DocketNumber： Docket No. 28925-11
Judges： MORRISON
Filed Date： 11/22/2016
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 11/20/2020
Decision will be entered under
MORRISON,
The issues in the case have been narrowed by the parties through a stipulation of settled issues (and also partly through the stipulation of facts). We resolve the remaining issues as follows:
(1) Barnes has unreported income of $25,754.71 for 2008 and $25,901.96 for 2009.
(2) Barnes is not entitled to a business-expense*212 deduction for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2008 or 2009 in excess of the amount conceded by the IRS ($15,937 for 2008 and $17,984 for 2009).
(3) Barnes is not entitled to a charitable-contribution deduction for 2008 or 2009 in excess of the amount allowed by the IRS in the notice of deficiency ($12,576 for 2008 and $16,381 for 2009).
*214 (4) Barnes is not entitled to a rental-property-expense deduction (that is, deductions for the expenses of owning rental property) for 2008 or 2009, except that Barnes is entitled to a $932.49 deduction for real-property taxes for 2009.
(5) Barnes is liable for
Some facts have been stipulated, and they are so found.
During 2008 and 2009, Barnes resided at 10515 Bushy Creek, Houston, Texas.*213 least 1994 and has prepared income-tax returns for individuals since at least 2004.
During 2008 and 2009, Barnes worked as an accountant for Robert Half, a staffing and temporary-work agency.
*215 During 2008 and 2009, Barnes also ran a tax-return-preparation business called Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. Barnes attached Schedules C, "Profit or Loss From Business", to her 2008 and 2009 tax returns to report the income and expenses of this business, a sole proprietorship. She prepared approximately 100 income-tax returns annually as part of this business. She leased an office for this business at 2626 South Loop West, Suite 655, Houston, Texas. When handling the work of this business, she usually used this office.
During 2008 and 2009, Barnes also ran a business that performed financial-consulting work for churches. Barnes attached a second Schedule C to each of her 2008 and 2009 tax returns to report the income and expenses of this business, a business that, like her tax-return-preparation business, was a sole proprietorship. Barnes did financial-consulting work for Williams Temple Church of God (referred to here as "the church" or "Williams Temple Church"). In 2009, Barnes received*214 at least $10,000 from the church for this financial-consulting work. She reported $10,000 on the second Schedule C attached to her 2009 tax return.
During 2008 and 2009, Barnes also volunteered for Williams Temple Church as the church's "Special Events Coordinator". In this volunteer role she ordered food for events hosted at the church, reserved party space, and purchased supplies. The church did not have a reimbursement policy, written or otherwise, *216 regarding the types of expenses incurred by church volunteers that the church would reimburse. Barnes had the authority to approve reimbursements from the church. For a number of reimbursement requests submitted to the church, Barnes made the request and also approved it.
In August 2008, Barnes went on a trip to Africa during which she visited Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Barnes visited schools and orphanages on the trip. Barnes also went on safaris during the trip. The trip was organized and sponsored by Williams Temple Church. Barnes paid $5,112 to Genesis Travel, a travel agency, for the trip. In exchange for the $5,112, Barnes received airplane tickets, meals, and lodging.
During 2008 and 2009, Barnes owned a 50% interest*215 in real property at 2115 North Durham Drive, Houston, Texas (referred to here as the "Durham Drive property"). Barnes inherited her 50% interest in the Durham Drive property from her father, Titus Barnes, following his death in 2001. Barnes's sister, Cassandra Mallett, inherited the other 50% interest in the Durham Drive property from Titus Barnes. Titus Barnes's will gave Barnes an option to buy her sister's interest in the Durham Drive property for $16,000. Barnes did not buy her sister's interest in the Durham Drive property until 2013, when she bought it from her sister for only $3,000 (rather than the $16,000 provided for in the option).
*217 Barnes rented the Durham Drive property to her cousin, Timothy Dixon, during 2008 and 2009, for $200 per month. The record does not show, nor does Barnes take the position, that she shared the rent she received with her sister, with whom she co-owned the house. At $200 per month, Barnes was supposed to receive rent of $2,400 per year. Dixon missed several of the $200 rent payments. As Barnes reported on her 2008 and 2009 tax returns, she received from Dixon total rent of only $800 in 2008 and $1,000 in 2009. Barnes did not begin eviction proceedings*216 against Dixon despite his missing several rent payments.
Barnes received various payments from her father's estate during 2008 and 2009 that were unrelated to the Durham Drive property. These payments are discussed in greater detail
Barnes maintained the following ten bank accounts during the 2008 and 2009 tax years: • Bank of America checking account ending in 8675 • Bank of America checking account ending in 9517 • Bank of America checking account ending in 4470 • Bank of America IRA ending in 5771 • Bank of America checking account ending in 6621 • Bank of America savings account ending in 2071 *218 • Bank of America savings account ending in 5962 • Bank of America savings account ending in 2422 • Wells Fargo checking account ending in 3054 • Wells Fargo savings account ending in 3183
Barnes filed a Form 1040, "U.S. Individual Income Tax Return", for the 2008 tax year. She reported two exemptions, wages of $64,242, interest income of zero, dividend income of zero, a business loss of $4,014, a net rental-property loss of $9,474, itemized deductions of $27,769, and*217 taxable income of $15,985.
Barnes attached a Schedule A, "Itemized Deductions", to her 2008 tax return. She reported, among other things, real-estate taxes of $2,557 and total charitable contributions of $16,727. The Schedule A did not report the amount of any individual charitable contribution or the names of the donee organizations.
On the Schedule C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2008, Barnes reported gross receipts of $18,237, total expenses of $17,120, and net business income of $1,117.
*219 On the Schedule C for her financial-consulting work with churches for 2008, Barnes reported gross receipts of $3,520, total expenses of $8,651, and a net business loss of $5,131.
As mentioned above, Barnes reported a net business loss of $4,014 on her 2008 tax return. This was calculated as follows:
| Barnes & Barnes Financial Services | $1,117 |
| Financial-consulting work with churches | (5,131) |
| Net business income/(loss) | (4,014) |
Barnes attached to her 2008 tax return a Schedule E, "Supplemental Income and Loss", to report the income and expenses for the Durham Drive property under the heading of "Residential Rental Property". On this Schedule E, Barnes reported rent received*218 of $800, expenses of $10,274, and a net rental-property loss of $9,474 from the Durham Drive property for 2008.
Barnes filed a Form 1040 for the 2009 tax year. She reported two exemptions, wages of $64,016, interest income of $108, dividend income of zero, a business loss of $1,771, a net rental-property loss of $9,151, itemized deductions of $26,252, and taxable income of $19,650.
*220 Barnes attached a Schedule A to her 2009 tax return. She reported, among other things, real-estate taxes of $2,505 and total charitable contributions of $17,766. The Schedule A did not report the amount of any individual charitable contribution or the names of the donee organizations.
On the Schedule C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009, Barnes reported gross receipts of $20,773, total expenses of $21,974, and a net business loss of $1,201.
On the Schedule C for her financial-consulting work with churches for 2009, Barnes reported gross receipts of $10,000, total expenses of $10,570, and a net business loss of $570.
As mentioned above, Barnes reported a net business loss of $1,771 on her 2009 tax return. This was calculated as follows:
| Barnes & Barnes Financial*219 Services | ($1,201) |
| Financial-consulting work with churches | (570) |
| Net business income/(loss) | (1,771) |
Barnes attached to her 2009 tax return a Schedule E to report the income and expenses for the Durham Drive property under the heading of "Residential Rental Property". On this Schedule E, Barnes reported rents received of $1,000, *221 expenses of $10,151 (including $1,094 in property taxes), and a net rental-property loss of $9,151 from the Durham Drive property for 2009.
In March 2011, the IRS reconstructed Barnes's income for the 2008 and 2009 tax years through a bank-deposits analysis for each year. The IRS's bank-deposits analyses for 2008 and 2009 consisted of the following steps: • The IRS totaled the deposits into Barnes's bank accounts. • The IRS subtracted what it determined to be nontaxable deposits, such as transfers between accounts and such as deposits that it determined were traceable to nontaxable sources. • The IRS subtracted the amounts of income that Barnes had reported on her tax returns (including wages, interest, gross receipts reported on the two Schedules C for each year, and rents reported on the Schedule E for each year).*220 *222 • The resulting amounts for each year were considered by the IRS to be Barnes's unreported income for each year. These amounts of unreported income thus determined were $30,543 and $53,785 for 2008 and 2009, respectively.supra*221 . The notice of deficiency incorporated the IRS's determinations of Barnes's unreported income from the bank-deposits analyses explained The notice of deficiency allowed $1,883 of the $17,120 in business-expense deductions claimed by Barnes for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services on her 2008 tax return. In particular, it allowed: • zero of the $350 claimed for advertising, *223 • zero of the $6,930 claimed for car and truck expenses, • zero of the $242 claimed for depreciation, • $1,651 of the $4,056 claimed for office rent, • $232 of the $2,855 claimed for supplies, • zero of the $100 claimed for taxes and licenses, • zero of the $220 claimed for travel, • zero of the $48 claimed for meal and entertainment expenses, and • zero of the $2,319 claimed for other expenses. The notice of deficiency allowed $7,116 of the $21,974 in business-expense deductions claimed by Barnes for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services on her 2009 tax return. In particular, it allowed: • zero of the $500 claimed for advertising, • zero of the $6,544 claimed for car and truck expenses, • zero of the $300 claimed for contract labor, • zero of the $1,090 claimed for depreciation, • $283 of the $830 claimed for insurance, • $300*222 for legal and professional services (rather than the $200 claimed), • $3,740 of the $5,056 claimed for office rent, *224 • $672 of the $2,503 claimed for supplies, • zero of the $100 claimed for taxes and licenses, • zero of the $195 claimed for meal and entertainment expenses, • $1,479 of the $1,523 claimed for utilities, and • $642 of the $3,133 claimed for other expenses. The notice of deficiency disallowed the full $8,651 of business-expense deductions Barnes claimed for her financial-consulting work with churches on her 2008 tax return. The notice of deficiency disallowed the full $10,570 of business-expense deductions Barnes claimed for her financial-consulting work with churches on her 2009 tax return. The notice of deficiency (1) disallowed all rental-property-expense deductions Barnes claimed ($10,274 for 2008, and $10,151 for 2009), and (2) recharacterized the amounts Barnes reported as rental income for both 2008 ($800) and 2009 ($1,000) as Barnes's "other income" instead of rental income.*223 *225 The notice of deficiency allowed charitable-contribution deductions of $12,576 for 2008 (instead of the $16,727 Barnes claimed) and $16,381 for 2009 (instead of the $17,766 Barnes claimed). The notice of deficiency determined that Barnes has unreported dividend income of $41 for 2008 and $38 for 2009. After issuing of the notice of deficiency, the IRS made revisions to its bank-deposits analyses. The IRS's litigating position (i.e., the position the IRS presents to the Court in this case) regarding the amounts of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 and 2009 is based on these revised bank-deposits analyses. Exhibit 4-J in the trial record consists of copies of the IRS's original and revised bank-deposits analyses and summaries thereof for the 2008 tax year. Exhibit 5-J in the trial record includes copies of the IRS's original and revised bank-deposits analyses and summaries thereof for the 2009 tax year. In its revised bank-deposits analysis for the 2008 tax year, the IRS determined that $1,693.79 of the $30,543 of bank deposits that it had treated as unreported income in the original bank-deposits analysis should be excluded from income. As a result, the IRS's revised bank-deposits*224 analysis determined that Barnes's unreported income for 2008 was $28,849.21. As with the original bank-deposits analysis for 2008, the IRS computed this amount of unreported income by *226 subtracting various nontaxable items and already-reported items of income from the total amount of deposits into eight of Barnes's ten bank accounts in 2008.*225 *226 The IRS computed the total deposits into Barnes's bank accounts in 2008 as follows: In its revised bank-deposits analysis for the 2009 tax year, the IRS determined that $25,526.74 of the $53,785 of bank deposits it had treated as unreported income in the original bank-deposits analysis should be excluded from income. As a result, the IRS's revised bank-deposits analysis determined that Barnes's unreported income for 2009 was $28,258.26. As with the original bank-deposits analysis for 2009, the IRS computed this amount of unreported income by subtracting various nontaxable items and already-reported items of income from the total amount of deposits into eight of Barnes's ten bank accounts in 2009. The IRS computed the total deposits into Barnes's bank accounts in 2009 as follows: Before trial the parties agreed*227 to a stipulation of facts and a stipulation of settled issues. We adopt their stipulations. As stated above, for 2008 Barnes deducted $8,651 of total expenses on her second Schedule C, which was the schedule she used for her financial-consulting work for churches. The deduction for these expenses was disallowed in the notice of deficiency. In the stipulation of settled issues, the parties stipulated that, "in settlement of the adjustments in the respondent's notice of deficiency", "[a]ll of Petitioner's [Barnes's] expenses related to her Schedule C-2 activity [financial-consulting work for churches] are classified as startup expenses in taxable year 2008." The IRS takes the position that this means that the expenses of Barnes's financial-consulting work for churches for 2008 are not immediately deductible *229 for the 2008 tax year but must be amortized by Barnes ratably over a period of 180 months. The stipulation of facts contains a table that is "a summary of the expenses claimed by petitioner and the amounts respondent alleges have been substantiated". This table relates exclusively to the expenses that Barnes claimed as deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2008 and 2009. After this table in the stipulation of facts is the following statement: Petitioner [Barnes] is not in agreement with the amounts listed for Car & Truck Expenses, Insurance Expenses, Publications ["Other expenses: Publications"], and Internet Expenses for taxable years 2008 and 2009, the amount listed for Supplies expenses for taxable year 2009 and the amount listed for Office Telephone for taxable year 2009. We now explain the significance of the amounts listed in the table. First, all the amounts listed (and which are greater than zero) are the amounts the IRS conceded to be deductible for the described categories and years. We conclude this is so because the stipulation of facts refers to the amounts in the table as "amounts respondent [the IRS] alleges have been substantiated." The stipulation by the IRS that it "alleges" that Barnes has "substantiated" the amount of a deduction is tantamount to a concession by the IRS that the amount is deductible.*230 Barnes agrees are deductible for the described categories and years, with the exception of the ten amounts specified in the statement following the table. This statement, which expresses Barnes's lack of "agreement" with these ten amounts, implies that Barnes is in "agreement" with all the other amounts in the table. To illustrate the effect of the post-table statement, it is helpful to reproduce the table in the stipulation of facts with each of the ten specified amounts in bold: To summarize, the amounts not in bold are amounts to which both Barnes and the IRS agreed, and the ten amounts in bold are the amounts that the IRS agreed Barnes is entitled to deduct and for which (as of the stipulation of facts) Barnes preserved the right to prove a higher amount. *233 The stipulation of facts, executed by the parties at the beginning of trial, reflects the parties' positions at the beginning of trial. The parties' positions regarding unresolved items in the table are further established by the parties' statements at trial and the parties' statements in their post-trial briefs. We explain these statements and the effect of these statements below. At trial, Barnes conceded on the record that she was not entitled to deduct office-telephone expenses for 2009. Accordingly, Barnes is not entitled to a deduction for office-telephone expenses for 2009. During trial and in her post-trial briefs Barnes did not present any argument that she is entitled to deductions in excess of the amounts in the table for either insurance expenses or "Other expenses: Publications" for 2008 or 2009. Therefore, she has conceded that the amounts in the table for these categories*232 for 2008 and 2009 are correct. In her post-trial briefs, Barnes contends that she is entitled to deductions in excess of the amounts agreed to as deductible by both her and the IRS for cell-phone expenses and depreciation for 2008 and 2009. As explained To summarize, only the following business-expense deductions need to be resolved: car and truck expenses for 2008 and 2009, internet expenses for 2008 and 2009, and supplies expenses for 2009. The following two tables reflect for each respective tax year the (1) categories of unresolved business expenses that Barnes reported on her Schedule C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services and (2) for each of these categories (a) the amounts Barnes claimed on the Schedule C, (b) the amounts allowed by the IRS in the notice of deficiency, (c) the amounts conceded by the IRS in the stipulation of facts, and (d) the amounts determined by the Court (determinations which are explained The IRS reconstructed Barnes's income using the bank-deposits method for the 2008 and 2009 tax years. The IRS contends that Barnes failed to report income of $28,849.21 for 2008 and $28,258.26 for 2009. Barnes contends that all bank deposits that the IRS treated as unreported income were attributable to various nontaxable sources. Barnes was engaged in three income-producing activities during the years at issue (setting aside her work as an employee of Robert Half): (1) her tax-return-preparation business (Barnes & Barnes Financial Services), (2) her financial-consulting work for churches, and (3) her collection*235 of rent for the Durham Drive property. With respect to her tax-return-preparation business, which appears to be the most financially significant of the three activities, Barnes did not keep any informal or formal books of account to record her income and expenses. Nor did she retain a bookkeeper or accountant. She also kept inadequate records for the expenses of the Durham Drive property. Barnes made numerous deposits into multiple bank accounts that were not attributable to her work as an employee of *237 Robert Half. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was reasonable for the IRS to use the bank-deposits method to reconstruct Barnes's income for 2008 and 2009. The notice of deficiency issued by the IRS to Barnes incorporated the IRS's determinations of unreported income made in the IRS's original bank-deposits analyses. After issuing the notice of deficiency, the IRS revised its bank-deposits analyses for the 2008 and 2009 tax years. The IRS's litigating position regarding Barnes's unreported income is based on the revised bank-deposits analyses. The IRS's revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008 reduced the amount it determined to be Barnes's unreported income*236 from $30,543 to $28,849.21. The revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008 treated several deposits as nontaxable which had previously been treated as taxable in the original bank-deposits analysis for 2008. The revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008 also treated four deposits (totaling $1,045.75) as taxable which had previously been treated as nontaxable in the original bank-deposits analysis for 2008. The IRS's revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009 reduced the amount it determined as Barnes's unreported income from $53,785 to $28,258.26 by treating several deposits as nontaxable which had previously been treated as taxable in the original bank-deposits analysis for 2009. *238 Barnes argues that the deposits that the IRS determined to be unreported income were attributable to various nontaxable sources.*237 pursuant to an agreement by the parties that the spreadsheet should be treated by the Court as if it were Barnes's testimony.*238 Accordingly, we treat the spreadsheet as Barnes's testimony. The spreadsheet lists alleged deposits that Barnes claimed originated from nontaxable sources, but that she claims the IRS included in her income. The spreadsheet has the following information: *239 • The amount of the alleged deposit. • The date of the alleged deposit. • The name of the bank account (for most of the alleged deposits). • The date on which Barnes alleged she originally received the money allegedly deposited. • The alleged nontaxable source of the money. The following table summarizes the spreadsheet: *241 The IRS argues that Barnes failed to prove that any of the deposits into her bank accounts that the IRS determined to be unreported income are traceable to the nontaxable sources listed above. Barnes's argument, as we explained, is that the IRS erroneously included in her income deposits that were not actually income. For her argument to prevail, all four of the following conditions must be true: (1) Barnes received an amount, (2) the amount was nontaxable, (3) she deposited the amount into her bank accounts, and (4) the IRS treated this deposit as income in its bank-deposits analyses. The following general rules regarding who bears the burden of proof are pertinent: • The taxpayer generally bears the burden of proving that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are erroneous. *242 • The IRS bears the burden of proof regarding any "new matter". • The IRS bears the burden of proof regarding an increased deficiency. • The IRS bears the burden of proof for issues for which the taxpayer shows that the requirements of ○ *243 ○ In addition, the following principles apply when the notice of deficiency is based on the bank-deposits method of reconstructing income: • The taxpayer generally bears the burden of proving that the reconstruction is in error and may do so, in whole or in part, by proving that a deposit is not taxable. • The IRS is not required to show a likely source of income for each deposit. Id. (citing For all the remaining deposits determined to be taxable by the IRS (i.e., the deposits determined to be taxable by the IRS other than the four deposits totaling $1,045.75), the IRS's determinations were made as part of the notice of deficiency. Therefore, Barnes should have the burden of proving that the remaining deposits are not taxable. To consider the effect of We conclude later in the opinion that Barnes has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining deposits in the second group were attributable to nontaxable sources. These conclusions are discussed infra part 1.a. through 1.l. For each of these deposits we hereby find (although we do not make a detailed explanation for this finding) that Barnes failed to*245 present credible evidence that the deposits are nontaxable. Thus, Our conclusions about the burden of proof regarding the bank-deposits method are summarized in the chart below. This chart covers all deposits *247 determined by the IRS to be unreported income in its revised bank-deposits analyses. Barnes received the following five checks from the estate of her father, Titus Barnes: • a check for $8,000 received in 2008, • a check for $22,359.13 received in 2008, *248 • a check for $1,406.15 received in 2009, • a check for $6,318.49 received in 2009, and • a check for $4,427.16 received in 2009. Barnes did not directly deposit the five checks she received from her father's estate into her bank accounts. Instead, she testified that she cashed them, kept the cash at home, and later deposited the cash into her bank accounts in amounts that did not correspond to the amounts of the checks. However, Barnes did not prove that she kept track of the cash from the five checks or that*247 she segregated this cash from her other cash. In our view, it is as likely that she spent the cash from the five checks as that she deposited this cash into her bank accounts. Accordingly, we cannot determine that any amounts that Barnes received from her father's estate were actually deposited into her bank accounts. *249 Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any deposits into the bank accounts used by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analyses were attributable to nontaxable amounts that she received from her father's estate. Accordingly, we hold that no adjustments to the IRS's determinations of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 or 2009 for these amounts are warranted. For 2008, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $3,098.39 that were attributable to reimbursements received from Williams Temple Church but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: As an initial matter, we conclude that the amounts identified in the table above of $421.64, $508, $150, and $100 (the $100 identified in the spreadsheet as *250 a November 3, 2008 deposit) were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts, and were already treated as nontaxable deposits by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. Therefore, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted for these amounts. The remaining amounts identified in the table above are $699.99, $248.05, $870.71, and $100 (the $100 identified in the spreadsheet as a December 18, 2008 deposit). We address these four amounts below. The trial record contains a check written to Barnes from Williams Temple Church for $699.99 that Barnes deposited into her bank account ending in 8675 on February 2, 2008. The notation on the memo line of this check reads "Reimb./Printer for Pastor's office". The trial record also contains a "Check Request Form" (a form apparently used by Williams Temple Church to record requests that the church make a payment, the name of the person requesting the payment, the name of the person approving the payment, the requested amount*249 of the payment, the requested payee, and the purpose of the payment) that corresponds to this $699.99 check. The form indicates that this $699.99 check was to be paid to Barnes and was for a "Printer". Meredith Jenkins signed this form as the "Requester" and Barnes signed this form as the "Approver". The IRS treated this $699.99 deposit as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for *251 2008. We conclude that this $699.99 deposit was attributable to a nontaxable reimbursement from the church and must be excluded from Barnes's income for the 2008 tax year. The trial record contains a check written to Barnes from Williams Temple Church for $248.05 that Barnes deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on March 3, 2008. The notation on the memo line of this check reads "Food for Superbowl Outreach". The trial record also contains a "Check Request Form" indicating that this $248.05 check was to be paid to Barnes and was for "Food-- Super Bowl". Jenkins signed this form as the "Requester" and Barnes signed this form as the "Approver". The IRS treated this $248.05 deposit as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. We conclude that this $248.05 deposit was attributable*250 to a nontaxable reimbursement from the church and must be excluded from Barnes's income for the 2008 tax year. The trial record contains a check written to Barnes from Williams Temple Church for $870.71 that Barnes deposited into her bank account ending in 8675 on December 8, 2008. The notation on the memo line of this check reads "Reimb./Funds spent for Leadership Conference". The trial record also contains a "Check Request Form" indicating that this $870.71 check was to be paid to Barnes and was for a "Leadership Conference". This form was signed by Barnes as both *252 the "Requester" and "Approver". The IRS treated this $870.71 deposit as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. We conclude that this $870.71 deposit was attributable to a nontaxable reimbursement from the church and must be excluded from Barnes's income for the 2008 tax year. The trial record contains a check written to Barnes from Williams Temple Church for $100 that she claims was deposited into her bank account ending in 8675 on December 18, 2008, which is also the date of the check. There is no $100 deposit into this bank account, or any of her bank accounts, on or around this date. We conclude that Barnes*251 failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she deposited this $100 check into any of her bank accounts. Accordingly, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted for this $100 check. In sum, we hold that the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 must be adjusted to exclude nontaxable deposits totaling $1,818.75. For 2009, Barnes claims that she made deposits into her bank accounts totaling $10,384.42 that were attributable to reimbursements received from Williams Temple Church but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: As an initial matter, we conclude that the $301.66 identified in the table above was deposited into one of Barnes's bank accounts and was already treated as a nontaxable deposit by the IRS in its*252 revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. Therefore, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 is warranted for this amount. The remaining amounts identified in the table above are $1,004.65, $350, $1,513.20, $864.20, $1,316.16, $627.70, $472.40, $293.87, $527.70, $890.75, $890.75, $665.69, and $665.69. We address these 13 amounts below. *254 The trial record contains a check written to Barnes from Williams Temple Church for $1,354.65 that Barnes claims was deposited into two of her bank accounts on January 12, 2009, through two separate deposits. Barnes claims that $1,004.65 of this $1,354.65 was deposited into her bank account ending in 8675 on January 12, 2009, and the remaining $350 was deposited into her bank account ending in 6621, also on January 12, 2009. Her bank statements show two such deposits on January 12, 2009. The notation on the memo line of the $1,354.65 check reads "Reimb./Christmas Gala & Law Enforcement Events". The trial record also contains a "Check Request Form" indicating that this check was to be paid to Barnes and was for a "Christmas Gala Event" and a "Law Enforcement Event". This form was signed by Barnes alone. The IRS treated*253 these two deposits as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. We conclude that these two deposits into Barnes's bank accounts totaling $1,354.65 were attributable to nontaxable reimbursements from the church and must be excluded from Barnes's income for the 2009 tax year. Barnes failed to provide checks or check request forms for any of the other amounts which she claims (1) were nontaxable reimbursements she received from the church (2) were deposited into her bank accounts but (3) were treated as income by the IRS for 2009. There are deposits into her bank accounts on the *255 dates identified by Barnes that correspond to a few of these other amounts: $864.20, $627.70, $472.40, $293.87, $527.70, $890.75, and $665.69. However, the deposit entries on her bank statements do not indicate the payor (i.e., the person who wrote the checks that Barnes deposited), and therefore we cannot rely on the deposit entries to determine the origin of any of these deposits. There are no deposits into Barnes's bank accounts matching any of the other amounts listed in the table above. We conclude that Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she received and subsequently*254 deposited into her bank accounts any nontaxable reimbursements from Williams Temple Church in 2009 other than the $1,354.65 and $301.66 amounts described above. In sum, we hold that the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 must be adjusted to exclude $1,354.65. For 2008, Barnes claims that she received, cashed, and subsequently deposited a $2,159.44 insurance reimbursement check from State Farm but the deposit was treated as income by the IRS. The trial record contains a copy of a check for $2,159.44 that Barnes received from State Farm on November 22, 2008, confirming that Barnes received this amount. Barnes testified that she cashed the *256 $2,159.44 check and deposited the cash into her bank accounts only "a little at a time as needed to make repairs." However, Barnes did not prove that she kept track of the cash from the $2,159.44 check or that she segregated this cash from her other cash. In our view, it is as likely that she spent the cash from this check as that she deposited this cash into her bank accounts. Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she deposited into*255 her bank accounts any amount of the $2,159.44 check that she received from State Farm in 2008. Accordingly, we hold that no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted. For 2009, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $26,017.12 that were attributable to reimbursements received from insurance companies but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: As an initial matter, we conclude that the amounts identified in the table above of $12,953.64, $935.26, $57.64, $500, and $89.36 were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts and were already treated as nontaxable deposits by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. Therefore, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 is warranted for these amounts. The remaining*256 amounts identified in the table above are the two $5,740.61 entries. For 2009, the trial record contains a copy of only one check for $5,740.61 that Barnes received from Farmers Insurance on January 5, 2009. Barnes deposited this check into her bank account ending in 4470 on January 6, 2009. We conclude that Barnes included the deposit of this $5,740.61 check twice in the spreadsheet that she contends lists nontaxable deposits treated as income by the *258 IRS. The IRS already identified and treated the $5,740.61 deposit attributable to this check as a nontaxable deposit in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. Accordingly, we hold that no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 is warranted for this $5,740.61 check. Barnes identifies $10,032.71 of bank deposits in 2008 and $15,401.76 of bank deposits in 2009 by date and amount. She contends that these deposits were attributable to federal income-tax refunds and that the IRS treated these deposits as income. We disagree that the IRS treated these deposits as income. We conclude that the IRS already identified and treated deposits of these amounts as nontaxable deposits*257 in its revised bank-deposits analyses. Accordingly, we hold that no adjustments to the IRS's determinations of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 or 2009 are warranted. A refund from a merchant of an amount the taxpayer previously paid to the merchant is generally not included in gross income. *259 proposition, such as the tax-benefit rule, i. For 2008, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $1,415.53 that were attributable to nontaxable refunds from stores or merchants but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: *260 As an initial matter, we conclude that the amounts identified in the table above of $13.52, $16.23, $40, $20, $191.50, $21.53, $31.98, $9.04, $10.70, and $14.06 were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts, and were already treated as nontaxable deposits by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. Therefore, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted for these amounts. The remaining amounts identified in the table above are $314.44, $175, $266.06, $290.25, and $1.22. These amounts total $1,046.97. We conclude that these five amounts were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts and were treated by the IRS as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. We discuss below whether these five deposits are includible in income. We conclude that four of the five deposits listed above (totaling $1,045.75 out of the $1,046.97) are nontaxable store or merchant refunds erroneously treated as income by the IRS. The four deposits totaling $1,045.75 are: (1) a $314.44 refund from American Express deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on February 20, 2008, (2) a $175 refund from Discover*259 Network deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on February 26, 2008, (3) a $266.06 refund from American Express deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on April 4, 2008, and (4) a $290.25 refund from American Express deposited into her bank *261 account ending in 9517 on April 18, 2008.2009 For 2009, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $387.51 that were attributable to nontaxable refunds from stores or merchants but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these amounts as follows: As an initial matter, we conclude that the amounts identified in*260 the table above of $6.05, $65.90, $25.97, and $32.46 were deposited into Barnes's bank *262 accounts and were already treated as nontaxable deposits by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. Therefore, no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 is warranted for these amounts. The remaining amounts identified in the table above are $107.74, $107.74, and $41.65. These amounts total $257.13. However, upon reviewing Barnes's bank statements and the IRS's revised bank-deposit analysis for 2009, we conclude that Barnes actually had deposits totaling $501.65 (instead of the $257.13 erroneously asserted by Barnes) in 2009 that were treated as income by the IRS but are in our view attributable to nontaxable store or merchant refunds. The first such deposit was a $200 refund (erroneously identified by Barnes in her briefs as a deposit of only $107.74, rather than $200) from Bank of America deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on February 10, 2009. The second such deposit was a $260 refund (also erroneously identified by Barnes in her briefs as a deposit of only $107.74, rather than $260) from Bank of America deposited into her bank account*261 ending in 9517 on February 17, 2009. The third such deposit was a $41.65 refund from American Express deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on November 16, 2009. These three deposits, totaling $501.65, are nontaxable deposits traceable to store or merchant refunds that were *263 erroneously treated as income for 2009 by the IRS. Accordingly, we hold that the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 must be adjusted to exclude $501.65. For 2008, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $747.03 that were attributable to "reimbursements from various sources" but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: As an initial matter, we conclude that the amounts identified in the table above of $339.24 and $127.79 were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts and were already treated as nontaxable deposits by the IRS in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. Therefore,*262 no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted for these amounts. *264 The remaining amounts identified in the table above are $50, $165, and $65. We address these three amounts below. We conclude that the amounts of $165 and $65 were deposited into Barnes's bank accounts and were treated as income by the IRS but are, in our view, attributable to nontaxable reimbursements from various sources. The $165 deposit was a $165 refund from Bank of America that was deposited into her bank account ending in 9517 on April 8, 2008. Specific and credible testimony by Barnes established that the $65 deposit was attributable to a $65 reimbursement she received from Ora Robinson (Barnes's aunt) and subsequently deposited into her bank account ending in 8675 on July 9, 2008. Regarding the third deposit, of $50, Barnes contends that she made a $50 deposit into her bank account ending in 9517 on January 28, 2008, that this deposit was attributable to a reimbursement check that she received from Brenda Ozen, and that this deposit was treated as income by the IRS. Barnes did not provide a copy of this $50 check. There is no $50 deposit into Barnes's bank account*263 ending in 9517 on this date. Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she received a $50 reimbursement check from Brenda Ozen or that she subsequently deposited such a $50 check into any of her bank accounts. Accordingly, we hold that the IRS's *265 determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 must be adjusted to exclude $230. For 2009, Barnes claims that she had deposits into her bank accounts totaling $317.54 that were attributable to "reimbursements from various sources" but were treated as income by the IRS. She identifies these deposits as follows: There is a deposit of $92.54 into her bank account ending in 9517 on January 5, 2009, but the source of this deposit is not determinable from the bank statements and Barnes did not describe the source of this deposit. There is no check in the record for that amount. There is also a deposit of $200 into her bank account ending in 6621 on March 16, 2009, but we are unable for similar reasons to confirm the source of this deposit. There is no deposit of $25 into*264 Barnes's bank account ending in 8675 on September 14, 2009. Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any of these alleged nontaxable amounts were deposited into her bank accounts. Accordingly, *266 we hold that no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2009 is warranted for these amounts. Barnes claims that she received, and subsequently deposited into her bank accounts, $8,023 in 2008 and $2,945 in 2009, that these deposits were attributable to repayments of the principal of loans that she had made to clients, friends, and family, and that the IRS treated these deposits as income. Gross income also does not include amounts received as repayments of loans. Barnes testified that she regularly made informal loans to clients, friends, and family members. If Barnes in fact lent money to her friends, family, or clients and was repaid, then the amounts representing repayments are not income. The trial record contains documentary evidence of the existence of only one of these alleged loans; specifically, there is a $500 check from Sylvia Law, a *267 friend of hers from church, which Barnes received in 2009, and which Barnes claims was the repayment of a $500 loan to Law.*266 In her testimony Barnes described only this loan with any specificity. Barnes credibly testified that she lent Law $500 and that Law subsequently repaid Barnes that same amount. The $500 check written to Barnes from Law was deposited into Barnes's bank account ending in 8675 on June 2, 2009. The IRS treated this deposit as income in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2009. Given Barnes's testimony and the documentary evidence, we conclude that this $500 deposit was from a nontaxable loan repayment and that it should be excluded from Barnes's income for 2009. We are unable to determine whether Barnes deposited into her bank accounts any other loan repayments. The sole evidence that she received any other loan repayments or that she deposited such amounts into her bank accounts is Barnes's uncorroborated testimony (via the spreadsheet). We are not required to, and do not, rely on Barnes's self-serving and unsubstantiated testimony to establish that she received any other loan repayments or that she deposited such amounts into her bank accounts. Barnes claims that a $250 deposit into her bank account ending in 8675 was attributable to a nontaxable*267 refund for $250 of unused American Express Traveler's checks. The IRS already identified and treated this $250 deposit as nontaxable in its revised bank-deposits analysis for 2008. Accordingly, we hold that no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted. The trial record contains a copy of a check that Barnes wrote to Clement Aldridge for $375 on May 22, 2008, that has the word "wills" in the memo line. Barnes identifies Aldridge as the attorney who wrote a will for Titus Barnes. Barnes claims that on June 3, 2008, she received a $375 payment from Jesse *269 Walker (an unidentified person whom we assume arguendo was associated with the estate of Titus Barnes) as a reimbursement for this expense and that she deposited this $375 into her bank account ending in 9517 on that same day. There is no $375 deposit into any of Barnes's bank accounts on or around June 3, 2008 (the date that Barnes claimed to have deposited the amount). Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any deposits into her bank accounts were attributable to this alleged nontaxable reimbursement.*268 Accordingly, we hold that no adjustment to the IRS's determination of Barnes's unreported income for 2008 is warranted. Barnes's spreadsheet, which we treat as her testimony, states that a $100 deposit into her bank account ending in 3054 on August 25, 2008 was attributable to a reimbursement from a client of Barnes & Barnes Financial Services, Tim Hadley, for court fees that Barnes had paid on his behalf. The IRS already identified and treated this $100 deposit as nontaxable in its revised bank-deposits *270 analysis for 2008.Gift from cousin Barnes claims that a $25 deposit into her bank account ending in 8675 on July 21, 2008, was attributable to a nontaxable*269 gift that she received from her cousin, Darnell Barnes. The sole evidence that this $25 deposit was attributable to a nontaxable gift is Barnes's uncorroborated testimony (via the spreadsheet). We are not required to, and do not, rely on Barnes's self-serving and unsubstantiated testimony. In her briefs, Barnes asserts that she made various deposits into her bank accounts, totaling $8,509 in 2008 and $5,705 in 2009, all of which, according to *271 her, were attributable to "personal funds or other loans not previously reported." Her spreadsheet, which we treat as her testimony, contains information about these deposits, including (1) the date of the deposit, (2) the bank account, (3) the amount of the deposit, and (4) a description of the nontaxable source of the money. A review of the bank statements shows that these*270 deposits listed in her spreadsheet were real deposits. However, the bank-statement deposit entries describe the deposits only as either "Deposit" or "Counter Credit". These descriptions do not aid us in determining whether these deposits were from taxable or nontaxable sources. Furthermore, Barnes's spreadsheet describes the source of these deposits only in vague terms. Each deposit is described in the spreadsheet as both "Cash Personal Funds/Loans" The table below summarizes our conclusions in part 1. Barnes seeks deductions in excess of the amounts the IRS conceded for the following business expenses for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services: car and *273 truck expenses for 2008 and 2009, internet expenses for 2008 and 2009, and supplies expenses for 2009. Unless otherwise indicated, all expenses discussed in this section relate to Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. As described Generally,*272 the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are erroneous. If the taxpayer chooses to calculate the expenses of operating a vehicle using the applicable mileage rate, then the "elements" to be substantiated include: *277 (1) the mileage of each business use and the total business and nonbusiness mileage during the taxable year, (2) the date of each business use of the vehicle, (3) the "business purpose of each use" of the vehicle, *278 The mileage, the date, and the business purpose of each business use of the vehicle must be recorded "at or near the time" of each business use. In the absence of "adequate records" sufficient for purposes of *279 Barnes claimed car and truck expense deductions of $6,930 and $6,544 on the Schedules C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2008 and 2009, respectively. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS disallowed these deductions in full. In the stipulation of facts, the IRS conceded that Barnes is entitled to deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for car and truck expenses of $3,465 for 2008 and $3,277 for 2009. During trial Barnes offered two sets of spreadsheets listing her alleged car and*278 truck expenses for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2008 and 2009. Both were admitted into evidence. The first set of mileage spreadsheets contains Barnes's calculations that she is entitled to deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for car and truck expenses of $7,100.95 for 2008 and $6,544.34 for 2009. The second set of mileage spreadsheets contains Barnes's calculations that she is entitled to deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for car and truck expenses of $6,582.26 for 2008 and $6,504.74 for 2009. Barnes explained during trial that the difference between the second set of mileage spreadsheets and the first is that the second omits some of the trips listed in the first that the IRS disputed as to deductibility. From this explanation we conclude that Barnes concedes that expenses for the trips removed from the first set of *280 mileage spreadsheets are nondeductible. Thus, it is the second set of mileage spreadsheets that presents Barnes's position as of the trial. For each trip, the second set of mileage spreadsheets describes: • the date of each trip, • the starting point and destination for each trip (e.g., "Drove from Baytown [her accounting job for*279 Robert Half at the Exxon Mobil refinery in Baytown] to office [Barnes & Barnes Financial Services's office in Houston]"), • the miles driven on each trip, and • the amount of the annual expense incurred on the basis of standard mileage rates.*281 Barnes drove 12,346.8 business miles in 2008 and 11,826.8 business miles in 2009. In her post-trial briefs Barnes concedes that expenses for trips from her church to the office of Barnes & Barnes Financial Services are nondeductible. She claims that after accounting for this concession, her deductible car and truck expenses are $6,002.96 for 2008 (compared*280 to $6,582.26 in the second set of mileage spreadsheets) and $5,942.92 for 2009 (compared to $6,504.74 in the second set of mileage spreadsheets). It appears that Barnes did not create the second set of mileage spreadsheets contemporaneously with the trips they purport to record. The second set of mileage spreadsheets is not dated and Barnes did not testify as to when she prepared the mileage spreadsheets. Attached to the first set of mileage spreadsheets were two blank calendars that had been printed from the website Internet expenses have been characterized as utility expenses rather than expenses related to the use of listed property (such as computer equipment). At trial and in her post-trial briefs Barnes contends that she is entitled to business-expense deductions for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services of $311.64 in each of 2008 and 2009 for expenses she incurred for internet service at her personal residence. Barnes did not claim an internet-expense deduction on any of the Schedules C attached to her 2008 or 2009 tax return. And Barnes did not raise a claim to internet-expense deductions in her petition. However, the IRS does not contend that this failure to plead the deductibility of internet expenses bars the Court from considering the issue. The IRS does not appear to dispute that Barnes actually paid $311.64 in both 2008 and 2009 for internet service at her personal residence. The IRS contends that Barnes has not shown that she used the internet at her personal residence for business purposes and accordingly is not entitled to a business-expense deduction for these expenses. *284 Barnes testified that she used the internet at her personal residence*283 for business purposes (i.e., conducting research and transmitting tax returns) and for personal purposes. However, Barnes did not provide us with a reasonable evidentiary basis for estimating the portion of time that the internet at her personal residence was used for business purposes. Accordingly, we hold that Barnes is not entitled to a deduction for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for any portion of her home internet expenses for 2008 or 2009. Barnes claimed a supplies-expense deduction of $2,503 on the Schedule C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009. The Schedule C did not include an itemized list of the supplies expenses. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS allowed a deduction of $672. The notice of deficiency did not indicate which particular supplies expenses corresponded to the $672 allowance. In the stipulation of facts the IRS agreed that Barnes was entitled to a supplies-expense deduction for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services of $3,752. The stipulation of facts itself did not indicate which particular supplies expenses corresponded to the $3,752 concession. However, the IRS would clarify this*284 during trial, as explained below. *285 At trial Barnes asserted that she is entitled to a total supplies-expense deduction of $4,861.93 for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009.*285 As explained above, the IRS has agreed in the stipulation of facts that Barnes is entitled to a supplies-expense deduction of $3,752. At trial, the IRS stated that the $3,752 concession is based in part on its concession that 33 of the 48 expenses on Barnes's spreadsheet are deductible. The total expense *286 corresponding to these 33 expenses is $3,710.85. This leaves $41.15 of the $3,752 concession unaccounted for. We proceed to determine which, if any, of the 15 disputed supplies expenses are deductible under As an initial matter, we conclude that the second entry of $31.39 from the Apple Store was a duplicate. Accordingly, Barnes is not entitled to a deduction for the second $31.39 entry. We also conclude that Barnes is not entitled to a *289 deduction for the $116.89 expense at Office Depot because the receipt indicates that this expense was subsequently refunded to Barnes. The remaining 13 expenses total $1,002.80. The record contains corroborating evidence of payment (in the form of evidence other than the spreadsheet, such as receipts or copies of checks) of only $215.43 out of this $1,002.80 amount. Barnes did not provide corroborating evidence of payment for the remaining $787.37 amount, i.e., $1,002.80 $215.43. We are not required to, and do not, rely on Barnes's self-serving and unsubstantiated testimony (through the form of her spreadsheet) to establish that*289 the uncorroborated $787.37 in disputed expenses was paid or incurred by Barnes. The documentary evidence for these $215.43 in purchases is: • a check for $15.24 written to Office Depot for a purchase that according to the spreadsheet was for "Supplies", • a receipt for $31.39 from the Apple Store for earphones, • a receipt for $140.71 from Target that, according to the spreadsheet, was for a DVD player, *290 • a receipt for $16.18 from the Apple Store for a protective phone screen, and • a receipt for $11.91 for batteries from Target. Barnes has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to deductions for any of the disputed supplies expenses for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009. Accordingly, we hold that she is not entitled to a deduction for supplies expenses for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009 in excess of the $3,752 the IRS already conceded in the stipulation of facts. Generally, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are erroneous. On the Schedule A attached to her 2008 tax return Barnes claimed a total charitable-contribution deduction of $16,727. Because the Schedule A did not contain an itemized list of contributions, we cannot tell what contributions form the $16,727 total. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS allowed a charitable-contribution deduction of $12,576 for 2008. Because the notice of deficiency did not itemize any particular contributions, we cannot tell which contributions were determined to be deductible as part of the $12,576 total. However, at trial the IRS conceded that the Court should treat the notice of deficiency as having determined that Barnes was entitled to a deduction of $961 for a church trip costing $5,112, and as having determined that Barnes was entitled to a deduction of $11,615 for charitable contributions unrelated to the church trip. The IRS further stated that even though it considered the $961 allowance of a deduction for the church trip in the notice of deficiency to be an error, it would not contest the deductibility of the $961. Also, the IRS stated that it does not contest the deductibility of the $11,615 of charitable contributions unrelated to the*296 church trip. The only contribution for which Barnes seeks a deduction (besides the amounts allowed in the notice of *296 deficiency) is the remaining $4,151 cost of the church trip. Our task therefore is to determine how much, if any, of the total $5,112 cost of this church trip Barnes may deduct. If the deductible portion of this $5,112 cost exceeds $961, then Barnes's charitable-contribution deduction for 2008 would exceed the $12,576 allowed in the notice of deficiency. Barnes visited Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, on the trip. The trial record contains descriptions of the sites that she visited as well as numerous photographs, presumably taken during site visits. Part of the trip consisted of visits to orphanages and schools. However, Barnes also went on at least one safari during this trip. Barnes paid $5,112 to Genesis Travel for the trip. The trip was organized by Williams Temple Church. In exchange for her $5,112 payment, Barnes received airplane tickets, meals, and lodging. The IRS does not contest whether Barnes made this $5,112 payment for the church trip in 2008. Rather, the IRS argues that parts of this trip were personal and that Barnes has not provided a contemporaneous*297 written acknowledgment from the donee organization, Williams Temple Church, that satisfies *297 Barnes did not contribute money or property directly to Williams Temple Church for this trip. Instead she paid a third party, Genesis Travel, for the expenses associated with this trip. Thus Barnes is entitled to a charitable-contribution deduction only if these expenses were, in the words of In her post-trial brief Barnes alleges, without citing any part of the record, that she provided adequate substantiation under *299 Barnes failed to substantiate her $5,112 payment for the church trip with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from Williams Temple Church, as required by Barnes reported a charitable-contribution deduction of $17,766 on the Schedule A attached to her 2009 tax return. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS allowed a charitable-contribution deduction of $16,381 for 2009. At trial and in her post-trial briefs Barnes contends that she is entitled to a charitable-contribution deduction of $20,581 for 2009, without explaining how this number was calculated or why it is greater than the amount she reported on her tax return. In her post-trial briefs,*300 her contention is found in the following statement: "The issue remains whether petitioner is entitled to Schedule A deductions for contributions in the amount of $17,226.00 and The trial record contains 227 pages of copies of cashed checks, identified as Exhibit 9-J, adduced by Barnes in an attempt to substantiate her charitable contributions for 2009. The parties stipulated that Exhibit 9-J consists of "copies of cancelled checks which petitioner claims are charitable contributions for * * * 2009". The checks in Exhibit*301 9-J total $17,983.99, which is $1,602.99 more than the $16,381 that the IRS allowed in the notice of deficiency. Most of these checks were written to various churches, including Williams Temple Church. Barnes must prove entitlement to deduct at least $16,382 in order to be allowed a deduction of even one dollar more than the $16,381 deduction allowed in the notice of deficiency. We easily conclude that at least $6,844 of the $17,983.99 in checks fails to satisfy the requirements of Barnes failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to a charitable-contribution deduction for 2009 beyond the amount allowed by the IRS in the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we hold that Barnes is not entitled to a charitable-contribution deduction for 2009 in excess of the $16,381 allowed by the IRS in the notice of deficiency. The Durham Drive property includes a dwelling unit within the meaning of Barnes reported rental income and expenses for the Durham Drive property on the Schedule E of her 2008 tax return and the Schedule E of her 2009 tax return. For 2008, Barnes reported rents received for the Durham Drive property of $800 and total expenses for the Durham Drive property of $10,274, and claimed a *304 net rental-property loss of $9,474, i.e., $10,274 $800. For 2009, Barnes reported rents received for the Durham Drive property of $1,000 and total expenses for the Durham Drive property of $10,151 (including $1,094 for property taxes) and claimed a net rental-property-loss of $9,151, i.e., $10,151 $1,000. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS (1) disallowed all*305 rental-property-expense deductions Barnes claimed for both 2008 and 2009, and (2) re-characterized the amounts Barnes reported as rental income for both 2008 ($800) and 2009 ($1,000) as Barnes's "other income" instead of as rental income. Generally, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are erroneous. *305 At trial Barnes presented documentary proof of payment for expenses related to the Durham Drive property of only $1,325 for 2008 and $2,287 for 2009. In her post-trial briefs Barnes continued to claim that she was entitled to rental-property-expense deductions of $10,274 and $10,151 for 2008 and 2009, respectively, the amounts she had reported on her tax*306 returns. The IRS contends that As discussed *306 Barnes rented the Durham Drive property to her cousin, Timothy Dixon, during 2008 and 2009. She charged Dixon $200 per month in rent. At $200 per month, Dixon should have paid $2,400 in each year. But Barnes received from Dixon rent of only*307 $800 for 2008 and $1,000 for 2009.*309 As we have said, Barnes bears the *307 burden of proving the fair rental value of Durham Drive property. To determine whether Barnes used the Durham Drive property as a residence during each taxable year, we first calculate the number of days she used *308 the property for personal purposes during each year. Because Dixon used the property every day during each of the years, and because Dixon did not pay fair rental value for any of these days, Barnes is deemed to have used the property for personal purposes on all 365 days of each year. For 2008, Barnes paid no property taxes (or any other*311 expenses of the type that would not be barred by For 2009, Barnes reported payment of $1,094 in property taxes for the Durham Drive property. The IRS fully disallowed deductions for the reported rental expenses ($10,151 for 2009) reported on Barnes's Schedule E for the Durham Drive property, which included the $1,094 in property taxes for the Durham Drive property. Therefore, the IRS disallowed any deduction for property taxes for the Durham Drive property.*310 The trial record contains a check*312 for $932.49 for property taxes for the Durham Drive property that Barnes paid in 2009. We find that Barnes paid $932.49 for property taxes for the Durham Drive property in 2009. In the notice of deficiency the IRS determined that Barnes was liable for accuracy-related penalties under With respect to any penalty, Whether substantial understatements of income tax exist, and if so, in what amounts, will depend upon the recalculation of Barnes's 2008 and 2009 tax liabilities given the stipulations and concessions made by the parties and the *312 *314 holdings reached in this opinion. We leave these calculations to the parties under Regardless of whether her underpayments were due to substantial understatements of income tax, we hold that they were due to Barnes's negligence. For the years in issue, we conclude that Barnes acted negligently by failing to keep adequate books and records and by not exercising reasonable care in determining her proper tax liabilities. Barnes asserts a defense to the *313 [i]n preparing her tax returns, the petitioner [i.e., Barnes] specifically*315 consulted IRS publications 17, 463, 535 and 529. * * * The petitioner introduced as evidence receipts for almost every expense deducted. However, if any receipts were missing, the petitioner "provided proof that the expenses herein dispute were paid" whether with bank statements or credit card statements. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Barnes has not established a defense to, and is liable for, the *314 In reaching our holdings,*316 we have considered all arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit. To reflect the foregoing,Bank of America checking (4470) $11,544.79 Bank of America checking (6621) 1,284.92 Bank of America checking (8675) 88,832.44 Bank of America checking (9517) 40,976.11 Bank of America savings (2422) 0.81 Bank of America savings (5962) 300.46 Wells Fargo checking (3054) 3,358.28 Wells Fargo savings (3183) 0.55 Total 146,298.36 Bank of America checking (4470) $28,750.91 Bank of America checking (6621) 2,145.00 Bank of America checking (8675) 111,169.88 Bank of America checking (9517) 42,582.50 Bank of America savings (2422) 0.21 Bank of America savings (5962) 275.17 Wells Fargo checking (3054) 6,484.08 Wells Fargo savings (3183) 215.30 Total 191,623.05 Advertising $415 $423 Car and truck expenses 3,465 3,277 Contract labor 0 300 Depreciation 0 904 Insurance 283 213 Internet 0 0 Legal services 0 300 Meals & entertainment 0 0 Office rent 4,050 4,079 Office telephone 1,619 0 "Other expenses: Bank fees" 344 259 "Other expenses: Cellular phone" 1,668 1,680 "Other expenses: Donations" 0 0 "Other expenses: Postage" 126 118 "Other expenses: Professional development" 475 710 "Other expenses: Publications" 0 0 Supplies *229 3,392 3,752 Taxes and licenses 100 100 Travel 0 0 Utilities 0 1,869 Total 15,937 17,984 Advertising $415 $423 Car and truck expenses Contract labor 0 300 Depreciation 0 904 Insurance Internet Legal services 0 300 Meals & entertainment 0 0 Office rent 4,050 4,079 Office telephone 1,619 "Other expenses: Bank fees" 344 259 "Other expenses: Cellular phone" 1,668 1,680 "Other expenses: Donations" 0 0 "Other expenses: Postage" 126 118 "Other expenses: Professional development" 475 710 "Other expenses: Publications" Supplies 3,392 Taxes and licenses 100 100 Travel 0 0 Utilities 0 *231 1,869 Total 15,937 17,984 Car and truck expenses $6,930 0 $3,465 $3,465 Internet 0 0 0 0 Car and truck expenses $6,544 0 $3,277 $3,277 Internet 0 0 0 0 Supplies 2,503 $672 3,752 3,752 Funds from her father's estate $30,539.13 $12,152.80 Reimbursements from Williams Temple Church 3,098.39 10,384.42 Reimbursements from insurance companies 2,159.44 26,017.12 for property damage Federal income-tax refunds 10,032.71 15,401.76 Store and merchant refunds 1,415.53 387.51 "Reimbursements from various sources" 747.03 317.54 Repayments of loan principal from 8,023.00 2,945.00 clients, friends, and family Redeposit of unused American Express 250.00 -0- Traveler's checks Reimbursement of attorney's fees paid 375.00 -0- on behalf of father's estate Reimbursement for court fees -0- 100.00 paid on behalf of client Gift from cousin 25.00 -0- Deposits "from personal funds or 8,509.00 5,705.00 other loans not previously reported" Total1 65,174.23 73,411.15 1The total amounts for both years that Barnes claimed were treated as unreported income by the IRS ($65,174.23 and $73,411.15) are significantly*239 greater than the amounts actually treated as unreported income by the IRS ($28,849.21 for 2008 and $28,258.26 for 2009). This is because (1) some of the amounts in the spreadsheet were not deposited in Barnes's bank accounts (and therefore did not show up in the IRS's revised bank-deposits analyses), (2) some of the amounts in the spreadsheet were deposited in Barnes's bank accounts but the IRS did not consider them to be income, and (3) some of the amounts in the spreadsheet were deposited in Barnes's bank accounts but the IRS determined they had already been reported by Barnes. These are four deposits in No such deposits 2008 totaling $1,045.75. For these deposits, the IRS has the burden of proof. This is the "first group" This is the "second group" of deposits mentioned in of deposits mentioned in the the text. For these text. We find that Barnes did deposits, there is no not produce credible evidence need to determine who has that these deposits are the burden of proof given nontaxable. Therefore, our finding that Barnes has Barnes has the burden of proven by a proof regarding*246 these preponderance of the deposits. evidence that these deposits are nontaxable. $699.99 8675 Feb. 12, 2008 248.05 9517 Mar. 3, 2008 421.64 9517 Mar. 14, 2008 508.00 3054 May 16, 2008 150.00 3054 July 25, 2008 100.00 8675 Nov. 3, 2008 870.71 8675 Dec. 8, 2008 100.00*248 8675 Dec. 18, 2008 $1,004.65 8675 Jan. 12, 2009 350.00 6621 Jan. 12, 2009 1,513.20 8675 Apr. 1, 2009 864.20 8675 May 5, 2009 301.66 8675 May 26, 2009 1,316.16 8675 June 9, 2009 627.70 8675 July 28, 2009 472.40 8675 Aug. 19, 2009 293.87 8675 Sept. 15, 2009 527.70 8675 Oct. 21, 2009 890.75 8675 Oct. 26, 2009 890.75 8675 Oct. 26, 2009 665.69 8675 Dec. 14, 2009 665.69 8675 Dec. 14, 2009 $5,740.61 Farmers Insurance 4470 Jan. 6, 2009 5,740.61 Farmers Insurance 4470 Jan. 6, 2009 12,953.64 Farmers Insurance 4470 Jan. 6, 2009 935.26 State Farm Insurance 3054 Mar. 30, 2009 57.64 Farmers Insurance 9517 May 26, 2009 500.00 Safeco Insurance 8675 May 26, 2009 89.36 State Farm Insurance 8675 Nov. 2, 2009 $13.52 Quill 9517 Feb. 11, 2008 314.44 American Express 9517 Feb. 20, 2008 175.00 Discover 9517 Feb. 26, 2008 16.23 Office Depot 9517 Mar. 24, 2008 266.06 American Express 9517 Apr. 4, 2008 290.25 American Express 9517 Apr. 18, 2008 40.00 Bank of America 4470 Apr. 28, 2008 20.00 Bank of America 4470 Apr. 28, 2008 191.50 Nordstrom 8675 July 14, 2008 21.53 Target 4470 Aug. 7, 2008 1.22 AT&T 9517 Aug. 16, 2008 31.98 Office Depot 9517 Dec. 15, 2008 9.04 Partyboy 9517 Dec. 22, 2008 10.70 Walmart 8675 Dec.*258 26, 2008 14.06 Target 8675 Dec. 29, 2008 $107.74 Bank of America 9517 Feb. 10, 2009 107.74 Bank of America 9517 Feb. 17, 2009 6.05 Target 4470 June 16, 2009 65.90 HSBC Private Label 8675 Nov. 12, 2009 41.65 American Express 9517 Nov. 16, 2009 25.97 Quill 9517 Dec. 10, 2009 32.46 Quill 9517 Dec. 11, 2009 $50.00 Brenda Ozen 9517 Jan. 28, 2008 165.00 Bank of America 9517 Apr. 8, 2008 339.24 Wells Fargo 8675 Apr. 28, 2008 127.79 Verizon 8675 July 9, 2008 65.00 Ora Robinson 8675 July 9, 2008 $92.54 Unidentified source 9517 Jan. 5, 2009 200.00 Wells Fargo 6621 Mar. 16, 2009 25.00 Ora Robinson 8675 Sept. 14, 2009
*272 The Court's conclusions regarding the IRS's revised bank-deposit analyses Unreported income as determined by IRS in revised bank deposit analysis $28,849.21 $28,258.26 Adjustments by Court for reimbursements by Church in part 1.b*271 1,818.75 1,354.65 Adjustments by Court for store and merchant refunds in part 1.e 1,045.75 501.65 Adjustments by Court for reimbursements from various sources in part 1.f 230.00 -0- Adjustments by Court for repayment of loan principal from clients, friends, and family in part 1.g -0- 500.00 Adjustments by Court: Total 3,094.50 2,356.30 Unreported income as determined by Court pursuant to bank-deposit analysis 25,754.71 25,901.96 Jan. 6, 2009 Coastal Teacher Supplies $8.42 Jan. 12, 2009 Acme Business Business cards 64.95 Jan. 12, 2009 Staples *286 Supplies 77.92 Jan. 26, 2009 Office Depot Copy paper 101.21 Feb. 9, 2009 Quill Corp. 5606 Tax forms W-2 20.88 6-pt laser Feb. 10, 2009 Quill Corp. Tax forms laser 68.61 link software and forms property taxes Mar. 9, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Mar. 31, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Apr. 6, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Apr. 6, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Apr. 17, 2009 Norton Software Norton Virus Protection 49.99 software renewal Apr. 27, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Apr. 27, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return May 1, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return May 1, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return June 2, 2009 Office Depot Binding combs 4.78*287 June 2, 2009 Office Depot Presentation envelopes 286.77 June 4, 2009 Office Depot Business card stock 7.99 June 4, 2009 Dollar Tree Stores Pens for office 29.23 June 15, 2009 HiEd Software Co. Microsoft Office 15.16 Enterprise June 17, 2009 Micro Electron Palm Pilot to store 539.98 tax contacts and Data Storage System for training June 30, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Proseries Professional 1,406.1 Edition July 2, 2009 FedEx Kinko's Copies 16.37 Sept. 22, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 49.80 - business return Sept. 22, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 3.25 - business return for office Oct. 27, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Nov. 16, 2009 Quill Corp. Binding covers 141.32 Nov. 19, 2009 Quill Corp. Matte texture binding 25.97 spines Nov. 23, 2009 GBC Binding supplies 58.05 Nov. 24, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Dec. 17, 2009 Quill Corp. 1203-4*288 LSR Link 86.66 software; tax forms; binding spines [no date given] Office Depot Toner 290.09 Dec. 28, 2009 Proseries Software Sales Pay per return 32.48 - business return Total 4,861.9
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Some dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.↩
2. Barnes resided in Texas when she filed her petition. Therefore, an appeal of our decision in this case would go to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unless the parties designate another circuit.
3. The notice of deficiency characterized the unreported income as unreported gross receipts for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. Barnes does not contend that if she indeed has unreported income it should be attributed to her business of financial consulting for churches or her rental of the Durham Drive property rather than to Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. Therefore, although we consider the propriety of the IRS's determinations of unreported income in one respect (i.e., whether the income considered by the IRS to be unreported income was indeed income and unreported), we do not consider whether the unreported income is attributable to Barnes & Barnes Financial Services, as opposed to her business of financial consulting for churches or her rental of the Durham Drive property.↩
4. The IRS's recharacterization of the rents from rental income to "other income" did not affect its calculation of the amount of the deficiency. Therefore we do not consider the propriety of this recharacterization.
5. The two bank accounts which Barnes maintained during 2008 and 2009 that the IRS did not include in its reconstruction of Barnes's income were a Bank of America IRA ending in 5771 and a Bank of America savings account ending in 2071. The only deposits to these two bank accounts consisted of interest income. The total amount of such interest was $39.30 in 2008 and $95.63 in 2009. It appears that the IRS did not include the $39.30 of interest deposits in its $146,298.36 total of bank deposits for 2008 and that the IRS did not include the $95.63 of interest deposits in its $191,623.05 total of bank deposits for 2009. The IRS does not assert that there should be an increase in Barnes's income on account of these two bank accounts. We decline to consider whether these amounts were unreported income.
Barnes's bank-account statements reflected that she received and deposited dividends. No dividends were reported on her returns. To account for these unreported dividends, the notice of deficiency adjusted Barnes's income upward. The revised bank-deposits analysis also recognized that Barnes received the dividends, but the dividends were subtracted from the amounts of Barnes's unreported income determined under the revised bank-deposits analysis. The subtraction was appropriate, we believe, because the dividends were included in Barnes's income by the notice of deficiency separate and apart from the bank-deposits analysis. The parties have stipulated that Barnes earned the dividend income. This means they agree that the dividend adjustments in the notice of deficiency were correct. If the revised bank-deposits analysis had also included the dividends in Barnes's income, this would have resulted in double counting the dividends.
6. Neither party explained which month begins the 180-month period.↩
7. The stipulation of facts uses the word "alleges" in an admittedly unusual sense. Normally when one says a party "alleges" a position, that means that the position would favor the alleging party if the position were adopted by a court.↩
8. Barnes also argues that the IRS misapplied the bank-deposits method because, as she vaguely asserts, the IRS "did not conduct an analysis of the cancelled checks, currency expenditures and cash on hand". Barnes does not explain exactly what she means by this. Furthermore, she raised this argument in the last brief she filed, a brief for which the IRS did not have an opportunity to respond. We decline to consider Barnes's vague and untimely argument.↩
9. During trial the attorney for the IRS said that "as long as there's no determination that Respondent [the IRS] agrees with her explanations * * * if you'd like to treat her explanations in this document as her direct testimony and you as a fact-finder make the ultimate determination as to credibility, then we are fine with that."
10. The cases cited for these principles,
11. The IRS revised its bank-deposits analyses after the notice of deficiency, but the revision did not cause an increase in the deficiency. See
12. These are the $1,045.75 in deposits for which the IRS has the burden of proof.
13. Barnes also attempted to enter into evidence affidavits from six different individuals, each of whom Barnes alleges repaid her for personal loans she made to them. However, these affidavits were excluded from evidence as inadmissible hearsay.
14. In her briefs, Barnes asserts that this $100 was deposited into her bank account in 2009. The check Barnes received for this payment is dated August 4, 2008, and was deposited into her bank account ending in 3054 on August 25, 2008. Therefore the IRS was correct to subtract this $100 amount from her bank deposits for the 2008 tax year, not the 2009 tax year.↩
15. Barnes reported deductions for car and truck expenses on both the Schedules C for her financial-consulting work and her Schedules C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. Barnes listed vehicle information on her Schedule Cs for her financial-consulting work for churches (i.e., the date a vehicle was placed in service, June 1, 2008; the miles she drove the vehicle for business for that year; and the total miles she drove the vehicle), but she listed no vehicle information on her Schedules C for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services. We surmise that Barnes intended to report that she used the same vehicle for both her financial-consulting work for churches and for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services and that she reported the information for the vehicle only on the Schedules C for her financial-consulting work for churches. (The deductibility of the "car and truck" expenses reported for Barnes's financial-consulting work with churches has been resolved in the stipulation of settled issues.) Although neither the returns nor the record indicates whether the vehicle was a passenger vehicle, Barnes and the IRS agree that Barnes's reported "car and truck" expenses for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services are subject to the strict substantiation requirements of
16. It appears that this amount is equal to the miles driven multiplied by the standard mileage rate, which was 50.5 cents per mile for the first six months in 2008,
17. In her post-trial briefs, Barnes continued to assert that she is entitled to a total supplies-expense deduction of $4,861.93 for Barnes & Barnes Financial Services for 2009. In Barnes's first post-trial brief she also included the number "$4,830.54" in a table that lists the amount she claims she is entitled to deduct for supplies for 2009. Barnes did not explain this number or itemize this amount.↩
18. spreadsheet prepared by Barnes with respect to her alleged sources of nontaxable deposits. We described that agreement
19. $3,752 $3,710.85 is $41.15.↩
20. We note that although the IRS does not contend that the DVD player is listed property, it appears that a tenable argument could be made that a DVD player is "property of a type generally used for purposes of entertainment, recreation, or amusement".
21.
22. In the notice of deficiency the IRS, consistent with the amounts reported on Barnes's tax returns, included in Barnes's income the total rents that Barnes received for the Durham Drive property--$800 for 2008 and $1,000 for 2009. Barnes did not argue that she should include only 50% of the rents in her income (because her sister owned 50% of the property in 2008 and 2009). Therefore, we sustain the IRS's uncontested determinations, consistent with Barnes's tax returns, that 100% of the rents received for the Durham Drive property are includible in Barnes's income.↩
23. property, but several documents were provided at trial and admitted into evidence that relate to the value of the Durham Drive property. According to electronic printouts from the website
Although it is true that Barnes bought her sister's one-half interest in the Durham Drive property in 2013 (for $3,000), this purchase (between sisters) is not a reliable guide to the value of the Durham Drive property.↩
24. Barnes reported $1,094 of property taxes as a deduction on Schedule E, the attachment on which she reported the income and expenses of the Durham Drive property. Barnes also reported $2,505 of real-estate taxes as a deduction on Schedule A to her 2009 return, but the return does not describe these taxes. Thus, the return does not explain which property the $2,505 in taxes relates to. The notice of deficiency allowed the entire $2,505 as a deduction. The IRS does not argue that the $932.49 Barnes paid in property taxes on the Durham Drive property in 2009 was part of the $2,505 deduction reported by Barnes on her Schedule A and disallowed by the notice of deficiency.↩
25. Barnes was only a 50% owner of the Durham Drive property in 2009, but the IRS does not argue that the $932.49 deduction should be reduced by 50% accordingly.↩
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