Estate of Richard R. Simplot v. Commissioner

112 T.C. No. 13
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF RICHARD R. SIMPLOT, DECEASED, JOHN EDWARD SIMPLOT,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 23122-97. Filed March 22, 1999.
I.
Decedent owned 18 of the outstanding 76.445 shares
of the voting stock and 3,942.048 of the outstanding
141,288.584 shares of the nonvoting stock of J.R. Simplot
Co. (the Company), a private, family-owned corporation.
The remaining shares of outstanding voting stock were
owned by decedent's three siblings. The voting stock is
subject to a 360-day restriction on transferability or
hypothecation. Both classes of stock are entitled to the
same dividends (without preference) on a per-share basis,
if and when dividends are declared. Holders of the
nonvoting stock are entitled to a liquidating preference.
On the estate tax return, the fair market value for
both classes of stock was reported as $2,650 per share.
Petitioner agrees that because of an error by its
appraiser in the calculation of the aggregate number of
outstanding shares, the fair market value for both
classes of stock should have been $3,025 per share. In
the notice of deficiency, respondent determined the fair
market value of the voting stock to be $801,994.83 per
share and the fair market value of the nonvoting stock to
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be $3,585.50 per share. The disparate valuations are
primarily attributable to the valuation methodologies
employed by the parties.
Held: On the basis of the facts and circumstances
presented, a premium for voting privileges is appropriate
and is determined in relation to the equity value of the
Company (enterprise value plus cash minus liabilities).
After application of a 35-percent marketability discount,
the fair market value of the voting stock is $215,539.01
per share and after application of a 40-percent
marketability discount, the fair market value of the
nonvoting stock is $3,417.05 per share.
II.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent reduced the
amount reported for the marital deduction from
$15,127,237 to $1,723,437. The amount of this reduction
($13,403,800) is due to: (1) Respondent's redetermination
of the fair market value of the voting stock, all of
which was bequeathed to the trustees of a credit shelter
trust for the benefit of decedent's children, and (2) the
charging of the Federal estate tax to that portion of the
estate (the residue) passing to decedent's wife. In
calculating the amount of the marital deduction,
respondent did not consider the amount of State transfer
and inheritance taxes which are payable with respect to
the value of the voting stock bequeathed to the trustees
of the credit shelter trust and which pursuant to
decedent's will are chargeable against that bequest.
Held: Because no State transfer or inheritance
taxes have yet been paid, and because the amount of the
marital deduction must be recalculated on the basis of
our determination of the value of the voting stock
passing to the trustees of the credit shelter trust, the
parties must consider (and not reduce the marital
deduction by) the amount of State transfer and
inheritance taxes actually and timely paid by reason of
the bequest of the voting stock to the trustees of the
credit shelter trust.
III.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined
that petitioner is liable for penalties pursuant to sec.
6662(a), (g), (h)(1), and (2)(C), I.R.C. The penalties do
not apply to any portion of the underpayment for which
the taxpayer: (1) Had reasonable cause, and (2) acted in
good faith with respect thereto.
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Held: Petitioner is not liable for the penalties at
issue because petitioner acted reasonably and in good
faith by relying on the advice of tax professionals and
appraisers.
David John Thornton, Gregory Allen Byron, and Sheldon I.
Fink, for petitioner.
David J. Mungo and Robert A. Varra, for respondent.
JACOBS, Judge: Respondent determined a $17,643,886 deficiency
in petitioner's Federal estate tax and $7,057,554 in penalties
pursuant to section 6662(a), (g), (h)(1), and (2)(C).
Following a concession by respondent, the issues for decision
are: (1) The fair market value of 18 shares of class A voting
common stock of J.R. Simplot Co. owned by Richard R. Simplot
(decedent) on June 24, 1993 (the valuation date); (2) the fair
market value of 3,942.048 shares of class B nonvoting common stock
of J.R. Simplot Co. owned by decedent on the valuation date; (3)
the amount of the section 2056 marital deduction to be allowed the
estate of decedent (petitioner); and (4) whether petitioner is
liable for the section 6662 penalties as determined by respondent.
Subsumed in the resolution of the stock valuation issues is the
question of whether a premium should be accorded the voting
privileges of the class A stock; and, if so, the amount of that
premium.
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All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect as of the date of decedent's death, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulations
of facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference.
A. Background
Decedent, a resident of Boise, Idaho, died testate on June 24,
1993. He was 59 years old. At the time the petition was filed
herein, John Edward Simplot, decedent's son and personal
representative, resided in Boise, Idaho.
Decedent and his siblings are the children of Jack R. Simplot
(J.R. Simplot), who was living on the trial date of this case. At
the time of his death, decedent owned 18 shares of class A voting
common stock (class A voting stock) and 3,942.048 shares of class
B nonvoting common stock (class B nonvoting stock) of J.R. Simplot
Co., constituting 23.55 percent of the outstanding shares of class
A voting stock and 2.79 percent of the outstanding shares of class
B nonvoting stock. The remaining shares of class A voting stock
were owned by decedent's siblings: Gay C. Simplot Otter (Gay), Don
J. Simplot (Don), and Scott R. Simplot (Scott). As of the date of
decedent's death, virtually all of the shares of class B nonvoting
stock were owned, directly or indirectly, by the descendants of
J.R. Simplot and an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)
established in 1978.
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B. The History and Business of J.R. Simplot Co.
J.R. Simplot Co. (through a predecessor entity) was founded in
the 1930's by J.R. Simplot. It was incorporated in Nevada in 1955.
None of its stock is publicly traded. J.R. Simplot originally
owned all of the Company's stock; he transferred the stock to his
children in the 1960's.
J.R. Simplot's philosophy was to reinvest the Company's cash-
flows into long-term assets (such as real estate mineral reserves,
water rights, and natural-resource-based operations), operate the
Company privately, and pass ownership of the Company on to his
descendants. From J.R. Simplot Co.'s inception through the
valuation date, J.R. Simplot was the Company's chairman of the
board and played a dominant role in the Company's operations.
J.R. Simplot Co. is a major frozen food processing and
agribusiness chemical company. Its predecessor developed the
technique for producing frozen French fried potatoes in the 1950's.
It is headquartered in Boise, Idaho, and operates in the western
part of the United States and in Mexico, Turkey, and Canada. J.R.
Simplot Co.'s taxable year ends August 31. On the valuation date,
J.R. Simplot Co. employed between 9,000 and 10,000 individuals.
For the 9 months ended May 31, 1993, J.R. Simplot Co. had net
sales of $1,282,526,000 and net income of $25,506,000. For its
fiscal year ended August 31, 1993, the Company had net sales of
$1,778,768,000 and net income of $37,825,000. On May 31, 1993,
J.R. Simplot Co. had assets with a book value of $1,340,803,000 and
shareholders' equity of $481,001,000. On August 31, 1993, J.R.
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Simplot Co. had assets with a book value of $1,222,610,000 and
shareholders' equity of $490,905,000.1
As of the valuation date, J.R. Simplot Co. was operationally
divided into five groups: (1) The food products group (FPG), which
comprises J.R. Simplot Co.'s potato, fruit, and vegetable
processing operations; (2) the agriculture group (AG), which owns
approximately 70,000 head of cattle and is one of the largest
suppliers of cattle in the United States; (3) the diversified
product group (DPG), which essentially manages two businesses--WSI,
a producer and marketer of assorted agribusiness products including
livestock feeds and livestock handling equipment, and Simplot
Transportation, the transportation management division of the
Company; (4) the minerals and chemical group (MCG), which
manufactures and markets fertilizers and chemicals, mainly in the
Western United States and in Canada; and (5) the development and
corporate group (DCG).
1. The Food Products Group
FPG is composed of three businesses: Potato processing, fruit
and vegetable processing, and other operations. As of the
valuation date, it represented approximately 55 percent or $718.3
1
J.R. Simplot Co. controlled a number of operations
(e.g., a potato storage facility operated through Aberdeen
Storage Limited Partnership and an office building operated
through Lake Forest Limited Partnership) using "off-balance sheet
financing".
In addition, entities were established in the names of
Simplot family members to acquire land, enabling J.R. Simplot Co.
to obtain greater water and grazing rights.
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million of J.R. Simplot Co.'s consolidated revenue for the 9-month
period ended May 31, 1993.
Through its processing plants, J.R. Simplot Co. produces
hundreds of millions of pounds of frozen French fries each year.
It is one of the two largest potato processors in the world.
Potato processing involves the following: Purchasing new-crop
potatoes, sorting and grading the potatoes, storing potatoes for
use in year-round production, transporting potatoes from storage
facilities to the plant, washing and peeling the potatoes, cutting
or forming potatoes into the desired product, precooking the
potatoes, freezing the potatoes, packaging the potatoes according
to customer requirements, and preparing the potato products for
shipment to the end user.
FPG's five potato production facilities produce a mix of
frozen French fries and formed products. The largest potato
processing facilities are located in Caldwell, Idaho; Hermiston,
Oregon; and Heyburn, Idaho.
FPG's potato operations serve three market segments:
McDonald's, Food Service, and Consumer.2 McDonald's is FPG's and
2
The Food Products Groups' 10 largest customers (in
alphabetical order) are:
Food Service of America
Friendly Restaurants Corp.
Marriott Distribution Services
McDonald's Corp.
Nichirei Corp. of America
PYA/Monarch Food Service
Reddy Raw, Inc.
Sugar Foods Corp.
(continued...)
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J.R. Simplot Co.'s largest customer, consuming approximately 42
percent of the total pounds of raw potatoes FPG processes, and
contributes approximately $200 million in revenues. J.R. Simplot
Co. supplies McDonald's with the following amounts of potato
products: 60 percent of McDonald's domestic potato products; more
than 95 percent of McDonald's potato products sold in Japan; 100
percent of McDonald's potato sales in Singapore, Hong Kong,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Mexico; and 80 percent of McDonald's sales
in the Caribbean.
J.R. Simplot Co.'s food service segment is the fastest growing
segment of potato consumption. Approximately 56 percent of the
potatoes J.R. Simplot Co. processed are consumed by this segment,
and revenues have increased an average of 10 percent a year since
1965. FPG provides this market with several potato products
(including a variety of French fry products, hash browns, and cubed
potatoes).
J.R. Simplot Co. serves the consumer market through brand
names such as MicroMagic, J.R. Simplot's Retail, and Okray's Hash
Browns. This segment accounts for approximately 2 percent of the
potatoes J.R. Simplot Co. processes.
J.R. Simplot Co.'s competitors within the frozen potato
industry include Lamb-Weston, a division of ConAgra, Inc.; Ore-Ida,
2
(...continued)
The Kroger Company
Victory Spud Service
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a division of H.J. Heinz Co.; McCain Foods; Universal Foods; and
Carnation Foods, a division of Nestle, S.A.
FPG's vegetable operation, drawing on the distribution network
of J.R. Simplot Co.'s frozen potato operations, distribute more
than 33 varieties of fruits and vegetables to J.R. Simplot Co.'s
Food Service customers either under the Classic label or as private
label products.
2. The Agriculture Group
AG is one of the largest suppliers of prime beef in the United
States, and the largest supplier to the Pacific Northwest. For the
9 months ended May 31, 1993, AG contributed $79.2 million or
approximately 6 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s gross revenues.
J.R. Simplot Co. raises and feeds approximately 260,000 head
of cattle per year on 1.4 million acres of leased or owned land.
The cattle operations complement the potato business through the
use of potato waste as cattle feed.
At the time of trial, J.R. Simplot Co. sold approximately 85
percent of its cattle to IBP, Inc. In 1991, J.R. Simplot Co.
entered into a contract with Nicherei Corp., a Japanese food
company, whereby Nicherei Corp. buys the beef packed by J.R.
Simplot Co.'s Nampa, Idaho, processing facility.
3. Diversified Products Group
DPG was established during the Company's 1989 fiscal year to
account for opportunities in the following diverse businesses:
Corporate trucking and maintenance services, refrigerated rail
cars, livestock feed, animal health, farm supply services, a
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commodities trading group, and two bonded grain elevators. For the
9 months ended May 31, 1993, DPG contributed $145 million or
approximately 11 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s gross revenues.
DPG is divided into two types of operations through WSI and
Simplot Transportation. WSI produces and markets a variety of
agribusiness products (including livestock feeds, nutritional
supplements, livestock health products, and livestock handling
equipment). Simplot Transportation provides companywide
transportation management (including the operation of approximately
100 to 150 bulk trailers, more than 135 owned over-the-road trucks,
and 750 owned or leased rail cars). A small amount of revenue is
generated from transportation for third parties.
During the 9-month period ended May 31, 1993, DPG had a loss
of $0.9 million on revenue of $145 million.
4. Minerals and Chemical Group
MCG is a major manufacturer and distributor of phosphate
fertilizers and agricultural chemicals in the Western United States
and in Canada. It was formed in 1944 after a manufacturing plant
west of Pocatello, Idaho, was constructed to supply J.R. Simplot
Co. with the fertilizers it needed to nourish thousands of acres of
potatoes. MCG sells the fertilizers primarily to farmers west of
the Mississippi.
MCG has consistently been J.R. Simplot Co.'s most profitable
segment (accounting for 31 percent of revenue for the period ended
May 31, 1993). At the time of decedent's death, it had
approximately 40 to 50 percent of the market. Despite the fact
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that prices fell to a 20-year low, MCG reported strong results for
the first 9 months of fiscal year 1993. For its fiscal year ended
August 31, 1993, MCG contributed $418.5 million or approximately 32
percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s consolidated revenues.
Mining and Processing, MCG's principal segment, operates five
business units: Agricultural Fertilizer, Professional Products,
Feed Phosphates, Industrial Chemical, and Consumer Products.
Products mined and processed by these units are marketed throughout
the Western United States and in Canadian prairie provinces by
independent companies and other MCG operations, including 75 retail
outlets carrying J.R. Simplot Co.'s "Soilbuilder" name. MCG
employs 2,467 individuals.
The Agricultural Fertilizer business unit (36 percent of MCG's
1992 revenues) markets nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers in the
Western North American agricultural market, sold through
agricultural fertilizer dealers who resell to growers. The
principal products manufactured and distributed are phosphoric
acid, ammonium nitrogen products, urea ammonium nitrate solutions,
and homogeneous N-P-K fertilizers. J.R. Simplot Co. has attained
a major share of the agricultural fertilizer market in the Western
United States and in Canada.
The Professional Products business unit (3.5 percent of MCG's
1992 revenues) develops and markets fertilizers and chemicals for
use in the maintenance of turf grasses and ornamentals. The Feed
Phosphates business unit (1.7 percent of MCG's 1992 revenues)
markets feed-grade phosphates that serve the needs of the poultry
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and livestock industries of Western North America. The Industrial
Chemical business unit (2.2 percent of MCG's 1992 revenues) markets
ammonia and phosphates used in different nonagricultural
applications. The Consumer Products business unit (1 percent of
MCG's 1992 revenues) produces and markets fertilizers for home and
garden use, mainly in the Western United States and Hawaii.
MCG operates four fertilizer manufacturing plants in Idaho,
California, and Manitoba, Canada. The largest facilities are the
Smoky Canyon Mine (near the Idaho-Wyoming border) and the Don
Manufacturing complex (west of Pocatello, Idaho).
In the beginning of fiscal year 1992, J.R. Simplot Co.
purchased Chevron's fertilizer manufacturing operations.
MCG also operates a silica sand operation in Overton, Nevada,
and an agricultural chemical formulating plant in Mountain Home,
Idaho.
J.R. Simplot Co. has been isolated from the pressures of other
U.S. fertilizer producers, mainly located in the Southeast. MCG
sells most of its fertilizer in inland markets, where access to
other producers by land or water via the west coast is expensive.
MCG sells more than 20 percent of its output in Idaho and 85
percent of its sales in protected markets west of the Rockies.
5. Development and Corporate (Administrative) Group
J.R. Simplot Co., through DCG, owns other agribusiness
ventures, including three cheese plants (e.g., Arpin Dairy, Inc.,
in Arpin, Wisconsin; Swiss Village Cheese Co., in Nampa, Idaho; and
Washington Farms Distribution, Inc., in Mount Vernon, Washington).
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DCG controls the operation of a hydroelectric plant, land
development, Simplot International (primarily in Hungary, Poland,
and Argentina), and former aquaculture operations that now grow
produce, such as tomatoes. For the 9 months ended May 31, 1993,
DCG had combined gross revenues of approximately $2.5 million.
C. Equity Investment
In addition to its operating assets, as of the valuation date
J.R. Simplot Co. held 5,259,800 shares of Micron Technology, Inc.
(Micron Technology), common stock. This interest represented 13.36
percent of the shares of Micron Technology common stock
outstanding.
Micron Technology manufactures and markets semiconductor
memory components and personal computers. It has operations that
directly or indirectly serve the computer, telecommunications, and
office automation industries. It competes in the manufacturing and
marketing of semiconductor memory components, the production of
memory-intensive modules and board-level products, the assembly and
selling of IBM-compatible personal computers, and the design and
development of new technologies relating to fueled emission flat
panel displays.
The shares of Micron Technology stock are traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. On decedent's date of death, shares of Micron
Technology stock were trading at $34.63 (the mean between the high
and low selling price per share of Micron Technology on the New
York Stock Exchange); the closing price was $34.875 per share.
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D. Capital Structure
As of June 24, 1993, J.R. Simplot Co. had two classes of
authorized stock: Class A common voting and class B common
nonvoting stock.
As of June 24, 1993, J.R. Simplot Co. had 141,365.029 shares
of outstanding stock: 76.445 shares of class A voting stock and
141,288.584 shares of class B nonvoting stock. The stock of J.R.
Simplot Co. was owned as follows:
CLASS A VOTING STOCK
Stockholder Number of Shares Percent of Total
Decedent 18.000 23.55%
Don 18.000 23.55
Gay 18.000 23.55
Scott 22.445 29.35
Total 76.445 100.00
CLASS B NONVOTING STOCK
Stockholder Number of Shares Percent of Total
Decedent 3,942.048 2.79%
Don 4,292.454 3.04
Gay 4,406.403 3.12
Scott 7,978.446 5.65
Trust--decedent's
family 28,909.342 20.46
Trust--Don's
family 24,997.252 17.69
Trust--decedent's
and Don's
family 34,826.391 24.65
Other Simplot
family and
affiliates 27,042.707 19.14
ESOP 4,893.541 3.46
Total 141,288.584 100.00
Each share of class A voting stock is entitled to one vote.
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Both class A voting and class B nonvoting shareholders are
entitled to the same dividends (without preference) on a per-share
basis, if and when declared by the board of directors of J.R.
Simplot Co. As of the date of decedent's death, J.R. Simplot Co.
had never declared a dividend.
Pursuant to J.R. Simplot Co.'s articles of incorporation, upon
liquidation of J.R. Simplot Co., the Company's assets are to be
used in the following order of priority: (1) Payment of all
outstanding indebtedness; (2) payment to the class B nonvoting
shareholders in an amount equal to the par value of their shares
($10 per share) plus a dividend equal to 40 cents per share for
each year that the stock is outstanding after July 1, 1955, up to
the last day of the February preceding the liquidation date; (3)
payment to the class A voting shareholders in an amount equal to
the par value of their shares ($10 per share); and (4) payment of
the balance to all class A voting and class B nonvoting
shareholders pro rata on a per-share basis.
The articles of incorporation and the bylaws of J.R. Simplot
Co. place a 360-day restriction on the transferability or
hypothecation of the class A voting stock. Pursuant to this
restriction, if a class A voting shareholder desires to sell,
transfer, or hypothecate his/her class A voting stock, the stock
must be first offered to the Company under the same terms and
conditions as otherwise could be obtained by the selling
shareholder from another purchaser or lender for a period of 180
days. If the Company declines to exercise its right during this
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180-day period, then the other class A voting shareholders (as a
group) have an additional 180 days within which to purchase the
stock.
Before June 23, 1993, class B nonvoting shareholders were
afforded a nominal level of liquidity for their shares through
sales to J.R. Simplot Co.'s ESOP as well as occasional ad hoc
redemptions of the shares by the Company. In substantially all
instances, the price paid for these repurchases occurred at the
most recent ESOP valuations prepared by Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
(Morgan Stanley).
As a practical matter, before June 23, 1993, J.R. Simplot set
the amounts of compensation paid by the Company to his children.
The amounts paid from 1991 to 1993 were as follows:
Officers/Directors 1991 1992 1993
Don $246,385.76 $314,628.71 $235,972.26
Scott 122,301.44 17,140.00 ---
Decedent 222,730.14 200,801.14 79,785.42
Gay --- --- ---
Before divorce, Gay's spouse received compensation in his
management capacity from J.R. Simplot Co.
J.R. Simplot Co. owned resort properties in Ketchum and
McCall, Idaho; it also owned a corporate aircraft. Simplot family
members were permitted to use these facilities for nonbusiness
purposes, on a space-available basis (and did so). Simplot family
members were permitted to use the corporate aircraft for personal
purposes at rates below those available on commercial flights.
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Additionally, J.R. Simplot Co. paid club membership fees of various
Simplot family members.
Several partnerships, joint ventures, and companies owned by
J.R. Simplot Co.'s class A voting shareholders were created in
conjunction with J.R. Simplot Co.'s businesses. These entities did
all or substantially all of their business with J.R. Simplot Co.
As of the valuation date, these entities owned, among other things,
food storage facilities, office buildings, livestock, agricultural
and development real estate, and grazing rights (see supra note 1).
E. Management
As of the valuation date, J.R. Simplot Co.'s management
structure was as follows:
Name Position
J.R. Simplot Chairman
Gordon C. Smith President and chief executive officer
Lawrence E. Costello Vice president of finance and chief
financial officer
James D. Crawford Corporate treasurer
Stephen A. Beebe President of the Food Products Group
Donald D. Pottinger President of the Minerals and Chemical
Group
Tom Basabe President of the Agricultural Group
Ray G. Kaufman President of the Diversified Products
Group
Ronald N. Graves General counsel and corporate secretary
Nonfamily members have served on the board of directors for
several decades.
In 1993, there was a change in both the chairmanship and
presidency of J.R. Simplot Co. J.R. Simplot retired as chairman of
the Company, and thereafter an office of the chairman, composed of
Don, Gay, Scott, and decedent's son, was established.
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While J.R. Simplot was on the board of directors, the other
board members usually adhered to his business and policy decisions.
Although J.R. Simplot's four children had independent views
regarding how the family business should be run, there was
unanimity in their philosophy to maintain J.R. Simplot Co. as a
private, family-owned company.
F. Contingent Environmental Liabilities
As of the valuation date, J.R. Simplot Co. had potential
environmental liabilities estimated to be at a maximum of $95
million.
G. Financial History
The consolidated balance sheets for J.R. Simplot Co. and
subsidiaries for their fiscal years ended August 31, 1991, 1992,
and 1993, reveal:
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY & SUBSIDIARIES
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
AUG. 31, 1993, 1992 and 1991
(in thousands)
ASSETS 1993 1992 1991
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash and equivalents $20,920 $22,366 $15,457
Notes & accounts receivable,
less allowances 206,398 187,935 164,285
Inventories 197,022 170,449 233,164
Manufacturing supplies 23,244 22,591 23,268
Prepaid expenses & other assets 15,739 15,487 16,086
Total current assets 463,323 418,828 452,260
INVESTMENTS & OTHER ASSETS
Amounts due from affiliates 32,810 36,488 10,000
Investments 128,543 110,718 102,941
Other assets 38,624 27,554 31,712
PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT, net 559,310 523,908 493,988
1,222,610 1,117,496 1,090,901
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LIABILITIES & SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Accounts payable & accrued
expenses $223,024 $193,987 $174,058
Income taxes payable 1,592 775 917
Long-term debt, current portion 3,440 4,126 2,571
Total current liabilities 228,056 198,888 177,546
LONG-TERM DEBT, less current portion 433,924 380,921 382,554
OTHER LIABILITIES & DEFERRED CREDITS 15,375 14,495 21,283
DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 54,350 61,694 62,734
731,705 655,998 644,117
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Class A capital stock, voting,
$10 par value, authorized 100
shares, issued 76.445 shares 1 1 1
Class B capital stock, nonvoting,
$10 par value, authorized 249,900
shares, issued 161,310.269 shares 1,313 1,324 1,336
Additional paid-in capital 6,931 6,931 6,931
Retained Earnings 482,660 453,242 438,516
490,905 461,498 446,784
1,222,610 1,117,496 1,090,901
The consolidated statements of cash-flow for J.R. Simplot Co.
and subsidiaries for their fiscal years ended August 31, 1991,
1992, and 1993, reveal:
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY & SUBSIDIARIES
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
YEARS ENDED AUG. 31, 1993, 1992 and 1991
(in thousands)
1993 1992 1991
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Net Income $37,825 $20,545 $5,281
Adjustments to reconcile net income
to net cash provided by operating
activities:
Depreciation 52,600 62,129 58,319
Deferred income taxes (6,089) 580 (2,671)
Equity investment earnings (16,378) (119) (3,112)
Other items, net 6,842 14 4,190
Changes in assets & liabilities:
Notes & accounts receivable,
net (22,771) (23,940) (2,784)
Inventories (27,335) 63,437 13,180
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Accounts payable & accrued
expenses $26,173 $12,252 $7,228
Other liabilities & deferred
credits (877) (2,404) (2,166)
Other assets & liabilities, net (313) 1,849 (10)
NET CASH PROVIDED BY OPERATING
ACTIVITIES 49,677 134,343 77,455
CASH-FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Capital expenditures (101,328) (87,359) (74,580)
Proceeds from sale of property &
equipment 2,042 7,260 6,766
Investments (111) (11,185) (2,319)
Change in amounts due to/from
affiliates 1,279 (27,728) (2,571)
NET CASH USED FOR INVESTING ACTIVITIES (98,118) (119,012) (72,704)
CASH-FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Long-term debt proceeds 100,000 112,989 40,511
Long-term debt repayments (52,121) (120,140) (41,888)
Purchase of Treasury stock (884) (1,271) (1,638)
NET CASH PROVIDED BY (USED FOR)
FINANCING ACTIVITIES 46,995 (8,422) (3,015)
NET CHANGE IN CASH & EQUIVALENTS (1,446) 6,909 1,736
CASH & EQUIVALENTS, beginning of year 22,366 15,457 13,721
CASH & EQUIVALENTS, end of year 20,920 22,366 15,457
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF CASH-FLOW
INFORMATION
Income taxes paid 11,023 8,273 1,414
Interest paid, net of amount
capitalized 32,083 27,134 37,171
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF NONCASH
INVESTING & FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Asset acquisitions through
assumption of liabilities 13,292 19,719 10,087
Asset acquisitions for noncash
consideration 4,406 --- ---
Exchange of receivables for stock 895 1,250 650
Exchange of inventory for noncash
consideration --- 4,400 4,435
H. Industry Conditions and J.R. Simplot Co.'s Prospects
Between 1983 and 1993, J.R. Simplot Co. began facing a number
of stronger competitors, such as Lamb-Weston, Ore-Ida, and
Universal Foods. (The trend involved large companies such as Ore-
Ida Foods purchasing a small potato plant; subsequently, Ore-Ida
- 21 -
Foods sold out to H.J. Heinz.) Moreover, the opening up of the
Canadian market through the North American Free Trade Act brought
Canadian companies into competition with J.R. Simplot Co. Through
acquisitions, mergers, and growth, J.R. Simplot Co.'s competitors
were becoming larger and better financed.
As of June 1993, the processed and frozen vegetable industries
appeared to be rebounding from a 3-year recession. Record crops
and the resulting high inventory levels were showing signs of
abatement, and frozen vegetables were expected to recover some of
the sales lost to fresh vegetables because of the decrease in fresh
vegetable prices.
Total U.S. nutrient consumption in 1993 was projected at 20
million short tons, down 4 percent from 1992. Nitrogen was
projected at approximately 11 million tons, down more than 4
percent from 1992; phosphates at 4 million tons, down more than 2
percent; and potash 5 million tons, down 4 percent.
In June 1993, the chemicals and fertilizer industry was
operating at full capacity. It was expected that the industry
would continue to operate at full capacity with slow to moderate
growth over the next several years.
As of June 1993, J.R. Simplot's near-term prospects were good.
The Company's operating and capital budget for fiscal year 1994
projected that the anticipated shareholders' equity of the Company
would increase by 7.22 percent between August 31, 1993 and 1994.
In 1993, the Company projected 1994 fiscal year net revenues to be
$1,965,022,000 and net income to be $36,104,000. J.R. Simplot
- 22 -
Co.'s 5-year strategic business plan also projected a favorable
outlook for the Company.
Both before and after the valuation date, several of J.R.
Simplot Co.'s competitors had inquired into whether the Company or
parts of the Company might be available for acquisition.
I. Decedent's Last Will and Testament
Pursuant to the terms of his will, executed on July 13, 1988,
decedent bequeathed to the trustees of a testamentary trust for the
benefit of his children (the credit shelter trust) all of his J.R.
Simplot Co. class A voting stock plus that amount of class B
nonvoting stock which, when added to the voting stock (as valued
for Federal estate tax purposes), equaled the Federal estate tax
return filing requirement amount in effect at the time of his death
(i.e., $600,000), reduced by the aggregate amount of any adjusted
taxable gifts (as defined in section 2001(b)) made by him after
December 31, 1976. The balance of decedent's estate, including the
remaining class B nonvoting shares owned by decedent, passed to
decedent's surviving spouse, Adelia Ann Simplot.
Federal estate tax due from decedent's estate is to be paid
out of that portion of the estate which is to otherwise pass to
decedent's surviving spouse. All State transfer and inheritance
taxes due with respect to a bequest are treated as a charge against
the distributive share of the person receiving the bequest.
J. U.S. Estate Tax Return
In September 1994, petitioner filed a Form 706, United States
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, that listed
- 23 -
among other assets, 18 shares of class A voting stock and 3,942.048
shares of class B nonvoting stock of J.R. Simplot Co. The fair
market value for both the class A voting shares and class B
nonvoting shares owned by decedent on the date of his death was
reported at $2,650 per share. (Accordingly, the aggregate fair
market value of the 18 class A voting shares was reported at
$47,700, and the aggregate fair market value of the 3,942.048 class
B nonvoting shares at $10,446,427.) This valuation was based upon
an appraisal by Morgan Stanley, dated December 9, 1993.
The total number of outstanding shares of J.R. Simplot Co.
used by Morgan Stanley in its appraisal erroneously included
treasury shares held by J.R. Simplot Co. Using the correct number
of shares outstanding, and the same methodology Morgan Stanley
employed, the fair market value of decedent's class A voting and
class B nonvoting shares of J.R. Simplot Co. would have been
approximately $3,025 per share (in lieu of $2,650 per share as
reported).
K. Notice of Deficiency
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner, dated
September 9, 1997, determining an estate tax deficiency of
$17,643,886 and penalties of $7,057,554, pursuant to section
6662(a), (g), (h)(1), and (2)(C). The deficiency and penalties are
primarily based upon respondent's redetermination of the value of
the 18 shares of class A voting and 3,942.048 shares of class B
nonvoting stock of J.R. Simplot Co. owned by decedent on the date
of his death. Respondent increased the value for the 18 shares of
- 24 -
class A voting stock from the reported $47,700 (or $2,650 per
share) to $14,435,907 (or $801,994.83 per share) and increased the
value for the 3,942.048 class B nonvoting stock from the reported
$10,446,427 (or $2,650 per share) to $14,134,213 (or $3,585.50 per
share). These values resulted in the following determined
increases to decedent's gross estate:
Amount Amount Increases
reported by determined by to gross
the estate respondent estate
18 shares of
class A voting
shares $47,700 $14,435,907 $14,388,207
3,942.048 shares
of class B
nonvoting shares 10,446,427 14,134,213 3,687,786
Total disputed increases 18,075,993
On brief, respondent concedes that the values of decedent's
class A and class B shares do not exceed $11,090,094 and
$13,887,007, respectively.
In addition, respondent decreased the amount of the marital
deduction from the reported $15,127,237 to $1,723,437, because of
(1) respondent's redetermination of the fair market value of the
class A voting stock and (2) the resulting estate tax consequences
which are to be borne by that portion of the estate (the residue)
passing to decedent's surviving spouse. And finally, respondent
determined that petitioner is liable for $7,057,554 in penalties
pursuant to section 6662(a), (g), (h)(1) and (2)(C).
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ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The class A voting stock is to be accorded a premium for
its voting privileges. After giving consideration to the premium
for the voting privileges, and after applying a 35-percent
marketability (lack of liquidity) discount, the fair market value
of decedent's class A voting stock was $215,539.01 per share or a
total of $3,879,702.19, on the valuation date.
2. After applying a 40-percent marketability (lack of
liquidity) discount, the fair market value of decedent's class B
nonvoting stock was $3,417.05 per share or a total of
$13,470,190.88, on the valuation date.3
3. Because there has been no payment of State transfer or
inheritance taxes, respondent correctly did not include in the
computation of the amount of the marital deduction (and in the
computation of the asserted estate tax deficiency) an allowance for
State transfer or inheritance taxes paid.
4. Petitioner acted reasonably and in good faith in relying
on the advice of tax professionals and appraisers in valuing
decedent's class A voting stock and class B nonvoting stock for
Federal estate tax purposes.
3
In arriving at the valuations in Ultimate Findings of
Fact Nos. 1 and 2, we did not consider certain exhibits (Exs. 22-
J, 30-R, 41-J, 42-J, 43-J, 44-J, 45-J, 46-J, 121-P, 124-P, 125-P,
126-P, 127-P, and 128-P) that the parties objected to in the
stipulations of facts. These documents are not probative and
accordingly have been accorded no weight.
- 26 -
OPINION
Issues 1 and 2. Valuation of J.R. Simplot Co. Stock
Our fundamental task is to determine the fair market value of
18 shares of class A voting stock and 3,942.048 shares of class B
nonvoting stock in J.R. Simplot Co. owned by decedent at the time
of his death. In performing this task, we must decide whether
under the facts and circumstances presented, a premium should be
accorded to the voting privileges of the class A voting stock and,
if so, the amount of that premium. Petitioner took the position
that no premium should be given to the voting privileges of the
class A stock and thus in the estate tax return valued both the
class A voting stock and class B nonvoting stock at $2,650 per
share, or an aggregate fair market value of $47,700 for the class
A voting stock and $10,446,427 for the class B nonvoting stock. On
the other hand, respondent asserts that the class A voting stock is
entitled to a premium for voting privileges and in the statutory
notice of deficiency determined an $801,994.83 per-share value for
the class A voting stock, for a total value held by decedent in
that class of $14,435,907, and a $3,585.50 per-share value for the
class B nonvoting stock, for a total value held by decedent in that
class of $14,134,213. On brief, respondent concedes that the
values of decedent's class A and class B shares do not exceed
$11,090,094 and $13,887,007, respectively.
It is well settled that a presumption of correctness attaches
to respondent's notice of deficiency. See Helvering v. Taylor, 293
U.S. 507, 515 (1935); Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11-12 (9th
- 27 -
Cir. 1959). Petitioner has the burden of showing that respondent's
valuation determinations as set forth in the notice of deficiency
are incorrect. See, e.g., Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 142 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998). "This burden is
a burden of persuasion; it requires * * * [petitioner] to show the
merits of [its] claim by at least a preponderance of the evidence."
Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1972-133; Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38,
51 (1987). In addition to initially overcoming the "procedural
burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of
the Commissioner, the taxpayer must still carry his ultimate burden
of proof or persuasion." Rockwell v. Commissioner, supra at 885.
Here, we find, and thus hold, that petitioner has produced
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness
attached to respondent's notice of deficiency valuation
determinations.4 However, this does not mean that we subscribe to
petitioner's reported valuations, for as will be further explained,
we do not.
Petitioner frames the ultimate valuation issue to be resolved
as "What was the fair market value of the Decedent's 2.8% minority
equity interest in Simplot as of June 24, 1993, represented by the
4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
"When the Commissioner's determination has been shown to be
invalid, the Tax Court must redetermine the deficiency. The
presumption as to the correctness of the Commissioner's
determination is then out of the case." Cohen v. Commissioner,
266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959), remanding T.C. Memo. 1957-172
(fn. ref. omitted).
- 28 -
Decedent's 18 minority Class A voting shares and 3,942.048 minority
Class B nonvoting shares?". We disagree with this framing of the
ultimate valuation issue before us. The valuation of a single
class of stock in J.R. Simplot Co. is not before us. Rather, we
must determine the value of decedent's interest in two distinct
classes of stock: Class A voting stock and class B nonvoting stock
of J.R. Simplot Co. The class A voting stock represents a
significant percentage (23.55 percent) of the total outstanding
voting stock of the Company. Although decedent's class A voting
stock represents a minority interest, it is sizable nonetheless,
and except for Scott's 29.35-percent interest in the voting stock
of J.R. Simplot Co., there is no other block of voting stock larger
than that of decedent. The class A voting stock should not, in our
opinion, be combined and valued with the class B nonvoting stock.
Petitioner further asserts that the fair market values of the
J.R. Simplot Co. class A voting and class B nonvoting stock are
identical--$2,964.10 per share. According to petitioner, because
decedent's class A voting shares do not represent voting control,
they are effectively equivalent to class B nonvoting shares and are
entitled to no or only a negligible premium for voting. In
petitioner's view, noncontrol voting and nonvoting shares are
"functionally equivalent" because no economic benefits were
available to class A vis-a-vis class B shareholders, and there was
no reasonable expectation that disproportionate economic benefits
would be available to the class A shareholders in the foreseeable
future. Indeed, petitioner's experts opined that the 360-day
- 29 -
restriction placed on the transferability of the class A voting
shares, as contrasted to the nonrestricted transferability of the
class B nonvoting stock, plus the liquidation preferences provided
to the class B nonvoting stock, made the class B nonvoting stock as
valuable as or more valuable than the class A voting stock.
On the other hand, respondent contends that a voting privilege
premium should be given to the class A stock and that because of
the disparate ratio (or skewed distribution) between the number of
shares of voting stock outstanding and the number of shares of
nonvoting stock outstanding (1 to 1,848), the premium should be
expressed as a percentage of (or in relation to) the equity value
of J.R. Simplot Co.5 For the reasons that follow, we agree with
respondent.
The applicable statutory law, section 2031(a), requires the
"gross estate" of decedent to be determined for Federal estate tax
purposes "by including * * * the value at the time of his death of
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever
situated." The standard for valuation is fair market value, which
5
As used by the experts, the term "equity value" means
J.R. Simplot Co's. enterprise value plus cash minus debt. In
determining J.R. Simplot Co.'s enterprise value, the experts
first valued the Company, exclusive of its Micron Technology
investment, using both an income and a market approach. The
value of the Company's Micron Technology investment was then
determined and added to the average of the values determined for
the Company under the income and market approaches.
We are mindful that this meaning of the term "equity value"
differs from that as used by accountants (namely, assets minus
liabilities of the Company). Herein, we use the experts'
meaning, rather than the accountant's meaning, of the term
"equity value".
- 30 -
is defined as "the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts." United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546, 550 (1973); Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625, 633 (2d
Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-478; sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate
Tax Regs. The standard is objective, using a purely hypothetical
willing buyer and willing seller, each of whom would seek to
maximize his or her profit from any transaction involving the
property. See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483, 486
(11th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-595; Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251-1252 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright
v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1981). The
hypothetical persons are not specific individuals or entities, and
their characteristics are not necessarily the same as the personal
characteristics of the actual seller or a particular buyer. See
Propstra v. United States, supra; Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 218 (1990); Kolom v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 235, 244 (1978), affd. 644 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1981).
However, the hypothetical sale should not be constructed in a
vacuum isolated from the actual facts that affect value. See
Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 956 (1982).
Valuation of property for tax purposes is a question of fact;
all facts and circumstances are to be examined on the date of
valuation without regard to hindsight. See, e.g., Hamm v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo.
- 31 -
1961-347; Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412, 423-424
(1993); Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217; sec.
20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs. However, future events that were
reasonably foreseeable at the valuation date may be considered in
determining fair market value. See Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, supra at 218; Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner,
supra at 52; Gray v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 672, 682 (1925); Estate
of Livermore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-503. The Court has
broad discretion to determine which facts are most important in
reaching a determination because "finding market value is, after
all, something for judgment, experience, and reason on the part of
the trier, and does not lend itself to dissection and separate
evaluation." Colonial Fabrics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 105,
107 (2d Cir. 1953), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court.
Determining fair market value of unlisted stock (such as J.R.
Simplot Co. stock) is, to say the least, difficult. Citing Alvary
v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1962), petitioner
admitted on brief that there is some "inherent inexactness of the
concept of fair market value". Here, our task is exacerbated as a
consequence of the skewed ratio of outstanding voting shares
(76.445) to nonvoting shares (141,288.584) in J.R. Simplot Co.'s
capital structure.
An actual arm's-length sale of unlisted stock in the normal
course of business within a reasonable time before or after the
valuation date is the best evidence of fair market value. See
Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, supra at 940; Estate of Campbell
- 32 -
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-615; sec. 20.2031-2(b), Estate Tax
Regs. In the absence of such an arm's-length sale, in valuing
unlisted stock we often look to the value of publicly traded stock
of corporations engaged in similar lines of business. See sec.
2031(b); Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 336 (1989).
Factors relevant in valuing stock in closely held corporations
include:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the
enterprise from its inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition
and outlook of the specific industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial
condition of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity [of the company].
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other
intangible value.
(g) * * * the size of the block of stock to be valued.
[and]
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged
in the same or similar line of business having their
stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either
on an exchange or over-the-counter.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-239; see also sec. 20.2031-
2(f)(2), Estate Tax Regs.
This revenue ruling "has been widely accepted as setting forth
the appropriate criteria to consider in determining fair market
value". Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217.
Nevertheless, these factors cannot be applied with mathematical
precision. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, supra, 1959-1 C.B. at 238. As the
- 33 -
trier of fact, we have broad discretion in assigning the weight to
accord to the various factors and in selecting the method of
valuation. Estate of O'Connell v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 249, 251-
252 (9th Cir. 1981), affg. on this issue and revg. in part T.C.
Memo. 1978-191. In reaching our ultimate valuation conclusions, we
have considered and given the weight we deem appropriate to these
factors.
In valuing stock in closely held corporations, discounts are
usually warranted. A discount for lack of marketability may apply
to minority interests in closely held corporations because a ready
market for shares in the corporations does not exist. See, e.g.,
Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Jameson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-43; Estate of Furman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-157; Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-
255, affd. without published opinion 91 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 1996);
Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-736; Estate of
Andrews v. Commissioner, supra at 953.
In several instances, courts have held that hypothetical
buyers will pay a premium for shares with voting privileges or
conversely apply a discount for nonvoting stock. See Barnes v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-413 (a 3.66-percent discount was
applied for nonvoting stock); Kosman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-112 (a 4-percent discount was applied for nonvoting stock);
Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-231 (voting
shares accorded a 10-percent premium); Wallace v. United States,
566 F. Supp. 904, 917 (D. Mass. 1981) (voting shares accorded a 5-
- 34 -
percent premium). In Wallace, a premium for voting shares was
calculated as a percentage of total equity value, rather than as a
percentage of nonvoting shares. Further, courts have found wide
disparities in value between voting and nonvoting shares, even
where the economic rights to dividends and liquidation proceeds do
not favor the voting shareholders. See Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. at 248-249 (each voting share worth
approximately $350,000 more per share than a nonvoting share even
though voting shareholders had no economic advantage in dividends
or liquidation).
Both parties relied upon experts' valuations in order to
demonstrate the correct value of the stock at issue. The
difference in amounts arrived at by the experts is extreme.
At times expert testimony aids the Court in determining
valuation; in other instances, it does not. See Laureys v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 101, 129 (1989). We weigh the testimony in
light of the expert's qualifications as well as other credible
evidence. See Estate of Christ v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171, 174
(9th Cir. 1973), affg. 54 T.C. 493 (1970). We have broad
discretion to evaluate "'the overall cogency of each expert's
analysis'". Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 333 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Ebben v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir.
1986), affg. in part and revg. in part on another issue T.C. Memo.
1983-200), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1986-318. We
are not bound by the formulas and opinions offered by an expert,
especially when they are contrary to our judgment. See Estate of
- 35 -
Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217; Chiu v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 722, 734 (1985). Instead, we may reach a decision as to the
value of the property based on our own analysis of all the evidence
in the record, see Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d
Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285; Hamm v. Commissioner, 325
F.2d at 941, using all of one party's expert opinion, see Buffalo
Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452
(1980), or selectively using any portion of such an opinion, see
Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 562 (1986). We have broad
discretion in selecting valuation methods, see Estate of O'Connell
v. Commissioner, supra at 251, and in ascertaining the weight to be
given the facts in reaching our conclusion because "finding market
value is, after all, something for judgment, experience, and
reason", Colonial Fabrics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d at 107.
Finally, because valuation necessarily results in an approximation,
the figure at which we arrive need not be one as to which there is
specific testimony if it is within the range of values that may
properly be arrived at from consideration of all the evidence. See
Silverman v. Commissioner, supra at 933.
A. Valuations of Petitioner's Experts
1. Paul J. Much
Petitioner's first expert, Paul J. Much, is senior managing
director of Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, an investment banking
firm. He valued both the class A voting shares and class B
nonvoting shares at $2,964.10 per share on a nonmarketable
minority-interest basis as of the valuation date.
- 36 -
In his expert witness report, Mr. Much stated that the
valuation of decedent's holdings in J.R. Simplot Co. on a per-share
basis requires an initial determination of the enterprise and net
equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. In this regard, he considered the
value of J.R. Simplot Co.'s business operations and the value of
its nonoperating assets (its 13.36-percent ownership in Micron
Technology), as well as whether any difference exists, on a per-
share basis, between the class A voting and class B nonvoting
shares.
In determining a value for J.R. Simplot Co., Mr. Much examined
the following factors: The Company's history, economic growth,
financial condition, and earning capacity; the amount (if any) of
dividends paid; the value of the Company's tangible and intangible
assets; prior sales of the Company's stock to similar companies;
and restrictions placed on the stock of the Company. He considered
both historical and projected earnings of J.R. Simplot Co.'s
operating divisions, using a market capitalization approach (which
applies market-related pricing ratios of comparable publicly traded
companies to the performance measures of each of the Company's
operating divisions) and by doing so arrived at an enterprise value
for J.R. Simplot Co. of $1,066,740,000. He also used a discounted
cash-flow approach (DCF) (which estimates the present value of the
projected future operating cash-flows generated from the business
of the Company) and by doing so arrived at an $1,079,900,000
enterprise value. (In arriving at J.R. Simplot Co.'s enterprise
value through the use of both these approaches, Mr. Much gave no
- 37 -
consideration to the Company's liabilities, cash, and nonoperating
assets (i.e., the Micron Technology stock).) Mr. Much then
averaged the values obtained under these two approaches and
concluded that the appropriate enterprise value for J.R. Simplot
Co. as of the valuation date was $1,073,320,000.
In using the market capitalization approach, Mr. Much examined
seven comparable public companies6 and concluded that J.R. Simplot
Co.'s "Food Division" (consisting of FPG, AG, and DPG) is similar
to the comparable companies in terms of revenues, total assets,
activity, and liquidity. However, he concluded that the Food
Division was less profitable than the comparable companies and was
highly dependent upon McDonald's for a large portion of its annual
revenue, presenting a risk to which the comparable companies were
not exposed. Applying the total invested capital (TIC) multiples
(including earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)),
Mr. Much determined the TIC value of J.R. Simplot Co.'s Food
Division to be $492,470,000.
Mr. Much performed a similar analysis with regard to J.R.
Simplot Co.'s Fertilizer Division (consisting of MCG), selecting
four public companies for comparison purposes (IMC Global, Inc.,
Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., Terra Industries, Inc., and
Vigoro Corp.). After comparing the quantitative factors of the
6
Mr. Much selected the following companies for
comparison purposes: ConAgra, Inc., Dean Foods Co., Flowers
Industries, Inc., Hormel Foods Corp., International Multifoods
Corp., Tyson Foods, Inc., and Universal Foods Corp.
- 38 -
Fertilizer Division with those of the four comparable companies,
Mr. Much concluded that, taken as a whole, the Fertilizer Division
operations "represent a similar investment risk, for a given
return", as the public fertilizer comparables as a group. Applying
his TIC/EBIT and TIC/EBITDA multiples, he determined the TIC value
of J.R. Simplot Co.'s Fertilizer Division as $574,270,000 (using a
market capitalization approach).
Following his comparative companies analysis, Mr. Much turned
to a DCF analysis to value J.R. Simplot Co.: (1) Determination of
the appropriate cash-flows to discount, based upon J.R. Simplot
Co.'s projected income statements and balance sheets; (2) selection
of a discount rate for J.R. Simplot Co. projections, based upon an
analysis of alternative investments (including public company
discount rates); (3) determination of a terminal value for J.R.
Simplot Co., as of the end of the last period for which projections
were available; and (4) determination of TIC value for J.R. Simplot
Co.
In determining the free cash-flows, Mr. Much concluded that
J.R. Simplot Co. had a revenue growth rate of 8.5 percent and an
EBIT margin of 4.5 percent based on historical performance. He
then applied a 10- to 12-percent discount rate, concluding that the
TIC value of the Food Division was between $481,100,000 and
$575,880,000, or $522,780,000 using an 11-percent discount rate.
In a similar manner, Mr. Much determined a 7.5- to 9.5-percent
discount rate with regard to the Fertilizer Division. He concluded
that using the discounted cash-flow approach, the TIC value of the
- 39 -
Fertilizer Division was between $493,590,000 and $648,610,000, or
$557,120,000 using an 8.5-percent discount rate.7
Next, Mr. Much valued J.R. Simplot Co.'s investment in Micron
Technology, a nonoperating asset. Considering that J.R. Simplot
Co. is an "affiliate" of Micron Technology under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933 (rendering any sale of J.R. Simplot Co.'s
Micron Technology shares subject to certain restrictions under
Securities and Exchange Commission rule 144),8 Mr. Much concluded
that a year (based on approximately 250 trading days per year) or
more would be required for J.R. Simplot Co. to sell its Micron
Technology shares through normal market channels, assuming that the
shares are sold on each available day (subject to Micron
7
The following summarizes Mr. Much's TIC conclusions
regarding the Food and Fertilizer Divisions (before considering
the value of nonoperating assets and liabilities):
Market Capitalization Method
Food Division $492,470,000
Fertilizer Division 574,270,000
J.R. Simplot Co. Consolidated 1,066,740,000
Discounted Cash Flow Method
Food Division $522,780,000
Fertilizer Division 557,120,000
J.R. Simplot Co. Consolidated 1,079,900,000
8
As of June 24, 1993, John R. Simplot, Don J. Simplot,
and Gordon C. Smith, all J.R. Simplot Co. officers, were also
members of Micron Technology's board of directors, and J.R.
Simplot Co. owned more than 10 percent of Micron Technology's
common stock.
- 40 -
Technology's "blackout" policy9) and that the sale of stock
constitutes 15 to 25 percent of daily trading volume.
Mr. Much also considered "blockage" (referring to the market's
ability to absorb an individual block of stock without an adverse
impact on the market price), analyzing block trades between June
27, 1989, and April 16, 1993, the length of the holding period,
blackout restrictions, and the relative size of the block; he
concluded that a 5-percent blockage discount was appropriate.
Moreover, he took into account the transaction costs (estimated to
be $500,000) necessary to sell the block of shares. Mr. Much
concluded that gross proceeds to J.R. Simplot Co. would approximate
$173.7 million. As an alternative means of realizing value, Mr.
Much considered selling the Micron Technology stock via a secondary
stock offering. Using this means of selling the stock, Mr. Much
determined that J.R. Simplot Co. would realize $176.4 million. Mr.
Much then considered income taxes payable as a result of J.R.
Simplot Co.'s selling its Micron Technology holding. Using the
estimated $176.4 million sale proceeds (via a secondary stock
offering), and after considering corporate income taxes (40
percent) on the gain, Mr. Much determined the maximum amount of net
proceeds J.R. Simplot Co. would realize from the sale of its Micron
Technology stock was $111,193,870.
9
Micron Technology maintained a trading "blackout"
policy that prohibited insider transactions in the stock for a
period from 30 days before the end of each quarter until after
each quarterly earnings announcement (which typically occurred
approximately 2-3 weeks following the end of every quarter).
- 41 -
Inasmuch as Mr. Much valued decedent's J.R. Simplot Co. shares
on a marketable, minority-interest basis, he believed the same
basis should be applicable to the valuation of the Company's
Micron Technology holding. Accordingly, Mr. Much applied a 6-
percent net minority discount10 to the maximum amount of net
proceeds J.R. Simplot Co. would receive ($111,193,870), which
resulted in an equivalent marketable minority interest value of
$104,522,238 for the Micron Technology shares.
In sum, Mr. Much averaged the results he determined under the
market capitalization ($1,066,740,000) and discounted cash-flow
($1,079,900,000) methods, arriving at $1,073,320,000. He then
added his predetermined value of the Micron Technology shares
($104,522,238) and J.R. Simplot Co.'s cash balance as of May 31,
1993 ($31,232,000), yielding an adjusted TIC value of
$1,209,070,000 (rounded). He then subtracted interest-bearing debt
($564,418,000), which yielded a marketable minority equity value of
$644,650,000 (rounded), or $4,560.18 per share of class A voting
and class B nonvoting stock outstanding.11 (In making the
10
Mr. Much applied this discount because, in his view, a
minority shareholder of J.R. Simplot Co. could not force the sale
of the Micron Technology shares.
11
Mr. Much calculated the $644,650,000 marketable
minority equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. as follows:
Total invested capital
(J.R. Simplot operations) $1,073,320,000
Value of Micron Technology
shares 104,522,238
(continued...)
- 42 -
adjustments for long-term debt and cash, Mr. Much believed that
under the discounted cash-flow method, all interest-bearing debt
must be taken into account, and the inclusion of cash provides an
adjustment to reflect the seasonal nature of the Company's
operations.)
Next, Mr. Much turned his attention to the relative voting
premium, if any, to be accorded the 18 class A voting shares vis-a-
vis the value of the 3,942.048 class B nonvoting shares, using the
following factors: (1) The potential for economic benefits (if
any) which might be attributable to class A shareholders and not to
class B shareholders; (2) market-based evidence of the allocation
of sale proceeds between dual class voting and nonvoting shares of
public companies involved in a sale or takeover; and (3) market-
based evidence of daily trading market data for public companies
with dual classes of voting and nonvoting shares.
In ascertaining the potential economic benefits attributable
to the class A voting shares, Mr. Much reviewed the compensation
11
(...continued)
Cash balance (May 31, 1993) 31,232,000
Adjusted total invested
capital (rounded) 1,209,070,000
Interest bearing debt (564,418,000)
Equity value of J.R.
Simplot Co. (rounded) 644,650,000
- 43 -
and prerequisites received by the class A voting shareholders12 and
examined J.R. Simplot Co.'s policy of not paying dividends and the
absence of any foreseeable sale or liquidation of, or public
offering by, J.R. Simplot Co.
Mr. Much first studied 14 transactions involving the
sale/merger/acquisition of publicly traded companies listed on the
stock exchange involving dual class securities. These transactions
involved a pro rata allocation of the sale proceeds (based upon
equal prices paid to both the voting and nonvoting shares). (Mr.
Much noted that in a hypothetical sale of J.R. Simplot Co.'s assets
or a liquidation of the Company, the maximum value a class A
shareholder would receive would be based on a pro rata share
allocation with the other class A and class B shareholders.)
Second, Mr. Much reviewed daily trading market data of public
companies with dual classes of voting and nonvoting shares,
determining that the relative proportion of the equity represented
12
The following is a review of the compensation and
perquisites of J. R. Simplot Co.'s class A voting shareholders:
Name Class A Shares 1991 1992 1993
Gordon C. Smith --- $562,721 $769,890 $722,005
J.R. Simplot --- 314,780 314,519 314,311
Don 18 246,385 314,628 235,972
Decedent 18 222,730 200,801 79,785
Scott 22.445 122,301 17,140 ---
Gay 18 --- --- ---
According to Mr. Much, an independent third-party purchaser
of decedent's 18 class A voting shares on a stand-alone basis
would lack the power of control. Thus, the purchaser would look
to other economic benefits in making an investment decision.
- 44 -
by voting and nonvoting stock is essentially irrelevant to any
difference in value between those shares.13
Mr. Much concluded that no difference existed in the per-share
value (i.e., voting rights premium) between J.R. Simplot Co.'s
class A voting and class B nonvoting shares primarily because the
class A shareholder could not extract economic benefits. Mr. Much
believed that even if a difference existed, it was negligible.
However, he testified that, on the basis of the available data, and
everything being equal, he would not "quibble" with valuing
decedent's class A voting shares at approximately 5 percent more
than decedent's class B nonvoting shares. In his opinion, this
premium would not be based on economics but rather on a "feel good"
basis for having the right to vote. Nevertheless, Mr. Much opined
that any premium for the feel-good right to vote would be offset by
the liquidation preference in favor of the class B nonvoting shares
and the right of first refusal encumbering the class A voting
shares.
Finally, Mr. Much determined that the discount for lack of
marketability of the stock would range from 10 to 40 percent of his
determined marketable minority value. After reviewing several
restricted stock studies, and giving consideration to the 360-day
restriction placed on the class A voting stock, Mr. Much concluded
that a 35-percent discount for lack of marketability was
13
In analyzing the 14 transactions discussed above, Mr.
Much determined that the ratio of outstanding voting shares to
total shares outstanding ranges from 9.8 percent to 92 percent
and is not correlated with a voting premium.
- 45 -
appropriate for both the class A voting and class B nonvoting
shares.
After applying this 35-percent lack of marketability discount
(to the $4,560.18 per-share value), Mr. Much concluded that as of
the valuation date, the fair market value of both the 18 class A
voting shares and 3,942.048 class B nonvoting shares of J.R.
Simplot Co., on a nonmarketable, minority-interest basis, was
$2,964.10 per share (based on a combined 141,365.029 shares of J.R.
Simplot Co.'s common stock issued and outstanding).
2. John R. Ettelson
Petitioner's second expert, John R. Ettelson, is a senior
banker in the corporate finance department of William Blair & Co.,
L.L.C., an investment banking and securities brokerage firm. Mr.
Ettelson was requested to render an opinion as to the voting rights
premium, if any, to be assigned to decedent's 18 class A voting
shares vis-a-vis decedent's 3,942.048 class B nonvoting shares. He
was not requested to render an opinion as to the per-share value of
the class A or class B stock as of decedent's death. In performing
his assignment, he focused on those public corporation having a
substantial value with the per-share price of their stock being
high (rather than low), working under the assumption that the
equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. on the valuation date was in
excess of $600 million and the value of its shares in excess of
$3,000 per share.
Mr. Ettelson began his analysis by considering the mindset and
objectives of a hypothetical buyer of decedent's 18 class A voting
- 46 -
shares. He stated that such a buyer would expect his investment in
J.R. Simplot Co. to provide an economic return14 over time.
Mr. Ettelson concluded that a buyer would not pay a
significant premium for decedent's class A voting shares vis-a-vis
decedent's class B nonvoting shares because the voting rights
acquired with the class A shares could not influence the buyer's
economic return. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ettelson
believed that because the controlling voting power of J.R. Simplot
Co. was held by only three individuals (other than decedent), all
of whom were related and had family interests to protect, a
hypothetical "outside" investor would have difficulty changing the
Simplot family's philosophy with regard to dividends, salaries, and
other perquisites. He further believed that an outside investor
would have difficulty in building a majority position (from the
investor's 23.55-percent minority interest) due to the fairly even
distribution of the class A voting stock among the three family
members and their desire to maintain control of the Company within
the family group.
Mr. Ettelson examined empirical market data, reviewing
approximately 40 public company dual class stock situations where
14
According to Mr. Ettelson, a buyer's economic return
consists of the future stream of dividends or other forms of cash
benefits such as salary, expense reimbursements, or other
perquisites that the buyer could reasonably expect to receive
from his ownership of the 18 class A voting and 3,942.048 class B
nonvoting shares, as well as any "exit dividend" (the amount
received when the buyer sells or liquidates his shares
individually or through the sale or liquidation of the business).
- 47 -
market capitalizations exceeded $75 million. He found that in
situations where both classes of stock traded publicly between
January 1990 and June 24, 1993, and where only one class held the
voting power and no dividend rights or other economic disparity
existed, the class with the voting power traded at an average 4.1-
percent premium over the per-share value of the nonvoting stock,
with a maximum price difference of 14.2 percent. According to Mr.
Ettelson, on June 24, 1993, the sample group of voting stock traded
at an average of 1.7 percent over the per-share value of the
nonvoting stock, with a maximum price difference of 10.3 percent.
Mr. Ettelson also studied publicly traded companies from June
24, 1993 to 1998, where only one class held the voting power and no
economic disparity in favor of the voting shares existed. The
average voting rights premium in such cases was 2.8 percent. In
examining studies by others, he noted that the shares of stock
having voting or greater voting rights traded at a premium of 5.4
percent to 9.2 percent relative to nonvoting shares.
Mr. Ettelson opined that no material economic benefit or
advantage existed to owning the 18 class A voting shares. Thus, he
stated he would not advise a hypothetical buyer to pay a
significant voting rights premium for decedent's class A stock in
excess of what he observed in the public markets (i.e., a typical
range of 3 to 7 percent, and occasionally up to 20 percent over the
fair market value of a nonvoting share).
- 48 -
B. Valuations of Respondent's Experts
1. Herbert T. Spiro
Respondent's first expert, Herbert T. Spiro, has been
president of American Valuation Group, Inc., a consulting firm
specializing in economic analyses and financial valuations, since
1985, as well as a professor of finance at California State
University at Northridge. In his expert report submitted for
trial, Dr. Spiro concluded that as of the valuation date, the fair
market value per share of J.R. Simplot Co.'s class A voting stock
was $616,116.36, and the value per share of J.R. Simplot Co.'s
class B nonvoting stock was $3,522.79 (resulting in the value of 18
shares of class A voting stock at $11,090,094 and 3,942.048 shares
of class B nonvoting stock at $13,887,007).
Dr. Spiro's approach in determining an equity value for J.R.
Simplot Co. was generally similar to that of Mr. Much. First, he
valued J.R. Simplot Co. exclusive of its Micron Technology
investment and then added the value of the Micron Technology
investment to determine the total equity value of J.R. Simplot Co.
In determining the value of J.R. Simplot Co. exclusive of its
Micron Technology holding, Dr. Spiro (in a manner similar to that
of Mr. Much) used both the income and market approaches15 and then
15
According to Dr. Spiro, the income approach is based on
the premise that a rational buyer of an asset would pay only the
equivalent of the present value of the net cash stream realized
from the asset. Future cash inflows and outflows are projected
in this analysis and then discounted to the present to yield a
value. The market approach presumes that the most an investor
will pay for an asset is the price other investors are currently
(continued...)
- 49 -
reconciled the resulting values. Dr. Spiro used discounted free
cash-flow projections16 to determine the value of J.R. Simplot Co.
(exclusive of its Micron Technology holdings) under the income
15
(...continued)
paying for identical assets.
16
Dr. Spiro defined "free cash flow" as the amount of
cash that could be drawn out of the business without impairing
operations, and represents the maximum amount of money available
to long-term debt and equity holders. Under this valuation
method, a calculation is made as to the level of sustainable
cash-flow the business can be expected to generate in the future.
- 50 -
approach, determini ng a $720,926,00017 aggregate equity value for
J.R. Simplot Co. on the valuation date.
17
Dr. Spiro's calculations (in millions) were as follows:
(We note that mathematically his calculations are slightly off.)
8/31/94 8/31/95 8/31/96 8/31/97 8/31/98
Net income $59,900 $70,033 $80,908 $92,329 $96,133
Cash-flow
adjustments:
(+)depreciation 75,097 81,104 86,782 91,989 96,588
(-)Capital
Expenditures (96,278) (103,980) (111,259) (117,934) (123,831)
(-)Working
capital
additions (20,669) (20,026) (18,924) (17,356) (15,331)
Free cash-flow 18,051 27,131 37,506 49,027 53,559
Discount rate 10.20%
Present value
factor 0.9526 0.8644 0.7844 0.7118 0.6459
Present value
of cash-flow 17,195 23,453 29,421 34,899 34,595
Total present
value of cash-
flows 139,563
Present value
of reversion 956,900 Reversion cash-flow: $80,8021
Business
enterprise
value 1,096,462
Less total
long-term
debt as of
5/31/93 375,536
Aggregate equity
value-liquid
minority
basis 720,926
1
Dr. Spiro explained that the discounted cash-flow model projects
cash-flows independently for 5 years. However, the business is expected to
generate cash-flows after the 5th year of the forecast. The present value of
the cash-flows that the business is expected to generate after the 5th year
or, equivalently, the present value of the reversion, is calculated using the
Gordon Model formula (or Dividend Discount Model).
- 51 -
Then, Dr. Spiro used a market valuation approach, focusing on
three food companies (ConAgra, H.J. Heinz, and Universal Foods) and
one fertilizer company (Vigoro), with size and business operations
comparable to J.R. Simplot Co.'s two primary divisions. He
compared relevant ratios (price-to-revenue; price-to-cash-flow;
price-to-EBIT; price-to-EBDIT) and data for J.R. Simplot Co. and
the chosen comparable companies as of their most recent fiscal year
or 12-month period,18 concluding: (1) J.R. Simplot Co. was smaller
than the average of the four comparable companies in revenue; (2)
the average comparable company used less debt in its capital
structure than J.R. Simplot Co., and J.R. Simplot Co.'s debt-to-
assets ratio was higher than the average of the comparable
companies; (3) based on revenue and income growth rates, J.R.
Simplot Co. was growing faster than all of the comparable companies
(only H.J. Heinz increased its assets faster, primarily due to
several acquisitions); (4) profitability ratios indicated that J.R.
Simplot Co. and ConAgra were less profitable than the other
18
Because J.R. Simplot Co.'s sales and profitability
figures were unavailable for the 12 months preceding the
valuation date, and the Company's fiscal yearend data was
sufficiently removed from the valuation date to be of limited
direct use, Dr. Spiro used two methods to derive J.R. Simplot
Co.'s revenue, earnings, and performance ratios. The first
method is based on a fiscal 1993 forecast prepared by J.R.
Simplot Co.'s management in May 1993. Certain financial
statistics were not computed for the fiscal 1993 period because
of insufficient support data. Second, Dr. Spiro derived
performance measures for the Company by annualizing operating
data for the 9 months ended May 31, 1993.
- 52 -
comparable companies; and (5) J.R. Simplot Co. was more liquid than
most of the comparable companies.
Dr. Spiro concluded that J.R. Simplot Co. was smaller and less
profitable than the average comparable company but was growing
faster and had slightly greater liquidity than the comparable
companies. (Dr. Spiro believed that J.R. Simplot Co. most closely
resembled ConAgra.19) Dr. Spiro used a weighing process for his
valuation ratio indicators and as a result determined a
$719,809,754 fair market value for J.R. Simplot Co. under the
market approach.
Dr. Spiro then averaged the values he determined for J.R.
Simplot Co. under the market ($719.8 million) and income ($721
million) approaches, arriving at $720 million.20
(According to Dr. Spiro, the value of J.R. Simplot Co. arises
from its resources, which, if properly used, could have yielded a
higher return. Dr. Spiro believed that if the Company had
sufficient equity capital, the Company could potentially be a
giant. Thus, in Dr. Spiro's opinion, J.R. Simplot's balance sheet
is not reflective of the Company's true value. He based his
valuation of the Company using the cash-flow generated but noted
19
According to Dr. Spiro, both companies have substantial
operations in food processing, fertilizers, and crop protection
products, as well as low gross and net margins. In Dr. Spiro's
opinion, because J.R. Simplot Co. is growing faster than ConAgra,
the applicable multiples would be increased.
20
As subsequently discussed, except for a disagreement
about how short-term debt factors into the value, as well as a
minority discount in valuing the Company's Micron Technology
shares, this amount is close to that determined by Mr. Much.
- 53 -
that the Company's cash-flow could have been substantially greater
if the assets of the Company had been better used. Thus, in Dr.
Spiro's opinion, if the hypothetical buyer could maximize the
Company's cash-flows, the aggregate equity value of the Company
would be greater than $720 million.)
The next step of Dr. Spiro's analysis was to determine the
fair market value of J.R. Simplot Co.'s interest in Micron
Technology on a freely traded, minority basis. He multiplied
Micron Technology's share price on June 24, 1993 ($34.63)21 by the
number of shares J.R. Simplot Co. owned (5,259,800) and arrived at
$110,269,092.22 (For purposes of this analysis, Dr. Spiro assumed
that any perceived blockage discount would be offset by the
anticipated premium from a sale of the block.)
Dr. Spiro then added the $110,269,092 valuation of J.R.
Simplot Co.'s Micron Technology holdings to the $720 million fair
market value of J.R. Simplot Co., rendering a total of $830
million23 aggregate equity value (rounded) for J.R. Simplot Co. on
a freely traded, minority-interest basis.
At this point, Dr. Spiro used the $830 million fair market
value to ascertain the value of decedent's class A voting and class
21
This is an average of the high and low prices reported
during trading on June 24, 1993.
22
Dr. Spiro deducted estimated underwriting costs of
3.825 percent and estimated taxes of 40 percent attributable to
the appreciation in value of the Micron Technology shares.
23
In Dr. Spiro's expert witness report, he arrived at a
$900 million aggregate equity value. Subsequently, he revised
this value to $830 million.
- 54 -
B nonvoting stock. In addressing the economic theory underlying
voting rights valuation, Dr. Spiro opined that because decedent's
class A voting stock constitutes only a 23.55-percent voting
interest in J.R. Simplot Co., it does not enable the hypothetical
buyer to exercise all the prerogatives of control. However,
relying on empirical evidence, Dr. Spiro noted that nonmajority
voting blocks of sufficient size are valued at a premium in the
marketplace in excess of the pro rata equity value represented by
those blocks. Moreover, analyzing the available studies, Dr. Spiro
suggested that voting premiums, if measured on a per-share basis
against nonvoting or low-voting shares (a "simple voting premium"),
are affected by the scale factor--generally, a small proportion of
voting stock in a capital structure tends to produce a high per-
share voting premium, pointing to the utility of calculating the
value of the aggregate voting stock as a percentage of total equity
capitalization (the "aggregate voting rights percentage").
Dr. Spiro also analyzed U.S. public markets, noting their
limitations and impediments to the trading of nonvoting stock. In
his view, it is unlikely that a company with a similar capital
structure to J.R. Simplot Co.'s would list its securities on the
U.S. exchanges. Moreover, he believed that a simple voting stock
price premium24 is irrelevant to the valuation of the class A voting
shares because the U.S. dual-capitalization stock price data for
24
Dr. Spiro defines a simple voting stock price premium
as the percentage difference between voting share prices and
nonvoting or inferior-voting share prices.
- 55 -
publicly traded companies would not necessarily be representative
of the value of voting rights inherent in an interest in a closely
held company. Dr. Spiro observed that voting premiums observed in
U.S. stocks tend to be understated.
Dr. Spiro next considered the aggregate value of J.R. Simplot
Co.'s class A voting stock on a 23.55-percent minority block basis.
In reviewing relevant empirical evidence, Dr. Spiro found aggregate
voting rights premiums ranging from 8.58 percent to 23.9 percent of
the equity value of the Company. After evaluating factors which he
deemed relevant (such as the lack of dividend payments, the remote
possibility of liquidation, the nonmajority status of the voting
stock block, the relative distribution of voting rights, the
attractiveness of J.R. Simplot Co. as an acquisition target, the
nature of the family-owned business, and the lack of a foreseeable
takeover offer) Dr. Spiro determined that the appropriate aggregate
voting rights premium applicable to decedent's block of voting
shares was 10 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s "equity capitalization
value" and then apportioned it according to decedent's 23.55-
percent interest.
Thus, calculating the aggregate value of the class A voting
and class B nonvoting stock of J.R. Simplot Co. on a freely traded,
minority-interest basis25 as of June 24, 1993, Dr. Spiro arrived at
a pro rata value of class A voting and class B nonvoting shares of
25
Dr. Spiro did not apply a minority discount to the
value of decedent's class A voting shares because the underlying
equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. was calculated on a freely
traded minority-interest basis.
- 56 -
$5,871.32 per share ($830,000,000/141,365.029 shares), or a
$947,871.32 value per class A voting share.26 (Dr. Spiro noted that
the value per vote he determined is very large because the voting
block rights are allocated among an extremely small number of class
A voting shares; thus, in his view, traditional valuation concepts,
as used by petitioner's experts, are not applicable to the
calculation of voting rights premium in this case.)
26
Dr. Spiro used the following calculation to arrive at
the $947,871.32 value:
Aggregate value of J.R. Simplot Co. -
freely traded, minority-interest basis $830,000,000
Aggregate value of J.R. Simplot Co. -
freely traded, minority interest basis
(excluding Micron Technology interest) 720,000,000
Value of voting rights associated with
23.55 percent interest in class A shares
Pro rata value of 23.55 percent
equity interest 169,560,000
Voting rights premium associated
with 23.55 percent voting block
interest 10%
Value of voting rights associated with
23.55 percent voting interest 16,956,000
Total number of class A shares at issue 18
Additional value per share of voting
rights associated with 23.55 percent
voting block interest 942,000.00
Total class A and class B common shares
outstanding 141,365.029
Pro rata value of class A and class B
shares (ignoring voting rights)
5,871.32
Value per class A share held in 23.55 percent
voting interest 947,871.32
- 57 -
Dr. Spiro then applied a 35-percent lack of marketability
discount to the class A voting stock, thereby reducing the value of
decedent's voting shares to $616,116.36 per share. He applied a
40-percent lack of marketability discount to decedent's class B
nonvoting stock, resulting in a $3,522.79 per-share value. Thus,
Dr. Spiro determined a value of $11,090,094 (rounded) for
decedent's 18 shares of class A voting stock and $13,887,007
(rounded) for decedent's 3,942.048 shares of class B nonvoting
stock as of the valuation date.
2. Gilbert E. Matthews
Respondent's second expert, Gilbert E. Matthews, served as
chairman of Bear, Stearns & Co.'s valuation committee from 1970
through 1995. Presently, he is chairman of the board and a senior
managing director of Sutter Securities, Inc., an investment banking
firm. Mr. Matthews was requested to render an opinion as to the
fair market value of the class A voting and class B nonvoting stock
held by decedent as of June 24, 1993, assuming the equity value of
J.R. Simplot Co. was $830 million.27 He was not retained to render
an opinion as to the equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. as of June
24, 1993.
Mr. Matthews believed:
The unusual capital structure of the Company has a
material impact on the relative value of the Class A and
Class B Shares. The Class A Shares, which have 100% of
27
In his expert report, Mr. Matthews assumed a $900
million equity value, based on Dr. Spiro's original conclusion.
Mr. Matthews subsequently amended his calculations to conform to
Dr. Spiro's amended $830 million.
- 58 -
the votes, were only 0.054% of shares outstanding. As
the Class A Shares collectively have full control of the
Company, they (as a class) are worth a substantial
premium over their pro rata share of enterprise value *
* *
* * * * * * *
In determining the relative value of the Class A
Shares and Class B Shares, it is my opinion that it is
necessary first to value each class of stock in its
entirety, then calculate the undiscounted value per share
of the Class A Shares and Class B Shares, and only then
to apply the discounts for lack of marketability and for
minority interest to the Estate's Class A Shares and
Class B Shares. As the value of voting control held by
the Class A Shares collectively is a function of the
premium over economic value to the class for the voting
power, it is analytically incorrect to calculate the
premium for voting control on a per-share basis rather
than a class basis. (In this case, the premium for the
Class A Shares as a percent of the total value of the
Company would not change materially if the number of
Class A Shares doubled or tripled, but such change
obviously would materially impact the premium per share.)
Mr. Matthews posited that the 18 shares of class A stock at
issue represent a potential swing block. According to Mr.
Matthews, the value of voting control held by the class A voting
shares collectively is a function of the premium over economic
value to the class for the voting power.
Mr. Matthews agreed with Dr. Spiro that studies of publicly
traded high vote shares in U.S. markets were not useful in
determining a premium for shares of J.R. Simplot Co.'s voting stock
because the prices paid in public markets understate the value of
blocks of shares with the potential for control. Moreover, in his
mind, publicly traded stocks possess neither swing vote
characteristics nor the extreme disparities in the numbers of
nonvoting to voting shares present in this case.
- 59 -
In order to arrive at an appropriate voting premium, Mr.
Matthews examined premium data from acquisitions, mergers, and
recapitalizations, observing that the mean aggregate premium
attributable to the "high-vote class" in relation to the "economic
value" of a company was 8 percent, with a median of 5.3 percent.
(Although Mr. Matthews acknowledged that decedent's minority
interest did not represent voting control on the valuation date,
the potential for such a scenario was real and foreseeable.) After
analyzing this data, Mr. Matthews concluded that an appropriate
aggregate premium for J.R. Simplot Co.'s class A voting shares of
6 to 7 percent of the equity value of the Company would be fair.
However, he acknowledged that the premium could be as low as 3
percent28 of the "economic value" of the Company and still be fair.
To determine the value of each share of class A voting stock
(before any discounts), Mr. Matthews calculated the aggregate
premium for all class A voting shares based on J.R. Simplot Co.'s
equity value and divided that amount by the total number of class
A shares outstanding. To determine the value of each share of
class B stock (before any discounts), Mr. Matthews subtracted the
aggregate premium for all class A voting stock from J.R. Simplot
Co.'s equity value and divided that amount by the total number of
class B shares outstanding.
28
Mr. Matthews testified that reasonable minds can differ
as to the premium to be applied to the class A voting shares. In
his opinion, the midpoint of the range of premiums that could be
reasonable was 4 to 5 percent. A 2-percent premium was below his
comfort level.
- 60 -
Mr. Matthews then ascertained the appropriate discounts.
Considering both potential swing vote characteristics and the risks
associated with decedent's 23.55-percent block of voting shares,
he determined that a 15-percent discount should be applied for
minority interest and lack of marketability. However, because the
right of first refusal materially adversely affected the value of
decedent's class A voting shares, Mr. Matthews determined that an
additional discount of 35 to 40 percent was appropriate. Applying
these discounts cumulatively Mr. Matthews arrived at a combined
range of 45 to 49 percent for the class A voting shares.
With regard to the class B nonvoting stock, Mr. Matthews
determined a 35-percent discount for lack of marketability. In
reaching this conclusion, he considered J.R. Simplot Co.'s size,
the industries in which it participated, and the fact that the
shares were not publicly traded. (Mr. Matthews observed that to
the extent J.R. Simplot Co.'s valuation is based on the market
prices of shares of publicly traded comparable companies, the
discount for minority interest would be implicitly subsumed in the
valuation because publicly traded shares are minority interests.)
The following chart summarizes Mr. Matthews' analysis and
determinations (using a 6-percent voting rights premium of the
equity value of J.R. Simplot Co.):
- 61 -
Class A Value at 6% Premium
Equity value of Simplot (Q) $830,000,000.00
Premium for class A voting shares 6%
Aggregate premium for class A shares (P) 49,800,000.00
Number of class A shares (A) 76.445
Number of class B shares (B) 141,288.584
Total number of shares (T) 141,365.029
Economic value per share (E) = Q/T 5,871.32
Class A premium per share = P/A 651,448.75
1
Value per class A share before discounts 657,320.08
Discounts for minority, lack of
marketability, and right of first
refusal (class A)
(1 - 0.15) x (1 - 0.35) = .5525 = 45% (rounded) discount
(1 - 0.15) x (1 - 0.40) = .51 = 49% discount
Per share value of decedent's class A shares:
After 45% discount 361,526.04
After 49% discount 335,233.24
Total value (rounded) of decedent's 18 class A
shares:
After 45% discount 6,507,469
After 49% discount 6,034,198
1
We note that mathematically Mr. Matthews' calculation is off by 1 cent.
Class B Value Using 6% Class A Premium
Economic value per share (E) = Q/T $5,871.32
Economic value of all class B shares (V) =
E x B 829,551,166.60
Less: Aggregate premium for class A shares (P) (49,800,000.00)
Net value of all class B shares = V - P 779,751,166.60
Value per class B share before discounts =
(V - P)/B 5,518.85
Discount for lack of marketability (class B) = 35%
Per share value of decedent's class B shares
after 35% discount 3,587.26
Total value (rounded) of decedent's 3,942.048
class B shares after 35% discount 14,141,134
- 62 -
C. Court's Analysis and Conclusions
The respective valuation methodologies adopted by the parties'
experts produced vastly different results. Petitioner's experts
used a simple, traditional methodology to value an unusual
corporate capital structure, which resulted in little or no premium
for voting rights. On the other hand, respondent's experts used a
valuation methodology which, given the Simplot family's philosophy,
appears to accord the class A stock an extraordinarily high premium
for its voting privileges.
Not unexpectedly, petitioner's experts found fault with the
analyses and conclusions of respondent's experts and vice versa.
We agree that each of the experts' analyses and conclusions is
subject, to an extent, to valid criticism. Specifically, we
believe, among other things, the situations involved in the data
and studies relied upon by both sets of experts to be so different
from the situation involved herein that such data and studies are
inapplicable to the case at hand.
The differing views of the experts as to the proper
methodology to be used in valuing decedent's class A voting shares
vis-a-vis his class B nonvoting shares illustrate the difficulty in
valuing shares of unlisted stock in a large, family-controlled
corporation. Moreover, those differing views give credence to the
belief that valuation is at best an inexact science.
The aforesaid notwithstanding, in fulfilling our task, we deem
it proper to value decedent's shares of class A voting and class B
nonvoting stock in J.R. Simplot Co. using one of the expert's
- 63 -
valuation methodologies. Therefore, as explained in more detail
infra, giving consideration to all the facts and circumstances
presented in this case (in particular, the ratio of the number of
outstanding shares of voting stock to that of the nonvoting shares,
1 to 1,848), and having dissected, analyzed, and evaluated the
reports as well as the testimony of all the experts, we find the
valuation methodology of respondent's experts (that is, a premium
should be accorded to the voting privileges of the class A stock
and the collective premium for those privileges should be expressed
in terms of a percentage of the equity value of J.R. Simplot Co.)
more persuasive than the valuation methodology of petitioner's
experts (that is, the premium, if any, to be accorded to the voting
privileges should be expressed in terms of a percentage of the
value of the class B nonvoting stock). Consequently, we adopt
respondent's experts' valuation methodology, with modifications, in
determining the fair market value of decedent's 18 shares of class
A voting stock and 3,942.048 shares of class B nonvoting stock of
J.R. Simplot Co. as of the valuation date.
We wish to stress at the outset that we are not valuing the
premium for controlling voting power, but rather the premium for
voting rights. The premium for controlling voting power would be
substantially greater than the premium we determine for voting
rights.
Having selected respondent's experts' valuation methodology,
we must now determine (1) the equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. as
of the valuation date, and (2) the appropriate collective voting
- 64 -
premium (expressed as a percentage of the equity value of J.R.
Simplot Co.) to be accorded the class A voting stock.
In determining the proper equity value of J.R. Simplot Co.,
Mr. Much and Dr. Spiro used similar approaches. They began by
valuing J.R. Simplot Co. exclusive of its Micron Technology holding
and later added the value of the Micron Technology holding. In
determining the equity value of J.R. Simplot exclusive of its
Micron Technology holding, both used the income and market
approaches and averaged the two values obtained. Excluding the
investment for Micron Technology and the reduction for short-term
debt, the values that Mr. Much and Dr. Spiro determined are not
materially different. These values can be summarized as follows:
Income Approach Market Approach
Mr. Much
Total Invested Capital $1,079,900,000 $1,066,740,000
Plus Cash 31,232,000 31,232,000
1,111,132,000 1,097,972,000
Less: Long-term debt (375,536,000) (375,536,000)
Net value 735,596,000 722,436,000
Dr. Spiro
Net value 720,926,000 719,809,000
As is discernible from this chart, under the income approach
the values are within 2 percent of each other, and under the market
approach the difference is less than 1 percent. Dr. Spiro's
average of the two values is $720,000,000 (rounded), which is
approximately 1 percent less than Mr. Much's average value of
$729,016,000.
The nominal disparity in their respective equity values arises
from adjustments Mr. Much made for the Company's short-term debt
($188,882,000) and for a 6-percent minority discount in valuing the
- 65 -
Company's Micron Technology holding. Mr. Much valued J.R. Simplot
Co. by reviewing financial statements for the 5 fiscal years ended
August 1988 through 1992, and for the 9-month period ended May
1993. The adjustments he made to his values for cash and debts of
the Company were derived from information on the quarterly
financial statement for the quarter ended May 1993.
J.R. Simplot Co.'s controller, James D. Crawford, testified
that Mr. Much improperly failed to account for the seasonally high
levels of the Company's receivables and inventory. According to
Mr. Crawford, because the Company's business was seasonal, its
financial statements from one quarter to another were not
comparable. Mr. Crawford explained that the Company's balance
sheet for the quarter ending in May would have higher levels of
inventory, receivables, and short-term debt than its balance sheet
for the year ending in August. (The high levels of inventory and
receivables were financed with working capital, resulting in high
short-term debt.) Mr. Crawford estimated that the Company's short-
term debt would have varied by approximately $150 million between
May and August 1993. We found Mr. Crawford a credible witness.
Mr. Much admitted at trial that if the seasonal changes in
short-term debt were not taken into consideration the equity value
as of August 1993 would be approximately $113,000,000 higher than
his value as of late June 1993. We believe that the high short-
term debt of the Company as of May 1993 is an aberration, and as a
result it should not have been taken into account.
- 66 -
In addition to not adjusting for the seasonal nature of short-
term debt, in our opinion, Mr. Much should not have discounted the
value of the Micron Technology stock by applying a 6-percent
minority discount. He valued both the operating assets of J.R.
Simplot Co. and its investment in Micron Technology on a minority
basis. Applying a 6-percent minority discount to the Micron
Technology stock has the effect of taking two minority discounts.
Although we agree with Mr. Much's argument that as a minority
shareholder in Micron Technology, J.R. Simplot Co. would lack
absolute control with regard to any disposition of the Micron
Technology stock, we do not believe a greater discount for an
investment asset than for an operating asset is justified when the
Company has already been valued on a minority basis.
To conclude this aspect of our valuation task, we believe Mr.
Much's determination of J.R. Simplot Co.'s equity value contained
two major flaws. Consequently, although we believe the equity
value of the Company may be greater than $830 million, we adopt Dr.
Spiro's $830 million equity value. (We note that Dr. Spiro stated
that if the Company's cash-flows could have been maximized, the
equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. would be greater than $830
million. Further, we are mindful that the Company is resource
rich, and as Gordon C. Smith, the CEO and president of the Company
in 1993, testified, the Company has assets worth substantially more
than their book values.)
We now turn our attention to the more difficult task--
ascertaining the amount of the collective voting premium (expressed
- 67 -
as a percentage of J.R. Simplot Co.'s $830 million equity value) to
be accorded the class A voting stock.
Petitioner's experts used what Dr. Spiro referred to as a
"cookie cutter" methodology, which he and Mr. Matthews found
unsuitable in this case. We do not accept petitioner's experts'
assertion that no difference exists between minority voting shares
and nonvoting shares, as well as their conclusion that the value of
the shares of class A voting and class B nonvoting stock were the
same. Common sense dictates otherwise. We believe petitioner's
experts failed to give due consideration to the hypothetical
seller's desire to achieve the highest price obtainable for his/her
stock.
Here, only four persons held all the class A voting stock, and
there was a relatively equal distribution of this class of stock
among them. In our opinion, the class A shares, on a per-share
basis, are far more valuable than the class B shares because of the
former's inherent potential for influence and control of the
Company. And because of the Company's size and resources, having
a voice (even though not a controlling voice) in the Company is
valuable. Indeed, there was testimony that the Company would be
worth even more if it were managed differently and divested itself
of its unprofitable agriculture (cattle) group. According to
Gordon C. Smith, the Company needed cash in order to remain
competitive and ultimately a choice would have to be made to merge
the Company with or into another entity, sell some of the Company's
- 68 -
assets, or take the Company's stock public. Only the holders of
the voting stock would make these decisions.
We agree with respondent's experts that through ownership of
decedent's voting shares, a hypothetical buyer would gain access to
the "inner circle" of J.R. Simplot Co., and by having a seat at the
class A shareholder's table, over time, the hypothetical buyer
potentially could position itself to play a role in the Company.
In this regard, we are mindful that "a journey of a 1,000 miles
begins with a single step."
At this point, we consider the characteristics of the
hypothetical buyer of decedent's class A voting shares. The
hypothetical buyer might well be one or a group of investors or
even one of the Simplots. The investor(s) might be a competitor,
supplier, or major customer of J.R. Simplot Co. The hypothetical
buyer would probably be well financed, with a long-term investment
horizon and no expectations of near-term benefits.29 The
hypothetical buyer might be primarily interested in only one of
J.R. Simplot Co.'s two distinct business activities--its food and
chemicals divisions--and be a part of a joint venture (that is, one
29
Petitioner claims that because J.R. Simplot was 90
years old and living at the time of trial, the Simplot family has
unusually good genes. Thus, the argument was made that a good
possibility existed for Don, Gay, and Scott to live until a ripe
old age, and the class A voting shares would wind up in J.R.
Simplot's grandchildren's hands later rather than sooner.
Decedent died at the age of 59. Apparently, J.R. Simplot's
"good genes" were of limited assistance to him. The length of
one's lifetime is unpredictable; no assurances exist that Scott,
Don, and Gay will live until the age of 90.
- 69 -
venture being interested in acquiring the food division and the
other being interested in acquiring the chemical division).
We agree with respondent's expert that on the valuation date,
a hypothetical buyer would consider the likelihood that one day
decedent's block of voting shares potentially could become the
largest block of voting shares because the record reveals that Don,
Gay, and Scott intended, upon their deaths, to pass their class A
shares to their children and thereafter no one shareholder (other
than the hypothetical buyer) would own 18 shares of voting stock.
Moreover, we agree with respondent that it was foreseeable on the
valuation date that following the deaths of Don, Gay, and Scott,
third-generation Simplots (a multiple number of descendants with
different personal objectives) would most likely be more willing to
sell their class A voting shares to outsiders than their parents or
grandfather would. And at that time, the hypothetical buyer would
benefit from the right of first refusal restriction on the voting
stock.
Petitioner asserts that Don, Gay, and Scott acted as a
cohesive group in following J.R. Simplot's philosophy to operate
the Company in a manner ensuring its perpetual existence and to
pass their shares and philosophy to their children. We believe
this assertion to be flawed in that J.R. Simplot was the glue that
bonded Don, Gay, and Scott. Indeed, Mr. Ettelson testified that,
over time, chances increase that closely held companies will
eventually sell, merge, or go public.
- 70 -
We agree with respondent that
The key to acquiring control of Simplot is the Class
A shares. The investor would likely pay large premiums
(in cash or stock) to induce the Class A shareholders to
relinquish control. Once a majority interest of the
Class A shares is obtained, the investor could force a
merger into another company.
* * * * * * *
The disparate ratio of nonvoting to voting stock in
this case is particularly important because it
dramatically increases, on a per share basis, the value
of the Class A shares. * * * When there are very few
voting shares, as here, the result is a huge increase in
the per share value of the voting rights associated with
the Class A shares. Simplot's extreme ratio of nonvoting
to voting shares--1,848.24 to one, with only
approximately 76 voting shares--magnifies the per share
premium by a thousand times or more compared to any
company with a typical single digit ratio.
Dr. Spiro opined that the amount of the collective voting
premium should equal 10 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s equity value.
Mr. Matthews selected a lesser amount. He stated that an amount
ranging from 7 percent (on the high side) to 3 percent (on the low
side) of the equity value would be a "fair" collective premium for
the voting privileges.
We recognize that on the valuation date the hypothetical buyer
of decedent's 18 shares of class A voting stock would not have the
ability to control the Company's management and would be subject to
the philosophy of the other three class A shareholders, all of whom
were related and had family interests to protect. And obviously,
an investor would pay more for a block of stock that represents
control than for a block of stock that is only a minority interest
- 71 -
in the Company. On the other hand, here, no one individual had a
controlling block of voting stock.
We also recognize that Don, Gay, and Scott would want to
maximize their children's interest in the Company and that if a
sale or liquidation of J.R. Simplot Co. occurred or if the Company
merged with or into another, the benefits derived therefrom would
probably be distributed not by class of stock, but rather on an
equal per-share basis, regardless of class. In other words, after
having paid for voting privileges, if on or after June 24, 1993,
the Company were merged, sold, or liquidated, the hypothetical
buyer would suffer a loss if the proceeds of the sale, merger, or
liquidation were to be distributed among all shareholders of J.R.
Simplot Co. on a pro rata share basis, rather than on a class
basis.
On the other hand, we agree with Mr. Matthews that although on
the valuation date decedent's class A voting shares constituted a
minority interest in J.R. Simplot Co., it was foreseeable that one
day (but not on the valuation date) the voting characteristics
associated with them could have "swing vote" potential if the
hypothetical buyer combined his 18 class A voting shares with
Scott's 22.445 shares or joined with Don and Gay (combined having
36 class A voting shares) to form a control group.
Considering and weighing all of these factors, we adopt Mr.
Matthews' lower range figure of 3 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s
equity value as the fair premium for the voting privileges (not
voting control) associated with the class A stock of J.R. Simplot
- 72 -
Co. We have adopted Mr. Matthews' 3-percent premium for voting
privileges because we give the greatest weight to the fact that
Don, Gay, and Scott would be inclined to vote in a manner that
would maximize their children's interests. Thus, we believe the
collective premium for the voting privileges of the 76.445 shares
of class A stock of J.R. Simplot Co. as of the valuation date is
$24.9 million (3 percent x $830 million), or $325,724.38 per share.
The following chart summarizes our valuation determinations
for decedent's 18 shares of class A voting stock and 3,942.048
shares of class B nonvoting stock of J.R. Simplot Co. as of the
valuation date before considering any discounts:
Class A Voting Stock Valuation
Number of class A shares (A) 76.445
Number of class B shares (B) 141,288.584
Total number of shares (T) 141,365.029
Equity value of J.R. Simplot
Co. (Q) $830,000,000
Pro-rata share of equity value
(E) = Q/T 5,871.32
Premium for voting privileges on
a per share basis 325,724.38
Value per share 331,595.70
x 18
Value of decedent's 18 shares of
class A voting stock, before
discount 5,968,772.60
- 73 -
Class B Nonvoting Stock Valuation
Equity value of J.R. Simplot Co. $830,000,000
Less: Aggregate premium for voting
privileges (76.445 shares x $325,724.38) (24,900,000)
Less: Aggregate class A share portion of
equity value (76.445 shares x $5,871.32) (448,833)
Net value of all class B shares 804,651,167
Value of class B stock on a per share
basis ($804,651,167 ÷ 141,288.584) 5,695.09
Value of decedent's 3,942.048 shares of x 3,942.048
class B nonvoting stock, before discount 22,450,318.14
All of the experts agreed that a lack of marketability
discount (liquidity discount) is appropriate; they essentially
agreed that the proper discount should be approximately 35 percent,
although Dr. Spiro allowed a 40-percent liquidity discount for the
class B nonvoting stock. Dr. Spiro believed that although a
restriction of the transferability of the class A voting stock
existed, decedent's class B shares should be given a slightly
higher liquidity discount because the class B stock lacks voting
rights. We adopt Dr. Spiro's liquidity discounts of 35 percent for
decedent's class A shares and 40 percent for decedent's class B
shares. Therefore, we find and thus conclude that the fair market
value of decedent's 18 shares of class A voting stock of J.R.
Simplot Co., as of the valuation date, is $3,879,702.19 or
$215,539.01 (rounded) per share, and the fair market value of
decedent's 3,942.048 shares of class B nonvoting stock of J.R.
Simplot, as of the valuation date, is $13,470,190.88 or $3,417.05
(rounded) per share.
A few final words before leaving the valuation issues. We
recognize the disparate ratio of our determined value before
- 74 -
consideration of a liquidity discount of the class A voting stock
($331,595.70 per share) to that of the class B nonvoting stock
($5,695.09 per share), that is a ratio of approximately 58 to 1.
This disparity is the consequence of the unique capital structure
of J.R. Simplot Co. and the skewed ratio of the number of class A
voting shares to the class B nonvoting shares, that is,
approximately 1 to 1,848.
Issue 3. Marital Deduction
The next issue is the amount of the section 2056 marital
deduction to be allowed the estate.
Decedent bequeathed all of his class A voting stock, and so
much of the class B nonvoting stock as, when added to the value of
the voting stock, equaled the Federal estate tax return filing
requirement in effect at the time of his death (i.e., $600,000) to
the trustees of a testamentary trust for the benefit of his
children (the credit shelter trust). The residue of decedent's
estate was bequeathed to his wife.
Decedent's will provides: (1) Decedent's personal
representative is to pay all State transfer and inheritance taxes
payable by reason of a bequest or devise to a devisee and to charge
the amount paid against the distributive interest of that devisee,
and (2) all Federal estate taxes imposed against the estate are to
be paid out of the residue that passes to decedent's wife.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent reduced the amount
reported for the marital deduction from $15,127,237 to $1,723,437.
The amount of this reduction ($13,403,800) is due to respondent's
- 75 -
redetermining of the fair market value of the class A voting stock
and charging the determined estate tax deficiencies against the
portion of the estate (the residue) passing to the wife. In
calculating the amount of the marital deduction, respondent gave no
consideration to the fact that the transfer tax liability payable
to the State of Idaho with respect to the class A voting stock
bequeathed to the credit shelter trust is chargeable against the
trustees.
Under section 2011, an estate may claim a credit against the
Federal estate tax for State transfer and inheritance taxes paid.
This credit generally applies to State and inheritance taxes paid
and claimed within 4 years of the filing of the original estate tax
return. See sec. 2011(c). Where the taxpayer has filed a petition
with this Court, this 4-year period is extended for 60 days after
the decision of this Court becomes final. See sec. 2011(c)(1).
Here, no transfer or inheritance taxes to the State of Idaho
have yet been paid. See sec. 20.2011-1(c)(2), Estate Tax Regs.,
regarding proof of payment. Accordingly, respondent correctly did
not include in the computation of the amount of the marital
deduction an amount of State transfer and inheritance taxes
chargeable against the bequest of the class A voting stock to the
trustees of the credit shelter trust.
The amount of the marital deduction must be recalculated on
the basis of our determination as to the value of the class A
voting stock passing to the trustees of the credit shelter trust.
Hence, a Rule 155 computation is required. In calculating the
- 76 -
amount of the marital deduction, the parties must consider (and not
reduce the marital deduction by) the amount of State transfer and
inheritance taxes actually and timely paid by reason of the bequest
of the class A voting stock to the trustees of the credit shelter
trust.
Issue 4. Penalties
The last issue is whether petitioner is liable for the
penalties determined by respondent pursuant to section 6662(a),
(g), (h)(1), and (2)(C).
A substantial estate tax valuation understatement occurs if
the value of property claimed on a return is 50 percent or less of
the amount determined to be its correct value, and the portion of
the underpayment attributable to the understatement exceeds $5,000.
See sec. 6662(g). The penalty equals 20 percent of the portion of
the underpayment attributable to the understatement. See sec.
6662(a). The penalty does not apply to any portion of the
underpayment for which the taxpayer shows that he or she: (1) Had
reasonable cause, and (2) acted in good faith with respect thereto.
See sec. 6664(c); see also United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,
242 (1985). Whether a taxpayer had reasonable cause and acted with
good faith is a factual determination. See sec. 1.6664-4(b),
Income Tax Regs. Reliance on the advice of a professional will
constitute good faith and reasonable cause where the reliance was
reasonable. See id.
Respondent argues that petitioner undervalued decedent's
shares of J.R. Simplot Co. Respondent further contends that
- 77 -
petitioner has failed to prove there was reasonable cause or good
faith reliance for the undervaluation. Petitioner, on the other
hand, maintains that it relied on professional appraisers and
attorneys in preparing the return. Essentially, petitioner argues
that any tax understatements were in good faith and due to
reasonable cause.
The parties stipulated that "the fair market value of the
Class A voting shares and Class B nonvoting shares reported on the
estate tax return was based upon an appraisal report issued by
Morgan Stanley & Co., Incorporated." That appraisal was prepared
for the purpose of guiding the estate in preparation of its tax
return.
We have found (as an ultimate fact) that petitioner acted
reasonably and in good faith in relying on the advice of tax
professionals and appraisers in valuing decedent's class A voting
and class B nonvoting stock for Federal estate tax purposes. We
believe petitioner exercised ordinary business care and prudence in
attempting to determine its proper tax liability. See Mandlebaum
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-255. Morgan Stanley was a long-
time adviser to J.R. Simplot Co., having prepared annual appraisals
for the J.R. Simplot Co.'s ESOP which were relied upon by both the
trustees of the ESOP and the participating employee/stockholders.
Thus, we hold petitioner is not liable for the penalties at issue.
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To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be
entered under Rule 155.