DocketNumber: Docket No. 7844-88
Judges: Korner
Filed Date: 10/30/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024
*137
Decedent formed a corporation and transferred his farm property to the corporation. Within 3 years of his death, decedent transferred 1,030 shares of stock in the corporation to each of his two sons. Upon decedent's death, petitioner included all the shares of the corporation in decedent's gross estate and valued them under
*513 OPINION
In his notice*138 of deficiency, respondent determined that the Estate of Thomas G. Slater (decedent) was liable for an estate tax deficiency of $ 149,163. After concessions by both parties, we must decide whether gifts of stock in a corporation owning a family farm, given by decedent to his sons within 3 years of his death, should be included in and taxed as part of decedent's gross estate or *514 included in the tentative tax base and taxed as adjusted taxable gifts. We must also ascertain the fair market value of decedent's interest in a 14.5-acre parcel of land.
This case was submitted fully stipulated by the parties under Rule 122. The stipulation of facts and exhibits attached are incorporated by this reference. Petitioner's coexecutors are decedent's sons, Thomas G. Slater, Jr. and Robert R. Slater. They were residents of Virginia when the petition herein was filed.
Thomas G. Slater owned the Rose Hill Farm in Upperville, Virginia. Decedent lived on the farm for 34 years until his death on April 19, 1984, during which time he was responsible for its management. Decedent incorporated the farm in 1962, naming it Rose Hill Farm, Inc. (corporation); in 1966, subchapter S corporation *139 treatment was elected.
Shortly after his wife died in 1983, decedent decided to make gifts of stock in the corporation to his two sons, Thomas G. Slater, Jr., and Robert R. Slater, so as to keep the farm in the family by avoiding onerous Federal estate tax burdens that might have required the family to liquidate it. Decedent hoped that he could transfer his stock in the corporation to his sons free of Federal gift tax, through the use of annual gift tax exclusions under section 2503(b) *140 shares in the corporation that decedent owned at death on Schedule B (entitled "Stocks and Bonds") of decedent's Federal estate tax return; petitioner listed 2,060 shares of stock given to decedent's sons during 1983 and 1984 on Schedule G (entitled "Transfers During Decedent's Life"). Petitioner valued the entire 3,400 shares using the special use valuation method under
As stipulated by the parties, the value of decedent's 1,340 shares in the corporation was $ 37,051, and was properly valued under
Decedent also owned a one-half interest in 14.5 acres of real estate in Loudoun County, Virginia, at the time of his death. He obtained this interest in lieu of receiving a real estate commission for selling a large tract of property*141 to which the interest was attached. Petitioner claims that this parcel of land is located in a rural, mountainous area and that it has never been surveyed. Petitioner further claims that this parcel is worthless, due to its inaccessibility and mountainous terrain. It was not reported in decedent's estate tax return. Respondent determined that the fair market value of decedent's one-half interest was $ 3,000. Respondent points out that the assessed value of the land for local real estate tax purposes was $ 7,250 ($ 500 per acre) in 1984. Respondent claims that the assessment for local tax purposes is accurate in determining fair market value because a study conducted by the Virginia Department of Taxation in 1984 showed that the average assessed value for tax purposes in 1984 was 9.8 percent less than the average selling price.
Petitioner claims that the gifts of stock in the corporation that decedent made to his sons must be included in and taxed as a part of the gross estate. Petitioner further argues that the gifts of stock should be valued as qualified real property under
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the gifts of stock to decedent's two sons*142 are considered (but not included) in his gross estate only for purposes of determining whether real property held by decedent at his death qualifies for
Before being amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520,
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, (ERTA) *143 Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, again amended
(1) In general. -- Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, subsection (a) [including gifts made within 3 years in a decedent's gross estate] shall not apply to the estate of a decedent dying after December 31, 1981.
* * * *
(3) 3-year rule retained for certain purposes. -- Paragraph (1) shall not apply for purposes of --
* * * * (B) [Bracketed material added for explanatory purposes.]
Based on the plain wording of
To preclude deathbed transfers designed to qualify the estate for
The context in which
Section 303 provides that where an estate is comprised in part of stock which has a value in excess of 35 percent of decedent's adjusted gross estate, amounts received in redemption of such stock will be treated as having been received in payment in exchange for the redeemed shares. Section 303 is a relief provision designed to facilitate the tax-free or nearly tax-free withdrawal of cash from a corporation whose stock forms a principal asset of decedent-stockholder's estate.
By constructively drawing back into the estate all gifts made by decedent within 3 years of his death, the statute attempts to avoid a situation where decedent gives away enough assets, except stock, *147 shortly before his death so that the stock in his estate equals or exceeds 35 percent of his adjusted gross estate, artificially qualifying his stock for the relief prescribed by section 303(b).
Similarly,
Taken as a whole, subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) are exceptions to the general rule that gifts made after 1981 are not included in the gross estate; they apply only in limited *519 and special circumstances. Therefore, given*148 the context in which
Finally, an analysis of the legislative history behind
Under the law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, gifts made in contemplation of death (other than gifts made more than 3 years before the decedent's death) were included in a decedent's gross estate to prevent deathbed transfers designed to avoid estate taxes. However, the prior law presumption that gifts made within 3 years of death were made in contemplation of death caused considerable litigation concerning the motives of decedents making gifts. As a result, Congress, in 1976, eliminated the problem by requiring the inclusion of all such gifts in a decedent's estate without regard to the motives of the decedent.
Under the unified transfer tax system adopted in the Tax Reform Act of*149 1976, the inclusion in the gross estate of gifts made within 3 years of death generally has the effect of including only the property's post-gift appreciation in the gross estate (because the gift tax paid with respect to the transfer is allowed as a credit against the decedent's estate tax). The committee believes that inclusion of such appreciation [187] generally is unnecessary except for gifts of life insurance and certain property included in the gross estate pursuant to certain of the so-called transfer sections (
[H. Rept. 97-201, 186-187 (1981),
The report continues with a brief explanation of then-new
In addition, all transfers within 3 years of death (other than gifts eligible for the annual gift tax exclusion)
*520 The Conference Report states that the conference agreement follows the House bill. H. Rept. 97-215 (Conf.), 255 (1981),
If Congress had wanted to provide special use valuation relief for gifts, it could have clearly stated that gifts of qualifying real property made within 3 years of a decedent's death are included in the gross estate, valued according to
Petitioner argues that we should liberally interpret
The gifts of stock in the corporation made by decedent to his sons are considered in decedent's gross estate only for the purpose of determining whether
As to the value of the 14.5-acre parcel of land in Loudoun County, we think that petitioner has failed in its burden of proof to show error in respondent's valuation. It has not presented sufficient evidence to prove that the property was worthless at decedent's death. The valuation report prepared by decedent's son is self-serving and insufficient. Furthermore, respondent presented credible evidence that the parcel of land should be valued in excess of the fair market value that he determined for the property. We hold for respondent on this issue.
*. By order of the Chief Judge, this case was reassigned from Judge Robert P. Ruwe to Judge Jules G. Korner III.↩
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect as of the date of decedent's death, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, except as otherwise noted.↩