DocketNumber: Docket No. 61999
Citation Numbers: 32 T.C. 906, 1959 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125
Judges: Raum,Opper,Drennen,Withey
Filed Date: 7/20/1959
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
*125
1. Petitioner's members paid their annual membership fees in advance. In reporting such fees petitioner, on an accrual basis, included in income only one-twelfth of each fee for each month of the year, thus leaving unreported for any given taxable year the portion of the fee allocable to the period of membership in the following taxable year, which, however, was reported in the following taxable year.
2.
*126 *906 Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's income and excess profits taxes for the calendar years, and in the amounts, indicated below.
Year | Excess profits | Income tax |
tax | ||
1944 | $ 488.74 | |
1945 | $ 13,174.40 | 1 (1,731.16) |
1946 | 117,325.04 | |
1947 | 83,984.22 | |
1948 | 114,435.77 | |
1949 | 240,893.85 | |
1950 | 225,991.83 |
*907 In an amendment to his answer respondent alleges that certain additions to income, upon which the above deficiencies are in part based, should be increased by the amounts shown in the following schedule, thereby producing an increase in the deficiencies previously determined: 1
Additional | Increase in | Additional | |
Year | income | additional | income as |
originally | income | recomputed | |
computed | |||
1946 | $ 470,426.25 | $ 1,320.63 | $ 471,746.88 |
1947 | 271,150.00 | 3,502.51 | 274,652.51 |
1948 | 334,967.50 | 3,907.50 | 338,875.00 |
1949 | 215,565.00 | 43,930.00 | 259,495.00 |
1950 | 293,666.25 | 3,810.00 | 297,476.25 |
*127 Petitioner concedes that if it was taxable on additional income in the years in question, respondent's figures, as recomputed, reflect the correct amount of that income.
The issues are:
1. Whether petitioner, for tax accounting purposes, was required to include in income in the taxable year of receipt the full amount of prepaid membership dues received during such year, or whether petitioner properly deferred a portion of such dues to the year immediately following the year of receipt.
2. Whether petitioner was required to include in income the annual excess of proceeds from the sale of "savings plan coupons" over redemptions of such coupons from members.
OPINION.
The parties have filed a stipulation of facts which is hereby adopted as our findings. Petitioner, a New York corporation having its principal office in New York City, filed its income and excess profits tax returns here involved with the*128 then collector of internal revenue for the third district of New York. It was incorporated on April 26, 1934, under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York; it functions as an "automobile club" which provides emergency road service, travel assistance, personal accident policies, bail bonds, and other similar and related services to its members. For purposes of this litigation, it is conceded that petitioner is not a tax-exempt organization and is subject to tax in the same manner as any other corporation carrying on or engaged in business for profit.
Petitioner maintains its books and records on a calendar year basis and has from its inception employed "the accrual method" in keeping *908 its corporate accounts. In 1943, the first year petitioner was required to file a corporation income tax return, and for the years 1944 and 1945, petitioner reported receipts from membership dues as gross income in the year of receipt. However, petitioner subsequently filed amended 1944 and 1945 returns in which it deferred a ratable portion of its receipts from membership dues in accordance with the method of bookkeeping employed in keeping its corporate accounts; returns*129 for 1946 through 1950 reported income according to the same method.
Membership dues constituted the primary source of petitioner's annual revenues, as indicated below:
Year | Membership | Initiation | Miscellaneous |
dues | fees | receipts | |
1944 | $ 383,700 | (1) | $ 3,705.01 |
1945 | 680,595 | ( | 7,725.89 |
1946 | 1,477,560 | $ 24,175 | 24,175.00 |
1947 | 1,996,965 | 231,875 | 154,002.10 |
1948 | 2,687,490 | 289,985 | 134,594.32 |
1949 | 3,171,270 | 254,975 | 182,653.95 |
1950 | 3,761,745 | 279,880 | 226,371.11 |
The column headed "Miscellaneous receipts" represents receipts from the operation of a driving school, proceeds of the sale of maps and publications, travel bureau commissions, and other items.
A person otherwise qualified for membership became a member upon payment of an initiation fee and annual dues of $ 15; payment might be made on any day of the calendar year. For years subsequent to the first year of membership, annual dues became payable on the last day of the month corresponding to the month in which the member was originally admitted to membership. Initiation fees were reported in full by petitioner as gross income in the year of receipt. Annual dues, on the*130 other hand, were not immediately recorded as receipts of income on petitioner's books, nor were they reported in full as gross income in the year of receipt. Petitioner instead credited each month's receipts to a reserve account; during the first month of membership and each of the following 11 months, one-twelfth of the reserve was taken into income. The effect of this accounting was to spread the receipts of any given month ratably over the ensuing 12-month period. Consequently, at the end of each calendar year, the reserve account contained substantial funds which petitioner had received during the year but had not yet credited to income; such funds remained to be taken into income ratably over that part of the 12-month period falling in the next calendar year. The amounts of annual receipts thus deferred are shown by the following table: *909
Dues deferred | |||
Year | Dues received | Dues reported | And not reported |
as income | as | ||
income | |||
1944 | $ 383,700 | 1 $ 351,570.60 | |
1945 | 680,595 | ||
1946 | 1,477,560 | 1,005,813.12 | 471,746.88 |
1947 | 1,996,965 | 1,722,312.49 | 274,652.51 |
1948 | 2,687,490 | 2,348,615.00 | 338,875.00 |
1949 | 3,171,270 | 2,911,775.00 | 259,495.00 |
1950 | 3,761,745 | 3,464,268.75 | 297,476.25 |
The annual increase in receipts from membership dues was attributable to the steady increase in petitioner's membership from 25,580 in 1944 to 250,783 in 1950.
All receipts of membership dues were deposited in petitioner's bank account, unsegregated from its general funds, and were available and used without restriction for general corporate purposes. Petitioner's bylaws provided that if a member resigned (or canceled his contract with petitioner), he forfeited all rights in petitioner's property and assets and was not entitled to a refund of any portion of his advance payments. In the event of liquidation, dissolution, or other discontinuance of petitioner's business, any surplus remaining after payment of debts and liabilities would be distributed to charities selected by petitioner's board of directors, and not to petitioner's members.
Petitioner incurred certain expenses in rendering services to its members. The table below reveals the annual amounts of such expenses and the purposes for which they were incurred:
Emergency | Travel | Personal | |
Year | road service | department | accident policies |
and bail bonds | |||
1944 | $ 83,389.23 | $ 33,566.28 | $ 25,925.34 |
1945 | 161,606.74 | 55,837.29 | 46,021.09 |
1946 | 313,325.12 | 172,794.66 | 99,364.50 |
1947 | 546,507.37 | 332,389.16 | 134,793.40 |
1948 | 899,512.91 | 395,756.60 | 181,864.72 |
1949 | 860,895.87 | 454,834.62 | 214,887.43 |
1950 | 1,185,644.63 | 521,188.21 | 254,553.93 |
*132 Petitioner could not estimate in advance the amount of monthly or annual expenses that would be incurred in rendering services to its members since such expenses were dependent upon the membership's demands and requirements. For example, the largest component of expenses incurred for "Emergency road service" was for "towing." Pursuant to separate contracts between petitioner and various automobile service stations, the stations agreed to tow a member's automobile from the point of disablement to the station's place of business or any other station on the way to the contracting station's place of business; petitioner agreed to pay for such emergency towing service *910 (and other incidental mechanical service) at a flat rate per call, either $ 1.50, $ 2, or $ 2.50, depending on the terms of the particular contract. No limit was imposed on the number of calls a member could make. In addition, petitioner's board of directors reserved the discretion to grant monthly and/or quarterly bonuses to contracting stations which rendered satisfactory service to petitioner's members during the particular month or quarter. The cost of providing travel assistance likewise depended on the*133 demands of the membership. The average
Percentage | ||
Year | Range per year | variation per |
Year | ||
1946 | $ 0.49-0.67 | 37 |
1947 | .54- .67 | 24 |
1948 | .50-1.00 | 100 |
1949 | .47- .65 | 38 |
1950 | .50- .75 | 50 |
In addition to the above services, petitioner made a purchase discount plan available to its members. Pursuant to contracts, petitioner sold "savings plan coupons" to service stations and automobile accessory stores at face value (100 cents in coupons for $ 1); the contracting stations and stores then distributed the coupons to petitioner's members in an amount equal to 10 per cent of each member's purchases. Members could then redeem their coupons either by applying them to the payment of annual dues or having them refunded in cash by petitioner; the coupons did*134 not have a time limit for redemption. In most years, petitioner's receipts from the sale of coupons exceeded the amounts paid out in redemptions, as follows:
Year | Sales | Redemptions | Sales in excess | Redemptions |
of redemptions | in excess of sales | |||
Nov. to Dec. 1935 | $ 1,775.00 | $ 20.27 | $ 1,754.73 | |
1936 | 18,267.26 | 6,701.31 | 11,565.95 | |
1937 | 38,844.67 | 22,924.48 | 15,920.19 | |
1938 | 54,850.81 | 44,016.79 | 10,834.02 | |
1939 | 80,703.73 | 57,310.12 | 23,393.61 | |
1940 | 108,910.23 | 87,960.01 | 20,950.22 | |
1941 | 121,593.47 | 94,369.15 | 27,224.32 | |
1942 | 43,242.21 | 126,302.60 | $ 83,060.39 | |
1943 | 4,406.06 | 13,444.13 | 9,038.07 | |
1944 | 2,738.13 | 4,428.67 | 1,690.54 | |
1945 | 6,985.76 | 3,224.95 | 3,760.81 | |
1946 | 97,099.32 | 26,499.88 | 70,599.44 | |
1947 | 296,738.08 | 145,087.71 | 151,650.37 | |
1948 | 544,449.50 | 315,405.78 | 229,043.72 | |
1949 | 963,967.79 | 654,159.75 | 309,808.04 | |
1950 | 1,193,546.72 | 1,007,450.48 | 186,096.24 |
*911 Coupons offered for redemption by service stations and accessory stores (as opposed to those redeemed by petitioner's members) were redeemed only upon cancellation of the savings plan contracts between petitioner and the redeeming stations or stores. The amounts of such redemptions*135 never exceeded between $ 200 and $ 300 in any given year.
No amounts received from the sale of coupons during the taxable years in question were reported by petitioner as income, nor were any redemptions taken as deductions. Instead petitioner credited all sales proceeds, and debited all redemptions, to a reserve account. The credit balance in the reserve account increased as follows during the taxable years in question:
Year | Credit balance |
1944 | $ 57,854.04 |
1945 | 61,614.85 |
1946 | 132,214.29 |
1947 | 283,864.66 |
1948 | 512,908.38 |
1949 | 782,716.42 |
1950 | 968,812.66 |
The "Credit balance" shown on the exhibit submitted jointly by the parties has been increased, as agreed to by them, by $ 40,000 for the years 1944 through 1948 to reflect a debit to the reserve for coupon redemption in 1942, which entry was reversed in 1949.
All receipts from the sale of coupons were deposited in petitioner's general bank account, unsegregated from its general funds, and were available and used without restriction for general corporate purposes. Those redemptions paid in cash were likewise paid from petitioner's general and unsegregated funds.
Petitioner, at all times, maintained sufficient cash *136 and liquid securities to redeem all outstanding coupons; but such assets were not segregated from general corporate assets not restricted to any particular use.
1.
We are not persuaded that the case at bar warrants modification of the established rule which has been followed in a long line of cases. There is no serious question here that the amounts in controversy are taxable as income. The only issue is
Under *140 accrual accounting, a taxpayer may be required to accrue an item prior to actual receipt if the right thereto has become unqualifiedly *913 established. But where there is actual receipt and the funds are at the unrestricted disposal of the taxpayer, as is the case here, all the events have already occurred that call for accrual. It has not been the practice in tax accounting to enter upon a further inquiry as to whether the income has been "earned" in order to defer the reporting of such income to a later year. The practical difficulties in embarking upon such inquiry and the burden of making the necessary allocations of the amounts of income which, though realized in the taxable year, would have to be charged in part to the taxable year and in part to other years, make clear why no such system has ever been part of the general scheme of our tax laws. To be sure, there may be special situations, such as those involving bond premiums, where specific regulations have permitted "amortization" of the premiums over the life of the bonds. But even in those exceptional situations, it has been recognized that the premium income is
Petitioner earnestly urges upon us a highly elaborate analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Whether the Commissioner's action herein be regarded merely as correcting certain items within petitioner's system of accounting or whether it be treated as requiring a different system of accounting is not a matter of crucial significance. If the former, he was plainly justified in so doing because the income in question must be taxed no later than when received under either cash or accrual systems of accounting. And if the latter, he is on even stronger ground. For, the latitude allowable to the Commissioner is very broad, and it is not the function of the courts to exercise the discretion which under the statute is committed to him. As the Supreme Court said *914 in
Moreover, the method employed by the taxpayer is never conclusive. If in the opinion of the Commissioner it does not clearly reflect the income, "the computation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner" as will, in his opinion, do so.
* * * *
It is not the province of the court to weigh and determine the relative merits of systems of accounting. * * *
See also
The contention that the tax is "in violation of the
Subsequent to the preparation of this opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on May 28, 1959, reversed our decision in
2.
We have had a number of occasions in the past to consider similar contentions, in analogous situations, and have repeatedly held that unrestricted income, subject only to a contingent liability to refund in future years, must be reported in the year of receipt, with the consequence that*146 deductions for refunds may be taken in the year in which such refunds are in fact made. See, e.g.,
The fact that petitioner did not intend ultimately to profit from the coupon transactions is not controlling. As was stated by the Court of Appeals in
Usually at the end of any year, containers are outstanding in the hands of the customers and income for the year includes charges for the outstanding containers; in the end, the charges will be nullified by credits for such of the containers as are returned. Although there is intended ultimately no gain in the transaction, the tide of "income" ebbs and flows over the dividing line between the statutory taxable years. We have decided that a reserve is unallowable by way of excluding from income the charge for containers expected to be returned.
Our opinion in the
*916 Finally, petitioner's argument that it did not "own" the proceeds but held them subject to a "trust" for its members has no support in the record, particularly in view of petitioner's stipulation that the funds might be used for general corporate purposes.
Opper,
Again, in
that both of the New Jersey taxes under consideration would in the normal course be treated as part of such overhead expense, not for the year
This uncertainty and capriciousness in what should be a rational and purely practical area is not alleviated by the fact that
If we were a free agent I would accordingly dissent from any conclusion that we should disturb the taxpayer's consistent practice in the absence of more convincing evidence than we have that this would result in any real, or at least avoidable, distortion of income over the long term.
But the question has already been passed on.
*152 But I disagree with my brother Pierce that for this reason we should follow the latter circuit. It seems to me, as a unified and integrated administrative court, the Tax Court is obligated by the geographical uniformity provisions of the
I accordingly concur in the result on the authority of the
Drennen,
We found in
I do not think this conclusion is contrary to the settled views of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as expressed in
Pierce,
1. Whether, under the accrual method of accounting, amounts received in one taxable year which are admittedly the price of services to be performed in future years,
2. Whether, if the Court of Appeals for a particular circuit has decided a question of law (such, for example, as the question above *919 mentioned) in such manner and at such time as to leave no doubt as to its present position, the Tax Court should, in deciding the same question of law in a case wherein its decision will (unless otherwise stipulated by the parties) be subject to review by said particular circuit, follow the settled law of such circuit.
My dissent from the majority opinion in the instant case is directed to the positions therein taken with respect to each of the above questions.
(A) As regards the first of said questions, this Court in *156 deciding the first issue of the instant case, relied on a so-called "established rule" which it had developed and consistently applied in numerous other cited cases. It said: "[Where] there is actual receipt and the funds are at the unrestricted disposal of the taxpayer, as is the case here, all the events have already occurred that call for accrual"; and it further said more specifically: "An item of income cannot accrue for tax purposes
Such "established rule" is, in substance, an application of the so-called "claim of right" doctrine to the accrual method of accounting -- although it was not here, as it was in several of the cited cases, so
Thus, in
Having been received under
Also in
the partnership's accounting system may well have "clearly reflected income" according to generally accepted commercial accounting practice. However, accounting practice must bow to established rules of law in the determination of taxable income. The "
Likewise, in
We agree that the principle upon which the
(B) Several of the Courts of Appeals have reversed the Tax Court in cases dealing with advance payments for future services. They have indicated that, with proper accounting, portions of advance payments received in one period by an accrual basis taxpayer may be taken into income in subsequent periods; and that
No detailed review of the above Courts of Appeals' cases is here presented, for their import can best be gathered from reading them in their entirety. It appears sufficient to state here that, while each case deals with different facts and approaches the general problem from a somewhat different viewpoint, all are consistent with one another. Emerging from these cases, when considered collectively, are the following principles:
1. That the "claim of right" doctrine has no proper application to the present problem of determining
2. That the purpose of Congress, in authorizing the use of the accrual method of accounting, was to bring tax accounting into closer *921 harmony with recognized methods of business accounting; 1 and thus to permit a clearer reflection of income than had been possible when sole emphasis had been placed on the time of receipts and the time of disbursements.
*161 3. That
4. That permitting deferral of advance payments does not involve interference with the Commissioner's *162 broad discretion to require that taxpayers' accounting methods shall clearly reflect income. It represents, rather, judicial correction of the Commissioner's action in improperly applying a legal principle.
5. That any "rule" which requires advance payments for future services to be accrued in their entirety
6. That established accounting systems based on sound accounting principles, under which advance payments are deferred, should not be disapproved solely because they do not conform to the Commissioner's application of the "claim of right" doctrine.
It is significant that in the
The practice*163 of disapproving consistent accounting systems of long standing seems to me to be exceeding all reasonable bounds. * * * Methods of keeping records do not spring in glittering perfection from some unchangeable natural law but are devised to aid business men in maintaining sometimes intricate accounts. If reasonably adapted to that use they should not be condemned for some abstruse legal reason, but only when they fail to reflect income. There is no persuasive indication that such a condition exists here. On the contrary, a whole industry apparently has adopted the method used by petitioner.
*922 It will not do to say that respondent should not have disturbed petitioner's accounting method, but that since he has done so, we are powerless to do otherwise. As long as we continue to approve the imposition of theoretical criteria in so purely practical a field, respondent will go on attempting to seize on such recurring fortuitous occasions to increase the revenue, even though he may actually accomplish the opposite. * * * I think it evident that petitioner's generally recognized accounting system did not distort its income and that it should be permitted to continue to use it. *164 * * *
The above dissenting opinion was approved and quoted in full by the Ninth Circuit, in its reversal of the majority opinion; and said court further said:
Not only do we have here a system of accounting which for years has been adopted and carried into effect by substantially all members of a large industry, but the system is one which appeals to us as so much in line with plain common sense that we are at a loss to understand what could have prompted the Commissioner to disapprove it. * * *
This statement of the Ninth Circuit was thereafter quoted with approval by the Fifth Circuit in the
Also, Roswell Magill who is one of the outstanding authorities on Federal income taxation, has indicated disagreement with the accrual in a single year, of amounts which are admittedly the price of services to be performed in future years. In his treatise, entitled "Taxable Income" (rev. ed. 1945) at pages 201-202, he said:
The receipt of the money in a given year satisfied only half the statutory requirements; it remains to inquire whether, under accrual accounting, it should properly be accounted for in later years. * * *
* * * Thus, an insurance company*165 collects a premium in one year for insurance with a three-year term. The premium can hardly be regarded as earned in the year of collection, so the company reports only one-third of it as income in that year. Nevertheless, the relatively few cases which have involved the point have held the income to have been realized in full in the first year. [Earlier cases cited in footnote.] These decisions put an undue emphasis upon the receipt of the money, an element which is the basic test of income under a cash receipts method, but which ought not to be under an accrual method. It is evident that such decisions, which would apparently treat a $ 1,000,000 down payment on a fifty-year lease as income in the year of receipt, lead to a gross and, it seems, quite unnecessary distortion of income. Moreover, they are inconsistent with the decisions denying to the lessee, on these facts, a deduction of $ 1,000,000 at the time the lease was made, and requiring him to prorate the deduction over the life of the lease. No controlling administrative reason for this bird-in-hand policy has yet been set forth; the inequities of the present decisions seem to overbalance the probable loss of revenue*166 from some future insolvencies of taxpayers who have prorated these cash receipts.
(C) The Supreme Court had an opportunity to pass upon the instant problem in
Moreover, it seems apparent that if the Supreme Court had believed, as did the Tax Court*167 in the instant case, that under the accrual method advance payments
Thus it appears that the present question is an open one, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned.
(D) Based on all the foregoing, I believe that this Court in deciding the first issue of the instant case, erred in applying its inflexible "established rule" based on the "claim of right" doctrine; and that the present question of law, which is the
Thereafter, if the Court believed that any question regarding the adequacy of petitioner's particular method of accounting was properly before it, it should have decided such secondary question, and should have developed the facts and reasoning to support its conclusion. See
The second ground for my dissent from the Court's opinion on the first issue of the instant case, is that this Court failed to follow the settled law of the Court of Appeals for the controlling circuit.
On May 28, 1959, as hereinbefore pointed out, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
The petition presents the question * * * whether or in what circumstances a taxpayer who has long employed the accrual method of accounting may defer the inclusion in income of prepaid revenues on contracts to render future services over a twelve month period subsequent to the date of receipt. The Commissioner *924 asserted a deficiency * * * on the ground that "the method employed does not clearly*169 reflect the income" of petitioner,
The Second Circuit then reviewed extensively the statutes and authorities bearing on the problem; and it made the following holdings:
the petitioner's "true income" would be distorted by the inclusion of the entire receipt in its year's revenues [when received].
* * * *
with the sole exception of
* * * *
It is apparent from the decision of the majority [of the Supreme Court in said
* * * *
Therefore there is no basis whatever in the cited cases for the Commissioner's broad assertion that for tax purposes concededly unearned receipts must be regarded as income in the year of receipt, and there is nothing to indicate that in construing
* * * *
In conclusion, petitioner's regularly employed method of accounting on an accrual basis and its deferral of income so that it most closely matched the corresponding expenses clearly reflected its true income. * * *
The opinion was unanimous; and the decision of the Tax Court was reversed.
On the following day, May 29, 1959, the same court (composed this time of three different judges) decided
*925 Notwithstanding the two above-mentioned decisions of the Second Circuit, and notwithstanding that any appeal from the Tax Court's decision in the instant case lies within the jurisdiction of that circuit, this Court decided the first issue in reliance upon its so-called "established rule" which is based on the "claim of right" doctrine. There can be no doubt that the position taken by this Court in the instant case is in direct conflict with the position of the Second Circuit in the
Two Courts of Appeals have recently admonished this Court, in no uncertain terms, that its duty is to follow the settled law of the controlling circuit.
the Tax Court of the United States is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow, as the settled law of the circuit, an opinion of the court of appeals for that circuit. If the tax court is not bound on questions of law by decisions of the appropriate circuit having jurisdiction, why should any jurisdiction be vested in circuit courts of appeals to review decisions of the tax court? The district courts of the several circuits also have statutory jurisdiction in tax cases and they are bound to follow the rules of decision pronounced by the United States Court of Appeals having appellate jurisdiction over the particular district court. The tax court is no less bound to do so. The mere fact that it is a court having jurisdiction in tax cases throughout the United States does not establish the tax court as superior in any aspect to United States District Courts.
The desire of the tax court to establish by its decisions a uniform rule does not empower it to disregard the decisions of its several reviewing courts of appeals. It is for the Supreme Court of the United States -- and for that tribunal alone*173 -- to review and reverse decisions of the courts of appeals of the United States in their respective jurisdictions. Until the Supreme Court reverses a rule by a court of appeals for its circuit, that rule must be followed by the tax court.
The statement of the Seventh Circuit, in the
The instant case does not present a situation, where the controlling circuit has not expressed its views on the particular question involved, or where a decision of the controlling circuit on such question is so old or so indefinite that the circuit's current position may be subject to reasonable doubt. Rather, the situation here presented is one where the controlling circuit has very recently considered, reviewed, and passed upon the identical question which the Tax Court has now decided in a contrary manner.
I believe that this Court, in deciding the first issue of the present case, should have followed the settled law of the Second Circuit. And I further believe that, at least as to situations like the present, the views heretofore expressed in
This is not to say that, if in a particular case this Court's views are contrary to those of the controlling circuit, it may not properly state that its decision in such case will not be regarded as a precedent. It is my conviction, however, that under our judicial tradition this Court should not substitute its own views for the contrary settled views of the Court of Appeals for a controlling circuit.
1. Determination of overassessment.↩
1. No figures have been submitted showing the increased deficiencies resulting from the increase in additional income.↩
1. None.↩
1. Per amended return.↩
2. A change in the law made by
1. "The Commissioner urges that in any event
1. H. Rept. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 22-24.↩
2.
Similarly
Bayshore Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 267 F.2d 55 ( 1959 )
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 267 F.2d 520 ( 1959 )
Neil Sullivan and Grace Sullivan v. Commissioner of ... , 241 F.2d 46 ( 1957 )
The Stacey Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner of ... , 237 F.2d 605 ( 1956 )
E. W. Schuessler and Aline Schuessler v. Commissioner of ... , 230 F.2d 722 ( 1956 )
Harrold v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Cromling v. ... , 192 F.2d 1002 ( 1951 )
Brown v. Helvering , 54 S. Ct. 356 ( 1934 )
Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner , 64 S. Ct. 596 ( 1944 )
Pacific Grape Products Co., a Corporation v. Commissioner ... , 219 F.2d 862 ( 1955 )
Old Colony Railroad v. Commissioner , 52 S. Ct. 211 ( 1932 )
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. , 31 S. Ct. 342 ( 1911 )
Lucas v. American Code Co. , 50 S. Ct. 202 ( 1930 )
United States v. Anderson , 46 S. Ct. 131 ( 1926 )
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner , 77 S. Ct. 707 ( 1957 )