DocketNumber: Docket No. 7538-73
Citation Numbers: 65 T.C. 528, 1975 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 13
Judges: Simpson,Drennen,Irwin
Filed Date: 12/15/1975
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
*13
*528 OPINION
Petitioner Hotel Equities Corp., on February 10, 1975, filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
The facts, which are undisputed for the purpose of the determination of the issue raised by the summary judgment, show that petitioner's tax return for its taxable year ended January 31, 1970, which otherwise would have been due on April 15 of that year, was due on July 15, 1970, pursuant to a properly secured extension of time. 2*18 On July 14, 1970, an officer of petitioner mailed from Burlingame, Calif., in a postage prepaid envelope, properly addressed to the Internal Revenue Service Center in Ogden, Utah, the United States corporate income tax return of petitioner for the year ending January 31, 1970. The respondent did not keep the envelope in which the return was mailed. 3
Petitioner's return for its fiscal year 1970 had affixed thereto a stamp reading "Received, Western Service Center, Jul. 17, 1970, No. 57, Internal Revenue Service, Ogden, Utah." On July 17, 1973, respondent mailed to petitioner a statutory notice determining a deficiency for petitioner's taxable year 1970. Petitioner timely filed with this Court a petition seeking review of that determination. *19 The petition alleged that assessment and collection of the deficiency set forth in the notice with respect to the fiscal year ending January 31, 1970, are barred by
While petitioner in its memorandum in reply to respondent's memorandum, refers to
Respondent, while conceding that petitioner's return was timely filed for the purpose of avoiding any addition to tax under
*22
Against the background of the longstanding definition of "filed" as being when the document is "delivered" *23 Congress enacted
There is no qualification contained in
The provision of this bill which permits the Secretary of the Treasury to require the filing of tax returns at service centers would technically require many taxpayers (for example, those in Hawaii) to mail their returns * * * at a much earlier date * * *
For these reasons, the bill amends the existing timely-mailing-timely-filing provisions to include returns and payments of tax. * * *
*533 In our view, even if this limited quotation from the Senate report properly reflects the underlying reasons for the enactment of
*27 *534 Further, in our view the case of
*28 In the
As contrasted to the "considered timely" words of
In our view, had
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is granted, and
Simpson,
In relevant part,
(1) Date of delivery. -- If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to be filed * * * within a prescribed period or on or before a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by United States mail to the agency, officer, or office*30 with which such return, claim, statement, or other document is required to be filed * * *, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document * * *, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery * * *
*536 Such provision does not state whether the postmark date is to be treated as the date of delivery only for purposes of determining whether a return, claim, statement, or other document has been filed within the prescribed period or on or before the prescribed date, or whether such rule is to be applied for all purposes under the internal revenue laws. It is that question which we must answer in this case.
It is true, as the majority assumes, that as a general rule, when a term or phrase is defined for one purpose, it may be assumed that the term or phrase was intended to have the same meaning for all purposes. See
Before
After its amendment in 1966,
The legislative history of the 1966 amendment furnishes additional support for such view. The amendment of
Technically, under present law taxpayers could be required --
It is thus clear that
The legislative history of the statute of limitations strongly suggests that Congress wanted the Commissioner to have a full 3-year period in which to assess a deficiency. Section 275(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 745, increased the general limitation period from 2 to 3*38 years. The House committee report stated the following reasons for the increase in the statutory period from 2 years:
Experience has shown that this period is too short in a substantial number of large cases, resulting oftentimes in hastily prepared determinations with the result that additional burdens are thrown upon taxpayers in getting ill-advised assessments removed. In other cases, revenue is lost by reason of the fact that sufficient time is not allowed for disclosure of all the facts. * * * [H. Rept. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 1939-1 (Part 2)
Moreover, the same 3-year period is applicable from the date the return is filed, whether or not the filing is timely for other provisions of the Code. Thus,
(a) General Rule. -- Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed
Yet, by its decision today, the Court has reduced the period allowed the Commissioner for examining returns and making assessments. *39 Ordinarily, the reduction in such period will be only slight -- the several days ordinarily required by the U.S. Post Office to deliver a tax return, but if a return is misplaced by the post office, the reduction in such period will be substantial.
What is more, the majority's interpretation of
The majority's treatment of
We do not agree with the plaintiffs' position that the legal effect of
Thus, the fact is that in
Finally, this case arose because the Commissioner asserted that the petitioner owed a very large tax deficiency. By its holding today, the Court has decided that the statute of limitations has run on the assessment of such deficiency and that the merits of the controversy need not be adjudicated. It has often been held that statutes of limitations should be construed narrowly and that courts should be reluctant to interpret them in such a manner as to restrict the activities of the United States. See
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise indicated.↩
2. Respondent in his answer denied petitioner's allegation that it obtained an extension of time for filing its tax return for its taxable year ending Jan. 31, 1970, to July 15, 1970. However, there is attached to petitioner's memorandum filed with its motion for summary judgment a copy of a request for automatic extension for 3 months and respondent has not questioned this exhibit for the purpose of this summary judgment.↩
3. Respondent for the purpose of this summary judgment motion admits the statements in an affidavit attached to petitioner's motion as to the proper mailing of the return on July 14, 1970, and, when questioned by the Court as to the envelope, his attorney stated that he had been unable through proper channels to locate the envelope in which the return was mailed and apparently had not kept it. Since the only evidence possibly available to show a postmark date of July 14, 1970, on the envelope was in effect conceded by respondent's attorney to have been destroyed by respondent, we have assumed that a postmark date of July 14, 1970, appeared on the envelope. Respondent does not contend that we should do otherwise.↩
4.
(a) General Rule. -- Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after such tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on which any part of such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period.
(b) Time Return Deemed Filed. -- (1) Early return. -- For purposes of this section, a return of tax imposed by this title, except tax imposed by chapter 3, 21, or 24, filed before the last day prescribed by law or by regulations promulgated pursuant to law for the filing thereof, shall be considered as filed on such last day.↩
5.
(a) General Rule. -- (1) Date of delivery. -- If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to be filed, or any payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or on or before a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by United States mail to the agency, officer, or office with which such return, claim, statement, or other document is required to be filed, or to which such payment is required to be made, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment, as the case may be.↩
6.
(a) Addition to the Tax. -- In case of failure -- (1) to file any return required under authority of subchapter A of chapter 61 (other than part III thereof), subchapter A of chapter 51 (relating to distilled spirits, wines, and beer), or of subchapter A of chapter 52 (relating to tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, and cigarette papers and tubes), or of subchapter A of chapter 53 (relating to machine guns and certain other firearms), on the date prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;↩
7. In fact, respondent in
"Advice has been requested whether, under the circumstances described below, the 45-day period within which no interest is allowable on an overpayment of tax under
"The taxpayer's return for the taxable year 1970 was due on March 15, 1971. An extension of time to file was granted to September 15, 1971. On September 15, 1971, the taxpayer mailed its return, showing an overpayment, to the Service by registered mail. The return was received by the Service on September 17, 1971.
"
"The taxpayer's return was sent by United States registered mail on September 15, 1971, which was the prescribed date for filing, including the extension granted. Under
"Accordingly, since the taxpayer timely mailed its return on September 15, 1971, under the terms of an extension to file on or before that date, the date the return was mailed is to be used in computing the 45-day period within which no interest is allowable on an overpayment under
8. Other portions of this report state as follows:
S. Rep. No. 1625, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
4. The bill also provides that the timely mailing of a tax return or payment is to be considered timely filing or timely payment. As a result, where the postmark on an envelope in which an individual income tax return and payment are enclosed shows that it was mailed on or before the due date, the return and payment will be considered as filed or paid on time even though received after the due date.
* * *
7. Timely Mailing Treated as Timely Filing Extended to Returns and Payments (Sec. 5 of the Bill and
Present law provides that where a claim, statement, or other document, which is required to be filed by a specified date is properly mailed, the postmarked date is to be considered as the date on which it was filed. This provision, however, does not apply to a return or to a payment of tax. The bill extends this rule to tax returns and payments.
* * *
The existing timely-mailing-timely-filing provision was enacted in 1954. At that time the rule was a new concept with which the Internal Revenue Service had had no experience. For this reason, the Service was concerned with applying it to returns and payments because of unforeseen problems which it believed might develop. Experience with the present provision since 1954 has allayed these fears, and in fact, the Service has in practice generally treated returns and payments which were mailed before the due date as being filed or paid on time.
For these reasons, the bill amends the existing timely-mailing-timely-filing provisions to include returns and payments of tax. However, the special provision relating to registered mail which provides that registration is prima facie evidence of delivery is extended to returns but not to payments of tax. In addition, the timely-mailing-timely-filing provisions, as amended by the bill, are not applied to currency or other medium of payment unless they are actually received and accounted for, or to returns, claims, statements, or other documents or payments which are required to be delivered by any method other than by mailing. This latter exception applies, primarily, to certain documents relating to alcohol taxes which are required to be submitted directly to the internal revenue officer present on the manufacturer's premises.
Present law contains a special provision dealing with postmarks which are not made by the U.S. Post Office. Under the bill, this provision will apply to returns and payments as it has in the past to other documents filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Among the postmarks to which this provision applies are those made by postage metering machines. By continuing this provision of present law, this committee does not intend to downgrade postal metering devices. Applying the rule of present Treasury Department regulations, if an envelope (containing a tax return) bearing an April 15 postmark made by a postage meter is received by the Internal Revenue Service not later than the time it would ordinarily have been received had it been postmarked April 15 by the U.S. Post Office at the same point of origin, the return is considered as filed on April 15. In addition, where there is a delay in the receipt of a metered return by the Internal Revenue Service, if the person who is required to file the return established that it was actually deposited in the mail at a time at which stamped letters deposited at that location received timely postmarks and the delay was due to the postal service, the return will be treated as timely filed as in the case of stamped returns.
Also,
This section does not reflect the amendments made by Pub. L. 89-713 but indicates to us that prior to that amendment a document was, as a "General rule," considered filed as of the postmark date.↩
9.
When the last day prescribed under authority of the internal revenue laws for performing any act falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the performance of such act shall be considered timely if it is performed on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. For purposes of this section, the last day for the performance of any act shall be determined by including any authorized extension of time; the term "legal holiday" means a legal holiday in the District of Columbia; and in the case of any return, statement, or other document required to be filed, or any other act required under authority of the internal revenue laws to be performed, at any office of the Secretary or his delegate, or at any other office of the United States or any agency thereof, located outside the District of Columbia but within an internal revenue district, the term "legal holiday" also means a Statewide legal holiday in the State where such office is located.↩
Real Estate Corporation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal ... , 301 F.2d 423 ( 1962 )
Loewer Realty Co. v. Anderson , 31 F.2d 268 ( 1929 )
Joseph P. Lucia v. United States of America , 474 F.2d 565 ( 1973 )
Drayton Heard and Elizabeth A. Heard v. Commissioner of ... , 269 F.2d 911 ( 1959 )
Poynor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 81 F.2d 521 ( 1936 )
robert-l-phinney-v-bank-of-the-southwest-national-association-houston , 335 F.2d 266 ( 1964 )
Pacific Coast Steel Co. v. McLaughlin , 61 F.2d 73 ( 1932 )
Pacific Coast Steel Co. v. McLaughlin , 53 S. Ct. 422 ( 1933 )
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank , 55 S. Ct. 50 ( 1934 )
Arthur J. Brown and Frieda G. Brown v. The United States , 391 F.2d 653 ( 1968 )
Angus McDonald v. United States , 315 F.2d 796 ( 1963 )
White v. United States , 24 S. Ct. 171 ( 1903 )
O'Bryan Bros. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , 127 F.2d 645 ( 1942 )
WH Hill Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 64 F.2d 506 ( 1933 )
Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc. , 55 S. Ct. 60 ( 1934 )
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States , 52 S. Ct. 607 ( 1932 )
Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co. , 50 S. Ct. 297 ( 1930 )
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner , 77 S. Ct. 707 ( 1957 )
Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Bros. , 79 S. Ct. 818 ( 1959 )