian MacKenzie, a valuation expert and principal with KPMG. The Court recognized Mr. MacKenzie as an expert in business valuation. He has prepared more than 500 appraisals in his career.
Mr. MacKenzie performed an appraisal that estimated IM's fair market value (FMV) at year-end 2008 and 2009. For both years he used the market approach and the income approach. In determining IM's value at year-end 2008 he relied heavily on management's projections of future revenue, cashflows, and expenses as stated in a financial forecast dated December 31, 2007. Notwithstanding the worldwide financial crisis, he opined*185 that market conditions had not materially changed during 2008. He used the weighted average of his outcomes under the two approaches to determine that IM's FMV at year-end 2008 was $55.4 million.
In determining IM's value at year-end 2009 Mr. MacKenzie used the same valuation approaches but adjusted his appraisal downward, chiefly because of *185 management's representations that increased competition had substantially diminished its prospects. Mr. MacKenzie relied heavily on management's representation that discussions with Google had effectively collapsed by year-end 2009. On the basis of this information he determined that the company's FMV during 2009 had declined by 74%, from $55.4 million to $14.3 million.
Respondent offered, and the Court recognized, James E. McCann as an expert in business valuation. Mr. McCann opined that Mr. MacKenzie's appraisal was flawed in several respects. With respect to the year-end 2008 valuation, he opined that Mr. MacKenzie gave undue weight to management's year-end 2007 financial forecast. He noted that the macroeconomic environment had deteriorated during the ensuing 12 months. And he noted that management's revenue projections were wildly inflated:*186 IM's actual revenues for 2008 were $383,090, about 98% below the $15 million projected at year-end 2007.
Mr. McCann opined that IM's financial condition at year-end 2009 did not differ materially from its financial condition at year-end 2008. At both dates IM's cash balances were insufficient to cover its expenses for more than two months. It was thus entirely dependent at all times on cash infusions from petitioner to stay afloat. He accordingly discerned no factual basis for Mr. MacKenzie's hypothesis that IM's FMV had declined by 74% during calendar year 2009.
The IRS' determinations in a notice of deficiency are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving them erroneous.
A bona fide debt is a debt that arises from "a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."
Advances made by an investor to a closely held or controlled*188 corporation may properly be characterized, not as a bona fide loan, but as a capital contribution.
To give rise to a deduction under
*189 This case presents three major questions under the statutory and regulatory regime outlined above. These questions are: (1) whether petitioner's advances to IM constituted debt or equity; (2) if the advances constituted debt,*189 and if the debt was held by "a taxpayer other than a corporation," whether the debt was a business or a "nonbusiness" debt under
Petitioner asserts that all of his advances to IM constituted bona fide debt whereas respondent contends that petitioner made capital investments in his capacity as an investor. In determining whether an advance of funds constitutes bona fide debt, "economic reality provides the touchstone."
Whether an advance of funds is treated as debt or equity "must be considered in the context of the overall transaction."
Absent stipulation to the contrary, appeal of this case would lie to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court has identified 11 nonexclusive factors to determine whether an advance of funds gives rise to bona fide debt as opposed to an equity investment.
In considering this factor we focus on the type of instrument evidencing the advance.
IM issued promissory notes for the cash advances petitioner made before March 2002. But those notes were converted to preferred stock in May 2005 and are not involved here. The $43.04 million involved here was advanced between May 2005 and December 2009. IM did not issue petitioner a single promissory *192 note to cover any of those advances. Rather, petitioner advanced cash on open account, generally monthly or semimonthly.*192 he chose not to write off. This document was backdated to December 31, 2009. We find this document to have no probative value in the debt-vs.-equity analysis. It did not cover the $8.55 million of advances for which petitioner claims a loss; it was not created during the 2009 taxable year; and it was a self-serving document created in connection with petitioner's year-end tax planning. The absence of a promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness for the $8.55 million of advances supports characterizing them as equity.
A fixed maturity date is indicative of an obligation to repay, which supports characterizing an advance of funds as debt.
Because IM issued no promissory notes for any of the advances at issue, there was of necessity no fixed maturity date. Petitioner testified that because he was the only person advancing money to*193 IM, he considered fixing of maturity dates to be "futile, senseless, and counter to the interests of all involved." We do not see how this testimony helps petitioner's position; it suggests that he was essentially indifferent as to how the advances were characterized. We find that the absence of any fixed maturity dates supports characterizing the advances as equity.
In considering this factor we examine the alleged borrower's source of funds to repay the advances.
IM had aggregate losses of $82.7 million during 1999-2009, and its expenses vastly exceeded its revenue for all relevant years. As of December 31, 2009, it had made no payments of principal or interest on petitioner's $43.04 million of cash advances. For much of the period after May 2005, IM was kept afloat because petitioner continued to provide monthly or semimonthly cash infusions keyed to IM's expected cash needs for the ensuing period. Thus, the most likely source*194 of repayment of petitioner's advances would be further cash infusions from petitioner himself. This does not support characterizing his advances as debt.
Petitioner testified that he hoped to secure ultimate repayment upon sale of IM to a third party or a third-party investment in IM. But this is the hope entertained by the most speculative types of equity investors, such as venture capitalists and private equity firms. Petitioner was a "classic capital investor hoping to make a profit, not * * * a creditor expecting to be repaid regardless of the company's success or failure."
A definite obligation to repay, backed by the lender's rights to enforce payment, supports a debt characterization.
Although petitioner's advances were shown as loans on IM's books, there was no written evidence*195 of indebtedness fixing IM's obligation to repay at any particular time. None of petitioner's advances was secured by any collateral. And even if petitioner under these circumstances were thought to have a "right to enforce repayment," that right was nugatory because his continued cash infusions were the only thing keeping IM afloat. Had he enforced repayment, he would simply have had to make a larger capital infusion the following month. This strongly supports characterization of his advances as equity.
In considering this factor we examine whether the taxpayer making the advances receives increased management rights in the business. Increased management *196 rights, in the form of greater voting rights or a larger share of the company's equity, support equity characterization.
Evaluation of this factor is tricky because IM had an unusual capital structure. Although petitioner had de facto control, he literally owned no common stock. But through his cash advances and preferred stock he held about 92% of IM's capital. Petitioner contends that none of his advances gave him increased voting rights or a larger equity share, and this is literally true. But it also*196 means little because he already had complete control of the company by virtue of his status as its sole funder. To the extent this factor is relevant here it supports characterizing the advances as equity.Status Relative to Regular Creditors In considering this factor we examine whether the alleged lender's rights are equal or inferior to those of an ordinary corporate creditor. Petitioner was the only supplier of cash to IM. It borrowed no money from banks and thus had no "regular creditors." While it is thus impossible to draw a relative comparison between petitioner and other creditors, it is significant that petitioner had, in absolute terms, none of the rights that a "regular creditor" would have. There was no promissory note, no maturity date, no collateral, no protective covenant, no personal guaranty, and no payment of interest. No "regular creditor" would have lent funds to a loss-ridden company like IM on such terms. We find that*197 this factor, to the extent relevant here, supports characterizing the advances as equity. In considering this factor we examine whether the taxpayer and the corporation intended the advance to be debt or equity. Petitioner's actions strongly suggest that he intended the advances to be equity. He did not execute promissory notes for any of the advances at issue. He received no interest on his advances and made no effort to collect interest or enforce repayment of principal. Although IM recorded the advances as loans and accrued interest on them, petitioner's control over the company gave him ultimate discretion to decide whether and how repayment would be made. In fact, he expected to be repaid, as a venture capitalist typically expects to be repaid, upon sale of IM to a third party or a third-party investment in IM.*198 This factor weighs in favor of treating the advances as equity. In considering this factor we examine whether the purported borrower had "thin" capitalization. A company's capitalization is relevant to determining the level of risk associated with repayment. Petitioner urges that he should be regarded as having written off, on a FIFO basis, the $8.55 million of advances that he made between May 2005 and June 2006, immediately after converting his previous $43.4 million of advances to preferred stock. At that point, he notes, the bulk of IM's capital structure consisted of preferred stock. He accordingly insists that IM was adequately capitalized at the time he made those advances. As we explain more fully, Between May 2005 and December 2009, petitioner's aggregate cash advances ($43.04 million) roughly equaled the face value of IM's preferred stock ($43.4 million). While this suggests that IM's capitalization may have been adequate, that fact would not seem compelling here. Normally, a large "equity *200 cushion" is important to creditors because it affords them protection if the company encounters financial stress: The creditors will not be at risk unless the common and preferred shareholders are first wiped out. But because petitioner himself supplied almost 100% of IM's "equity cushion," he would not derive much comfort from the latter prospect. On balance, we conclude that this factor slightly favors petitioner or is neutral. In considering this factor we examine whether the advance is made by a sole shareholder. In considering this factor we examine the source of interest payments. The final factor we examine is whether the purported debtor could have obtained similar funding from third-party lenders. The evidence is clear that no third party operating at arm's length would have lent $43 million to IM between May 2005 and December 2009 without insisting (at a minimum) on promissory notes, regular interest payments, collateral to secure the advances, and a personal guaranty from petitioner. Especially is that so where (as here) the purported debtor was losing about $8 million a year and could not fund its operations without petitioner's monthly cash infusions. IM's financial condition has been extremely precarious in every year since its inception. Respondent's expert, Mr. McCann, determined that IM had an extremely high risk of bankruptcy and that, without petitioner's continued advances, it would surely have ceased operations within*202 one or two months. Under these circumstances, no third-party lender would have lent $43 million to IM on the terms petitioner did. In addition, petitioner continued to advance funds to IM even after he concluded that its financial condition was dire enough to justify writing off some of his advances. He advanced $600,000 to IM near the end of 2009 while his lawyers were preparing documents to write down his prior advances. And he advanced another $37.75 million to IM during 2010-2013, again evidenced by no *203 promissory notes. An unrelated lender would not have acted in this manner. Our finding that petitioner's advances constituted equity investments rather than debt is sufficient to support our holding that he is not entitled to a bad debt deduction. For the sake of completeness, however, we will consider his ability to satisfy the other requirements for claiming a deduction against ordinary income under "In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation," Respondent contends that petitioner made his advances in his capacity as an investor. Petitioner contends that he made his advances in pursuit of his trade or business as a "lender" or as a "promoter" of startup companies. We find neither of petitioner's contentions persuasive. Taxpayers who advance funds to controlled corporations often assert that they are in the lending business. But "[t]he right to deduct bad debts as business losses is applicable only to the exceptional situations in which the taxpayer's activities in making loans * * * [are] so extensive and continuous as to elevate that activity*205 to the status of a separate business." *206 There is no support in the record for petitioner's assertion that he was in the business of lending money. He advanced more than $80 million to IM without executing promissory notes or collecting interest. No bank or other professional lender operates in this fashion. Indeed, Mr. Bardoff acknowledged in an email that petitioner "is not a traditional banker looking at liquid assets asking for regular repayment on loans. Rather he instead very actively seeks to increase the value of the assets they are trying to create." Petitioner's advances to IM were indisputably "extensive and continuous." But this shows only that IM was continuously in need of money, not that petitioner was in the lending business. To establish that he was in the lending business petitioner must show that he lent money, as banks do, with the expectation of making a profit on his loans. But petitioner did not collect a penny of interest on his advances during the eight-year period commencing March 2002. He likewise sought no repayment of principal;*206 indeed, he admitted that he hoped to be repaid, as a venture capitalist typically hopes to be repaid, upon ultimate sale of IM to a third party or a third-party investment in IM. This is not how lenders expect to make a profit. We find no evidentiary support for the proposition that petitioner's advances constituted "a *207 debt created or acquired * * * in connection with a trade or business" of lending money in which he was personally engaged. Petitioner likewise failed to establish that he was engaged in the "trade or business" of promoting biotech startup companies. The Supreme Court sustained the disallowance of his claimed deduction, ruling that he was not in the "trade or business" of bottling or any other business that would enable him to deduct the advances as a business bad debt. *208 In subsequent cases we have held that a taxpayer is not in the business of being a "promoter" where he is entitled to no compensation other than a normal investor's return. A taxpayer may be able to show that he is engaged in business as a "promoter" or "trader" if he establishes that his goal is to earn profits by "flipping" assets, i.e., making quick and profitable sales of real estate, securities, or other property. These cases do not help petitioner. He did not incorporate IM to make a profit from a quick and profitable sale. Quite the contrary: He testified that he invested in IM as he had invested successfully in Chiron, recognizing that each venture would take considerable time to develop into a successful business. Petitioner fit the paradigm of a patient long-term investor, advancing funds to IM continuously from 1999 through 2013 in the hope that his investment would eventually*209 pay off. These are not the actions of a "promoter" or "trader." In sum, we find that petitioner was not in the "trade or business" of lending money or promoting companies. If his advances were considered debt, they were neither debt "created or acquired * * * in connection with" a trade or business conducted by him nor debt the loss from the worthlessness of which was incurred in any trade or business he conducted. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's advances were debts and constituted business debts, he would be entitled to a deduction for 2009 only if he established worthlessness during 2009. To analyze this issue we must first decide whether petitioner's advances*210 constituted separate individual "debts" (several of which allegedly became wholly worthless) or a single aggregate "debt" (which allegedly became worthless in part). Petitioner contends that each of his advances was a separate "loan" and that he decided to write off some of the oldest loans that he made during 2005-2006. To support his position he cites We find this case inapposite here. The only question we addressed in Treating petitioner's advances as separate loans might be appropriate if they were evidenced by promissory notes that had different maturities, different interest rates, or different levels of creditor protection in terms of covenants or collateral. But as Mr. Bardoff admitted, petitioner regarded all of his advances as fungible; he believed it unnecessary to execute promissory notes because he was the only person funding IM. Indeed, Mr. Bardoff's plan to write off the advances on a FIFO basis, as one would record the disposition of inventory, underscores the fungibility of the advances. Petitioner did not contend that his 2005 and 2006 advances were especially risky, and he could not plausibly make that argument because he advanced all the money on exactly the same terms. *212 The economic reality is that petitioner advanced $43.04 million to IM on an open account, as needed by IM, as if he were extending a line of credit. Like a bank line of credit, this is properly regarded as a single aggregate debt. Mr. Bard-off confirmed the aggregate nature of the advances by stating his belief that petitioner was making a "partial write down" of this alleged debt. We*212 accordingly must decide whether petitioner met the requirements for establishing for 2009 a partially worthless debt. A taxpayer can establish worthlessness by showing that a debt has neither current nor potential value. The taxpayer's burden is especially great where he seeks to deduct a partially worthless debt. The statute affords the IRS discretion on this point, providing that "the Secretary Petitioner has not made the showing that the statute and the regulations require. First, he has not established to the Commissioner's satisfaction, or ours, the amount of the debt that was worthless at year-end 2009. Second, petitioner did not show that any portion of his advances became worthless during 2009. He appears to have had a reasonable hope of recovering on his investments; that is presumably why he continued to advance another $37.75 million to IM during 2010-2013. In seeking an "identifiable event" that would cause partial worthlessness during 2009 in particular, petitioner and his expert seize upon the supposed collapse of IM's discussions with Google. But those discussions were proceeding apace through the end of 2009, complete with two Powerpoint presentations*215 by petitioner to Google executives. The email correspondence convinces us that Google during 2009 was genuinely interested in the possibility of integrating IM's products into its applications. It was not until March 2010 that Google reached an internal "no go" decision about partnering with IM, and that decision was not communicated to IM until June 2010. Petitioner's assertion that talks with Google had totally collapsed by year-end 2009 is hard to reconcile with these facts or with his upbeat assess-ment, *216 in a December 2009 email to IM employees, that "convergent forces" had "created great potential for change" and had "create[d] an unusual opportunity for consumer oriented approaches." Petitioner relies heavily on Mr. MacKenzie's expert report to support his position that IM's value had declined from $55 million at year-end 2008 to $14 million at year-end 2009. We agree with Mr. McCann, respondent's expert, that Mr. MacKenzie's report is flawed in several respects. For 2008 Mr. MacKenzie relied heavily on management's revenue projections for that year, which were made in 2007. This reliance was clearly misplaced. The worldwide financial crisis that began during 2007 peaked in 2008,*216 leading to a massive lack of liquidity in the financial system and leaving even stable companies starved for credit. The revenue projection that IM made in 2007 could not reasonably be taken at face value; in fact, IM's 2008 revenues were 98% below that target. For 2009 Mr. MacKenzie relied heavily on the purported collapse of IM's partnership discussions with Google as his basis for determining that IM's value had declined by 74% from year-end 2008. As noted earlier, we find no factual support for this hypothesis; IM's discussions with Google were ongoing at year-end 2009 and did not turn south until mid-2010. Far from the 74% decline in value posited by Mr. MacKenzie, we find Mr. McCann's assessment more plau-sible. *217 Using conventional financial metrics, he concluded that IM's financial condition at year-end 2009 was not materially different from its financial condition at year-end 2008. In sum, the IRS did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner was not entitled to a deduction of $8.55 million for a partially worthless debt for 2009. Even if petitioner established that his advances were debt and that this debt was a business debt, he did not meet the requirements for*217 deducting a partially worthless debt under The Code imposes a 20% penalty upon the portion of any underpayment of income tax that is attributable (among other things) to "negligence" or any "substantial understatement of income tax." *218 Under A taxpayer may avoid the accuracy-related penalty by showing that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Both of these determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant facts. The most important factor is the taxpayer's efforts to assess his tax liability correctly. A taxpayer may demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith by showing reliance on the advice of a tax professional, such as an accountant or a lawyer, regarding a particular item's tax treatment. Before turning to the We now consider whether petitioner has established a "reliance on professional advice" defense to the accuracy-related penalty under the *221 We find that Mr. Bardoff omitted or misstated several important facts in his communications with Mr. Graham. Mr. Bardoff erroneously told Mr. Graham that promissory notes existed for the advances and that IM had paid interest on them. (These facts are critical for at least three of the
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the relevant year, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.↩
2. Petitioner made many of these advances through a revocable trust. For convenience, we will refer to all advances as having been made by petitioner.↩
3. The labels appearing on documents may have less importance when the parties are related.
4. Petitioner contends that he intentionally used cash advances instead of equity investments to fund IM because he "did not want to dilute the common shareholders." Our task in this case is to determine the true character of petitioner's advances for purposes of Federal tax law; how those advances would be treated under California corporate law is an entirely separate question that is not before us. If petitioner's advances were treated as preferred stock under State corporate law, they would not "dilute the common shareholders" any more than petitioner did in May 2005 when he converted his prior $43.4 million of advances to preferred stock.↩
5. Petitioner introduced testimony from Mr. Bardoff that an "outside vendor" advanced funds to IM in 2013 or 2014. Petitioner supplied no evidence as to: (1) the identity of this vendor; (2) whether the vendor was a truly unrelated party; (3) the amount of money it advanced; (4) whether it demanded a guaranty from petitioner; or (5) the other terms on which it supposedly advanced the funds. We accordingly found this testimony to lack credibility and probative value. In any event, the relevant question is whether an unrelated lender would have lent funds to IM at the time petitioner did (i.e., between May 2005 and December 2009) on the same terms as petitioner did. Petitioner introduced no evidence to support an affirmative answer to that question.↩
6. Banks receive more liberal treatment. A partially charged-off loan is deductible by a bank if the charge-off is (among other things) "[i]n accordance with established policies" of the bank's regulator.
7. Given our disposition, we need not address respondent's contention that petitioner's deduction should be disallowed because the documents implementing the writedown were executed in February or March 2010 and backdated to 2009.↩
8. Respondent contends that petitioner could not reasonably rely on Mr. Halasz (his personal attorney), on Matthew Sanders (IM's CEO), or on IM's tax return preparers. Because petitioner does not contend that he relied on any of these people, we need not address the application of the Neonatology test to them.↩
9. Because we find that petitioner did not supply accurate information to his tax adviser, we need not determine whether he "actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment."
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