DocketNumber: Docket No. 25696-08.
Judges: Goeke
Filed Date: 10/18/2010
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024
Decision will be entered under
P's charter granted its preferred shareholders redemption rights which if exercised triggered obligations by P to pay interest on the redemption amount if P was not able to pay the redemption amount. P and its shareholders entered into several consecutive forbearance agreements by which the shareholders agreed to forgo the redemption elections if they received payments resembling the interest payments. P deducted these payments, and R disallowed the deductions for 2004 and 2005.
*424 GOEKE,
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioner is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business at the time it filed its petition was Norwalk, Connecticut. Since its incorporation in 1999 petitioner has conducted business in the field of media advertising sales.
Petitioner raised startup capital by issuing shares of stock. Petitioner had authority to issue shares of common stock, series A preferred stock, series B preferred stock, and undesignated preferred stock. In or before 2000 petitioner issued 5,197,176 shares of series A preferred stock and 231,389 shares of series B preferred stock to eCOM Partners Fund I, L.L.C. (the series A investor), for total consideration of $5 million. Also in or before 2000, petitioner issued 1,145,926 shares of series B preferred *39 stock to E-Services Investments Private Sub, L.L.C. (the series B investor), for consideration of $11.9 million.
Article IV of petitioner's "Fourth Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation" (the charter) provided for dividends to be paid on the series A and B preferred stock at a rate of 8 percent per year. The charter also provided certain redemption rights to the series A investor and the series B investor (collectively, the investors). The investors had the right to require petitioner to redeem the preferred stock on September 30, 2003, or anytime thereafter. The investors were allowed to demand that petitioner "redeem, out of funds legally available therefor, up to one hundred percent (100%) of the originally issued and outstanding shares" of each series held by the investors.
The charter required that investors making redemption elections give to other holders of the preferred stock series and to petitioner "not less than fifteen (15) days prior written notice". Petitioner was required to redeem a series (in part or in whole) only if a majority of the holders of the specific series elected redemption.
The series A redemption price was defined in the charter as: *426 an amount *40 in cash, equal to (i) $0.577237 per share of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock held by such holder (adjusted appropriately for stock splits, stock dividends, recapitalizations and the like with respect to the Series A Convertible Preferred Stock), plus (ii) any accumulated but unpaid dividends to which such holder of outstanding shares of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock is then entitled, if any, plus (iii) any interest accrued pursuant to Section A.5(e) hereof to which such holder of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock is entitled.
Sections A.5(e) and B.5(e) of the charter addressed the possibility that petitioner could be prohibited from redeeming the shares under Delaware general corporation law because of an impairment of petitioner's capital or that petitioner could otherwise fail to redeem the shares as required by the charter. In such a case, petitioner was required to pay interest to the investors at the rate of 4 percent per annum, which would increase by 0.5 percent at the end of each 6-month *41 period until paid in full, subject to a maximum rate of 9 percent per annum. Petitioner was also required to continue paying the 8-percent dividend on any shares it could not redeem. In addition, petitioner was required to "redeem such shares on a pro-rata basis among the holders * * * in proportion to the full respective redemption amounts to which they are entitled hereunder to the extent possible and shall redeem the remaining shares to be redeemed as soon as the Corporation is not prohibited from redeeming some or all of such shares".
Before September 30, 2003, petitioner and the investors recognized that petitioner would not have the funds to redeem all of the series A or series B preferred shares. Petitioner's auditors stated that if the redemption rights were able to be exercised before September 30, 2004, the auditors would need to issue a going concern statement on petitioner's financial statements. A going concern statement is issued when there are material doubts due to financial constraints as to whether a corporation will be able to operate. At the time, petitioner was attempting to negotiate a new financing agreement with Fleet Bank. A going concern statement could have *42 caused Fleet Bank to back out of the financing arrangement *427 with petitioner and negatively affected petitioner's financial relationships with vendors.
Petitioner and the investors had several discussions in 2003 regarding redemption. The series A investor wished to exercise its redemption rights but realized doing so would not be feasible because petitioner would not be able to redeem the shares. The series A investor also wished not to forfeit its redemption right. The series B investor was short on cash and expressed its desire to have petitioner redeem its shares as soon as possible. Neither investor ever gave petitioner a written notice that it was electing to have shares redeemed.
Petitioner and the investors entered into negotiations regarding a forbearance agreement by which the investors would agree to forbear temporarily from exercising their redemption rights. Petitioner proposed a 1- to 2-year forbearance, but the investors limited the agreement to 1 year, wishing to regain their redemption rights as soon as possible while also enabling petitioner to avoid issuance of a going concern statement.
Petitioner and the investors entered into the forbearance agreement on September *43 30, 2003. The investors agreed to forbear from exercising their redemption rights until September 30, 2004. In exchange, petitioner agreed to pay the investors a "Forbearance Amount" on September 30, 2004. The "Forbearance Amount" was defined as: with respect to the Series A Investor and the Series B Investor, as applicable, an amount equal to interest accruing at 4.0% per annum on the Redemption Amount applicable to such Investor commencing on September 30, 2003 and ending on the Termination Date, which interest rate shall increase by an additional 0.5% at the end of each six-month period thereafter, not to exceed 9.0% per annum (calculated on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed and a 360-day year and compounded annually). The sum of the Series A Convertible Redemption Price and the Series B Convertible Redemption Price then payable to the Series A investor or the Series B investor, as the case may be, assuming the Series A Convertible Redemption Date and the Series B Convertible Redemption Date had occurred on September 30, 2003 and such Investor had duly elected to require the Company to redeem all of its respective *44 shares of Preferred Stock as of such date.
The forbearance agreement was a contract separate from the charter. While the forbearance agreement did not provide for amendment of the charter in regard to the date on which the investors would gain the redemption right or the amount paid to the investors in return for deferral, it did provide for other amendments to the charter. While most of these amendments appear to be superficial, at least one of these amendments was substantive--removal of section 1.A.8(d)(ii). Removal of this section gave the holder of each series of preferred stock the power to block by majority vote "the *45 redemption of * * * Common Stock from employees, officers, or Directors of, or consultants, advisors or independent contractors to, the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries".
As September 30, 2004, approached petitioner still did not have the funds to redeem the preferred shares. Petitioner and the investors began discussing an extension of the forbearance agreement. The series B investor again expressed its desire to have petitioner redeem its shares. After negotiations an 8-month extension was agreed upon, extending the expiration date to May 31, 2005. In reaching the 8-month agreement, the investors again rebuffed a proposal by petitioner to extend the forbearance agreement for more than a year. The investors wished to regain their redemption right as soon as possible, in case petitioner became able to redeem the shares.
The terms of the extension continued to track sections A.5(e) and B.5(e) of the charter for the length of this forbearance agreement extension. The initial payment rate of the September 30, 2004, extension was 5 percent per annum, which increased to 5.5 percent per annum after 6 months.
*429 In advance of the new May 31 expiration date, petitioner was still unable to *46 redeem the shares of stock. Another extension was agreed upon, extending the forbearance agreement expiration date to May 31, 2006. Since then the forbearance agreement has been extended four additional times, the latest extension lasting through May 31, 2010. The payment rate in each extension from May 31, 2005, has been 6.5 percent per annum, differing from the rate that would have been required by sections A.5(e) and B.5(e) of the charter.
Pursuant to the original forbearance agreement and the extensions, petitioner accrued and deducted $874,955 and $1,229,367 in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Petitioner deducted the 2004 forbearance payment on its 2004 corporate tax return as an interest expense under
Petitioner had cashflow of negative $677,582 in 2003, $1,019,597 in 2004, and negative $1,428,554 in 2005. The reduction in cashflow in 2005 coincided with a $5 million increase in accounts receivable.
On August 26, 2008, respondent issued the notice of deficiency to petitioner, determining the following *47 deficiencies:
2004 | $19,035 |
2005 | 22,127 |
Petitioner timely petitioned this Court contesting respondent's determinations. A trial was held on November 3, 2009, in Boston, Massachusetts. At trial petitioner introduced an expert report which stated that forbearance agreements of various sorts are common in almost any business.
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any claimed deductions.
Petitioner argues that the forbearance payments deferred the payment of an obligation and thus may be deducted as interest under
Respondent argues that petitioner is prohibited from deducting the forbearance payments as interest under
Respondent argues that the payments may not be deducted under
Petitioner argues the payments were made on indebtedness and that even a conditional obligation may give rise to indebtedness. Petitioner also contends that respondent's argument elevates form over substance because the result of the forbearance agreement was, in petitioner's view, the same as if the investors had made a redemption election.
For the reasons stated below, we find that although the parties intended the forbearance payments to constitute interest, the payments were not made on an existing indebtedness and therefore may not be deducted under
The testimony and other evidence make it clear that the parties intended the forbearance payments to constitute interest. In the forbearance agreement the forbearance payments were identified and calculated as "interest" on the redemption amount. On their tax returns the investors declared the payments as taxable interest. Communications between petitioner and the investors indicated that all parties considered the forbearance payments to be interest payments. Respondent has offered no evidence that the parties did not intend the forbearance payments to constitute interest.
We find that the parties intended the payments to constitute interest. We must next determine whether the law will give effect to the intention of the parties.
Indebtedness must be genuine in substance, not merely in form.
*432 Petitioner argues that the redemption right creates an indebtedness because it is "an existing, unconditional, and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of a principal sum." See
Petitioner's obligation to pay the redemption amount was predicated upon the preferred shareholders' making a written election to have petitioner redeem their shares. As of May 2010 no such election had been made. Therefore, petitioner had no obligation to pay the redemption amount. As petitioner had no obligation to pay a principal sum existed, there was no indebtedness as defined in
Petitioner notes that in some circumstances conditional obligations may be treated as indebtedness. See even if materially conditional, an existing, legally enforceable obligation may still give rise to indebtedness, so long as (1) the contingency on which the obligation rests is beyond the control of the party seeking the interest deduction, (2) the amount of the indebtedness on which the interest accrued was fixed as of the date that the interest began to accrue, and (3) the payor's liability to the payee is primary and direct. * * *
*433 In
Petitioner *53 argues that the obligation to pay the redemption amount exists and is legally enforceable but is conditioned upon the redemption election of the shareholders. We disagree, again finding that the obligation to pay the redemption amount did not exist.
Unlike the interest in
Petitioner has no obligation to pay the redemption amount until the investors make a redemption election. Until such an election occurs, no debt exists. Therefore the
Petitioner argues respondent's position elevates form over substance. Petitioner *54 contends the forbearance agreement was merely a formality and that the substantive result of the forbearance agreement is that petitioner has an obligation to pay the redemption amount to the investors.
As petitioner's principal place of business is in Connecticut, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has appellate jurisdiction. See
In 2003 and 2004 the investors made clear their desire to have petitioner redeem their shares upon their receipt of the redemption right. The series B investor told petitioner it intended to exercise the redemption right as soon as possible. Petitioner argues that these statements show that the investors were undoubtedly going to make a redemption election as soon as they gained the redemption right. As a result, petitioner contends that the redemption amounts are in substance its obligation to the investors, even though no actual election was made. We disagree.
Comparing the results of the forbearance agreement and the results that would have occurred had a redemption election been made reveals a glaring difference: petitioner would not be legally bound to redeem the investors' shares as a result of the forbearance agreement. If the investors had made a redemption election, petitioner would have been bound to redeem the shares *56 pro rata as petitioner became financially able to redeem them. Under the redemption election scenario the investors are entitled to redemption, but under the forbearance agreement the investors retain the choice of whether or not to have their shares redeemed.
While the investors had expressed their desire to have their shares redeemed as soon as possible, such statements are not legally binding. Indeed, nearly 7 years after the first forbearance agreement was signed the investors still have *435 not elected to have a single one of their shares redeemed. By the time the forbearance agreements cease to be extended (whenever that may be), the investors may unilaterally decide to hold their shares instead of having them redeemed.
We find that petitioner has not met the "strong proof" standard. Both formal and substantive differences exist between the terms of the forbearance agreement and the terms which would have applied had the investors made a redemption election. The mere fact that the investors made nonbinding statements indicating they wished to have their shares redeemed as soon as possible does not create a substantive indebtedness.
The caselaw relating *57 to instances in which interest accrues on a conditional debt is not well defined. See generally Hill, Casenote, "Darkening the Already Murky Waters of
Petitioner argues the forbearance payments may be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Respondent argues that regulations and Code sections prevent petitioner from deducting the payments under
To be deductible under
"Ordinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary. *59 To be sure, an expense may be ordinary though it happen but once in the taxpayer's lifetime. * * * Yet the transaction which gives rise to it must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved."
Petitioner produced an expert report by Richard A. Clarke, an expert in investment business. Mr. Clarke has 32 years of experience in banking, during which time he has participated in hundreds of forbearance arrangements. Mr. Clarke's report states that forbearance agreements, such as the one in this case, are common in almost any business, including petitioner's line of business. Mr. Clarke knew of "at least five" advertising agencies participating in forbearance agreements during his time in banking. Respondent has introduced no evidence contesting that such forbearance agreements are common in the type of business petitioner conducts. We find the payments were ordinary.
"[T]he term 'necessary' imposes 'only the minimal requirement that the expense be "appropriate and helpful" for "the *437 development of the [taxpayer's] business"'".
We conclude that the forbearance payments are ordinary and necessary under
Respondent argues that petitioner in substance exchanged the forbearance payments and new preferred stock with deferred redemption rights for old preferred stock with nondeferred redemption rights. Respondent has cited no caselaw in support of this assertion.
We agree with respondent that petitioner's tax liability is determined by the substance *61 of the transaction. See
We do not believe deferring the redemption right by a year or less at a time is such a significant change in the nature *438 of the investment as to amount to a new investment. The nature and structure of petitioner's business did not change as a result of the forbearance agreement, and the preferred stock retained all other rights, including receipt of the 8-percent dividend. Petitioner would not likely have been able to redeem the investors' shares even had the investors gained and exercised the redemption right, and the *62 investors had previously agreed to be paid compensation should they make a redemption election and petitioner be unable to redeem.
Considering the facts of the case, we find that the forbearance agreement between petitioner and the investors was not in form or in substance a reacquisition of stock and
The Supreme Court has defined a recapitalization as a "reshuffling of a capital structure, within the framework of an existing corporation".
For the same reasons stated hereinabove, we find that no exchange of stock occurred in form or in substance. See
Under
if a corporation having only common stock outstanding, exchanges one share of newly issued common stock *64 and one bond in the principal amount of $10 for each share of outstanding common stock, the distribution of the bonds will be a distribution of property * * * to which
Respondent argues that the forbearance payments were in substance nondeductible distributions to the investors with respect to their stock, regardless of the fact that the payments were connected in a formal sense to the deferral of the redemption right. Respondent contends these distributions were given to provide the investors with a return on their investment in petitioner.
We agree that petitioner's tax liability is determined by the substance of the transaction. See
"Distribution of profits is neither the purpose nor effect of the action taken by the corporation" *65 in this case. See
We find that petitioner paid the investors to defer the redemption election, not to give the investors a return on their investment. The payments were not distributions in substance under
Under
Petitioner cites several cases as authority for the proposition that
For the same reasons stated hereinabove, we again find that no exchange of stock ownership occurred in form or in *441 substance. See
Respondent first contends that
Respondent also contends that
Before the forbearance agreement was entered into, the investors could have exercised their redemption right on September 31, 2003; afterwards they were not able to exercise their redemption right until September 31, 2004. Such a pattern of deferral continued in each extension to the forbearance agreement. A change of the charter's provision regarding the date on which the investors could exercise their redemption rights was the aim of the parties and was effectively the result accomplished by the forbearance agreement.
*442 Petitioner *69 has argued that it and the investors were attempting to follow, not modify, the provisions of the charter by entering into the forbearance agreement. However, as discussed
We also note that the forbearance agreement provided for some amendments to the charter itself. While none of these amendments related to the date on which the investors would gain the redemption right, at least one of the amendments (removal of section 1.A.8(d)(ii), which allowed the investors to bar petitioner from redeeming employees' common stock) was substantive.
The forbearance agreement was a contract meant to modify the rights of the parties under the charter. Some terms it modified by actually amending the charter (i.e., removal of section 1.A.8(d)(ii)). Other *70 terms it modified by acting as an external contract (i.e., the date on which the investors gained the redemption right). We must "[disregard] the mask and [deal] with realities."
As we have found that *443 a taxpayer is not required to capitalize under this section amounts paid to create * * * any right or benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond the earlier of-- (i) 12 months after the first date on which the taxpayer realizes the right or benefit; or (ii) The end of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the payment is made.
The fact that similar rights have been renewed in the past is evidence of a reasonable expectancy of renewal. When the taxpayer has no experience with similar rights, this factor is *444 less indicative of a reasonable expectancy of renewal.
There is no evidence that petitioner had any prior experience with similar arrangements at the time of the original forbearance agreement. However, as the forbearance agreement continued to be extended, petitioner naturally gained experience with similar arrangements. We find this factor is neutral in regard to the September 2003 agreement but begins to indicate a reasonable expectancy of renewal in regard to the September 2004 agreement. We also find this factor strongly indicates a reasonable expectancy of renewal in regard *73 to the May 2005 agreement.
The fact that renewal is necessary for the taxpayer to earn back its investment in the right is evidence of a reasonable expectancy of renewal. For example, if a taxpayer pays $14,000 for a 9-month contract which earns the taxpayer $1,000 per month, the fact that renewal is necessary for the taxpayer to earn back its investment is evidence that a reasonable expectancy of renewal existed.
In this case, there was no investment comparable to the example found in the regulations. The only investment was that of the investors in petitioner's stock, and extension of the forbearance agreement was not necessary for them to earn back their investment. We find this factor is neutral.
Evidence that indicates a likelihood of renewal to a right, such as a bargain renewal right or similar arrangement, is evidence of a reasonable expectancy of renewal.
There was no bargain renewal provision or similar arrangement in the forbearance agreement. We find this factor is neutral.
The fact that material *74 terms of the right are subject to renegotiation at the end of the initial term is evidence of a lack of a reasonable expectancy of renewal. For example, if *445 the parties must renegotiate price, this is evidence that no reasonable expectancy of renewal existed.
Petitioner and the investors renegotiated the amount of the forbearance payments, the length of the deferral at the end of the original agreement, and the extensions. The amount paid increased as a result of the September 2004 and May 2005 extensions, and the length was reduced to 8 months in the September 2004 extension (down from 12 months in the September 2003 original agreement) but then again pegged at 12 months in the May 2005 agreement. We find the fact that material terms were renegotiated is evidence that no reasonable expectancy of renewal existed.
The fact that similar rights are typically terminated before renewal is evidence of a lack of a reasonable expectancy of renewal.
There is no evidence that petitioner ever previously had experience with a similar right or terminated such a right. The parties have supplied, *75 and we have found, no evidence that rights similar to those in this case are typically terminated within the industry. We find this factor is neutral.
The likelihood of renewal was also partially dependant on petitioner's financial health. While no provisions of the forbearance agreement prevented its extension past the point at which petitioner became financially able to redeem the shares, we believe that petitioner would be less likely to agree to a further extension as its financial condition improved.
Petitioner's cashflow increased from negative $677,582 in 2003 to $1,019,597 in 2004, an increase of $1,697,179. When the original forbearance agreement expired on September 30, 2004, petitioner did not demand a yearlong extension of the forbearance agreement but instead negotiated a shorter 8-month extension. The fact that the length of the extension was cut as cashflow was improving may well indicate that petitioner believed it would be able to redeem the shares without further extensions.
*446 However, in 2005 petitioner's cashflows deteriorated to a loss of $1,428,554, representing a $2,448,151 decline from 2004. With the forbearance agreement extension *76 set to expire on May 31, 2005, petitioner negotiated a 1-year extension. The May 31, 2005, extension was increased to 1 year (from the 8-month September 30, 2004, extension) at the same time cashflows were plummeting. This may well indicate that petitioner believed its ability to redeem was weakening, and that further extensions past May 2006 could be necessary before petitioner could redeem the shares.
Weighing the factors in the light of the facts and circumstances, we find that no reasonable expectancy of renewal existed at the time the September 2003 and September 2004 agreements were created. Thus, petitioner may take advantage of the 12-month rule for the September 2003 and September 2004 agreements. However, we find that a reasonable expectancy of renewal existed at the time the May 2005 agreement was created. We therefore consider the term of the May 2005 agreement to be combined with the term of the May 2006 agreement. Combined, the terms of those agreements extend beyond 12 months, and consequently, petitioner may not take advantage of the 12-month rule for the May 2005 agreement.
We have found that *77 the forbearance payments satisfy the "ordinary and necessary" test of
We find petitioner may not deduct the forbearance payments as interest under
To reflect the foregoing,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
Knetsch v. United States ( 1960 )
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co. ( 1935 )
Palmer v. Commissioner ( 1937 )
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Dunlap v. Commissioner ( 1980 )
Journal Co. v. Commissioner ( 1941 )
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering ( 1934 )
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Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp. ( 1942 )
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Microdot, Inc. v. United States ( 1984 )
Commissioner v. Tellier ( 1966 )
Golsen v. Commissioner ( 1970 )