Nicole Rose Corp., formerly Quintron Corporation v. Commissioner

117 T.C. No. 27UNITED STATES TAX COURT
NICOLE ROSE CORP., FORMERLY QUINTRON CORPORATION, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 3328-00. Filed December 28, 2001.
Held: Approximately $22 million in claimed
ordinary business expense deductions are disallowed
because they relate to transactions lacking in business
purpose and in economic substance.
Stanley C. Ruchelman, Harold L. Adrion, and Sandra Gale
Behrle, for petitioner.
Lewis R. Mandel and Andrew J. Mandell, for respondent.
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SWIFT, Judge: For petitioner’s taxable years ending
January 31, 1992, 1993, and 1994, respondent determined
deficiencies in petitioner’s Federal income taxes and accuracy-
related penalties as follows:
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)
1992 $1,171,365 $234,273
1993 684,700 136,940
1994 4,559,237 911,847
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
The primary issue for decision is whether the transfer of
petitioner’s interests in multilayered leases of computer
equipment and related trusts had business purpose and economic
substance and should be recognized for Federal income tax
purposes and whether petitioner should be entitled to the
$22 million in claimed ordinary business expense deductions
relating thereto.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner’s principal
place of business was located in Jericho, New York.
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In 1992, Quintron Corp. (Quintron), a Virginia corporation,
entered into negotiations with Loral Aerospace Corp. (Loral), a
Delaware corporation, for the sale to Loral of Quintron stock or
for the sale to Loral of Quintron’s assets.
Quintron was engaged in the design, manufacture, sale, and
service of aircraft flight simulators and other electronic
equipment. Loral was a major defense contractor and was engaged
in the design, manufacture, sale, and service of communications
and satellite equipment.
Representatives of Quintron wanted Loral to purchase from
Quintron’s shareholders their stock in Quintron. Representatives
of Loral wanted Loral to purchase the assets of Quintron.
In 1993, representatives of Intercontinental Pacific Group,
Inc. (IPG), a California corporation and the parent corporation
of QTN Acquisition, Inc. (QTN), suggested that, with IPG’s and
QTN’s participation as a type of intermediary or facilitator in
the transaction, the stock in Quintron could be sold, and Loral
could purchase Quintron’s assets. The controlling shareholder of
IPG was Douglas Wolf (Wolf).1
After further negotiations, in September of 1993, QTN, until
that point in time a dormant shell corporation and a subsidiary
of IPG, purchased from the shareholders of Quintron for
$23,369,125 in cash their stock in Quintron. QTN financed this
stock purchase through a bank loan.
1
Wolf was a lawyer and organized IPG to purchase and sell
leased equipment.
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Upon purchase of the stock in Quintron, QTN was merged into
Quintron, and Quintron thereafter remained as the surviving
corporation and was controlled by IPG.2 A major benefit to IPG
and to QTN of retaining Quintron as the surviving corporation
after the merger between Quintron and QTN was that Quintron had
significant taxable income in 1993 and prior years against which
claimed carryback losses (arising from the claimed ordinary
deductions relating to the transactions at issue herein) could be
applied in an attempt to produce large tax refunds for the
successor corporation to Quintron (and even though, as stated,
QTN in prior years had been a dormant shell corporation).
By prearrangement and simultaneously with the above stock
purchase transaction, Quintron (the stock of which was now
controlled by IPG) sold to Loral the assets of Quintron.3
Quintron’s sale price for the assets was approximately $20.5
million in cash, plus the assumption by Loral of certain
liabilities of Quintron. Expenses of $892,943 were incurred by
QTN and Quintron in connection with the stock purchase and asset
sale transactions.
In spite of the transactions involving the purchase of its
stock by QTN, QTN’s merger with Quintron, and the sale of assets
2
After the merger of QTN into Quintron, IPG owned directly or
indirectly more than 75 percent of the stock in Quintron.
3
The parties do not explain why the only assets of Quintron
that were sold to Loral consisted of $4.6 million in goodwill,
$16.5 million in trade receivables, and $85,000 in other assets.
Presumably, Quintron had operating assets that were the basis of
Quintron’s manufacturing and sales business. What happened to
such operating assets is not explained in the record.
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to Loral, and in spite of Quintron’s name change on October 27,
1993, to “Nicole Rose Corp.”, for convenience generally
hereinafter we refer to Quintron as “petitioner”.
The $20.5 million received on the sale of assets to Loral
was used by petitioner to pay off most of the bank loan obtained
to purchase the stock in Quintron.
Upon the sale of assets to Loral (due to petitioner’s low
carryover tax bases in the assets) petitioner would be required
to recognize on its 1994 Federal income tax return approximately
$11 million in income.4
The above $11 million in income that petitioner would have
to report on its 1994 Federal income tax return (relating to
petitioner’s sale of assets) explains the transactions that were
entered into in order to produce the claimed $22 million in
ordinary Federal income tax deductions that are at issue herein.
Petitioner, QTN, IPG, other entities controlled by Wolf, and
other domestic and foreign entities, planned and participated in
a series of complicated, tax-oriented transactions involving the
establishment and transfer of petitioner’s interests in certain
leases of computer equipment and related trusts.
We first explain the background and history relating to the
leased equipment. We then seek to explain the complicated tax-
oriented maneuvers that petitioner and others entered into in
4
Because the stock in Quintron was purchased by QTN, followed
by QTN’s merger into Quintron, Quintron’s tax bases in the assets
were not, prior to the sale to Loral, adjusted to fair market
value.
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order to produce the claimed $22 million tax deductions relating
thereto.
Background Relating to Leases5
In 1990, N.V. Brussels Airport Terminal Co. (Brussels
Airport), a Belgium corporation which financed, developed, and
managed the Brussels, Belgium, airport, purchased from ABN AMRO
Bank, N.V. (ABN), a commercial Dutch bank, certain computer
equipment and leased the equipment back to ABN, which was the end
user of the equipment. Brussels Airport financed the purchase of
5
Also in 1990 and later years, in addition to the series of
computer equipment leasing transactions, transfers, and payments
into trust (relating to what we refer to generally as the
Brussels Airport package of leased equipment) that are
specifically described in our findings of fact, two other series
of transactions were entered into involving petitioner, entities
controlled by IPG, other domestic entities, and two foreign
entities (namely, N.V. Reilly Chemicals S.A. (Reilly) and
Reibelco S.A. (Reibelco)), that also involved computer equipment
leasing transactions, transfers, and payments into trusts, and
that generated large ordinary tax deductions claimed by
petitioner, that were disallowed by respondent, and that are at
issue herein.
At the time of trial, however, none of the documentation
relating to the Reilly and to the Reibelco transactions could be
located by petitioner. Because the nature and purpose of the
Reilly and Reibelco transactions (for which no documentation is
available) are, in all relevant respects, similar to the
transactions involving the Brussels Airport leased equipment
described in our findings of fact (for which documentation is
available), petitioner and respondent have stipulated that the
resolution of the claimed tax deductions in issue relating to the
Brussels Airport leased equipment will also control the
resolution of the tax issues relating to the Reilly and Reibelco
transactions. In order properly to reflect the amounts involved
that are the basis for petitioner’s claimed $22 million tax
deductions, in our findings and opinion we generally use dollar
amounts that reflect cumulative numbers and cumulative dollar
amounts for the three series of transactions (i.e., our findings
and opinion generally reflect cumulative dollar amounts for the
combined Brussels Airport, Reilly, and Reibelco transactions).
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the equipment with a loan from Pierson, Heldring & Pierson N.V.
(Pierson), a subsidiary of ABN (Pierson loan).
The initial term of the leaseback of the equipment from
Brussels Airport to ABN (the Brussels Leaseback) extended from
December 28, 1990, to December 31, 1997. Under the Brussels
Leaseback, ABN had the option to extend the Brussels Leaseback
for up to 3 additional years.
Because of similarities in the amounts due under the
Brussels Leaseback and the Pierson loan, ABN was to make lease
payments due under the Brussels Leaseback directly to Pierson,
and the lease payments were then to be applied by Pierson in
satisfaction of the payments due on the Pierson loan.
One year later, on December 12, 1991, ABN assigned to Atrium
Finis (Atrium), an equipment leasing and financing partnership
organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, all of its
interest as lessee under the remaining 6-year term of the 7-year
Brussels Leaseback. ABN, however, simultaneously leased back
from Atrium for approximately 3 years, until December 31, 1994,
use of the equipment covered by the Brussels Leaseback, and ABN
retained an option to extend this leaseback for an additional 4
years, until December 31, 1998 (the Atrium Sublease).
On December 12, 1991, ABN prepaid to Atrium approximately
$25 million, reflecting generally lease payments scheduled to be
paid to Atrium by ABN over the course of the 3-year Atrium
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Sublease. This $25 million (taking into account the time value
of money) apparently corresponded generally to approximately 90
percent of the total lease payments to be paid during the
remaining 6-year term of the Brussels Leaseback.
By prearrangement, with receipt from ABN of the $25 million
in prepaid lease payments, the $25 million was transferred into a
trust fund (the Trust Fund) to secure Pierson’s right to receive
the lease payments due under the remaining 6-year term of the
Brussels Leaseback.
Under the December 12, 1991, assignment to Atrium of ABN’s
interest in the Brussels Leaseback, even though Pierson was
secured for the lease payments due from Atrium under the Brussels
Leaseback, Atrium was stated to be nominally obligated on the
lease payments due thereunder (which as stated were to be paid
directly to Pierson as lender). Pierson, however, had no
recourse to Atrium on the Pierson loan. Pierson’s recourse
thereon was limited to the equipment covered by the Brussels
Leaseback and to the $25 million that was transferred into the
Trust Fund.
As creditor on Brussels Airport’s purchase of the equipment
from ABN and as the entity to whom the ABN end-user lease
payments ultimately were due to be paid under the Brussels
Leaseback, the beneficiary of the Trust Fund was Pierson. Even
though Pierson, however, was the beneficiary of the Trust Fund
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and was to receive distributions from the $25 million Trust Fund
over the course of the remaining term of the Brussels Leaseback,
Pierson also was the trustee of the Trust Fund, and, as such,
from the December 12, 1991, date on which the funds were
transferred into the Trust Fund, Pierson had possession of the
$25 million.
Under the terms of the Trust Fund, in 1995, 1996, and 1997
Atrium was required to make additional payments into the Trust
Fund of approximately $1.6 million relating to the remaining 10
percent of the total payments to be paid during the remaining 6-
year term of the Brussels Leaseback.
Residual Value Certificate, Transfer of Interest in the
Trust Fund, and Cancellation of Petitioner’s Lease Interest
From March of 1993 through September of 1993, ABN, Atrium,
Wolf on behalf of QTN and petitioner, and other parties
negotiated a modification or a restructuring to some of the terms
relating to the payments due under the Brussels Leaseback, under
the Atrium Sublease, and under the Trust Fund. The additional
$1.6 million that Atrium, in later years, would have been
required to pay under the Trust Fund was reduced to $400,000.
ABN effectively obligated itself to continue leasing the
equipment during the 4-year renewal period of the Atrium
Sublease, and the scheduled lease payments to be due from ABN
during the 4-year period were restructured.
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As restructured as of September 30, 1993, the lease payments
to be paid to Atrium during the 4-year renewal period were set
forth and described in what was referred to as a residual value
certificate (RVC). Under the terms of the RVC, ABN would be
required to pay Atrium, on November 30, 1996, and on November 30,
1998, an unspecified amount equal to 200 percent of the fair
market value of the leased equipment, as of the two respective
payment due dates, in excess of specified base amounts of $5
million on the first date and $2 million on the second date. In
other words, if the fair market value of the leased equipment as
of the specified dates did not exceed the stated base amounts for
the equipment, no payments would be due from ABN under the RVC.
Also, under the terms of the RVC, ABN expressly disclaimed any
warranty or representation regarding the present or future value
of the equipment.
In connection with ABN’s, Atrium’s, and ultimately
petitioner’s participation and acceptance of the terms of the
RVC, no appraisal was obtained of the fair market value of the
leased equipment as of September 30, 1993, and ABN, Atrium, and
petitioner relied on an incomplete and outdated appraisal of the
leased equipment made in 1991. No credible effort was made to
establish, as of September of 1993, that the base amounts
specified in the RVC were reasonable and that the RVC had any
foreseeable value.
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On September 30, 1993 (through a series of section 351
transfers involving a number of entities related to and
controlled generally by Wolf and through which Atrium ultimately
received stock in a corporation related to petitioner),6 Atrium
transferred to petitioner Atrium’s remaining interests and
obligations relating to the underlying Brussels Leaseback, the
Atrium Sublease, and the Trust Fund. The interests transferred
to petitioner included the potential right to receive the
unspecified payments from ABN under the RVC and the stated
obligation to make the restructured additional $400,000 payment
into the Trust Fund. This transfer to petitioner was the first,
direct step in the plan to generate the multi-million dollar
ordinary tax deductions that petitioner sought to use as an
offset against, among other income, the $11 million that
petitioner would be required to recognize on its 1994 U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return (Form 1120) as a result of the sale
to Loral of Quintron’s assets.
As the second, direct, prearranged step in the plan to
generate for petitioner the above-referenced multi-million dollar
tax deduction, also on September 30, 1993, simultaneously with
petitioner’s receipt from Atrium of the above interests relating
6
For convenience, we do not specifically identify each and
every entity related to and generally controlled by Wolf which
participated in the various transactions involving the transfer
of the leases and the interest in the Trust Fund.
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to the Brussels Leaseback, the Atrium Sublease, and the Trust
Fund, petitioner transferred to B.V. Handelsmaatschappij
Wildervank (Wildervank), a Dutch bank based in the Netherlands,
petitioner’s interests in the Brussels Leaseback and in the Trust
Fund, $400,000 in cash, and 10 shares of stock in Cove
Enterprises, Inc. (Cove), an unrelated corporation. Petitioner’s
interest in the RVC was not transferred to Wildervank and was
retained by petitioner.
In exchange for the above transfers to Wildervank,
Wildervank assumed all of petitioner’s purported lease
obligations relating to the Brussels Leaseback and the Trust
Fund.
On September 30, 1993, the balance of the funds held in
trust by the Trust Fund was approximately $22 million.
On or about November 30, 1996, ABN informed petitioner that
no payment would be made to petitioner under the RVC. Petitioner
made no effort to establish the value of the leased equipment or
otherwise to question why no payment would be made to it under
the RVC. On October 1, 1997, petitioner was liquidated and went
out of business.
On its 1994 Federal corporation income tax return
(reflecting a taxable year ending January 31, 1994), petitioner
reported income in the amount of approximately $11 million
relating to the sale of assets to Loral, and petitioner claimed
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an ordinary business expense deduction of $400,000 relating to
the transfer to Wildervank of $400,000 in cash, a capital loss of
$2,118,644 relating to the transfer to Wildervank of the 10
shares of Cove common stock, and an ordinary business expense
deduction of $21,840,660 relating to the transfer to Wildervank
of its interests in the Brussels Leaseback and in the Trust
Fund.7
Petitioner’s approximate $22 million claimed ordinary
business expense deductions offset the $11 million in income that
petitioner was required to report on the sale of assets to Loral
and also resulted in petitioner’s reporting for 1994 a claimed
net operating loss of $8,953,708. Petitioner elected to carry
back from 1994 to 1992 and to 1993 the $8,953,708 claimed net
operating loss to offset Quintron’s reported income for those
years, and based thereon respondent issued refunds to petitioner
for 1992 and 1993 in the respective amounts of $1,172,448 and
$684,705.
In respondent’s notice of deficiency to petitioner for 1992,
1993, and 1994, respondent disallowed petitioner’s claimed
$400,000 and $21,840,660 ordinary business expense deductions
relating to the above transactions petitioner claimed on its 1994
7
Petitioner’s tax return preparer, Howard B. Teig, C.P.A.,
received $39,940 for his involvement in the above transactions
and for his preparation of petitioner’s 1994 Federal income tax
return.
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Federal income tax return, and respondent disallowed petitioner’s
$8,953,708 claimed net operating loss carryback deduction to 1992
and to 1993. Respondent did not disallow the $2,118,644 claimed
capital loss relating to petitioner’s transfer to Wildervank of
the Cove common stock.
OPINION
Taxpayers have a legal right to structure transactions to
minimize their tax obligations. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 469 (1935). A transaction, however, entered into solely for
tax avoidance without economic, commercial, or legal effect other
than expected tax benefits constitutes an economic sham without
effect for Federal income tax purposes. Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933
F.2d 143, 147-148 (2d Cir. 1991), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-205;
Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184, 196
(1983), affd. in part and revd. in part 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985).
Whether we respect a taxpayer’s characterization of a
transaction depends upon whether the characterization represents
and is supported by a bona fide transaction with economic
substance, compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, and not shaped solely or primarily by tax avoidance
features that have meaningless labels attached. Frank Lyon Co.
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v. United States, supra at 583-584; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001), affg. 113
T.C. 254 (1999); UPS of Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014,
1018-1020 (11th Cir. 2001), revg. T.C. Memo. 1999-268; ACM Pship.
v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998), affg. in part,
revg. in part, dismissing in part, and remanding T.C. Memo. 1997-
115.
Our inquiry as to whether a transaction has sufficient
economic substance to be recognized for Federal income tax
purposes turns on the subjective business purpose and on the
objective economic substance of the transaction. Kirchman v.
Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1490-1492 (11th Cir. 1989), affg.
Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986).
In UPS of Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-268, we
held that the restructure of certain insurance premiums lacked
business purpose and economic substance and should be disregarded
for Federal income tax purposes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. UPS of Am., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001). In the context of
an ongoing, viable business, the Court of Appeals articulated
“business purpose” broadly, as follows:
a transaction has a “business purpose,” when we are
talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it
figures in a bona fide, profit-seeking business. * * *
[Id. at 1019.]
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Under any version of the business purpose and economic
substance test, the transactions before us must be regarded as
lacking in business purpose and economic substance.
Additionally, we note that, prior to the September 1993
transactions, QTN was a dormant shell corporation, controlled by
Wolf, not a going concern.
Petitioner contends that it is entitled to the $22 million
claimed ordinary business expense deductions relating to its
transfer to Wildervank of its interest in the Trust Fund and the
$400,000 in cash. Petitioner’s apparent theory of deductibility
is that the value of petitioner’s interest in the Trust Fund was
equal to the $21.8 million balance in the Trust Fund and
therefore that when petitioner transferred to Wildervank its
interest in the Trust Fund, plus the $400,000 in cash, the
transfer should be treated as a “payment” by petitioner to
Wildervank of $22 million in exchange for the cancellation of
petitioner’s obligation on an onerous lease. In support,
petitioner cites case authority and respondent’s rulings for the
proposition that payments extinguishing lease obligations may
qualify as ordinary and necessary business expense deductions.
Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 32 (1941); Stuart Co. v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1952), affg. a
Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Helvering v. Cmty. Bond &
Mortgage Corp., 74 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir. 1935), affg. 27 B.T.A.
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480 (1932); Rev. Rul. 69-511, 1969-2 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 68-112,
1968-1 C.B. 62.
Petitioner claims that the RVC it received and retained had
significant value, that petitioner had the opportunity to realize
significant profit from the RVC, and that this profit potential
explains and supports petitioner’s participation in a legitimate
for-profit transaction.
Respondent claims that the transfer to Wildervank of
petitioner’s interests in the Brussels Leaseback, in the Trust
Fund, and in the $400,000 in cash, in exchange for Wildervank’s
assumption of petitioner’s obligations relating to the Brussels
Leaseback and the Trust Fund lacked business purpose and economic
substance and should be disregarded. We agree with respondent.
The record establishes that no credible business purpose and
that no viable economic substance existed for the transfer to
Wildervank of petitioner’s interests in the Brussels Leaseback,
in the Trust Fund, and in the $400,000 in cash. The complicated
nature of these transactions fails to mask the lack of business
purpose and economic substance in key aspects of the transactions
and the tax avoidance objectives thereof.
In September of 1993, when it participated in these
transactions, petitioner never had any genuine obligation with
respect to the Brussels Leaseback and the Trust Fund. Even
petitioner’s payment of the $400,000 in cash we regard as not
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supported by a valid business purpose and economic substance.
That payment is tainted by petitioner’s sole tax motivation for
participating in these transactions.
Petitioner’s only purpose for transferring to Wildervank its
interests in the Brussels Leaseback and in the Trust Fund was to
create the claimed tax deductions. As respondent’s expert
testified at trial, independent of the production of claimed tax
deductions, there was no purpose to, and no substance for, the
transfer to Wildervank of petitioner’s interests in the Brussels
Leaseback and in the Trust Fund.
As respondent’s expert testified, the RVC had no value. In
fact, due to incomplete information, a significant portion of the
underlying equipment to which the RVC related was not capable of
being valued.
The testimony at trial and the report of the expert who was
used in late 1990 and early 1991, at the time of the original
Brussels Leaseback, were significantly inadequate. The expert
and his report reflect incomplete information on the type of
equipment, the manufacturer of the equipment, the extent of the
equipment, the model of the equipment, and the original market
introduction date of the equipment. In his calculations, the
expert used a beginning life for the equipment that corresponded
with the 1991 Brussels Leaseback, even though the expert knew
that the type of equipment involved in the leaseback had been
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introduced into the market a number of years prior thereto. The
expert utilized the same methodology for valuation that he used
and that we specifically rejected in Smoot v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1991-268.
Although we criticize petitioner’s expert witness, who also
was used in 1990 and 1991 in connection with the Brussels
Leaseback, we do not suggest any lack of business purpose or
economic substance in the Brussels Leaseback, the Atrium
Sublease, or the Trust Fund, about which we have inadequate
information, which involved generally non-U.S. taxpayers, and
with respect to which no U.S. tax issue has been raised. Our
focus, our findings, and our conclusions relate to petitioner’s
interest in, and the transfer of its interest in, the Trust Fund
and in the value of the RVC, and whether a business purpose and
economic substance were associated with petitioner’s
participation in these specific latter transactions.
The report and the testimony of petitioner’s trial expert
witness (in addition to relying on and perpetuating errors made
by petitioner’s first expert witness) were riddled with
additional significant errors and inaccuracies. Many items of
equipment were omitted from his report, and values were used for
some of the equipment that was included in his report that were
higher than the original cost figures for the equipment.
Petitioner’s experts were not credible.
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Petitioner’s actions, or lack thereof, corroborate that
petitioner never regarded the RVC as having any value. In 1993,
prior to receiving the RVC, petitioner never obtained an
independent appraisal of the equipment, and in 1997, when
petitioner was notified that a payment would not be made under
the RVC, petitioner did nothing to establish the value of the
equipment and to verify that under the RVC petitioner had no
right to receive a payment from ABN.
The various transfers prior to 1993 relating to the Brussels
Leaseback, the Atrium Sublease, and the Trust Fund created
essentially a circular flow of funds with the net result that,
once the $25 million was transferred into the Trust Fund by ABN,
Pierson was obligated to pay itself. Pierson’s only recourse for
the payments under the Brussels Leaseback was from the equipment
and from the funds held in the Trust Fund. Because the $25
million transferred into the Trust Fund represented security for
Pierson as lender on the Brussels Leaseback and because of
Pierson’s status as trustee on and as beneficiary of the Trust
Fund, petitioner had no legitimate interest of value in the Trust
Fund and no legitimate obligations associated therewith.
Petitioner’s claimed $22 million tax deductions relating to
interests held for less than a day in the Brussels Leaseback and
in the Trust Fund constitute merely a tax ploy, a sham, without
business purpose and without economic substance.
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Petitioner’s case and ruling authority involving the tax
treatment of payments to cancel legitimate and economically
viable lease obligations are not applicable.
Further, from petitioner’s perspective, no nontax profit
potential was associated with petitioner’s role as facilitator in
connection with the purchase of the Quintron stock and the sale
of assets to Loral. As a result thereof (due only to the low tax
bases in the assets), petitioner was required to report more than
$11 million in paper taxable income. Petitioner paid $23,369,125
for the stock of Quintron and then sold to Loral the assets of
Quintron for $20,576,754 (retaining five accounts receivable with
a balance of $2,997,364). Assuming the retained accounts
receivable were fully collected by petitioner, producing a gross
profit of $204,992 on the prearranged and simultaneous stock
purchase and asset sale transactions, petitioner’s $892,943 in
expenses more than consumed any gross profit.
Petitioner’s participation in the purchase of Quintron stock
and in the asset sale to Loral is explained by petitioner’s
manufacture of the $22 million claimed tax deductions which, if
allowed, would effectively offset the tax cost associated with
petitioner’s sale of assets and which would produce to petitioner
refunds of $1,857,153 in taxes Quintron (not petitioner) had paid
in prior years. Again, from petitioner’s perspective, claimed
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tax benefits provide the only credible explanation for
petitioner’s participation.
The evidence is clear that petitioner had no valid business
purpose for the transfer to Wildervank of its interests in the
Trust Fund and in the Brussels Leaseback and for the transfer to
Wildervank of the $400,000 in cash. Other than claimed tax
benefits, petitioner received nothing of value. The transactions
lacked business purpose and economic substance, and the
transactions are to be disregarded for Federal income tax
purposes.
Petitioner argues that because of a shift in respondent’s
argument, the burden of proof should be shifted to respondent.
Rule 142. Our findings and conclusions herein are based on the
evidence and are made without reliance on the burden of proof.
Other arguments made by petitioner have been considered and
are without merit.
Section 6662 imposes a penalty of 20 percent on
underpayments of tax attributable to negligence or to disregard
of the rules or the regulations. For purposes of section
6662(a), negligence constitutes a failure to make a reasonable
attempt to comply with the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 6662(c).
The accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) will not
apply to any part of petitioner’s underpayments of tax if, with
regard to that part of the underpayments, petitioner establishes
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reasonable cause and if petitioner acted in good faith. Sec.
6664(c).
The participation of highly paid professionals provides
petitioner no protection, excuse, justification, or immunity from
the penalties in issue. Petitioner participated in a clear and
obvious scheme to reap the benefits of claimed ordinary business
expense deductions that had no business purpose and no economic
substance. The facts and circumstances of this case reflect no
reasonable cause and no good faith for petitioner’s participation
in the transactions before us.
Petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related penalties
under section 6662(a).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.