DocketNumber: No. 23394-04S
Judges: "Dean, John F."
Filed Date: 12/21/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
*107 PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b), THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of
Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax of $ 4,798 for 2003. The issues for decision are whether petitioner: (1) Is entitled to deductions for dependency exemptions, (2) is entitled to head of household filing status, *108 Background The stipulated facts and exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein by reference. At the time the petition in this case was filed, petitioner resided in Ayer, Massachusetts. Petitioner has two sons, RM, born on May 12, 1983, and JM, born on July 30, 1995. Petitioner is married to, but separated from, Estacia Ovalle (Ms. Ovalle), who is the mother of RM. Petitioner and Ms. Ovalle are in the process of seeking a divorce. JM's mother is Yosary Manzueta. During 2003, both RM and JM lived with Ms. Ovalle. During 2003, petitioner was employed as a driver by Trombly Motor Coach Services, Inc. Petitioner timely filed a 2003 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return Form 1040A reporting wages of $ 11,757 and adjusted gross income of $ 12,472. In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner's filing status was single rather than head of household. Respondent also determined that petitioner was not entitled to: (1) Deductions for dependency exemptions, (2) an earned income credit, or (3) an "additional child tax credit". Discussion The Commissioner's determinations are presumed correct, and generally taxpayers bear the burden of proving otherwise. *109 Dependency Exemption Petitioner claimed dependency exemptions for RM and JM for 2003. Respondent disallowed the deductions in the notice of deficiency. Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to claim a dependency exemption for JM on his 2003 Federal income tax return. RM attained the age of 20 in 2003. Petitioner concedes that RM was not a full-time student in 2003, and as such, RM is not a student within the meaning of Accordingly, respondent's determination, to the extent not conceded, is sustained. Head of Household Petitioner filed as a "head of household" for 2003. In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined petitioner's filing status to be single. Petitioner*111 concedes that RM and JM lived with Ms. Ovalle during 2003. At trial, petitioner testified that he lived at his mother's home. He further testified that he would drop off and pick up JM from school and that JM would stay with him "sometimes". Petitioner is not entitled to "head of household" filing status since his sons did not live with him for more than one-half of the year in 2003. Therefore, respondent's determination on this issue is sustained. Earned Income Credit Petitioner claimed the earned income credit for taxable year 2003 for two "qualifying children", RM and JM. Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to the earned income credit for 2003. To be eligible to claim an earned income credit with respect to a qualifying child, a taxpayer must establish, inter alia, that the child*112 bears a relationship to the taxpayer prescribed by Petitioner conceded that RM and JM lived with Ms. Ovalle during 2003. Therefore, they fail to meet the residence requirement under Although petitioner is not eligible to claim an earned income credit under Accordingly, petitioner is not eligible for an earned income credit. Respondent's determination on this issue is sustained. Additional Child Tax Credit For 2003, petitioner did not claim a child tax credit,*113 but he claimed an "additional child tax credit" of $ 126 with JM as the qualifying child. Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to an additional child tax credit for 2003. The child tax credit is a nonrefundable personal credit that was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 101(a), 111 Stat. 796, with a provision for a refundable credit, the "additional child tax credit", for families with three or more children. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2000, the additional child tax credit provision was amended to remove the restriction that only families with three or more children are entitled to claim the credit. See In the absence of other nonrefundable personal credits, a taxpayer is allowed to claim a child tax credit in an amount that is the lesser of the full child tax credit or the taxpayer's Federal income tax liability for the taxable year. See If the child tax credit exceeds the taxpayer's Federal income tax liability for the taxable year, a portion of the child tax credit may be refundable as an "additional child tax credit" under At trial, respondent conceded that petitioner was allowed to claim a dependency exemption deduction with respect to JM for 2003. JM attained the age of 10 in 2003 and is petitioner's son. Therefore, JM is a qualifying child within*115 the meaning of For 2003, the child tax credit is $ 1,000 per qualifying child. Since petitioner's child tax credit exceeds his Federal income tax liability for 2003, he is entitled to a refundable additional child tax credit in an amount that is the lesser of the remaining child tax credit available, or 10 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's earned income exceeds $ 10,500. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to claim the lesser of $ 839 ($ 1,000 - $ 161) or $ 197.20 ($ 12,472*116 - $ 10,500 = $ 1,972 x .10 = $ 197.20). The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a child tax credit of $ 161 and an additional child tax credit of $ 197.20. Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case Division. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
1. The Court's resolution of the issue of petitioner's filing status will determine the correct computation of his standard deduction for 2003.↩
2. Petitioner has not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a), which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain situations. This Court concludes that sec. 7491 does not apply because petitioner has not produced any evidence that establishes the preconditions for its application.↩