Norman Hinerfeld v. Commissioner

T.C. Memo. 2019-47
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
NORMAN HINERFELD, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 4879-15L. Filed May 2, 2019.
R's Appeals Office (Appeals) rejected P's offer to settle his
liability for trust fund recovery penalties because it did not reflect the
value of his residence, L, title to which he had previously transferred
to his wife, W.
Held: Upholding a determination by Appeals that lacks an
adequate explanation does not violate the doctrine of SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), when the failure of explanation relates to a
legal issue rather than a matter committed to the agency's discretion.
Held, further, because (1) P failed to established that W paid
adequate consideration for L, (2) the record demonstrates, or provides
grounds for inferring, that P transferred L to W to protect it from his
creditors, and (3) P failed to demonstrate any respect in which the
transfer of L affected his use or enjoyment of the property, W can
appropriately be treated as holding title to L as P's nominee;
accordingly, R's settlement officer did not abuse her discretion in
rejecting an offer-in-compromise that did not reflect L's value.
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[*2] Richard S. Kestenbaum, Scott L. Kestenbaum, and Bernard S. Mark, for
petitioner.
Michael J. De Matos, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: This case is before us for review of a determination by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Appeals Office (Appeals) to sustain the filing
of a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL) concerning trust fund recovery penalties
(TFRPs) assessed against petitioner under section 66721 in regard to unpaid
employment taxes of Thermacon Industries, Inc. (Thermacon), for the quarters
ended September 30 and December 31, 2002, March 31, September 30, and
December 31, 2003, and March 31 and June 30, 2004 (quarters in issue). Before
his resignation in 2003, petitioner had been chairman of Thermacon. We must
decide whether Appeals abused its discretion in rejecting petitioner's offer to settle
for $12,720 liabilities that exceeded $550,000 when respondent issued the NFTL
and remained almost $300,000 at the time of trial.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended and in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
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[*3] Background
The Larchmont Residence
Since 1968, petitioner and his wife have resided in a house located in
Larchmont, New York (Larchmont residence). In February 2003, petitioner
executed a deed by which he transferred title to the Larchmont residence to Mrs.
Hinerfeld. The deed states that petitioner made the transfer "in consideration of
ten ($10.00) dollars paid by * * * [Mrs. Hinerfeld]". The parties stipulated the
deed to be a quitclaim deed. After transferring the Larchmont residence to his
wife, petitioner continued to pay at least some of the expenses of maintaining the
property.
Mrs. Hinerfeld's Payments to Financial Institutions
Between March 2002 and November 2003, Mrs. Hinerfeld made payments
to various financial institutions totaling $5 million. The dates and amounts of
those payments are as follows:
Date Amount Payee
3/15/02 $300,000 Commerce Bank of PA NA
11/20/02 750,000 Fleet National Bank
1/28/03 1,100,000 LaSalle Business Credit, LLC
1/28/03 400,000 LaSalle Business Credit, LLC
11/7/03 850,000 LaSalle Business Credit, LLC
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[*4] 11/7/03 900,000 LaSalle Business Credit, LLC
11/7/03 700,000 LaSalle National Bank
Assessment of Trust Fund Recovery Penalties, the Prior Levy Notice, and
Hinerfeld I
Respondent assessed petitioner's TFRP liabilities for the quarters in issue
between February and May 2006. The following June, respondent notified
petitioner of his intention to collect those liabilities by levy.2 In Hinerfeld v.
Commissioner (Hinerfeld I), 139 T.C. 277 (2012), we considered a petition to
review Appeals' determination to sustain the proposed levy. Hinerfeld I presented
two issues for our decision: (1) whether Appeals and area counsel in the Small
Business/Self-Employed Division of the Office Chief Counsel had engaged in
prohibited ex parte communications during the collection due process (CDP)
hearing concerning the 2006 levy notice and (2) whether Appeals had abused its
discretion in rejecting petitioner's offer to settle his liabilities for $74,857. We
resolved both issues in respondent's favor.
2
The 2006 levy notice covered all of the quarters in issue other than the
quarter ended March 31, 2004. See Hinerfeld v. Commissioner (Hinerfeld I), 139
T.C. 277, 277 (2012).
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[*5] The NFTL; Petitioner's Initial CDP Hearing
In July 2013, respondent issued to petitioner an NFTL regarding amounts
assessed under section 6672 for the quarters in issue. In August 2013, petitioner
requested a CDP hearing in regard to the NFTL. That request referred to a
pending offer petitioner had made to settle his TFRP liabilities but raised no other
issues. In particular, petitioner did not dispute his TFRP liabilities.
In April 2014, before petitioner's initial CDP hearing, Settlement Officer
(SO) Marilyn Matthews reviewed the deed by which petitioner transferred title to
the Larchmont residence to his wife. The copy of the deed included in the record
bears no evidence of having been recorded.
In October 2014, petitioner's attorney, Richard Kestenbaum, sent SO
Matthews a copy of an affidavit petitioner had given in Hinerfeld I in which he
stated: "In exchange for the deed [to the Larchmont residence], my wife paid off
my bank guarantees of $300,000.00 to Commerce Bank and $750,000.00 to Fleet
Bank". The following month, after the initial CDP hearing, Mr. Kestenbaum sent
SO Matthews another letter that identified wholly different payments as the
consideration. After claiming that "Mrs. Hinerfeld paid substantial consideration
for the deed transfer", Mr. Kestenbaum elaborated: "[A]mong other payments,
Mrs. Hinerfeld satisfied debts of her husband to LaSalle Bank in the amount of
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[*6] $830,000.00 and $700,000.00 * * * and then paid approximately
$1,000,000.00 to satisfy the mortgage on the subject premises."
Notice of Determination
In a notice of determination issued in January 2015, Appeals sustained the
NFTL filing. The notice of determination acknowledged petitioner's $12,720
offer-in-compromise (OIC) but stated that Appeals could not consider an OIC as a
collection alternative because the financial information petitioner provided
indicated that he had sufficient assets to satisfy his liabilities. In particular,
Appeals "determined that the taxpayer maintains a 50% interest in the primary
residence and that his wife does not meet the requirements of a purchaser
according to Internal Revenue Code 6323(h)(6)." Appeals interpreted the deed by
which petitioner transferred the Larchmont residence to his wife as indicating that
he made that transfer "for no consideration." The notice of determination further
states that "[t]he deed was quitclaimed while * * * [Thermacon's employment
taxes] were accruing".
Remand
After petitioner petitioned this Court for a review of Appeals' determination,
respondent moved to remand the case to Appeals for reconsideration of petitioner's
OIC. Respondent acknowledged that SO Matthews' analysis "regarding Mrs.
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[*7] Hinerfeld's status as a 'purchaser' under I.R.C. § 6323(h)(6) was a mistake of
law." Mrs. Hinerfeld's status as a purchaser would have been relevant to the
question of whether her interest in the Larchmont residence was subject to any
preexisting tax lien on the property. But respondent did not assess petitioner's
TFRPs until after petitioner had transferred the Larchmont residence to his wife.
Therefore, as respondent acknowledged in his motion to remand, "there was no
lien at the time the Larchmont property was transferred." We thus granted
respondent's motion.
Conflicting Explanations of Consideration
After our remand of the case, petitioner and his attorney continued to make
conflicting claims about the consideration Mrs. Hinerfeld allegedly paid for the
Larchmont residence. During a March 2016 meeting with Appeals, petitioner
disavowed the claims his attorney had made in his November 2014 letter to SO
Matthews. At that meeting, petitioner claimed that Mrs. Hinerfeld's payments to
the LaSalle entities in November 2003 had nothing to do with the transfer of the
Larchmont residence. Instead, petitioner claimed that Mrs. Hinerfeld had made a
separate payment of $1 million on the date of the deed. In response, Appeals gave
petitioner two weeks to provide documentation of the alleged $1 million payment.
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[*8] Petitioner later admitted in a letter to SO Matthews that "[t]here was no
'million dollar check'." In the meantime, Mr. Kestenbaum sent SO Matthews a
letter in which he reverted to his original claim. "In payment for the equity in the
subject property," Mr. Kestenbaum alleged, "Mrs. Hinerfeld, on March 15, 2002,
paid the sum of $300,000.00 to satisfy Mr. Hinerfeld's liability to Commerce
Bank." "In addition," Mr. Kestenbaum added, "on November 20, 2002, in further
payment for the equity in the residence, Mrs. Hinerfeld tendered a letter of credit
to Fleet National Bank in the amount of $750,000.00 to satisfy Mr. Hinerfeld's
obligation to Fleet." (Petitioner's subsequent letter to SO Matthews made the same
claim.)
Supplemental Notice of Determination
In the supplemental notice of determination (supplemental notice) it issued
to petitioner, Appeals stated that it could not consider an OIC as a collection
alternative because he "has sufficient equity in assets to satisfy the liabilities". In
reaching that conclusion, SO Matthews treated the Larchmont residence as an
asset available to satisfy petitioner's liabilities on the ground that Mrs. Hinerfeld
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[*9] held that property as petitioner's nominee. SO Matthews based her analysis
on Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.17.2.5.7.2(3) (Jan. 8, 2016).3
The supplemental notice does not explain in any detail SO Matthews'
application of the factors listed in the IRM. Instead, it states only: "Most or all of
the factors listed in * * * Internal Revenue Manual section 5.17.2.5.7.2 that are
used to determine if a nominee situation exists are present in this case."
3
Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.17.2.5.7.2(3) (Jan. 8, 2016) stated:
No one factor determines whether a nominee situation is
present, but a number of factors taken together may. The following
list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but nominee situations
typically involve one or more of the following:
(a.) The taxpayer previously owned the property.
(b.) The nominee paid little or no consideration for
the property.
(c.) The taxpayer retains possession or control of
the property.
(d.) The taxpayer continues to use and enjoy the
property conveyed just as the taxpayer had before such
conveyance.
(e.) The taxpayer pays all or most of the expenses
of the property.
(f.) The conveyance was for tax avoidance
purposes.
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[*10] The supplemental notice states repeatedly that the transfer of title to the
Larchmont residence occurred while Thermacon's employment taxes were
accruing.
Trial Testimony
According to Mrs. Hinerfeld's testimony at trial, her agreement to pay
petitioner's liabilities arose from his interest in placing a second mortgage on the
house to pay those liabilities. Mrs. Hinerfeld expressed concern about losing the
house and offered to give him the funds to repay the liabilities and thereby avoid
further encumbering the residence. In exchange, she said, she asked that title to
the house be transferred to her name to protect it from petitioner's creditors. Mrs.
Hinerfeld acknowledged that the payments she claimed to have made as
consideration for the house were made before execution of the deed. When asked
why, she said, "Well, I had to wait for it but that was my quid pro quo. I get the
house and I will pay your loans."
In his own testimony at trial, petitioner attributed the delay in execution of
the deed to his attorney's busy schedule. Petitioner also testified that he was
unaware of Thermacon's unpaid employment taxes until 2006, when he was
apprised of Thermacon's liabilities by the corporation's then owner.
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[*11] Discussion
I. Applicable Statutory Provisions
Sections 6320 and 6330 provide a taxpayer the right to notice and the
opportunity for an Appeals hearing before the Commissioner can collect unpaid
tax by means of a lien or levy against the taxpayer's property. If a taxpayer
requests a CDP hearing, the Appeals officer conducting the hearing must verify
that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been
met. Secs. 6320(c), 6330(c)(1). The taxpayer may raise at the hearing any
relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the collection action, including
appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of collection
actions, and offers of collection alternatives. See sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Section
6330(d)(1) allows a taxpayer to "appeal * * * to the Tax Court" a determination
under section 6320 or 6330.
Although petitioner claims to have resigned from Thermacon in 2003 and to
have been unaware of the corporation's unpaid employment taxes until 2006, he
does not dispute his liability under section 6672(a) for Thermacon's unpaid
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[*12] employment taxes for the quarters in issue.4 Petitioner argues only that SO
Matthews abused her discretion in rejecting his OIC.
Section 7122(a) gives the Commissioner the discretion to compromise
unpaid tax liabilities. Section 301.7122-1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs., lists
doubt as to collectibility as a valid ground for compromising an unpaid liability.
"Doubt as to collectibility exists in any case where the taxpayer's assets and
income are less than the full amount of the liability." Id. Generally, under the
Commissioner's administrative guidelines, Appeals will accept a taxpayer's OIC as
a result of doubt as to collectibility only if the OIC reflects the taxpayer's
reasonable collection potential (RCP)--that is, the amount the Commissioner could
reasonably collect through other means, including administrative and judicial
collection remedies. See IRM pt. 5.8.4.3(2) (May 10, 2013). A taxpayer's RCP
ordinarily includes, in addition to his own assets and future income, any amounts
collectible from third parties, such as through enforcement of a lien against
4
Sec. 6672(a) imposes a penalty equal to the amount of any unpaid
employment taxes withheld by a corporation from its employees' wages on any
person who willfully fails to collect, account for, or pay over those taxes. In
general, any person with the duty and authority to cause the corporation to
withhold and pay over the taxes in question can be subject to liability under sec.
6672(a). See sec. 6671(b).
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[*13] property held by a nominee of the taxpayer. IRM pt. 5.8.4.3.1(1) (Apr. 30,
2015).5 We generally find no abuse of discretion when an Appeals officer rejects
a taxpayer's OIC because it does not reflect the taxpayer's RCP, determined in
accordance with the Commissioner's administrative guidance. E.g., Caney v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-90, 2010 WL 1687679, at *2.
II. Standard and Scope of Review
A. Standard of Review: Dalton
The parties devote considerable portions of their briefs to the questions of
the standard and scope of our review. When a taxpayer's underlying liability is at
issue in a CDP case, we review Appeals' determination de novo; otherwise, we
review that determination for abuse of discretion. E.g., Goza v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). The parties agree that, because petitioner does not
challenge his underlying liabilities, our review is generally for abuse of discretion.
Cf. 5 U.S.C. sec. 706(2)(A) (2018) (requiring a reviewing court subject to the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be * * *
5
The value of property held on behalf of a taxpayer by a nominee can be
included in the taxpayer's RCP regardless of whether the Commissioner proceeds
against the property. See IRM pt. 5.8.5.6(7) (Sept. 30, 2013) ("It is not necessary
to actually seek or obtain any specific legal remedy in order to address * * *
[transferee/nominee/alter ego] issues in an offer.").
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[*14] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law"). In Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69, 75 (2005), however, we
wrote: "When faced with questions of law * * * the standard of review makes no
difference. Whether characterized as a review for abuse of discretion or as a
consideration 'de novo' (of a question of law), we must reject erroneous views of
the law." But Kendricks left open the question of the standard we apply in
identifying error in a legal conclusion on which a determination by Appeals rests.
Do we accept any legal conclusions that are reasonable, even if we might reach a
different conclusion? Or do we instead resolve underlying legal issues by
applying our own view of the law?
In Dalton v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 2012), rev'g 135
T.C. 393 (2010), and T.C. Memo. 2011-136, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit described a court's role in CDP cases as "consider[ing] whether the factual
and legal conclusions reached at a CDP hearing are reasonable, not whether they
are correct." Respondent urges us to "follow the reasonableness standard set forth
by the First Circuit in Dalton." Petitioner observes that, because he does not
reside in the First Circuit, we need not follow the doctrine of Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), and
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[*15] apply Dalton's reasonableness standard. Petitioner thus urges us instead to
review SO Matthews' legal conclusion de novo.
This Court has not yet expressly adopted the reasonableness test articulated
by the Court of Appeals in Dalton,6 and the present case does not give us occasion
to do so. For the reasons described below, we conclude that SO Matthews'
determination that Mrs. Hinerfeld held title to the Larchmont residence as
petitioner's nominee was not only reasonable but correct.7
6
Citing our opinions in Porro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-81, aff'd,
589 F. App'x 502 (11th Cir. 2015), and Jewell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2016-239, respondent claims that we have "applied the Dalton principles in cases
outside of the First Circuit." In Porro, we did uphold as reasonable an SO's
determination regarding the ownership of property, but that issue proved to be
irrelevant to our disposition of the case. The taxpayers' RCP would have been
more than twice the amount of their offer without regard to the property in issue.
Thus, we noted that, "even if we agreed with * * * [the taxpayers] and disregarded
the value of the * * * [property], it would not affect the outcome of this case."
Porro v. Commissioner, at *17. In Jewell v. Commissioner, at *19, we cited
Dalton v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 149 (1st Cir. 2012), rev'g 135 T.C. 393 (2010),
and T.C. Memo. 2011-156, principally for the proposition that, should the
Commissioner enforce a lien against property held by a corporation that he
claimed to be the taxpayer's nominee, the corporation "may have an opportunity to
assert its ownership and to litigate that question in an appropriate forum."
7
Because SO Matthews did not explain her rationale in any detail, we cannot
be sure that our conclusion rests on the analysis she applied. But the prospect that
we might be relying on an analysis that differs from hers does not prevent us from
upholding her determination. See infra part III.C.
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[*16] B. Scope of Review: The Record Rule
Regarding the scope of our review, respondent argues that, because
petitioner's underlying liabilities are not at issue, review "should be limited to the
administrative record." In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), the Supreme
Court opined: "In applying * * * [the] standard [provided in 5 U.S.C. sec.
706(2)(A)], the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record
already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court."
In Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th
Cir. 2006), however, we held that, "when reviewing for abuse of discretion under
section 6330(d), we are not limited by the Administrative Procedure Act * * * and
our review is not limited to the administrative record." We noted that the statutory
provisions governing our traditional deficiency jurisdiction predated the APA and
that, accordingly, the APA's judicial review provisions did not apply to deficiency
cases. And the jurisdiction granted us by section 6330(d) to consider appeals in
CDP cases, we reasoned, is "part and parcel" of the statutory framework granting
us jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies. Id. at 97-98.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed our Opinion in
Robinette and held that the record rule applies in CDP cases before this Court.
The court declined to view CDP cases as part and parcel of our traditional, pre-
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[*17] APA deficiency jurisdiction. "Collection due process hearings under
§ 6330", the court observed, "were newly-created administrative proceedings in
1998, and the statute provided for a corresponding new form of limited judicial
review." Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d at 461. Two other Courts of
Appeals have concluded that the record rule applies to CDP cases before this
Court. See Keller v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'g in
part T.C. Memo. 2006-166, and aff'g in part, rev'g in part decisions in related
cases; Murphy v. Commissioner, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006), aff'g 125 T.C.
301 (2005).
Although all three Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue have
rejected our position that the record rule is inapplicable to CDP cases, we have not
expressly overruled our Opinion in Robinette. Nonetheless, at least two of our
more recent Opinions call into question our rationale in that case.
In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 120 (2008), the Commissioner
argued that the Court of Appeals' reversal of our Opinion in Robinette required us
to accept the record rule when reviewing the denial of innocent spouse relief. We
had initially adopted our position regarding the inapplicability of the record rule in
innocent spouse cases in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated,
439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). In Ewing, we noted the similarity in the statutory
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[*18] text granting us jurisdiction in deficiency and innocent spouse cases.
Section 6213(a) gives us jurisdiction to "redetermin[e]" deficiencies. And section
6015(e)(1)(A) gives us jurisdiction to "determine" appropriate innocent spouse
relief. In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 118, we relied on that same
similarity in statutory text to conclude that "[s]ection 6015 is part and parcel of the
* * * statutory framework" governing our deficiency jurisdiction. We
distinguished Robinette on the ground that "Congress chose not to use the word
'determine' or some derivation thereof in section 6330(d)". Id. at 120. In doing so,
we implicitly acknowledged that, given the difference in statutory terms, section
6015 can more readily than section 6330(d) be viewed as part and parcel of the
statutory framework governing our traditional, pre-APA deficiency jurisdiction.
More recently, in Kasper v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. 8 (2018), we accepted
the applicability of the record rule in cases involving the Commissioner's denial of
whistleblower awards. Among other things, we noted that the jurisdictional
statute, section 7623(b)(4), does not allow us to determine (or redetermine) the
appropriate whistleblower award. It simply allows the Commissioner's
determination regarding a whistleblower award to be "appealed" to this Court. "If
Congress's use of 'determine' was as important as our caselaw tells us it was," we
reasoned, "then the use of 'appeal' in a jurisdictional grant is telling." Id. at 17. In
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[*19] that regard, we acknowledged that the text of section 6330(d)(1), before its
amendment in December 2015, was "admittedly similar to that in section 7623(b)".
Id. at 19. Nonetheless, we allowed that Kasper v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. 19
n.13, was "not the right case to revisit the record rule's application in CDP cases."
Nor is the case now before us. As with the issue regarding the standard of
our review, we need not resolve the question of the scope of our review. Whether
or not we limit our review to the administrative record, we would conclude that
SO Matthews correctly took into account the value of the Larchmont residence in
evaluating petitioner's OIC.
III. Other Preliminary Issues
A. Impact of Hinerfeld I
Before evaluating SO Matthews' determination regarding the nominee issue,
we must address two aspects of Appeals' consideration of the present case that
petitioner claims establish, by themselves, that rejection of his OIC was an abuse
of discretion. First, petitioner alleges that, in Hinerfeld I, the Commissioner
accepted that the transfer of the Larchmont residence had not been fraudulent.
Petitioner claims that Appeals' alleged failure to "follow its own prior conclusions
* * * alone is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion." Respondent counters that "SO
Matthews * * * was under no obligation to reach the same conclusion as that of
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[*20] * * * [the SO in the prior case] regarding the transfer of the Larchmont
residence." We agree. If this Court had concluded in Hinerfeld I that petitioner
retained no interest in the Larchmont residence after his transfer of legal title to his
wife, petitioner might be able to argue that that conclusion was binding for
purposes of the present case under collateral estoppel. But petitioner's counsel,
Mr. Kestenbaum, conceded at trial that we did not address that issue in Hinerfeld I
and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is thus inapplicable.8
B. Form of Deed
Petitioner also argues that a mischaracterization, in the original notice of
determination, of the deed by which petitioner transferred title to the Larchmont
residence to his wife, evidenced a "mistake of law" that "standing alone, should
constitute an abuse of discretion." Respondent accepts that SO Matthews'
description of petitioner as having "quitclaimed" the Larchmont residence was in
8
The SO handling the CDP hearing concerning the levy notice addressed in
Hinerfeld I, 139 T.C. 277, concluded that acceptance of Mr. Hinerfeld's offer
would be premature because then-pending litigation might have disclosed the
availability of an additional source of collection. We concluded that, under those
circumstances, Appeals had not abused its discretion in rejecting Mr. Hinerfeld's
OIC. In evaluating Mr. Hinerfeld's offer, Appeals determined that his transfer of
the Larchmont residence to his wife had not been fraudulent. When the
Commissioner sought at trial and on brief to raise the fraudulent transfer issue, we
declined to consider it because "[t]he transfer of the residence * * * played no role
in the determination to reject * * * [Mr. Hinerfeld's] offer-in-compromise". Id. at
280 n.3.
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[*21] error (notwithstanding the parties' stipulation describing the deed as a
quitclaim deed) but contends that her error was "harmless" because it did not
affect her determination that Mrs. Hinerfeld held the Larchmont property as
petitioner's nominee. Again, we agree with respondent. As petitioner
acknowledges, the distinction among the various types of deeds for conveying
property under New York law relates to the "warranties or covenants made by the
grantor"--a point that has no obvious relevance to the factors on which SO
Matthews based her conclusion.
C. Adequacy of Explanation of Appeals' Determination: Chenery
Petitioner also complains that, "[a]lthough SO Matthews cited to the IRM
and its provisions respecting nominee theories of ownership, the administrative
record discloses no analysis or thoughtful consideration of any of the factors and
fails to apply them in a reasoned way to Petitioner's case". Petitioner's argument
implicates a fundamental doctrine of administrative law drawn from opinions of
the Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943), and
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). As articulated by the
Court in Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196, the basic Chenery doctrine posits that "a
reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of
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[*22] such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency." And that basic
doctrine has "an important corollary": "If the administrative action is to be tested
by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such
clarity as to be understandable." Id.9
The Chenery doctrine rests on a proper respect for the separate roles of
administrative agencies and the courts who review their determinations. In
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88, the Court opined: "If an order is valid only as a
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make
and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an
administrative judgment. * * * [A]n appellate court cannot intrude upon the
domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency."
The Court thus drew a clear distinction between acts of administrative discretion,
9
As recently as 2011, this Court had not decided whether the Chenery
doctrine applied to our CDP cases. See Rosenbloom v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2011-140, 2011 WL 2490659, at *7 n.17 ("[W]e haven't yet addressed the
applicability of Chenery in CDP cases, and we are not going to start in a case
where neither party made the argument."). Since then, however, we have
repeatedly accepted the doctrine's potential application. See Antioco v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-35; Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
274, at *22-*23 (invoking Chenery to justify refusal to consider "post hoc
explanations" for sustaining Appeals' determination); Salahuddin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-141, 2012 WL 1758628, at *7 ("[O]ur role
under section 6330(d) is to review actions that the IRS took, not actions that it
could have taken.").
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[*23] in which courts should be reluctant to interfere, and legal determinations,
which are more squarely within the courts' purview:
If the action rests upon an administrative determination--an exercise
of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency--
of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court might
have made a different determination were it empowered to do so. But
if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which the
reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may
not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94.
Although the supplemental notice provides only a conclusory explanation of
SO Matthews' determination that Mrs. Hinerfeld held the Larchmont property as
petitioner's nominee, we can nonetheless uphold that determination without
violating the Chenery doctrine or its corollary adequate explanation requirement.
The reason, simply put, is that the treatment of Mrs. Hinerfeld as her husband's
nominee is a legal issue that is not committed to respondent's administrative
discretion. SO Matthews' failure to explain her reasoning means that, even if we
were to reach the same conclusion she did, we could not be confident that we
would be relying on the same analysis. But our upholding her determination on
grounds that might differ from the precise analysis she employed would not
encroach upon the Commissioner's discretion.
-24-
[*24] The issue of the adequacy of a taxpayer's proposed OIC is obviously one
committed to the Commissioner's administrative discretion. Therefore, we cannot
uphold the rejection of an OIC on grounds other than those on which the agency
relied. It is not for us to say which proposals are acceptable and which are not.
But the agency has already told us that, in the exercise of its discretion, it would
not accept petitioner's OIC if he can be treated as owning the Larchmont
residence. And the question of petitioner's rights in that property is a legal one.
The adequacy of an offer of $x in settlement of a liability of $y made by a taxpayer
with assets of $z is a question for the agency to determine. But whether the assets
available to satisfy the taxpayer's liability are $z or some lesser amount may turn
on "determination[s] of law as to which * * * [our] reviewing authority * * *
come[s] into play". See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94.10
10
If the reasonableness test of Dalton v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d at 156,
defined the standard of our review, the question of Mrs. Hinerfeld's status as
petitioner's nominee might not be a legal question. As the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit recognized in Dalton, Appeals' rejection of a taxpayer's OIC
because it does not take into account property held by a third party who may be
the taxpayer's nominee does not definitively resolve the legal issue of the
property's ownership. That question would be resolved only if and when the
Commissioner proceeds against the property, at which time the alleged nominee
would have the opportunity to contest the Commissioner's claim. When Appeals
rejects a taxpayer's OIC because it fails to take into account property held by an
alleged nominee, it merely concludes that the taxpayer is sufficiently likely to have
an interest in the property to warrant its inclusion in the taxpayer's RCP. And that
(continued...)
-25-
[*25] Although SO Matthews' failure to articulate her reasoning does not risk our
encroaching on the Commissioner's discretion in violation of the Chenery
doctrine, that failure could still be grounds for remand if it prevented effective
judicial review. The requirement of clear explanations of agency actions is, at
least to some extent, independent of Chenery. Judge Friendly argued that it would
"misconstrue[]" the adequate explanation requirement to treat it as "included
within the 'Chenery doctrine'". Henry J. Friendly, "Chenery Revisited:
Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders," 1969 Duke L.J.
199, 206. To satisfy that part of the adequate explanation requirement that is
independent of Chenery, however, an explanation need not be "a paragon of
clarity". See Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
290 (1974). It need only be sufficient to allow for "effective judicial review".
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142-143.
10
(...continued)
question--how likely a taxpayer's potential interest in property must be for it to be
included in the taxpayer's RCP--may well be one committed to the Commissioner's
discretion. Even so, we need not determine the applicability of Dalton's
reasonableness test in deciding whether to uphold Appeals' determination in the
present case or instead remand the case for further proceedings. Because we
would conclude on the record before us (whether or not limited to the
administrative record) that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Hinerfeld held the Larchmont
residence as petitioner's nominee, petitioner's interest in that property would
appropriately be taken into account in determining his RCP under any standard of
assessing potential ownership.
-26-
[*26] SO Matthews' explanation of her rejection of petitioner's OIC, though
conclusory, is nonetheless adequate for us to conduct judicial review. We can
assess her conclusion that Mrs. Hinerfeld holds the Larchmont residence as
petitioner's nominee without knowing the precise analysis that led her to that
conclusion.
Although the APA requires an agency that denies the request of an
interested person made in connection with an agency proceeding to provide
"[p]rompt notice" of that denial that includes "a brief statement of the grounds for
denial", 5 U.S.C. sec. 555(e) (2018), that requirement has been construed as
simply a codification of the more general requirement of adequate explanation for
agency actions originating in caselaw, see Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d
731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing 5 U.S.C. sec. 555(e) as a codification of the
"'fundamental' requirement of administrative law" that "an agency 'set forth its
reasons' for decision"). Thus, the 5 U.S.C. sec. 555(e) requirement of a brief
explanatory statement is no more stringent than the general adequate explanation
requirement. A statement complies with 5 U.S.C. sec. 555(e) if it is "sufficiently
detailed * * * [to allow a] reviewing tribunal * * * [to] appraise the agency's
determination under the appropriate standards of review." City of Gillette, Wyo.
v. FERC, 737 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1984). Because SO Matthews' explanation
-27-
[*27] of her rejection of petitioner's proposed OIC would comply with 5 U.S.C.
sec. 555(e) as well as the more general judicially created administrative law
requirement, the adequacy of her explanation does not give us any more reason
than the question of the scope of our review to reconsider the APA's applicability
to our CDP cases.
IV. Mrs. Hinerfeld as Petitioner's Nominee
Having disposed of petitioner's threshold arguments and considered the
standard and scope of our review, we now turn to the ultimate issue the case
presents: whether SO Matthews was correct in treating Mrs. Hinerfeld as holding
title to the Larchmont residence as petitioner's nominee.
A. Relevant Factors Under New York Law
We begin by asking whether New York courts would recognize the nominee
theory on which SO Matthews relied. Although Federal law provides means by
which the Commissioner can proceed against property owned by a delinquent
taxpayer, the question of whether a taxpayer has an interest in particular property
must be answered by State law. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985). And it is a "universal" conflicts of laws
principle that "the law of the place where it is situated * * * governs all matters
-28-
[*28] concerning the title and disposition of real property". 16 Am. Jur. 2d,
Conflict of Laws, sec. 22 (2009).
The District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged in
Nassar Family Irrevocable Tr. v. United States, No. 13 Civ. 5680 (ER), 2016 WL
5793737, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Nassar,
699 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2017), that "New York state courts have not explicitly
applied the nominee theory of ownership in tax cases." As that court went on to
note, however, it and other District Courts in the Second Circuit "have applied the
nominee theory in tax cases where the property interest was governed by New
York law." Id.; see also United States v. Evseroff, No. 00-cv-06029 (KAM), 2012
WL 1514860, at *9-*13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012), aff'd, 528 F. App'x 75 (2d Cir.
2013); Giardino v. United States, No. 96-cv-6348T, 1997 WL 1038197, at *2-*5
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1997); Blue Lotus Holdings Ltd., Inc. v. United States,
No. 96-cv-233, 1996 WL 679758, at *3-*4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996); First Corp.
Sedans, Inc. v. United States, No. 94 Civ. 7642 (DC), 1996 WL 145958, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1996). In determining whether a titleholder is really a nominee
for a delinquent taxpayer, the court in each cited case applied a six-factor test
drawn from LiButti v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 589 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
-29-
[*29] LiButti was a wrongful levy suit brought by Edith LiButti to challenge the
Government's efforts to collect tax owed by her father, Robert, by levying on a
racehorse, Devil His Due, which it claimed she held as his nominee. Although
Edith and her father were New Jersey residents, Edith brought suit in the District
Court for the Northern District of New York because the IRS had seized Devil His
Due when the horse was in Saratoga to run in the Whitney Handicap. Because the
court determined that New Jersey had a stronger interest in the case than did New
York, it concluded that conflict of laws principles required it to "apply New Jersey
law, when possible". Id. at 597. But the court found "no reported cases
addressing the factors relevant to the nominee theory from New Jersey". Id. at
598. With the parties' agreement, the court therefore applied six factors drawn
from caselaw in various jurisdictions by the District Court for the District of
Montana in Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 791 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont.
1992). As listed by the court in LiButti, those factors are:
(1) whether inadequate or no consideration was paid by the nominee;
(2) whether the property was placed in the nominee's name in
anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability while the transferor remains
in control of the property; (3) whether there is a close relationship
between the nominee and transferor; (4) whether the * * * [parties]
-30-
[*30] failed to record the conveyance; (5) whether the transferor retains
possession; and (6) whether the transferor continues to enjoy the
benefits of the transferred property. * * *
LiButti, 894 F. Supp. at 598.11
B. Application of Factors
For the reasons explained below, consideration of the six LiButti factors
supports SO Matthews' conclusion that Mrs. Hinerfeld holds the Larchmont
residence as her husband's nominee.
11
On the facts before it, the court in LiButti v. United States, 894 F. Supp.
589 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997), found
only one of the listed factors (close relationship) to be present and thus concluded
that Edith LiButti did not hold Devil His Due as her father's nominee. The court
also rejected the Government's argument that the stable business that owned the
horse was an alter ego of Mr. LiButti on the grounds that the alter ego theory
applied only to pierce the veil of a corporation and could not be applied to impute
property of a proprietorship to its owner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit viewed the District Court as having evidenced "an over-rigid
'preoccupation with questions of structure'". LiButti, 107 F.3d at 119 (quoting
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir.
1996)). The appellate court reasoned that "if Robert dominated and controlled
Lion Crest [the stable] he should not be able to escape his tax liabilities simply
because it was not incorporated, and he chose, instead, to constitute his daughter
as his unincorporated business' nominee." Id.
-31-
[*31] 1. Adequacy of Consideration
Petitioner has not established that Mrs. Hinerfeld paid any consideration for
the Larchmont residence.12 None of the payments made by Mrs. Hinerfeld that
petitioner and his attorney have, at various times, claimed to be the consideration
for that transfer were made contemporaneously with the deed by which petitioner
transferred to his wife title to the Larchmont residence. The record includes no
written documentation that specifically identifies those payments as bargained-for
consideration for Mrs. Hinerfeld's acquisition of the residence.
Although petitioner and his attorney made conflicting claims about which of
Mrs. Hinerfeld's payments in satisfaction of petitioner's liabilities constituted
consideration for petitioner's transfer of the residence, they both ended up singling
out Mrs. Hinerfeld's March 2002 payment of $300,000 to Commerce Bank and her
$750,000 payment to Fleet Bank the following November. Petitioner would thus
have us believe that he and his wife entered into an agreement no later than March
2002 for her to acquire the Larchmont residence and that his conveyance to her in
February 2003 satisfied a preexisting obligation. New York law requires contracts
for the sale of real estate to be in writing, N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law sec. 5-703(2)
12
Petitioner has the burden of proving that SO Matthews abused her
discretion in rejecting his OIC. See Rule 142(a); Titsworth v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-12, 2012 WL 86670, at *6.
-32-
[*32] (McKinney 2018) ("A contract for * * * the sale * * * of any real property
* * * is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing
the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing."), and the record provides no
evidence that petitioner and his wife committed their alleged agreement to writing.
If petitioner and Mrs. Hinerfeld had entered into an oral agreement requiring him
to transfer to her title to the Larchmont residence in consideration of the payments
she made in March and November 2002, her part performance of that agreement
might have enabled her to have a court compel petitioner's transfer of title despite
the absence of a written agreement. See id., sec. 5-703(4) ("Nothing contained in
this section abridges the powers of courts of equity to compel the specific
performance of agreements in cases of part performance."). But the conflicting
claims made by petitioner, his wife, and his attorney regarding the precise terms of
the alleged agreement provide grounds for skepticism about the existence of an
agreement with sufficiently clear terms to be specifically enforced.
In short, even considering the additional evidence presented at trial,13 the
record does not establish a clear enough nexus between petitioner's transfer of title
13
If we were to decline to consider the Hinerfelds' trial testimony, we would
have no explanation at all of the discrepancy in timing between the transfer of title
and the payments that allegedly provided consideration for that transfer.
-33-
[*33] to the Larchmont residence and specific payments by Mrs. Hinerfeld for us
to accept those payments as bargained-for consideration.
2. Transfer With Retained Control in Anticipation of Liability
Although Mrs. Hinerfeld admitted at trial that she had acquired title to the
Larchmont residence to protect it from petitioner's creditors, petitioner argues that
the second LiButti factor does not apply in the present case because "[t]he
Larchmont residence was transferred to Ruth three years prior to the assessment of
the tax liabilities in issue, and without any knowledge of the same." As articulated
by the court in LiButti, 894 F. Supp. at 598, however, the factor applies if the
transfer was made "in anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability". The transfer
need not have been made in anticipation, or to avoid the collection, of the specific
liability that the Commissioner seeks to have satisfied.
In the case of a transfer of title to residential property from one occupant to
another, it is not obvious how one goes about determining whether the transferor
retained "control" of the property after the transfer. The location of legal title
would be unlikely to have a significant practical impact on the residents' use and
enjoyment of the property.
Perhaps in recognition of that reality, the Federal District Courts in the
Second Circuit, in applying the LiButti factors, have tended to equate possession
-34-
[*34] and control. For example, in Evseroff, 2012 WL 1514860, at *11, the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York wrote: "Evidence in the record
indicates that the second factor is satisfied in that * * * the property was
transferred in anticipation of Evseroff's liability to the IRS and possibly his
estranged wife, and Evseroff remained in possession and control of the Dover
Street Residence." In Nassar Family Irrevocable Tr., the District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that a trust to which a taxpayer had
transferred an apartment held that property as the taxpayer's nominee. The court
began its analysis by stating its finding "that the undisputed evidence demonstrates
that * * * [the taxpayer] has exercised complete control over the Apartment and
has retained all the benefits of ownership, suggesting that he, not the Trust, is the
true owner of the property." Nassar Family Irrevocable Tr., 2016 WL 5793737,
at *9. But at no point in its analysis did the court differentiate between possession
and control. (In discussing the second LiButti factor, the court referred only to
evidence that the taxpayer transferred the apartment to the trust in anticipation of
the tax liabilities in issue and other liabilities.)
Without citing any caselaw on point, respondent seems to follow the same
tack: essentially equating possession and control. In listing the reasons to believe
that petitioner retained control over the Larchmont residence, respondent notes
-35-
[*35] that petitioner and Mrs. Hinerfeld have lived there since 1968 and that
petitioner continued to pay at least some of the expenses relating to the property
after transferring title to his wife. On the premise that Mrs. Hinerfeld acted at
petitioner's direction in satisfying his liabilities, respondent asks us to infer that
she also acted at his direction in paying household expenses. Petitioner counters:
"[T]he fact that * * * [he] minimally supported the residence by paying
insignificant expenses cannot be enough to establish his 'control over the
property'".
But petitioner has failed to identify any respect in which his transfer to his
wife of legal title to the Larchmont residence materially affected their use of the
property. As respondent argues: "There is no indication in the record that the
'transfer' of the Larchmont residence to Mrs. Hinerfeld affected Petitioner's use of
the property in any way." Certainly, petitioner remained in possession of the
property. To the extent that possession can be equated with control, he also
retained control of the property. And, again, Mrs. Hinerfeld admitted that she
acquired title to the property in an effort to shield it from petitioner's creditors.14
14
The administrative record alone provides sufficient evidence to support a
conclusion that the Larchmont residence was placed in Mrs. Hinerfeld's name in
anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability. SO Matthews, of course, did not have
Mrs. Hinerfeld's trial testimony before her. SO Matthews seems to have inferred
(continued...)
-36-
[*36] For those reasons, we conclude that the second LiButti factor also weighs in
favor of viewing Mrs. Hinerfeld as holding the Larchmont residence as petitioner's
nominee.
3. Close Relationship
Petitioner admits that he and his wife have a "close relationship" but claims
that, under the circumstances, their relationship ought to be a "neutral" factor. As
he articulates his argument: "Although there is a 'close relationship' between the
alleged nominee (Ruth) and Petitioner; and although Petitioner resides in the
residence and enjoys its benefits, considering the marital relationship, and the fact
14
(...continued)
from the fact that the transfer of title to the Larchmont residence occurred while
Thermacon's employment taxes were accruing that petitioner made the transfer to
protect the residence from his personal liability for those taxes. Because she
purported to apply the factors listed in IRM pt. 5.17.2.5.7.2(3), she apparently felt
she had to establish that the transfer was "for tax avoidance purposes". But
respondent did not assess any of the liabilities in issue until February 27, 2006,
and the record provides no evidence that petitioner was aware of Thermacon's
unpaid employment taxes before that date. In any event, under the LiButti factors,
the relevant question is not whether the transfer in issue was motivated by a desire
to avoid the particular tax liabilities in issue but simply whether the transfer was
made to protect the property from liabilities. And the administrative record
provides plenty of evidence that petitioner's transfer to his wife of title to the
Larchmont residence was related to his and Thermacon's financial difficulties.
Indeed, petitioner insisted to SO Matthews that his wife's payment of liabilities
served as the consideration for the transfer.
-37-
[*37] that Ruth paid for almost all costs respecting the residence, it is submitted
that these are neutral factors."
Petitioner's reasoning seems to be grounded on the premise that, whenever
one spouse transfers a joint residence to the other, the transferor's continued use
and enjoyment of the residence is to be expected. Given their relationship, the
transferee is unlikely to send the transferor packing after securing title to the
residence. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized this reality in a
bankruptcy case when it rejected the creditors' argument that the debtor's residing
at property purchased by his wife and transferred to a trust evidences that the
debtor was the property's equitable owner. Babitt v. Vebeliunas (In re
Vebeliunas), 332 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2003). As the court observed: "[T]he mere fact
that the debtor lived at Lattingtown Estate, along with his wife and family, without
paying rent does not divest * * * [the wife] or the * * * [t]rust of ownership of the
property, because a homeowner would be expected to allow her spouse and
children to live rent-free in her home." Id. at 92. And we ourselves have noted
that "[c]ourts * * * must be cognizant of letting a close relationship take
precedence over all of the other factors" in determining whether a relative acts as
nominee for a transferor. Dalton v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 416.
-38-
[*38] Certainly, "a close relationship between grantor and grantee does not
necessarily make the grantee the grantor's nominee." Id. But rendering the close
relationship factor neutral, as petitioner suggests, would go too far in the other
direction. When other factors weigh in favor of treating one related party as the
other's nominee, as in petitioner's case, the parties' relationship can and should
provide further support for that treatment.
4. Recording of Conveyance
Although the copy of the deed by which petitioner transferred to his wife
title to the Larchmont residence that is included in the record bears no evidence of
recording, respondent does not contest petitioner's claim that "[t]he deed reflecting
the transfer was properly recorded." On the basis of respondent's concession, we
will treat the fourth LiButti factor as weighing against viewing Mrs. Hinerfeld as
petitioner's nominee in holding title to the Larchmont residence.
5. Retention of Possession and Continued Enjoyment of the
Transferred Property
In the case of property used as a residence, possession and continued
enjoyment amount to the same thing. Thus, in the present case, the fifth and sixth
LiButti factors collapse into one. And those factors both weigh in favor of
treating Mrs. Hinerfeld as petitioner's nominee in holding title to the property. As
-39-
[*39] noted above, there is no evidence in the record that petitioner's transfer to
his wife of title to the Larchmont residence significantly affected his possession or
enjoyment of the property.
V. Conclusion
Because all of the LiButti factors other than the recording of the deed weigh
in favor of treating Mrs. Hinerfeld as petitioner's nominee in holding title to the
Larchmont residence, SO Matthews' determination to that effect was not only
reasonable but correct. Petitioner transferred the property to a person--his wife--
with whom he had a close relationship. He failed to establish that Mrs. Hinerfeld
paid adequate consideration for the property. Mrs. Hinerfeld admitted at trial that
title to the Larchmont residence was placed in her name to protect the property
from her husband's creditors (and the administrative record before SO Matthews
gave her grounds to infer that to have been the case). Finally, petitioner failed to
identify any respect in which the transfer of legal title to the residence affected his
use or enjoyment of the property. Because Mrs. Hinerfeld can appropriately be
-40-
[*40] treated as petitioner's nominee in holding title to the Larchmont residence,
SO Matthews did not abuse her discretion in rejecting an OIC that did not reflect
the value of that property.
Decision will be entered for
respondent.