DocketNumber: Docket Nos. 26302-83; 2662-84; 29168-85; 29354-85; 29731-85; 29873-85; 29878-85
Filed Date: 9/27/1988
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
SCOTT,
Addition to tax | |||||||
Docket No. | Petitioners | Taxable Year | Deficiency | Sec. 6653(a) 26302-83 | Peter F. Maring | 1979 | $ 18,759 |
29878-85 | and Bettie L. Maring | 1980 | 16,925 | ||||
1981 | 12,423 | ||||||
2662-84 | Lawrence J. Franks | 1978 | 122,420 | ||||
and Jonelle Franks | 1979 | 142,785 | |||||
29168-85 | Robert H. Blomquist | 1979 | 14,156 | ||||
and Karen I. Blomquist | 1980 | 57,603 | |||||
1981 | 68,435 | ||||||
29354-85 | Thomas H. McAllister | 1978 | 18,709 | $ 935 | |||
and Veda J. McAllister | 1979 | 59,696 | 2,985 | ||||
1980 | 152,176 | ||||||
1981 | 151,205 | ||||||
29731-85 | John S. Maring, Laura | 1976 | 11,049 | ||||
J. Maring, and Rosemary | 1977 | 62,416 | |||||
E. Lindquist (formerly | 1978 | 351,071 | |||||
Rosemary E. Maring) | 1979 | 1,946,772 | |||||
29873-85 | David C. Castagno and | 1978 | 7,426 | ||||
Darla J. Castagno | 1979 | 29,795 | |||||
1980 | 40,293 | ||||||
1981 | 63,002 |
In his Amended Answer with respect to Thomas H. and Veda J. McAllister, respondent asserted the addition to tax for negligence under section 6653(a) for 1980 and under section 6653(a)(1) and (a)(2) for 1981. Additionally, in his Amended Answers, respondent alleged that the remaining petitioners were liable for the addition to tax for negligence under section 6653(a) for the years 1976 through 1980 and section 6653(a)(1) and (a)(2) for the year 1981.
In his Amended Answers, respondent alleged that the deficiencies owed by each of the petitioners constitute substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions within the meaning of section 6621(c). *500 respondent orally moved the Court to award damages under section 6673 with respect to each petitioner. The Court took respondent's motion under advisement.
Some of the issues raised by the pleadings have been disposed of by agreement of the parties, leaving for decision the following: (1) whether petitioners are entitled to deduct losses with respect to alleged Government securities transactions; (2) whether petitioners' purported gain and income with respect to Government securities transactions are includable in income; (3) whether petitioners are entitled to deduct interest expense with respect to their alleged Government securities transactions under section 163; (4) whether petitioners are entitled to deduct fees allegedly paid with respect to their purported Government securities transactions under section 212; (5) whether petitioners are liable for the addition to tax under the provisions of section 6653(a) for the years 1976 through 1980 and section 6653(a)(1) and (a)(2) for the year 1981; (6) whether petitioners' deficiencies constitute substantial underpayments attributable to tax-motivated transactions within the meaning of section 6621(c); and (7) whether damages should*501 be awarded to the United States under section 6673.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are found accordingly. *502 is a physician specializing in internal medicine. Mrs. Blomquist obtained her real estate license in the mid-1970s. She enrolled in business courses in 1977 and received a MBA in 1980.
Thomas H. and Veda J. McAllister resided in Woodburn, Oregon, at the time their petition was filed. They filed joint Federal income tax returns for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. Dr. McAllister is a dentist.
John S. and Laura J. Maring resided in Portland, Oregon, at the time their petition was filed. They filed joint Federal income tax returns for the years 1977, 1978, and 1979. Rosemary E. Lindquist, formerly Rosemary E. Maring, resided in Portland, Oregon, at the time her petition was filed. She and John Maring filed a joint Federal income tax return for the year 1976. *503 filed joint Federal income tax returns for the years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. Mr. Castagno was licensed by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) in 1965.
John Maring is a real estate broker with Maring & Associates. He was the sole proprietor of diversified Capital, Inc., a general contracting company, from 1976 through 1981. He received his license with the NASD in 1971 or 1972, and he maintained his license through 1986. In the mid-1970s, John Maring syndicated several real estate partnerships. In 1976 and 1977, he formed four oil and gas partnerships.
Upon receiving his real estate license in 1974 or 1975, Mr. Castagno became a salesman for John Maring's company.
During the years in issue, petitioners entered into alleged government securities transactions through various entities that were controlled by Michael M. Senft. Petitioners allegedly invested in Treasury bills as clients of entities that were controlled by Mr. Senft, as limited partners of a partnership that was a client of Mr. Senft's entities, and as general partners of partnerships that were limited partners of Mr. Senft's entities.
In 1975 or 1976*504 Mr. Senft formed Michael M. Senft & Co. (Senft & Co.), a partnership, as an investment advisory firm in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Senft established Senft & Co. to act as a middleman between individuals who needed tax benefits and brokerage firms that would provide the losses.
Mr. Senft used an alleged trading program entitled "bond borrow versus collateral pledged." In September 1978, Senft & Co. issued a "Description of Bond Investment Program," which stated, in part, as follows:
Under the Program, an investor will attempt to earn long-term capital gains by investing in U.S. Government and/or highest quality Corporate Bonds. The Advisor will attempt to purchase Bonds for the investor which he believes will appreciate in value and will generate capital gains and interest income over a period of at least one year, which will exceed the net interest cost of carrying the Bonds. The Program will use leverage to the full extent practicable; * * *
* * *
The margin maintenance requirements for the Bonds is currently one-half of the initial margin requirement. As the market price of the Bonds goes up, equity can be released from the account by the carrying broker. However, if the*505 market price of the Bonds were to drop below one-half of their initial cost, additional collateral would have to be deposited by the investor, or some or all of the Bonds would be sold to meet the margin call.
The document described the tax benefits purportedly to be realized from the program.
Mr. Senft, the principal of Senft & Co., was granted full discretion by his clients to trade their accounts with Senft & Co. Senft & Co. used client agreements that read, in part, as follows:
1. The Client retains the Investment Manager [Mr. Senft] to manage, invest and reinvest in Treasury Bills and Treasury Bill Futures for the account of the Client, and to sell, redeem or otherwise dispose of the same for the benefit of the client, and in connection therewith appoints the Investment Manager as Client's agent and attorney-in-fact and grants the Investment Manager full authority to make all decisions and to give all orders and instructions for the purposes of this Agreement without prior consultation with the client.
2. Investment Manager will have discretion with respect to choice of brokers and dealers to execute transactions for the account of the Client.
* * *
12. The*506 client states that he has read the offering memorandum and opinion of counsel describing the "Program" and has consulted with his tax advisor * * *.
Beech Run, Ltd. (Beech Run), a partnership of which John Maring, Dr. Franks and Mr. Castagno were limited partners as a client of Senft & Co. entered into a client agreement with Senft & Co. Beech run was a limited partnership of which Mr. Delbert K. Burkhart was the sole general partner. It was formed to enter into mining operations for profit which it would offset by losses on purported Treasury bill transactions. Prior to the formation of Beech run, Mr. Burkhart met with Mr. Senft and arranged for Beech Run, if formed, to enter into a purported Treasury bill program through Mr. Senft. Mr. Burkhart was informed by Mr. Senft that the Treasury bill program was designed to generate ordinary losses in one year offset by equal gains in the next year. Mr. Burkhart was told that the "margin deposit" to be paid by Beech Run was to be a percentage of the tax loss desired. He was also informed that the program would be designed to generate no actual profit or loss so that the only payment required would be the "margin deposit" and that*507 no economic gain would result from the transaction. In November 1977 Beech Run paid ACLI Government Securities, Inc. (ACLI), a "margin deposit" of $ 102,400 for a purported loss of $ 1,280,000.
In 1978 Beech Run paid ACLI a "margin deposit" of $ 46,000 and requested a loss of $ 1,150,000. In 1979 Beech Run paid a "margin deposit" to Sentinel financial Instruments (SFI) in the total amount of $ 94,319 and requested losses of $ 1,268,650. The 1977, 1978, and 1979 transactions were arranged in a manner to preclude the making of a profit.
Senft & Co. had statements sent to its clients indicating that their accounts were brokered through ACLI of Chicago, Illinois, a primary dealer in government securities. Clients of Senft & Co. entered into customer agreements with ACLI that provided, in part, as follows:
all transactions executed by you [ACLI] for the account of the customer * * * for the purchase or sale of government securities and other financial instruments, whether for immediate delivery or for delivery under the terms of futures or forward contracts or subject to a standby or option contract, shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. All transactions*508 shall be subject to the constitution, rules regulations, customs, usages, rulings and interpretations, then obtaining, of the exchange or market and its clearing house, if any, where the transactions are executed by you [ACLI] or your [ACLI's] agents. All transactions under this agreement shall also be subject to any law, rule, or regulation then applicable thereto. Orders are to be received and executed with the understanding that actual delivery is contemplated. With respect to futures transactions, it is expressly understood that unless otherwise disclosed to the customer in writing in your [ACLI's] normal manner, you [ACLI] are acting solely as a broker as to any transactions made with you [ACLI] by the customer. * * *
Mr. Senft allegedly chose the securities and prices of the securities that were allegedly bought and sold by ACLI on behalf of clients of Senft & Co. Mr. Senft at times requested ACLI to buy and sell securities for Senft & Co. clients, but he has not actual knowledge that ACLI did so.
Mr. Senft prepared a sheet summarizing the accounts of Senft & Co.'s clients who allegedly traded through ACLI in 1978. The sheet lists the client's name and account*509 number, the alleged margin deposit, loss goal, alleged loss realized, Senft & Co.'s fee, ACLI's fee, and fees paid to salesmen for referring clients. The alleged "margin deposit" represented a percentage of the tax loss that the client wanted to realize. Each Senft & Co. client paid his alleged margin deposit to ACLI. ACLI kept a portion of the margin deposit as its fee and paid a portion to Senft & Co. as its advisory fee. Senft & Co. kept part of the advisory fee, paid part to its salesmen, and returned part to its clients. The clients of Senft & Co. were informed that the losses and gains to be realized from the alleged trading in government securities would offset each other so that the only funds they would be required to pay was the alleged "margin deposit" and the only amount they would receive from the transaction would be a return of a portion of that alleged deposit.
The ACLI accounts of Senft & Co. clients generally showed a net loss at the end of a trading program because Senft & Co.'s fee was paid out of the client's margin deposit. If the loss was significant, then profit would be added back into the client's account by either allegedly buying additional Treasury*510 bills, or crediting to the client interest income from Senft & Co. The sheets summarizing the accounts of clients in 1978 indicates that Senft & Co. realized gain from Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., Inc. (Cantor, Fitzgerald), a brokerage company, and that a part of such gain was distributed among Senft & Co. clients, including Beech Run, Mr. Castagno, Dr. Franks, and John Maring.
In order to avoid sharing fees with ACLI, Mr. Senft formed Sentinel financial Instruments (SFI), a limited partnership, in October 1978. Mr. Senft was the sole general partner of SFI in 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981. In November 1978 and March 1979, SFI promoted itself as a dealer of U.S. Government Securities; in September 1979, SFI promoted itself as a broker-dealer.
SFI's office was initially located in Chicago, Illinois. In May 1979 SFI moved its operation from Chicago to Mr. Senft's apartment in New York, New York. At that time, SFI had three employees: Mr. Senft, Joseph Antonucci and Sally Schelby. In September 1979, SFI moved its operation from Mr. Senft's apartment to an office on Wall Street. During the fall of 1979, SFI had the following employees: Mr. Senft, *511 David Senft (Michael Senft's brother), Mr. Antonucci, Ms. Schelby, Norma Jean Curtin, Paz Pimental, and James Canton.
In a document entitled Summary of Treasury Bill Hedging Program of SFI, which accompanied a Description of Treasury Bill Investment Program of SFI, dated November 16, 1978, it is stated that the objective of the hedging program is to "realize significant investment income in a future tax year while incurring lesser ordinary expense in the current tax year." The summary of SFI's hedging program described hedging as "the simultaneous establishment of equal long and short amounts of Treasury Bills having two or more maturity dates. As hedging can reduce risk it may also reduce the investors' opportunity for profits."
The summary described the Federal income tax consequences resulting from SFI's clients' participation in the alleged hedging program as follows: "Losses incurred from the short sales are treated for Federal tax purposes as deductions from ordinary income. Code Section 1233(a); Reg. 1.1233-1(a)(1). Gains from the long positions are treated as unearned income for Federal tax purposes. Code section 1221(5); Reg. 1.1221-1(e)." This description of the*512 Federal tax consequences of the alleged hedging program is consistent with the tax opinion of a New York law firm which accompanied the summary and description of the SFI alleged hedging program.
In a Description of Investment Programs for U.S. Government Securities, dated March 5, 1979, SFI stated that it offered two programs to sophisticated investors in upper income brackets: (1) Treasury Bill Program, and (2) Government Bond Program.
Each of the petitioners, except Dr. McAllister, became a client of SFI in 1979. Dr. McAllister became a client of SFI in 1978. Prior to entering into the SFI purported investment programs, each petitioner received a copy of the appropriate SFI description of its purported investment program.
According to the description of the investment programs, an investor in the Treasury bill program would "attempt to earn profits by simultaneously purchasing and selling short equal face amounts of T-bills." The SFI description further stated that an investor in the bond program would:
attempt to earn long-term capital gains and interest income by investing in U.S. Government Bonds or Notes or Bonds issued with the guarantee of the U.S. Government*513 * * *. SFI will purchase Bonds for the investor having a yield to maturity (consisting of interest income and capital gain) which it estimates will exceed the net cost of carrying the Bonds for more than one year in the future. * * *
The description of the investment programs, which consists of 17 pages of text, includes a 6-1/2 page discussion of the tax considerations of the programs.
Clients of SFI executed agreements that included a provision similar to the agreement with Senft & Co. appointing SFI as their agent with discretion too act for the clients. This agreement also provided, in part, that --
7. SFI will effect transactions in Treasury Bills purchased and sold under the Program, acting as principal "dealer" selling for its own account to (or buying from its own account from) the customer. In transactions in which SFI acts as a dealer, it will sell or buy from the customer on a net basis at prices reflecting a retail mark-up or mark-down not more than the amount customarily charged by broker-dealers in U.S. Treasury Bills. * * *
SFI may arrange financing for customers with banks, brokers or other lending institutions, or may itself advance credit to customers.*514 * * *
On November 21, 1978, Dr. McAllister signed an agreement with SFI. Similar agreements were signed by Beech Run, John Maring, Mr. Castagno, Dr. Blomquist, Peter Maring and Dr. Franks.
SFI utilized a customer's agreement that provided that all transactions would be subject to the rules of the exchanges or market and where applicable to the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The agreement further provided that margins would be maintained as SFI required and debit balances would be paid on demand.
The agreement further provided in part:
10. In all transactions between you and me, I understand that you are acting as dealers (selling government obligations or other bonds from your own trading position or inventory), except when you disclose to me in writing at or before the completion of a particular transaction that you are acting, with respect to such transaction, as brokers for some other person, or as agent on your behalf.
SFI had each of its clients sign a document designated as limited power of attorney which purportedly authorized SFI to act as "agent and attorney-in-fact to buy, sell (including short sales) and trade in bonds, and*515 any other securities and or commodities and or contracts relating to the same on margin or otherwise in accordance with your [SFI] terms and conditions * * *." On December 18, 1979, Dr. Franks signed a document entitled as a limited power of attorney to SFI. Similar documents were signed by Beech Run, John Maring, Dr. Blomquist, Mr. Castagno, Peter Maring, and Dr. McAllister.
SFI obtained its customers or clients through its own salesmen or Mr. Senft. In order to establish an account with SFI, a client paid a purported margin deposit. The purported margin deposit was a percentage of the tax loss requested by the client. The purported margin deposit was divided into three parts: (1) SFI's fee; (2) fee of SFI's salesmen; and (3) amount to be returned to customer at the end of his investment program. No money other than the purported margin deposit and a return of a predetermined portion of that purported deposit ever changed hands between SFI and its clients.
Ms. Schelby was an employee of SFI from May 1979 to May 1980. She reported to Mr. Antonucci, who was employed at SFI as an accountant from June 1979 to March 1980. Ms. Schelby, Mr. Antonucci and David Senft entered*516 a customer's purported transactions on a "green sheet," which was a 13-column accounting pad piece of paper. They listed the customers' purported transactions on the "green sheet" based on prices listed in the Wall Street Journal on the date the entry was dated. Ms. Schelby did not call any broker or dealer to buy or sell the securities with respect to the purported transactions listed on the "green sheets;" she did not check SFI's inventory to determine whether it had the securities that the customer was purportedly buying. Thereafter other purported transactions such as coupon interest, interest paid, and gain on sales were listed on the "green sheets."
After completing the listing of customers' purported transactions on the "green sheets," Ms. Schelby, Mr. Antonucci, and David Senft listed the purported transactions including the following information on pencil tickets: whether purportedly buying or selling security, description of purported security, price, and account number of SFI customer. The completed pencil tickets were time stamped. However, some blank pencil tickets were time stamped. The completed pencil tickets were given to the SFI keypunch department, which was*517 supervised by Ms. Curtin from August 1979 to December 1980. The keypunch department would enter the data on the pencil tickets into the computer. Purported confirmations of the transactions were generated from these tickets by ADP, a computer service that was not affiliated with SFI.
In January 1980, SFI was supposed to send to its customers a monthly statement for December 1979 and a profit and loss statement detailing all of the 1979 transactions. However, the documents for many of SFI's customers were not timely issued due to errors, including clerical errors and miscalculation errors (either the customer had too much or too little loss for 1979). If the customer had too little or too much loss in 1979, then SFI would allegedly reconcile the account in 1980 by generating "as of" confirmations for transactions that allegedly occurred in 1979. The purported reconciliation of the 1979 accounts of SFI customers was completed by mid-March 1980. The untimely documents sent to SFI customers were backdated to January. SFI employees crumpled up and stepped on the letters that should have been mailed in the beginning of January 1980 in order to make them look like they had been*518 defaced by the postal service.
Walter Raquet, a certified public accountant, was an employee of SFI from March to October 1980. Mr. Senft hired Mr. Raquet to prepare SFI's books and records for an audit on September 30, 1980, by the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell. In approximately May 1980, Mr. Raquet completed a liquidation schedule that listed the alleged customer accounts and their balances, such as margin deposits, salesman fees, long and short positions, and realized and unrealized income. The schedule indicated that the total liquidation value to SFI of the customer accounts was approximately $ 30 million and SFI would have had gains of $ 30 million. The purported liquidation schedule indicated to Mr. Raquet that SFI customer accounts were out of line with their margin deposits. The accounts were brought in line with their margin deposits through purported trades that were run through the books and records. The purported transactions were run through the accounts to bring them into line in order for them to pass audit and to look good for Internal Revenue Service purposes. Since no actual purchases and sales had been made for clients, the entries bringing*519 the accounts into line were likewise merely entries on the paper.
When Mr. Raquet started working for SFI in March 1980, Mr. Canton kept records of market projections. However, he did not actually trade. In late March or early April 1980, Mr. Raquet set up a clearing account for Mr. Canton at Bradford Trust. Mr. Canton actually made certain purchases and sales some of which transactions would be run through the individual client's accounts. Mr. Canton's transactions were a small amount of the alleged account trades. Mr. Senft instructed Mr. Canton to make a few actual purchases and sales. Mr. Senft, without disclosing the reason to Mr. Canton, gave him these instructions in order to use the records of the few actual purchases and sales as "window dressing." Mr. Canton was not shown the customers' "green sheets."
In June 1980, Mr. Senft formed Sentinel Government Securities (SGS), a New York limited partnership, to replace SFI, which he intended to close in 1980. SGS commenced operations on September 5, 1980. *520 SFI, and SGS, Inc. (an entity controlled by Mr. Senft). *521 of SGS' purported objectives is consistent with the following statements in the private placement memorandum:
The nature of the Partnership's business is such that, while pursuing a primary profit-making objective, substantial tax benefits may be generated for a Limited Partner. In this regard, the Partnership will, whenever possible and when consistent with its profit-making objective, attempt to maximize current deductions, defer the inclusion of income, and realize and recognize long-term capital gain.
The Federal income tax consideations of an investor in the partnership are discussed in a 65-page opinion, which is an exhibit of the private placement memorandum.
Mr. Senft proposed to provide limited partners of SGS with a four-to-one tax write-off based on a contribution of cash and a promissory note. The amount of the note was three times the amount of the cash contributed by the limited partner.
SGS entered into an alleged trading program from October to December 1980 with Lasser-Marshall. According to the alleged trading program, SGS traded about $ 6 billion with Lasser-Marshall and received losses of $ 60 million and Lasser-Marshall received a commission of $ *522 600,000 for providing the service. Mr. Senft arranged for SGS to enter into the prearranged loss transactions with Lasser-Marshall for the purpose of obtaining deductible tax losses with the understanding that only a fee would be paid to Lasser-Marshall for generating those losses. SGS paid Lasser-Marshall the fee of $ 600,000 in six $ 100,000 installments. SGS entered into six alleged transactions with Lasser-Marshall in which SGS lost $ 100,000 each time to Lasser-Marshall. SGS provided all of the information concerning the alleged buying and selling of securities to Lasser-Marshall, which generated confirmations of the transactions exactly as furnished it by SGS. No securities were purchased, sold, or transferred between SGS and Lasser-Marshall.
SGS and Lasser-Marshall started a second alleged $ 6 billion dollar trading program in the fall of 1981. According to the alleged trading program, SGS was to receive losses from this program and Lasser-Marshall was to receive a fee of $ 600,000 for its paperwork in providing the losses. The second alleged trading program was not completed due to the seizure of the records of SGS.
In addition to the alleged trading programs with*523 Lasser-Marshall, SGS and Gill and Duffus Securities, Inc. (Gill and Duffus) agreed in December 1980 to a "tax roll" whereby Gill and Duffus would lose approximately $ 10 million to SGS in 1980. Gill and Duffus received a fee of approximately $ 62,500 or one-half to three quarters of a percent of the requested "tax roll." SGS and Gill and Duffus agreed that there would be no market risk to either of them from the paper transactions. There was an agreed limit on the daily balance of the accounts between SGS and Gill and Duffus. SGS and Gill and Guffus agreed if the balance exceeded the agreed amount because of daily market movement, the account would be traded back into balance through either market trades or backdated trades. The parties agreed there would be no payment of money between them other than the fee to be paid to Gill and Duffus for generating the losses.
In addition to buying losses for its use, SGS sold tax losses to other entities. Berkeley Capital Partner (Berkeley Capital), a limited partnership unrelated to SGS was organized to be a tax shelter for its partners. In mid-December 1980, Berkeley Capital arranged a purported loss of $ 2 to $ 4 million with Mr. Orchard*524 of SGS for a commission of $ 75,000. After the transactions were completed, Mr. Orchard told Berkeley Capital that it owed an additional $ 25,000. It was agreed that Berkeley Capital could pay the fee by putting on a trade which would purportedly lose approximately $ 25,000. There was no exchange of securities or any actual purchase or sale of securities. *525 of $ 708,431.
In November 1979, the Securities Groups was a joint operating venture of two limited partnerships: (1) the Securities Group, which was formed in September 1978; and (2) the Monetary Group, which was organized in October 1979. Securities Group 1980, which was organized in July 1980, became a partner of the Securities Groups in 1980. On April 6, 1981, the Securities Groups announced the acquisition of New York Hanseatic, a division of Stuart Brothers. (Hereinafter this group is referred to as TSG.) In July 1981, New York Hanseatic Division of the Securities Groups was listed as a primary dealer in government securities. *526 that the limited partnership's principal business would be a broker-dealer and market-maker in U.S. Government securities, U.S. Government Agency securities, money market instruments, financial futures, and foreign exchange. The offering circular includes an extensive description of the Federal income tax consequences of investment in Securities Group 1980. Additionally, a 38-page tax opinion, which was prepared by a Washington, D.C., law firm, is an exhibit of the offering circular. TSG provided tax losses to its limited partners in a manner similar to the manner in which SFI provided losses to individuals.
On March 23, 1984, Mr. Senft, Walter Orchard, Mr. Antonucci, David Senft, and Frank Susi were indicted in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York with one count of violating section 371 of Title 18 concerning their activities at SFI and SGS. Mr. Senft was charged with 59 counts of aiding and assisting the filing of false tax returns in violation of section 7206(2); Mr. Antonucci and David Senft were charged with 31 such counts; Mr. Orchard and Mr. Susi were charged with 28 such counts. Mr. Senft was charged with one count of tax evasion*527 in violation of section 7201 and one count in subscribing to a false return in violation of 7206(1).
Following a jury trial, Mr. Senft, Mr. Orchard, Mr. Antonucci and David Senft, but not Mr. Susi, were convicted of violating section 371 of Title 18. Mr. Senft, Mr. Antonucci, and David Senft were found guilty of 12 counts of violating section 7206(2); Mr. Orchard was found guilty of one count. Mr. Senft was convicted of tax evasion in violation of section 7201. In July 1984, Mr. Senft was sentenced to a 15-year term of imprisonment and Mr. Orchard to a 4-year term. Mr. Antonucci was sentenced to a 6-month term and David Senft to a 2-year term. In March 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of conviction entered against Mr. Senft, Mr. Orchard, Mr. Antonucci, and David Senft. Mr. Senft, who was serving his prison sentence at the time of the trial of the instant case, testified pursuant to a grant of immunity. He testified in detail of the fictitious nature of the purported Government securities transactions he conducted for his clients.
In addition to the fictitious transactions Mr. Senft's entities arranged for their clients, these entities*528 may have also engaged in certain legitimate transactions.
(a) John S. Maring
In 1977 John Maring invested in Beech Run as a limited partner. Beech Run was a customer of Senft & Co. from 1977 through 1979. In 1978 John Maring became aware of the Senft & Co. purported trading program through Mr. Burkhart, the general partner of Beech Run. John Maring then went to Chicago, Illinois, in order to meet and talk with Mr. Senft about his purported trading program. After returning to Portland, Oregon, and reading the information that he had received from Mr. Senft, John Maring decided to invest in the purported government securities transactions, and he recommended the investment to 25 to 40 people, including the other petitioners in the instant case.
John Maring was a salesman of Senft & Co., SFI, and SGS from 1978 to 1980. He was to and did receive a fee of $ 16,100 for referring clients, including Mr. Castagno, Dr. Franks, and Dr. McAllister, to Mr. Senft in 1978. Clients referred to Senft & Co. by John Maring in 1978 were required to pay a "margin deposit" equal to 8 percent of their desired loss.
John Maring earned*529 a fee of $ 80,775 for referring 17 individuals, including Dr. Blomquist, Peter Maring, Mr. Castagno, Dr. McAllister, and Dr. Franks, to SFI in 1979. Of the referral fee, $ 34,160 was treated as additional "margin deposit" of John Maring to SFI in November 1979. The remaining $ 46,615 was paid to John Maring in January 1980. Clients referred to SFI in 1979 by John Maring were required to pay a margin deposit equal to 12-1/2 percent of the loss requested in 1979. Of the 12-1/2 percent margin deposit, 7-1/2 percent was paid to SFI, 2-1/2 percent was to be returned to the client, and a 2-1/2 percent fee was to be paid to John Maring at the end of the program.
In 1980 John Maring earned over $ 96,000 as a salesman of SGS. He referred three limited partnerships, including KBB and CAM, to SGS during 1980.
John Maring contributed $ 25,000 and $ 4,784 in 1977 and 1979, respectively, to Beech Run. His reported distributive share of Beech Run's income or loss in 1977, 1978, and 1979 was the following:
1977 | 1978 | 1979 | |
income | $ 2,033 | ||
loss ($ 101,637) | ($ 26,698) |
*530 In 1978, John Maring made a margin deposit of $ 13,800 with respect to purported government securities transactions that were brokered by Senft & Co. with ACLI. With respect to the $ 13,800 margin deposit, John Maring reported the following amounts on his 1978 and 1979 Federal income tax returns:
1978 | 1979 | |
loss | ($ 231,675) | |
interest income | 285,850 | |
interest expense | (17,500) | (56,261) |
investment management expense | ( 8,340) |
In 1979 John Maring made a margin deposit of $ 30,000 with SFI. With respect to the $ 30,000 margin deposit, he reported a loss of $ 375,888 resulting from "cancellation of forward contract." He also claimed a deduction of loan fee charges of $ 13,934.
(b) Peter F. Maring
Peter Maring relied solely on the advice of his brother, John Maring, when deciding to invest in purported government securities. He made a margin deposit of $ 6,250 with WFI in 1979. His check for the amount of the margin deposit was accompanied by a form letter to SFI in which he stated that he wanted to open a trading account in government securities "for profit." Identical letters were sent in October 1979 to SFI by Dr. Franks, Dr. McAllister, and*531 Dr. and Mrs. Blomquist and in March 1980 by Mr. Castagno and Dr. Blomquist as managing partners of CAM and KBB to SGS. As a result of the purported government securities transactions with SFI, Peter Maring claimed an ordinary loss of $ 48,344 1980 1981 ordinary loss (56,358) (28,082) ordinary gain 61,612 interest income short-term capital loss ( 2,188) long-term capital gain 54,063 interest expense deduction ( 5,296) ( 1,650)
*532 Peter Maring contributed $ 51,282, and $ 18,000 to CAM in 1980 and 1981, respectively. CAM was an Oregon general partnership formed on October 1, 1980. It was a limited partner of SGS in 1980 and 1981 and in 1981 it was also a limited partner of the Securities Group 1980.
With respect to his investment in CAM, Peter Maring reported the following amounts on his 1980 and 1981 Federal income tax returns:
1980 1981 Ordinary Loss | ($ 39,564) | ($ 15,053) | |
Short-term capital gain | 502 | 3 | |
Interest income | 2 | ||
Investment interest expense | 8,551 |
*533 (c) Lawrence J. Franks
In 1978 Lawrence Franks heard about the purported tax straddle investment opportunity from John Maring. In 1978 Dr. Franks made a margin deposit of $ 20,800 for purported government securities transactions to be brokered by Senft & Co. with ACLI. As a result of the purported ACLI transactions, Dr. Franks reported a loss of $ 237,646 on his 1978 Federal income tax return and claimed deduction for interest expense of $ 14,236 and investment management fees of $ 8,000. In 1979 he reported a gain of $ 231,288.10 with respect to his 1978 margin deposit.
In 1979 Dr. Franks made a margin deposit of $ 66,250 with SFI. With respect to this margin deposit, Dr. Franks purportedly realized a gain of $ 284,491.26, a loss of $ 797,258.34, and had loan fee charges of $ 18,895.92. On his 1979 return, Dr. Franks reported a loss of $ 281,479 with respect to the government securities transactions. He claimed a deduction for interest expense of $ 18,896. *534 (d) Robert H. and Karen I. Blomquist
Karen Blomquist is responsible for investigating and analyzing investment opportunities on behalf of her family. In 1978, she became aware of purported investments in government securities from John Maring. She talked about the investment with the staff of SFI and her fellow students. She understood the basic concepts, but not the details of investing in government securities.
In 1979, Dr. and Mrs. Blomquist made a margin deposit of $ 5,000 with SFI. As a result of their purported government securities transactions with SFI, Dr. and Mrs. Blomquist reported the following amounts on their 1979, 1980, and 1981 FEderal income tax returns:
1979 | 1980 | 1981 | |
loss | (50,095) | (21,076) | |
interest income | 49,290 | 19,190 | |
long-term capital gain | 44,500 |
They claimed a deduction for interest expense of $ 3,149 in 1979 and of $ 473 in 1981. In 1980 they claimed*535 a deduction of $ 3,531 as a loan fee and in 1981 claimed a loan fee deduction of $ 473. *536 (e) Thomas H. McAllister Dr. McAllister, became aware of purported Treasury-bill straddle investments from John Maring in 1978. In deciding whether to invest in the purported government securities transactions, he relied on the advice of John Maring and read the circulars offered by Mr. Senft. Dr. McAllister made a "margin deposit" of $ 4,000 with SFI in 1978. On his Federal income tax return for 1978, Dr. McAllister reported with respect to this deposit an ordinary loss of $ 47,173 and deducted investment expense of $ 4,000. In 1979 Dr. McAllister made a "margin deposit" of $ 12,500 with SFI. With respect to his purported government securities transactions, Dr. McAllister reported a loss of $ 31,071 on his 1979 Federal income tax return and claimed deductions for investment expense in the amount of $ 20,798. The net loss of $ 31,071 in 1979 was presumably calculated as follows: gain of $ 65,956, with respect to the 1978 margin deposit less a loss of $ 97,027 with respect to the 1979 margin deposit. On his 1980 and 1981 returns, Dr. McAllister reported the following with respect to his government securities transactions: *537 He also claimed a deduction of $ 19,926 as investment expense/loan fees in 1980 and of $ 4,985 in 1981. Dr. McAllister contributed $ 65,443 and $ 138,081 to KBB in 1980 and 1981, respectively. With respect to his KBB investment, Dr. McAllister reported the following amounts on his 1980 and 1981 Federal income tax returns: (f) David C. Castagno In 1978 David Castagno became aware of the purported Treasury-bill straddle investment*538 through John Maring. He relied on the advice of John Maring concerning the investment opportunity. In November 1978, Mr. Castagno made a "margin deposit" of $ 2,400 with ACLI through Senft & Co. With respect to the purported securities transactions brokered by Senft & Co., Mr. Castagno claimed an ordinary loss of $ 25,548.20 *539 On his 1980 and 1981 Federal income tax returns, Mr. Castagno reported the following amounts with respect to the 1979 margin deposit of $ 7,500: *540 (a) John S. Maring Respondent in his notice of deficiency to John Maring adjusted his distributive share of Beech Run income and loss in the years 1977, 1978 and 1978, with the following explanation: It is determined that your distributive share of the income/[loss] from Beech Run, Ltd., is $ 23,101.00, $ 160,420.00 and $ 216,680.00 in lieu of the [$ 101,637.00], $ 2,033.00 and [$ 26,689.00] as reported on your 1977, 1978 and 1979 tax returns, respectively. See computation below. 1980 1981 ordinary loss (72,984) (88,213) interest income 12 short-term capital gain 708 20 1980 1981 ordinary loss ($ 118,163) ($ 104,337) coupon interest 140,731 99,588 long-term capital gain 99,750 1980 1981 ordinary loss interest income 16 short-term capital gain 641 27 1980 1981 ordinary loss ($ 70,372.64) ($ 54,393.81) coupon income 73,990.49 45,071.67 long-term capital gain 70,281.25 short-tem capital loss 1980 1981 ordinary loss (27,800) (40,074) interest income 5 dividends 1 short-term capital gain 290 9 investment interest expense (4,941)