DocketNumber: Docket No. 28738-09.
Citation Numbers: 139 T.C. 468, 2012 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45, 139 T.C. No. 18
Judges: GUSTAFSON,THORNTON,COLVIN,FOLEY,GALE,MARVEL,GOEKE,WHERRY,KROUPA,PARIS,MORRISON,KERRIGAN,GOEKE,THORNTON,GALE,MARVEL,WHERRY,KROUPA,GUSTAFSON,MORRISON,HOLMES,HALPERN,VASQUEZ
Filed Date: 12/19/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
Decision will be entered for respondent with regard to the deficiency and for petitioners with regard to the accuracy-related penalty.
P-H was divorced, and his ex-wife had custody of their son C.E. A May 2003 arbitration award, a June 2003 State court order, and a March 2007 State court order provided that P-H would be entitled to the dependency exemption for C.E. (and the March 2007 order explicitly required his ex-wife to execute in his favor a Form 8332, "Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents"), on the condition that P-H pay child support for C.E. P-H paid the full amount of child support throughout 2007, but his ex-wife failed to provide the executed Form 8332.
P-H remarried. Ps timely filed their joint 2007 Federal income tax return, attaching the May 2003 arbitration award. During an examination of that return, Ps also provided R with P-H's 2003 and 2007 child support orders, the latter signed by P-H's ex-wife. R disallowed Ps' claim for a dependency exemption deduction for C.E. for tax year 2007.
*468 GUSTAFSON,
Mr. Armstrong is a truck driver. He and his former wife Dawn Delaney divorced, and in 2003 the couple agreed to resolve by arbitration unspecified questions regarding the support of their two children. The children stayed in Ms. Delaney's custody, but the arbitration resulted in a May 2003 "Arbitration Award" that granted to Ms. Delaney the tax exemption for "C.W." and to Mr. Armstrong the tax exemption for "C.E."2 Under the arbitration award, Mr. Armstrong would get the dependency exemption for C.E. outright for tax years 2003 and 2004, but he would get it for later years, including 2007, only if he stayed *48 current with child support. The arbitration award did not include a provision requiring Ms. Delaney to provide Mr. Armstrong with a Form 8332, "Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents." (As we will explain below, Form 8332 is the document by which a parent who does not have custody of a child may nonetheless become entitled to claim a dependency exemption deduction for the child.) In June 2003 the Washington State court overseeing the divorce entered an "Agreed Order of Child Support on Arbitration" that incorporated this arbitration award and likewise did not require Ms. Delaney to give Mr. Armstrong a Form 8332.
In March 2007, for reasons not in the record, the Washington State court changed the June 2003 order. The March 2007 order contained the following provision: 3.17 INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS. Tax exemptions for the children shall be allocated as follows: The Mother shall have the exemption for C[.W. and] the father shall have the exemption for * * * [C.E.] , In reviewing *470 The parents shall sign the federal income tax dependency exemption waiver. [Emphasis altered.]
By 2007 Mr. Armstrong had remarried. He had consistently made his child support payments required under the State court's orders. But Ms. Delaney nonetheless failed to give him an executed Form 8332 for 2007. Lacking that form, the Armstrongs attached a copy of the 2003 arbitration award to their timely filed *50 joint 2007 Federal income tax return.
The IRS examined that 2007 return. During the course of the audit, the Armstrongs sent to the IRS copies of the 2003 and 2007 child support orders, the latter of which had been signed by Ms. Delaney. The Commissioner nonetheless rejected the Armstrongs' claim for a dependency exemption deduction and a child tax credit for C.E., because the award and orders were "condition[al]" upon Mr. Armstrong's staying current with his support obligations. The IRS also determined an accuracy-related penalty. The Armstrongs timely petitioned this Court, and at that time they resided in South Dakota. The parties stipulated the facts and submitted the case for decision without trial.
An individual is allowed a deduction for exemption for "each individual who is a dependent (as defined in
However, in the case of divorced parents, special rules determine which parent may claim a dependency exemption deduction for a child. • The "child receives over one-half of the child's support during the calendar year from the child's parents * * * who are divorced * * * under a decree of divorce", • *52 such child was "in the custody of 1 or both of the child's parents for more than one-half of the calendar year", • "the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such a manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar year", • "the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the noncustodial parent's return" for the appropriate taxable year,
The IRS's Form 8332 provides an effective and uniform way for a custodial parent to make the declaration required in
A basic element necessary for satisfying
We assume here that Ms. Delaney's signature on the March 2007 order constitutes, in effect, her declaration that she would comply with the order. Therefore, the critical question is whether, by declaring that she would comply with the March 2007 order, Ms. Delaney thereby declared that she "will not claim" C.E. as a dependent in 2007.
That March 2007 order did not provide unconditionally that Ms. Delaney would not claim a dependency exemption deduction for C.E. or that she must sign Form 8332. Rather, the order unambiguously stated that her obligation to sign the release--and Mr. Armstrong's right to the exemption--was conditional upon Mr. Armstrong's payment of child support.7*57 This child support requirement appears nowhere in • that Mr. Armstrong would obtain the exemption (and that Ms. Delaney would release it) only " • that entitlement to the exemption would require first a determination of " • that Ms. Delaney would release her claim only " • that an exemption might be "
Therefore, in signing and assenting to the order, Ms. Delaney did not declare that she "will not claim such child as a dependent". Instead, she thereby declared that she will
Of course, Mr. Armstrong can point to the stipulated fact that, although the State court order was conditional, he fulfilled the condition: He did keep current with his support obligations, so that under the terms of the order, he was entitled to the exemption deduction and Ms. Delaney was obliged to execute the release. *59 The question here, however, is not what he was entitled to under the State court order but what he is entitled to under
The drafters of
The record in this case illustrates the commonplace that custody and support orders are amended from time to time, and we have observed that "the Internal Revenue Service cannot be expected to police divorce decrees and separation agreements or determine taxpayer compliance therewith."
Mr. Armstrong's case is quite sympathetic: He was up to date on his child support; and under the State court order, Ms. Delaney was obliged to sign Form 8332 and release the exemption deduction to him. We are obligated, however, to follow the statute as written, whether the resulting disadvantage is (as here) suffered by a noncustodial parent who bore the burden of child support but did not receive an executed Form 8332, or whether the disadvantage is suffered by a custodial parent who executed a Form 8332 but then bore an undue and unintended burden of child support.
A taxpayer is entitled to a child tax credit for "each qualifying child", as defined in
Under
For purposes of
A taxpayer who is otherwise liable for the accuracy-related penalty may avoid the liability if he successfully invokes one of two defenses pertinent here:10*65 First,
Having kept up to date on his child support, Mr. Armstrong knew that, under the State court order, he was entitled to receive Ms. Delaney's release of the exemption for C.E. and to claim the dependency exemption deduction for himself. And he was indeed so entitled, under that order. He had in his possession a copy of one version of the court order to that effect that bore Ms. Delaney's signature. Court orders can sometimes suffice as an equivalent to Form 8332; and since he lacked the Form 8332 to which he was entitled, Mr. Armstrong attached, to his tax return, a copy of a prior iteration of that order--i.e., the arbitration award. The arbitration award, like the later court order, explicitly disclosed the conditionality of Ms. Delaney's obligation to give *478 him the release (and the absence of her signature on that version of the document was evident).
On these facts, we do not think that the Commissioner has borne his burden to show negligence. We do not believe that Mr. Armstrong, a truck driver, was sufficiently experienced in tax accounting and law such that he would realize that entitlement *66 under the State court order to Ms. Delaney's release did not necessarily mean entitlement under
Moreover, if the Armstrongs' reporting position had amounted to negligence, we think either or both of the defenses described above would excuse them from penalty, on the facts of this case: First, regarding
Second, regarding
Therefore, *67 although we hold in favor of the Commissioner with regard to the tax deficiency, we hold in favor of the Armstrongs with regard to the penalty.
Reviewed by the Court.
THORNTON, COLVIN, FOLEY, GALE, MARVEL, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, PARIS, MORRISON, and KERRIGAN,
*479 GOEKE,
Although the opinion of the Court considers *68 the March 2007 order, it acknowledges that-- The Commissioner also argues that the Armstrongs are unable to show compliance with the fourth criterion--i.e., "attach[ing] such written declaration to the noncustodial parent's return"
The dissent's proffered secondary definitions of "attach" are not, as suggested, *69 all "plain meanings [that] vary so widely",
Indeed, a cursory reading of the numerous
Furthermore, while the dissent endeavors to manipulate the seemingly plain meaning of the term "attach" to accommodate the expanding electronic tax return filing regime, we are presented with no reason to do so in this case. Petitioner physically filed his individual *71 tax return for taxable year 2007, and our focus should appropriately narrow to those particular facts. Instead, by approaching this present matter in a side opinion, we risk complicating our tax laws by implication. Indeed, the dissent's mere suggestion that the term "attach" is subject to different interpretations may have unintended and far-reaching consequence.
We must be both circumspect and judicious in avoiding a manufactured ambiguity in our tax laws. The deliberate use of the word "attached", in the context of
THORNTON, GALE, MARVEL, WHERRY, KROUPA, GUSTAFSON, and MORRISON,
HOLMES,
That state-court order specified that as long as Mr. Armstrong kept current with child support, he "shall have" the tax exemption for his minor child, C.E. It also mandated that Ms. Delaney "shall provide" Mr. Armstrong "an executed IRS Form 8332" for every year he was entitled to the exemption. Even though Mr. Armstrong kept his promise and paid his child support, Ms. Delaney did not keep her part of the deal and never gave him an executed Form 8332. The first question here is whether that state-court order that Ms. Delaney did sign "conform[s] to the substance" of Form 8332.
Divorce decrees and separation agreements often transfer the right to a dependency exemption from one parent to another. They also very often make that transfer conditional--usually, as in this case, on the timely payment of child support. Yet the question of whether such conditional language makes it impossible to use that decree or agreement as a custodial parent's "written declaration * * * that such custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent,"
The majority says it is "obligated * * * to follow the statute as written,"
I agree that we must follow the statute as written, but what does the statute mean?
The question presented is: Does language in a state-court *74 decree that "noncustodial X shall have the exemption for C.E. as long as he is current with his child support obligation for the tax year involved" "conform to the substance" of Form 8332's and
Now, obviously it is--but it's a conditional promise. The rest of the Court reasons thusly: ! ! "This statement is unconditional." ! "[I]n order for a document to comply with the substance of Form 8332 and ultimately *483 ! the language in Mr. Armstrong's form is conditional, ! Mr. Armstrong's form does not conform to the substance *75 of Form 8332 and
What has just happened is an assumption of the conclusion--the conclusion to be proved is assumed to be the case in the third bullet point (and on page 9 of the Court's opinion).
This is not a promising way to construe the language of the Code and regulations. I would look at the problem altogether differently--this question being one where "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." (i) In general.--The written declaration * * * must be an unconditional release of the custodial parent's claim to the child as a dependent for the year or years for which the declaration is effective. A declaration is not unconditional if the custodial parent's release of the right to claim the child as a dependent requires the satisfaction of any condition, *76 including the noncustodial parent's meeting of an obligation such as the payment of support. * * * (ii) Form designated by IRS.--A written declaration may be made on Form 8332 * * * A written declaration not on the form designated by the IRS must conform to the substance of that form and must be a document executed for the sole purpose of serving as a written declaration under this section. A court order or decree or a separation agreement may not serve as a written declaration.
*484 As the majority acknowledges, however,
Apart from our caselaw, the first hint that conditions would make a taxpayer's right to claim a dependency exemption ineffective came from a January 2006 revision to Form 8332. In the "[g]eneral[i]nstructions" for a "[p]ost-1984 decree or agreement" the Commissioner noted: If the divorce decree or separation agreement went into effect after 1984, the noncustodial parent can attach certain pages from the decree or agreement instead of Form 8332. To be able to do this, the decree or agreement must state * * * the following. 1. The noncustodial parent can claim the child as a dependent without regard to any condition (such as payment of support).
In any event, not long after this revision, the Secretary issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to change further provide[d] that a written declaration must include an unconditional statement that the custodial parent will not claim the child as a dependent for the specified year or years. A statement is unconditional if it does not expressly condition the custodial parent's waiver of the right to claim the child as a dependent on the noncustodial parent's meeting of an obligation such as the payment of support. * * *
The Secretary received a comment arguing that a divorce settlement agreed to by both parents should still be able to serve *79 as a standalone declaration.
But was he correct?
I would begin by noting that
Congress's first attempt at a solution was to add
Our caselaw interpreting that version of
The second method by which the noncustodial parent could claim the exemption, however, proved exceptionally contentious. *487 (e) Support Test in Case of Child of Divorced Parents, Etc.-- * * * * (2) Exception *83 where custodial parent releases claim to exemption for the year.--A child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having received over half of his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial parent if-- (A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar year, and (B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the noncustodial parent's return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar year.
As the majority notes,
Congress expected that the requirement of getting a declaration would increase the probability that noncustodial parents would keep current in their payment of child support: "the declaration may be made by the custodial spouse annually in order to better insure the receipt of child support payments."
*489 There is nothing in this history that suggests Congress thought it needed to end conditional transfers of exemptions, or render them unenforceable at the whim of the custodial parent. It just wanted to end the yearly contests between parents on how much they spent on their kids--contests that had become the festivals of litigation.
A look at the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) from around that time also shows the Commissioner to be unconcerned with the conditionality of transferring exemptions.3 Shortly after Congress enacted
Congress's and the Commissioner's lack of concern over conditions (such as payment of support) isn't surprising. Then, as now, several states allowed--or even required--courts *89 to condition the allocation of dependency exemptions on the noncustodial parent's payment of child support. Since at least 1999, for example. Florida has
The rest of the Court reasons that the purpose of
So what happened with our caselaw after the 1984 amendments, and after
It's often hard to glean exactly what elements are essential to a taxpayer's case when he loses for several different reasons. This is a part of tax law where a great many working- and middle-class parents try to represent themselves and are usually not very good at researching the development of *492 caselaw and distinguishing one precedent from another. This almost guarantees some problems in reaching consistent results. We have held, somewhat contrary to
Although the majority repeats this sweeping generalization,
The majority, however, uses
Despite that context, our caselaw began to frequently cite
The next case to take its inspiration from the "unconditional" language in
What I would take away from
That leaves our nonprecedential caselaw from
It's important to remember here that the Commissioner stipulated that Mr. Armstrong met his condition--he in fact paid his child support in full and on time. When Mr. Armstrong satisfied that unambiguous condition precedent, Ms. Delaney-- according to the terms of the state-court order--did not have a choice as to whether she could claim the dependency exemption. She categorically
The majority acknowledges that in this case it is easy to determine whether the noncustodial parent satisfied the condition.
By holding that Mr. Armstrong is not entitled to the dependency exemption, the majority dishonors a state-court judgment ordering Ms. Delaney not to claim the exemption *496 and to provide Mr. Armstrong an executed IRS Form 8332 for *103 1997. The legislative history of
Just because the Armstrongs should win on conditionality doesn't mean they necessarily can claim the dependency exemption for C.E. The Code also requires that the noncustodial parent "attach" the signed declaration to his tax return.
This immediately creates a problem for the Armstrongs because only the arbitrator, and neither Ms. Delaney nor Mr. Armstrong (nor anyone like a lawyer who might have been empowered to act on their behalf) signed this 2003 award, and
But--as has already been detailed--the record doesn't stop here. The Armstrongs provided two additional relevant documents to the Commissioner during the examination of *105 their 2007 tax return, including the 2007 child support order that is at the core of the dispute over conditionality.
The Commissioner says that the 2007 order fails--not only on the conditionality issue--but also because the Armstrongs didn't attach it to their return. Like the conditionality argument, the Commissioner's position regarding attachment has some support in our caselaw, but not in any precedential Opinion. So as with the conditionality issue, I would take a closer look.
But that's not the only meaning of the word and, in an age where the IRS strongly encourages filers, especially middle-income filers with relatively simple returns, to file electronically, *106
Like any other word in the Code, we normally would give "attach" its plain meaning. • "connect: place so as to belong" (as in • "to fasten (itself)" (as in *498 • "make fast or join (as by string or glue)" (as in • "to connect by attribution" (as in
Since the meaning of the word "attach" isn't plain, I start with legislative history, which can be a good lexicographical source.
Congress appears to have intended that "[w]here one of the parents claims the deduction with respect to a child pursuant to a written agreement between them, the Treasury Department may require that [I]n the case of a written agreement * * * between the parents which allocates the deduction to the noncustodial parent, the noncustodial parent *499 must
The Secretary followed this lead and issued a new temporary regulation that reflected the changes to Q-3 How may the exemption for a dependent child be claimed by a noncustodial parent? A-3 A noncustodial parent may claim the exemption for a dependent child only if the *110 noncustodial parent attaches to his/her income tax return for the year of the exemption a written declaration from the custodial parent stating that he/she will not claim the child as a dependent for the taxable year beginning in such calendar year. The written declaration may be made on a form to be provided by the Service for this purpose. Once the Service has released the form, any declaration made other than on the official form shall conform to the substance of such form.
One theme that emerges from this mixed history is that Congress and the Commissioner grew increasingly concerned about inefficiencies and uncertainties surrounding the dependency exemption, seeking to avoid expensive litigation where there was "little tax revenue at stake." H.R. Rept. No. 98-432 (Part 2),
But I think that there is a better reading.
Congress itself referred to "
But if the dictionary and legislative history don't compel a narrow reading, and there is no regulation defining the word, where else could one turn? The Code does not define "attach", and has few references to the term.13*113 These sections unfortunately emit no more light than the legislative history. Other Code sections appear to give "attach" a variety of meanings.
Some, such as current
Likewise, the December 2011 revision of the form given by the Commissioner to claim the credit, Form 5405, First-Time Homebuyer Credit and Repayment of the Credit, warns taxpayers about the credit's strict requirements: "Caution! You must attach a copy of the properly executed settlement statement (or similar documentation) used to complete the purchase (see instructions)." The accompanying instructions add that a taxpayer filing a return claiming the section 36(d)(4) credit "must file on paper and attach all required documentation."
Other sections are much looser.
I think it helpful, on this subject where Congress seems to have been concerned about administrability, to also look at the IRM. Two sections of the IRM in effect when the Armstrongs filed their return and when they were audited seem particularly important to solving our problem.14*116
IRM pt. 21.6.1.4.2 (Oct. 1, 2007) explains the Commissioner's general procedures when dealing with "[r]eturns[w]ith[m]issing[i]nformation." It instructs return reviewers to "request[] the necessary information if * * * [s]upporting forms, schedules, or documents are missing."15*117 IRM 21.6.1.5.8 (10-01-2002) Verifying Form 8332 Procedure * * * * 3. Upon receipt of a math error notice response concerning a missing or incomplete Form 8332 (or similar statement) take the following actions: * * * * C. Correspond with the noncustodial parent; enclose a blank Form 8332. D. Request taxpayer to complete and return the Form 8332, signed by the custodial parent. E. Tell taxpayer IRS will reconsider the request when the appropriate information is provided. * * * *
The IRS has consistently followed such practices.16 Around the time
Current IRS procedure also underscores the Commissioner's interpretation of "attach". The IRM part dealing with "[l]oose[s]chedules"18 says they are not rejected outright but are associated (or reassociated) with the return they relate to: 2. Upon receipt of a loose schedule * * * do one of the following: * * * * C. If you want the loose schedule attached to the original return and not returned to you, enter the employee number for Files * * * * * * * E. If the loose schedule relates to a prior year return or for a return that should have already posted, research for DLN. If DLN is found, enter it on the schedule and route it to Return Files function to associate with return. If DLN is NOT found, return the loose schedule to taxpayer.
*504 These sections indicate that, informally at least, the Commissioner adopts a less rigid definition of "attach"--not just "fastened" but "associated with" or "connected to by attribution." *120 I believe the part of the IRS bureaucracy that handles the processing of returns has a perfectly reasonable understanding of the word. For purposes of
That again leaves our nonprecedential caselaw. We have consistently noted
In only a few cases did we address the attachment requirement head on. In
Mr. Armstrong didn't create a record after his case had begun. Instead, he dug out records the IRS asked for--the 2003 and 2007 child support orders--both of which were in effect when he filed his 2007 income tax return.
I would hold that "attaches" in
It is one of the great theorems of law that if all sides are rational actors with perfect knowledge and zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources--even including exemptions, child tax credits, and the like--would be the same regardless of the rules we choose.
Maybe, with the bright line we draw today, more separated parents will hire escrow agents to manage the flow of Forms 8332.
I respectfully dissent.
HALPERN and VASQUEZ,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.) in effect for the tax year at issue, and all citations of Rules refer to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Pursuant to
3. For these purposes, Ms. Delaney was C.E.'s custodial parent and Mr. Armstrong was C.E.'s noncustodial parent, because the State court orders gave Ms. Delaney sole custody of C.E.
4. The Commissioner also argues that the Armstrongs are unable to show compliance with the fourth criterion--i.e., "attach[ing] such written declaration to the noncustodial parent's return"--since the Armstrongs attached to their tax return only the May 2003 arbitration award, and not the March 2007 court order that Ms. Delaney actually signed. Since we are able to resolve the case on the basis of the third criterion, we need not and do not reach this fourth criterion.
5. Form 8332 requires a taxpayer to furnish: the name of the child; the name and Social Security number of the noncustodial parent claiming the dependency exemption deduction; the Social Security number of the custodial parent; the signature of the custodial parent; the date of the custodial parent's signature; and the year(s) for which the claims were released.↩
6. For taxable years starting after July 2, 2008, a court order signed by the custodial parent will
7. Because the year at issue is 2007, this case is not governed by current
8. The statute itself does provide a "support" criterion that must be satisfied before a noncustodial parent may claim the dependency exemption deduction: The first of the four criteria listed above is that the child must receive over one-half of his support from his "parents" (without any distinction between the custodial parent and the noncustodial parent).
9. The House report stated: The present rules governing the allocations of the dependency exemption are often subjective and present difficult problems of proof and substantiation. * * * The committee wishes to provide more certainty by allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless that spouse waives his or her right to claim the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes between parents will be resolved without the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service.
10. Another potential defense does not appear to be implicated here:
1. Whether this regulation would survive review is a question for a later day. Although the Secretary may well have legitimate reasons for limiting the scope of what can serve as a written declaration, he must do so in a rational way.
2. Congress had, a few years before, enacted
3. The IRM doesn't carry the force of law,
4. Foreshadowing the discussion in the next section, this part of the IRM also speaks to the definition of attachment. One section mentions a taxpayer "submit[ting] [a] Form 8332" pursuant to the IRS's request for documentation; the taxpayer would need to submit a Form 8332 only if he hadn't already provided a declaration or a Form 8332 with his filed return.
5. Both Indiana and Minnesota also
6. Commentators have noted that just telling noncustodial parents in this situation that their remedy lies in asking a state court to order an offsetting reduction in future support if the custodial parent refuses to fill out a Form 8332 would cause collateral damage to the minor children who are supposed to benefit from that support.
7. This is a very broad generalization--state-court divorce decrees allocate rights between parents. The characterization of those rights for federal tax-law purposes remains a federal question,
8. The majority quotes a T.C. opinion.
9. The Commissioner had also claimed in
10. Let's assume for a moment that the Secretary promulgated a regulation that said--as an alternative to a Form 8332--a noncustodial parent can also satisfy
11. Webster's Third New International Dictionary is widely regarded as a "descriptive" dictionary--one that describes various word usages without prescribing any.
For what it's worth, the two dictionaries track each other as to the meaning of "attach". The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 115 (5th ed. 2011), in relevant part, defines attach as: (1) "To fasten, secure, or join" (as in "attached the wires to the post"); (2) "To connect as an adjunct or associated condition or part" (as in "Many major issues are attached to this legislation"); (3) "To affix or append; add" (as in "attached several riders to the document"); (4) "To ascribe or assign" (as in "attached no significance to the threat"); (5) "To bind by emotional ties, as of affection or loyalty" (as in "I am attached to my family"); and (6) "To adhere, belong, or relate" (as in "Very little prestige attaches to this position").
12. The Supreme Court has used dictionaries to "provide potential meanings from which the Court would select based on statutory purpose, legislative intent, common sense, or some other contextual argument."
13. In the sense in which the word is used in
14. I am aware that the IRS Office of Chief Counsel has taken the position that section 6330(c)(1)'s requirement that an Appeals officer obtain "verification that 'the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met'" in collection cases includes verification that the IRS followed procedures the IRM requires.
15. The IRM clarifies that returns with potential statute-of-limitations problems are "never returned to the taxpayer." IRM pt. 21.6.1.4.2 (Oct. 1, 2007). We don't have this problem here: The Commissioner was well within the general three-year limitations period when the Armstrongs filed their petition with this Court.
16. The IRS seems to have followed this practice of requesting additional information regarding a taxpayer's entitlement to a dependency exemption where it hadn't already been provided.
17. IRS examiners assigned to classification were required to follow the IRM Classification Handbook. IRM pt. 41(12)0 (Nov. 1, 1984).
18. Loose schedules are schedules "that have inadvertently been detached from, or cannot be
19. DLN means "document locator number" in taxspeak.
20. The Commissioner even has a form, Form 8453, U.S. Individual Income Tax Transmittal for an IRS
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