DocketNumber: Docket No. 10985-96
Citation Numbers: 74 T.C.M. 69, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 379, 1997 T.C. Memo. 317
Judges: PARR
Filed Date: 7/9/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
*379 An appropriate order and decision will be entered granting respondent's motion for summary judgment.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PARR,
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b);
The facts presented below are stated solely for purposes of deciding respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner was employed by International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) until his termination on April 20, 1992. Petitioner was employed to develop, manage, and present trade shows.
At some point prior to July 31, 1992, petitioner became eligible to participate in the IBM Modified and Extended Individual Transition Option Program (ITO II Program). The ITO II Program allows IBM employees to resign or retire early, receiving lump-sum payments and other benefits. Petitioner was required to sign a General Release and Covenant Not to Sue (the release) as a condition for receiving the lump-sum payment and benefits pursuant to the ITO-II program. The release is broadly written and covers any and all possible and potential claims in contract or in*382 tort arising from employment or termination of employment. Pertinent sections of the release read as follows: In exchange for the sums and benefits which you will receive pursuant to the terms of the * * * [ITO-II Program], M. M. Brennan * * * * 3. This release does not waive any claims that you may have which*383 arise after the date you sign this release. * * * * 6. In the event of rehire by IBM or any of its subsidiaries as a regular employee, you understand that IBM reserves the right to require repayment of a prorated portion of the ITO-II Program payment. The amount of repayment will be based on the number of weeks off the IBM payroll compared with the number of weeks' salary used to calculate your payment.
On July 31, 1992, petitioner signed the release. At the time of signing the release petitioner had no legal claims pending in either State or Federal court against IBM for unlawful employment practices. *384 Petitioner, however, thought that he had a claim against IBM for infliction of emotional distress caused by his hectic employment travel schedule and pressure at work. *385 a statement to it indicating that he was submitting the release under duress.
For the year 1992 petitioner received a Form W-2 from IBM showing wages, tips, and other compensation as $ 90,946.51. On October 13, 1993, petitioner filed his 1992 Federal income tax return. Petitioner reported the $ 90,946.51 as wages, subtracted the $ 52,169 ITO payment therefrom, and attached a disclosure statement to his return, asserting that the ITO payment is excludable from gross income pursuant to section 104(a)(2) as a payment received in exchange for the release and settlement of tort-type rights. Respondent determined that the ITO payment was fully taxable severance pay.
Except as otherwise provided, gross income includes income from all sources. Sec. 61(a);
Under section 104(a)(2), gross income does not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness". (c) Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. * * * The term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" means an amount received * * * through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
Thus, an amount may be excluded from gross income only when it was received both: (1) Through prosecution or settlement of an action based upon tort or tort type rights; and (2) on account of personal injuries or sickness.
Where damages are received pursuant to a settlement agreement, the nature of the claim that was the actual basis for settlement controls whether such*387 damages are excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Determination of the nature of the claim is factual.
Petitioner asserts that he had a bona fide claim against IBM for infliction of emotional distress caused by his travel schedule and pressures at work, and therefore IBM accepted petitioner's ITO II Program participation request and subsequent release in lieu of litigation. Petitioner claims that his position is supported by the fact *389 that he filed informal claims and/or grievances against IBM pursuant to the company's own internal programs (e.g., Open Door Policy). Respondent argues that petitioner's failure to lodge any formal tort-type claim against IBM prior to and at the time of signing the release establishes that there was no bona fide dispute between petitioner and IBM that could provide the basis for settlement.
We disagree. An employee is not always required to file a formal legal action against an employer prior to settling an existing claim in order to exclude such settlement payment from income under section 104(a)(2).
We now turn to the language of the release itself. The release in this case is the same as that in
Finally, we note that petitioner has not alleged or come forward with any evidence of the specific amounts of the payments allocable to claims of tort or tort-type damages for personal injuries. Failure to do so results in the entire amount being presumed to be taxable. See
In sum, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to petitioner, we conclude that respondent has made a prima facie case to support a motion for summary judgment and that petitioner has failed to come forward with countervailing assertions having sufficient specificity to cause us to hold that there is any material issue of fact which requires a trial. Accordingly, we hold that respondent's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
To reflect the foregoing,
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. All dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar, unless otherwise indicated.↩
2. The name M. M. Brennan was typewritten in a blank space provided in the release.↩
3. Although petitioner did not file any legal claims against IBM prior to signing the release, he did file informal claims against IBM pursuant to the company's own internal Open Door program.↩
4. During the 179-day period from Oct. of 1991, through Mar. of 1992, petitioner was traveling or away from home on business for 119 days. On Mar. 28, 1992, petitioner suffered a nervous breakdown at his hotel room in Cincinnati, Ohio, and had to enter an emergency room for treatment. Upon petitioner's release, IBM requested that he return to Austin immediately. From Apr. 2 through Apr. 4, 1992, at IBM's request, petitioner underwent a complete neurological checkup. Upon returning to work in late April, petitioner felt that nothing had changed; he was still expected to travel at the same frenetic pace. Following a difficult and pressured meeting with his supervisor, petitioner submitted a request for participation in the ITO II Program. Petitioner, in fear of experiencing another nervous breakdown, signed the release on July 31, 1992.↩
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Commissioner v. Schleier , 115 S. Ct. 2159 ( 1995 )
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Dorothy M. Thompson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ... , 866 F.2d 709 ( 1989 )
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