DocketNumber: Docket No. 1039-74.
Filed Date: 6/3/1976
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANNENWALD,
This case has been submitted to the Court fully stipulated.
At the time of filing the petition herein, petitioners, husband and wife, resided in Burlington, Massachusetts, and North Andover, Massachusetts, respectively. Petitioners filed a joint Federal income tax return for the 1972 taxable year. Since the single issue before us pertains to Linda (Joyal) Cain's receipt of certain payments from her former husband, hereinafter any reference to petitioner shall be to Linda (Joyal) Cain.
In 1959, petitioner married Rene Joyal in the State of New Hampshire, where the couple lived as husband and wife until their separation in 1964 when petitioner moved to Massachusetts. On October 4, 1966, the Superior Court at Nashua, Hillsborough County, New Hampshire, issued petitioner a decree of divorce from Rene Joyal, awarded petitioner custody of the child born of the marriage, and ordered Joyal to pay petitioner
the sum of Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) per week towards the support of the said Linda G. Joyal and said minor child.
In 1968, petitioner was married to James Cain in the State of New Hampshire. Thereafter, petitioner and Cain lived in Massachusetts until*230 July, 1974, when, after separating from Cain, petitioner moved to McLean, Virginia. During the year in question (1972), petitioner received $1,300 from Rene Joyal in accordance with the 1966 divorce decree.
The parties agree that if only the divorce decree were involved, petitioner would fail under the rule laid down by
*231 Petitioner casts the issue as a classic choice of law problem and urges us, as a national court, to adopt our own rules for the resolution of conflicts of law questions. The conflicts rule that petitioner would have us adopt is a hybrid of modern conflicts theories favoring, on the one hand, the substantive law of the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the elements of the controversy and, on the other hand, the substantive law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the resolution of the controversy by application of its own law. Petitioner reasons that Virginia is the jurisdiction filling both of these bills and that Virginia law, which provides for the cessation of the obligation to make support and maintenance payments upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse, 2 should, therefore, apply to deem petitioner's receipts nontaxable. 3
*232 We see no reason to accede to petitioner's blandishments. Whatever the effect of petitioner's contacts with Virginia may be, we cannot conceive how they would have any bearing on the taxable year before us, since she did not move to Virginia until 1974. 4 More importantly, as far as this record reveals, the New Hamsphire divorce decree remains in full force and effect and has not been varied in any way by the action of any other state having jurisdiction over petitioner or her former husband. Under such circumstances, we think it clear that New Hampshire law controls. Compare
*233 Initially, we observe that the New Hampshire courts retain jurisdiction to take appropriate action to continue or modify the alimony provision of a divorce decree without being bound by the law of another state to which one of the parties to the divorce action may have moved. See
The parties agree that, under New Hampshire law, Rene Joyal's obligation under the divorce decree did not terminate upon petitioner's remarriage because the rights of a minor child were affected by such decree. 5 See
While the presence of a minor child may have been the sine qua non of Rene Joyal's continuing obligation to make payments under the divorce decree, it does not follow that such payments were child support. New Hampshire does not view child support and alimony as separate and distinct provisions unless the decree specifically provides that they be such; a decree is read in its entirety.
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise stated.↩
2.
3. Petitioner does not urge us to adopt rules dealing with the marital relationship independent of state law. Cf.
4. In so stating, we do not imply that we would necessarily conclude that the Virginia statute automatically modified the New Hampshire decree -- a question not without constitutional ramifications. Compare
Both spouses will everywhere be held bound by any provision relating to support in the divorce decree to the extent that they would so be bound under the local law of the state of rendition. * * *
See also,
5. Where no minor children are involved, New Hampshire law provides that an order of support pursuant to a divorce decree shall be effective for no more than three years, absent renewal, modification, or extension.