DocketNumber: Docket No. 10646-79.
Filed Date: 11/24/1981
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
*65 D died in Sept. 1976. Within 3 years of his death, D assigned a contributory group term life insurance policy on his life to W. On D's death, W received the proceeds of such policy.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
*66 SIMPSON,
In 1974, the decedent revised his estate plan. On July 8, 1974, the decedent executed a document entitled "Absolute Assignment of All Incidents of Ownership," whereby he assigned all of his incidents of ownership in the group term policy to Mrs. McNamara. From the date of such assignment to his death, all premiums due on such policy, $ 382.42, were paid*68 by the decedent through deductions from commission payments due to him from Great-West. No assignment or transfer of ownership of the decedent's other life insurance policies was made during his lifetime. On August 2, 1974, the decedent executed his last will and testament. Mrs. McNamara was the major beneficiary under such will. On such date, the decedent also executed an unfunded insurance trust of which American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Company was trustee.
During 1974, Mrs. McNamara was suffering from mental illness. In the fall of 1974, she was voluntarily admitted to the LaRue Carter Hospital where she received treatment for approximately 3 months. During 1973 or 1974, one of the decedent's brothers died of lung cancer. During 1974, another brother of the decedent had rheumatoid arthritis. The decedent's father had died some years earlier at the age of 64.
Beginning in 1966, the decedent was treated at St. Vincent Hospital, Indiana University Hospital, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, and the Lilly Clinic for bursitis, rheumatoid arthritis and rheumatoid lung disease, a cervical disc problem, and a urinary retention problem. However, during the summer*69 of 1974, the decedent's health had improved and he was more active professionally and socially than he had been previously. In July 1976, the decedent learned that he had oat cell carcinoma of the lung, which was the cause of his death.
As owner and beneficiary of the group term policy, Mrs. McNamara received the proceeds of such policy, $ 44,164, after the decedent's death. None of such proceeds were included on the Federal estate tax return filed by the petitioner. In his notice of deficiency, the Commissioner determined that the decedent's assignment of the group term policy was a gift made in contemplation of death and that the proceeds of such policy should have been included in the decedent's gross estate pursuant to
OPINION
The sole issue for decision is whether the decedent's assignment of a group term life insurance policy on his life was made in contemplation of death, so that the proceeds of such policy are includable in his gross estate under
The petitioner's primary argument is that the decedent's dominant motive for the assignment of the group term policy was the peace of mind that the ownership of such policy would give to Mrs. McNamara, by enabling her to provide for her family, and the decedent's desire to help his wife with her estate planning. However, the group term policy had no value other than the right to receive the proceeds of such policy on the decedent's death. Thus, only in the event of the decedent's death could Mrs. McNamara's well*72 being or her estate planning objectives be advanced. As such, the assignment could serve no purpose other than as a substitute for a testamentary disposition by the decedent and the avoidance of estate taxes. Such motive is not consistent with the decedent's continued life.
Moreover, the assignment of the group term policy to Mrs. McNamara was made about the same time as the decedent was revising his overall estate plan and had executed a new will and a trust agreement, under which Mrs. McNamara was the major beneficiary. Such circumstances suggest that the assignment was part of a unified testamentary scheme and strongly support the statutory presumption and the Commissioner's determination that the assignment was made in contemplation of death.
The petitioner also argues that at the*73 time the decedent assigned the group term policy to his wife he was relatively young and in good health, and that, therefore, he could not have anticipated his death 2 years later. Although the record does show that the decedent had a history of medical difficulties, as of July 1974, none of such difficulties was of a nature which would have indicated that death was imminent. However, expectation of death must not be confused with contemplation of death. The question is not whether the decedent expected imminent death, but whether the assignment of the group term policy was motivated by purposes associated with the distribution of property in anticipation of death.
The petitioner argues next that the assignment of the groupd term policy was part of a pattern of lifetime transfers and that the assignment of such policy was consistent with the decedent's life-oriented motives in making such transfers. However, the record fails to establish the existence of a pattern of life-motivated transfers. On the contrary, the nature of such "transfers" indicates the decedent's unwillingness to part with total control over property which could have value to him during his lifetime. The decedent's other lifetime transfers were the purchasing of a home for his mother-in-law and her sister and an "assignment" of a $ 150,000 whole life insurance policy on his life to his five daughters. While it is true that the decedent did purchase such a home, he only transferred the life use of such property and retained a reversionary interest. With respect to the "assignment" of the whole life policy, the record shows that the decedent retained the ownership of such policy and that the*75 "assignment" was merely the designation of his daughters as beneficiaries of such policy under an installment payment option. Furthremore, even if the petitioner had established a pattern of lifetime transfers, it has not made an affirmative showing that the assignment of the group term policy was part of a pre-existing plan to distribute the decedent's property during his lifetime. See
The petitioner relies on
In summary, we find and hold that the assignment of the group term policy was made within 3 years of death and that the petitioner has utterly failed to carry its burden of proving that the decedent's dominant motive for making the assignment was to accomplish a lifetime purpose unrelated to the possibility of the decedent's death.
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as in effect during 1976, unless otherwise indicated.↩
2.
Igleheart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 1935 )
lillian-landorf-and-william-m-landau-as-surviving-executors-of-the-last ( 1969 )
mrs-daisy-miller-boyd-bel-and-richard-e-gerard-co-executors-under-the ( 1971 )
Estate of Sumner Gerard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 1975 )