DocketNumber: Docket No. 5818-81, 20307-81, 20308-81, 17898-83.
Filed Date: 8/7/1985
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHITAKER,
Petitioner | Docket No. | Year | Deficiency | |||
Harvey L. Sheid and | 5818-81 | 1972 | $13,987.00 | |||
Rita Sheid | 1973 | 17,958.91 | ||||
Herbert and Dorothy | 5818-81 | 1972 | 27,598.47 | |||
Quittner | 1973 | 43,648.73 | ||||
Alfred J. and Elizabeth L. | 5818-81 | 1972 | Traynor | 1973 | 48,993.92 | |
Frederick H. and Susan F. | 5818-81 | 1972 | 14,198.64 | |||
Joseph | 1973 | 22,504.83 | ||||
Gerald B. and Barbara | 5818-81 | 1972 | 63,488.55 | |||
Cramer | 1973 | 89,735.59 | ||||
Edwin and Sondra Abramson | 5818-81 | 1972 | 23,168.59 | |||
1973 | 37,575.75 | |||||
Estate of Jacob C. Abramson, | 5818-81 | 1972 | 24,940.33 | |||
Deceased, and H. Cecelia | 1973 | 43,429.30 | ||||
Abramson | ||||||
Melvin S. and Judith I. | 5818-81 | 1972 | 26,451.01 | |||
Bernhaut | 1973 | 36,178.60 | ||||
Roy E. and Doris H. | 5818-81 | 1972 | 28,248.20 | |||
Osterstock | 1973 | 53,087.34 | ||||
David G. Kay | 20307-81 | 1972 | 14,879.00 | |||
1973 | 25,631.00 | |||||
Robert J. and Bessie N. Breeden | 20308-81 | 1973 | 35,684.55 | |||
Eli and Esther Shapiro | 17898-83 | 1973 | 28,550.24 |
Certain issues in these four cases were severed and consolidated for the purposes of trial, briefing, and opinion. These issues all arise out of activities of a limited partnership, JHE PROPERTY LTD. (JHE), formed pursuant to the laws of the State of New Jersey on August 10, 1972, to acquire, own, and exploit the motion picture "The First Roman" (the Film). The issues for our decision are: (1) whether the partnership constituted an activity engaged in for profit within the meaning of
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and they are so found. Petitioners Robert J. and Bessie N. Breeden, and Eli and Esther E. Shapiro resided in Michigan when they filed their petitions herein. Petitioner *239 David Kay resided in New York State when his petition was filed. All other petitioners resided in New Jersey at the time they filed their petitions. Except for petitioners Frederick and Susan F. Joseph, the parties stipulated that the notices of deficiency were timely mailed. *240 of those limited partners who are parties in this case are as follows: Percentage of Amount of Capital Name Ownership Contribution Harvey L. and Rita Sheid 3-1/3 $10,000 Herbert and Dorothy 6-2/3 20,000 Quittner Alfred J. and Elizabeth L 6-2/3 20,000 Traynor Frederick H. and Susan F. 3-1/3 10,000 Joseph Gerald B. and Barbara 13-1/3 40,000 Cramer Estate of Jacob C. 6-2/3 20,000 Abramson, Deceased, and H. Cecelia Abramson Melvin S. and Judith I. 6-2/3 20,000 Bernhaut Roy E. and Doris H. Osterstock 6-2/3 20,000 David G. Kay 3-1/3 10,000 Robert J. and Bessie N. 6-2/3 20,000 Breeden Eli and Esther Shapiro 6-2/3 20,000 Total 70 $210,000
Five other limited partners, not parties to this action, own the remaining 23-1/3 percent of the partnership interests. The partnership received capital contributions from all partners totaling $300,000. Of this $300,000, $280,000 of cash was invested in acquiring the Film on September 12, 1972.
The Film is a 98-minute color sound motion picture, filmed in English (although minor characters may have spoken in a foreign language). It was directed by Robert Siodmak and produced in Europe by CCC Filmkunst and Company, GMBH K.G. (CCC), a European film producer. The leading roles are played by Orson Wells, *241 Laurence Harvey, Sylvia Koscina, Honor Blackman, and Robert Hoffman. The sets and costumes used in the Film and the photography are of high quality. The Film was copyrighted in 1969 and had been shown in Europe when acquired by JHE.
The Film came to the attention of Mr. Peter Strauss, an executive vice president of Allied Artists (Allied) in late 1971 through a press book furnished by Mr. Armand Rubin, a sales agent for CCC. Allied was a distribution and production company, which during 1971 and 1972 was classified as either the largest of the independent distribution companies or the smallest of the majors. At that time, Allied was both cash poor and product poor. Thus, it was interested in acquiring more film products for distribution in order to assist in absorbing its fixed overhead distribution costs but without depleting its cash reserves whenever possible. One method of accomplishing this goal was to locate and negotiate a film purchase arrangement with a producer for a film Allied desired to distribute and then to locate an investor willing to acquire title to the film and to enter into a distribution agreement with Allied. It was Allied's practice in negotiating the *242 purchase price for a film to attempt to make certain that Allied would recover its out-of-pocket costs, that is, that the "down side" potential would allow for this. Also, in negotiating with foreign producers Allied had to take into account the rule of thumb that revenues from the United States should reimburse the producer for one-half of the production costs. These factors were taken into account by Strauss in negotiating for the Film.
As a way of opening negotiations Rubin indicated that the producer wanted several million dollars for the Film, roughly 50 percent of the production costs, and that another major company had made an offer in excess of $1 million. He was informed by Strauss that Allied would not consider paying any sum approximating even $1 million in cash. Rubin requested a preliminary offer and, based solely on the press book, Strauss in 1971 made an offer of $90,000 cash plus 80 percent of the gross proceeds of one prime-time television network sale. *243 rights to the Film for a price of $1,200,000, payable $280,000 in cash and a nonrecourse note in the amount of $920,000 payable from 20 percent of any proceeds that the distributor might collect (distributor gross). *244 After his screening of the Film and during the course of his negotiations with Rubin, Strauss estimated the "up-side" potential to be approximately five million dollars and that Allied could at worst recover a $280,000 cash investment from its 80 percent share of the distributor gross.
The Film is described as a "sandal and sword" type, After negotiating the purchase terms, Strauss returned to the United States to attempt to locate an investor group. It is not clear whether Allied would have purchased the Film itself if *245 an investor group had not materialized. Through mutual acquaintances, Strauss was put in touch with Abramson (who later became the JHE general partner) in order to discuss the formation of an investment group to assume and undertake Allied's tentative purchase understanding and to contract with Allied as the distributor. Strauss presented a packaged investment, a film to be acquired at a specified price with Allied as the distributor. A screening of the Film was arranged in July 1972 for Abramson and his legal advisor, Felix Ziffer. Abramson is a certified public accountant with offices in West Orange, New Jersey. He has specialized in doing accounting work for businesses in the entertainment field and for entertainers. Prior to 1972, he had represented entertainers and authors in connection with film production and distribution matters, had assisted in the production of a film, and had himself worked as a professional musician. Ziffer is an attorney, practicing in New York City and specializing in "leisure time activities" which includes the motion picture industry. Prior to 1972, he had represented several of the major film producers and distributors and many businesses and *246 individuals in business matters pertaining to production and distribution of films. He and Abramson had on occasions represented the same client in specific matters. Ziffer also had represented Abramson personally in motion picture matters. Ziffer had also acquired and produced films for his own account. He knew Allied by reputation and knew Strauss socially. Abramson and Ziffer were favorably impressed with the Film and requested from Strauss an estimate of the Film's potential. Although Abramson had never had any business dealings with Allied, he was influenced by Allied's reputation in the distribution field and was impressed with the fact that it was willing to take on the financial and business burden of marketing this product. Abramson and Ziffer understood that they were being offered a package--that the Film's purchase price had already been negotiated and that Allied was to be the distributor. Abramson and Ziffer relied on information supplied by Strauss, including information that the Film had generated receipts somewhere in the neighborhood of $5 million up to that date in its European showings. By letter dated July 25, 1972, Strauss estimated television sales at $800,000, *247 nontheatrical and Canadian sales at $200,000, and theatrical Ziffer and Strauss agreed that the distribution agreement would provide for a sharing by Allied and JHE of distributor gross, rather than the net receipts of the distributor, which was favorable to JHE as the owner of the Film. Under the distribution agreement *248 the estimated revenues of JHE would be approximately $2,000,000, providing a gross profit potential of $800,000 (after payment of the entire purchase price), less the partnership's expenses which were nominal in the years 1972 and 1973. As originally negotiated between Strauss and Rubin, CCC was entitled to 20 percent of the distributor gross or more than one-half of the initial percentage of 35 percent payable to the investors. As a result, Ziffer persuaded Strauss to renegotiate the percentage of the distributor gross payable to CCC, which was reduced to 17-1/2 percent. On this basis, Abramson put together a group of investors, with the partnership formed in August 1972; the United States and Canadian rights to the Film were purchased by JHE on September 12, 1972. *250 Ziffer assisted Abramson in negotiating the details of the closing documents but they did not attempt to negotiate a more favorable price. The distribution agreement with Allied was executed on September 14, 1972. The investors were furnished a confidential memorandum which described the terms of the offering, the purchase price, and the tax consequences. It is indicated that, typically, the investment would appeal *249 to taxpayers in high brackets. There are also some comments among Allied internal documents describing the arrangement as a "tax shelter." However, we do not find that tax benefits represented the sole or predominant objective of either the general or the limited partners. The cash portion of the $1,200,000 purchase price, the sum of $280,000 was paid to CCC *251 out of funds of JHE provided by the investors. The balance was evidenced by a nonnegotiable nonrecourse promissory note in the amount of $920,000, payable solely out of one-half of JHE's gross. However, the note was due in full on September 12, 1987. Simple interest at the rate of 4 percent per annum from September 12, 1972 was also then due. JHE was not accountable for any revenues from the Film until actually collected. A security agreement gave the right to foreclose and sell the Film in Newark, New Jersey, in a commercially reasonable manner on default. Thus if the purchase price was not paid by September 12, 1987, the Film could be reacquired on foreclosure. Under the distribution agreement, Allied was obligated to test market the Film in five markets prior to December 31, 1972. Strauss had no interest in JHE and neither he nor Allied received any compensation from JHE or anyone else in connection with the purchase of the Film. The only way in which Allied could recover its out-of-pocket costs was from its share of distributor gross. The Film progressed through normal distribution channels at Allied and was shown in five test markets during 1972 with disappointing results. JHE's share of revenues generated in 1972 was $206.50. Additional theatrical showings in 1973 generated $80.50 for JHE. On Strauss' recommendation, Abramson for the partnership then decided to market the Film to television. Ziffer prodded and pushed Allied in every reasonable fashion and in fact obtained early in 1974 a $10,000 advance against television revenues which the contract did not require. There was also some hope that interest could be developed in films involving Orson Wells that would be sufficient to merit a re-release of the Film theatrically. Industry experience *252 indicates that approximately one out of ten films is successful, that 60 to 70 percent of theatrical revenues will be received within the first 6 months and such revenues will be exhausted at the end of a year. The initial public reaction to a film, such as the results of the showing of the Film in the five test markets, may have an immediate and major impact on its value, since word as to the results of test marketing tends to travel rapidly through the distribution chain. Hence, a film which is estimated to have substantial value prior to showing may be found upon test marketing to be practically valueless, which is what in fact occurred in this case. The partnership accrued and reported gross receipts from theatrical distribution for the 1972 taxable year in the amount of $206.50 (in addition to $93.06 of interest income), although no moneys were received until a later year. In connection with preparation of the 1972 partnership return, Abramson estimated total gross receipts from theatrical exhibition to be $317.69 based on an estimate made by Strauss in 1973. The partnership calculated depreciation for 1972 by the income forecast method as follows: $206.50 / $317.69 X $1,209,646.01 *253 = $786,269.91 *254 and other expenses of $673.10. *255 negotiations and reflected their reasonable expectations as of September 12, 1972. OPINION The first issue for decision is whether the partnership's business was an activity engaged in for profit within the meaning of This does not mean, however, that our inquiry is confined solely to the activities *256 of the partnership, for those parties possessing resources sufficient to acquire and exploit investment property are not always blessed with corresponding expertise. In such a case, a partnership can rely upon the expertise of third parties * * *. The scope of the relevant inquiry therefore expends to encompass the entirety of such multilayered transactions. [ As we have found, in 1972 Allied was an established, nationally recognized producer and distributor of films with established expertise. In arm's-length bargaining, Strauss negotiated with an unrelated agent of an unrelated foreign producer terms for the purchase of the Film, which Strauss on behalf of Allied felt were fair to Allied or to a third party investor if one could be located. Allied's reasons for wishing to conserve its cash and thus look for a third party purchaser were satisfactorily explained. There is no responsible suggestion in the record that Allied was undertaking to market an abusive tax shelter, as apparently respondent believes. *258 was through the distribution of a successful film since Allied did not receive any cash out of the purchase price. Allied's only interest in finding an investor group to purchase the Film was to obtain with only a minor cash outlay another film to distribute, and distribution of the Film again caused Allied to incur further out-of-pocket costs which it could recoup only out of its share of gross distribution revenues. Respondent seems to have been misled by his overemphasis on the initial offer made by Strauss for the Film which respondent consistently describes as the sum of $90,000, apparently not recalling that in addition Strauss offered to the Film's owner 80 percent of a single prime-time television showing. Moreover, the record is undisputed that this offer was made simply to open the negotiations and was not intended or received as a serious or firm offer for the Film. Neither do we find anything suspicious in the fact that the proposition pur to Abramson was essentially a package--a nonnegotiable purchase price for the Film tied into a distribution agreement with *259 Allied. In fact, at the instance of Abramson and his advisor, the percentage of the distributor gross to be paid to the seller of the Film was decreased from 20 percent to 17-1/2 percent so that JHE would be able to retain at least half of its share of the moneys it was to receive until the promissory note had been paid in full. Abramson also negotiated a very favorable distribution agreement with Allied, a producer and distributor of recognized reputation. This was clearly not a typical abusive tax shelter scenario. A profit objective may be analyzed in relation to the nine factors set out in respondent's We *260 note, of course, that, on the basis of the showing in test markets in 1972 and 1973, Allied concluded that further theatrical exploitation would be fruitless. This too was an informed judgment by an experienced person. Abramson and Ziffer did all that could reasonably be expected of the general partner and his attorney in those circumstances. Petitioners have conclusively established the good faith profit objective of the general partner and thus of the partnership and all limited partners. Respondent argues that a profit motive is negated by the fact that the price of the Film so far exceeded its fair market value as to preclude petitioners from making a profit, relying on our opinion in The next issue for our determination is the amount, if any, of the nonrecourse note given by JHE to the seller which can be included in basis for purposes of depreciation. The general rule is that where property is acquired by purchase its cost includes the amount of liabilities assumed, or taken subject to, by the purchaser. Respondent divides his argument into two subparts, whether the note was too contingent to be recognized as of its date in 1972, and whether the debt represented by the note substantially exceeds the Film's fair market value so as to preclude recognition of the note under cases such as In support of his position on the nonrecourse debt, respondent has directed our attention to the recent opinion in The contingency issue has arisen in several contexts such as whether the nonrecourse obligation should be added to basis, However, JHE as well as CCC realized that the speculative nature of the movie industry precluded any certainty as to payment of the contingent part of the purchase price. Like The Court *268 of Appeals in The principal cases dealing with the problem of nonrecourse loans and taxation have involved situations in which the property securing the nonrecourse note "was real and personal property of a durable nature," which (1) possessed "an objectively ascertainable present value at least equal to the amount of the indebtedness" along with "a reasonably predictable future value * * * reasonably certain to remain at least equal to the amount of indebtedness," and (2) "was relatively immune to or which might be insured against sudden developments [that] might reduce the value of the property below the amount of the unpaid indebtedness." [ The common thread which runs through these contingent debt cases is that until the activity has been completed--the well drilled, the book, the song or the movie exposed to the public or the gold recovered from the mine--it is impossible to determine whether or not the activity will produce income which can be applied to retire the indebtedness. In this factual circumstance, it cannot *269 be said that when the nonrecourse obligation is created there is sufficient certainty of its repayment to warrant its inclusion in basis. This is true even though the fair market value of the security equals or exceeds the indebtedness. Fair market value is simply that value which parties dealing at arm's length with equal knowledge of the facts deem the property to be worth. *270 It is a peculiarity of a new film as with any other item of property which depends for its ultimate value on subsequent events that the previously determined fair market value may totally vanish at the moment of the first public showing or it may in those lucky circumstances multiply in value many times. We do not by what we have said here mean to imply a rigid rule for all films until after the results of public showing are known. We simply conclude, on the basis of the evidence before us in this case including the testimony of petitioners' expert on which we place heavy reliance, that under these facts this nonrecourse indebtedness was too contingent to be taken into basis. With respect to the income forecast method of computing depreciation, this case presents two issues--whether any income was received by JHE for purposes of the income forecast method in the year 1972, and if so the denominator to be used in the fraction. The income forecast method of accounting is described in With respect to the first aspect of respondent's argument, respondent contends that the revenues from the five test market showings which took place during December 1972 were not received by Allied until 1973 or thereafter and then distributed to JHE. Respondent also argues that under the terms of the distribution agreement revenues are not required to be taken into account until actually received. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that JHE elected the accrual method, respondent contends that for tax purposes the share of the revenues from the five showings to which JHE is entitled, the sum of $206.50, is not to be treated as accruable in 1972. Respondent cites no authority for its position; we have found none. JHE's share of gross distribution revenues for the year 1972 was $206.50. The partnership's right was not contingent and no facts have been brought to our attention which would cast any doubt, as of the end of 1972, upon the right of JHE to receive those revenues as and when collected by Allied. Under these circumstances JHE was entitled to and required to accrue *272 this income as of December 31, 1972. See The remaining question is the denominator of the fraction. For purposes of this calculation, the denominator of the fraction used by petitioners was the sum of $317.69 which was the amount of revenue Strauss estimated in 1973 would be received from theatrical performances of "The Last Roman" during its useful life. This estimate was made in a letter by Strauss to Abramson during 1973 and obviously reflected the poor showing by the Film in December 1972 and in the two additional test markets in 1973. So far as pertinent to this question, respondent's revenue ruling provides as follows: If in subsequent years it is found that the income forecast was substantially overestimated or underestimated *273 by reason of circumstances occurring in such subsequent years, an adjustment of the income forecast for such subsequent years may be made * * *. The total forecast or estimated income to be derived from the films should be based on the conditions known to exist at the end of the period for which the return is made. This estimate can be revised upward or downward, as explained above, at the end of subsequent taxable periods based on additional information which became available after the last prior estimate. [ Respondent takes the position that the 1972 income forecast calculations should be made by using as the denominator the Strauss projected total income of $3,750,000 contained in his letter to Abramson dated July 25, 1972. As subissues, respondent argues that: (1) Petitioners have not proven any different figure for the denominator of the fraction, there being no detailed explanation of how the figure of $317.69 was derived; (2) estimated television sales revenues should be included in the denominator; and (3) pursuant to Focusing upon these arguments in their inverse order, we have held that the nonrecourse indebtedness was too contingent to be included in basis, at least for the 1972 and 1973 years. *275 Accordingly, it is also too contingent to be included in the forecasted income for purposes of the denominator of the fraction. Respondent recognizes that if the nonrecourse note were invalid it should not be included either in basis or in the denominator of the income forecast fraction and we think the rule is equally applicable where we have determined that the obligation is too contingent to be taken into account. The legislative history relative to section 280 and the recent Supreme Court case of Under the applicable revenue rulings, the facts to be taken into account for purposes of making the total income forecast estimate are those known to exist "at the end of the period for which the return was made." This would be as of December 31, 1972 with respect to that year. As of that date, Abramson as the general partner for JHE had no knowledge of the success or failure of the Film in the test market showings which took place during the month of December. That information was not communicated to Abramson until the Strauss letter of January 18, 1973. The fact that some of the Allied personnel may have known of the disastrous results of the test markets in December (and the record does not indicate whether or not this is a fact) is immaterial. Obviously the theatres in which the Film was shown were aware of the facts but that knowledge cannot be attributed to JHE. The error in the JHE position is that JHE took into account knowledge acquired as of the date of filing of the 1972 partnership return rather than as of the end of the taxable *276 period. As of December 31, 1972, the only estimate available was that made by Strauss in his letter to Abramson dated July 25, 1972. It is that estimate which must be used for the denominator of the fraction for the year 1972. With respect to the year 1973, however, the facts are different. A downward revision in accordance with The nonrecourse note obligation is not to be taken into account in 1973 as we have already determined for the year 1972. There remains, however, the question of whether the denominator for 1973 is to include some estimate of television and other revenues. The 1973 facts demonstrate that Strauss' July 1972 revenue estimate was *277 grossly inaccurate, not just as to theatricals but in total. As of the end of the year 1973 there was no factual basis for estimating significant revenue from television and other sources. However, by that time Strauss and Allied concluded that television and other revenues would be at least sufficient to warrant the making of an advance of $10,000 to JHE. They were convinced that JHE's share of future television and other revenues would be sufficient for the advance to be recovered. Hence, the advance was made early in 1974. Viewing all the facts together, we conclude that as of December 31, 1973 it was reasonable to estimate that JHE would receive television and other revenues from the Film of $10,000. The denominator of the fraction for 1973 should be the sum of $10,317.69, the sum of estimated theatricals and other revenues. That leaves simply the element of salvage value to determine. JHE apparently estimated salvage value at 5 percent of the cost. This figure has not been challenged by respondent. For both years the formula should be applied to the cost of the Film less 5 percent of the cost. Cost for this purpose is $289,646.01. The final issue is *278 whether or not the Film constituted new
See also
1. An addition to tax under section 6651(a) in the amount of $5,154.11 for the year 1972 was determined.↩
2. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect during the years in issue, and all rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
3. By Pretrial Order dated September 20, 1983, the common issues in this case were stated to be:
(a) Whether the proposed acquisition of the motion picture ever occurred and, if so, the facts relevant to its acquisition;
(b) Whether the partnership constituted an activity engaged in for profit within the meaning of
(c) Whether any amounts expended by the partnership are deductible under
(d) What amount of the nonrecourse note given by the partnership to the seller of the film, if any, can the partners and partnership include in their bases for tax purposes;
(e) Whether the partnership is entitled to depreciate the film;
(f) Whether under section 163 the partnership during such years may deduct interest accrued on the nonrecourse note given by the partnership to the seller of the film; and
(g) Whether petitioners are entitled to an investment tax credit with respect to the motion picture allegedly purchased by the partnership.
Respondent has not argued on brief issue (a) and we deem that the sham argument has been abandoned. In any event, we would find for petitioner on that issue as our opinion on the first issue indicates. Issue (c), to the extent not encompassed by issue (1) above, was not argued by respondent in his trial memorandum, on brief, or during the trial. We conclude that the deductions claimed by JHE on its returns for the years 1972 and 1973 for expenses are conceded by respondent if we find, as we do, that JHE was engaged in its activities for profit. Issue (d) is now argued in the alternative by respondent--that the note was too contingent to be recognized and that since the debt represented by the note substantially exceeded the Film's fair market value as of the date of the transaction, the note cannot be recognized for tax purposes. Issue (e) has been somewhat refined by respondent into issue (2)(iii). Issue (f) is controlled by our resolution of issue (2)(i). Petitioner makes no point about this redefining of the issues as noted in our Pretrial Order.
4. Respondent conceded on the record that the notice of deficiency for the year 1972 issued to petitioners Joseph was untimely. Respondent requests a finding that the notice for the year 1973 was timely but there is no basis in this record for us to make any such finding, although the fact that counsel for petitioners Joseph did not raise the issue of the year 1973 being barred might be viewed as a concession. However, since the statute of limitations question was not included in our Pretrial Order, we decline to decide it.↩
5. There is no estimate in the record as to the possible or probable value of this item. ↩
6. We have used the word "understanding" to reflect the fact that there was no writing exchanged between Strauss and Rubin and we assume neither Allied nor CCC was bound to go forward with the proposed purchase. The record does not indicate whether Rubin was informed of Strauss' intention of attempting to find an investor group to consummate the purchase. However, apparently Rubin and CCC gave Strauss sufficient assurance that CCC would consummate the sale upon the proposed terms within a reasonable period of time. ↩
7. The principal source of film revenue at this time was from movie theater showings. An agreed percentage of the customer revenues generally was retained by the theater and the balance paid to the distributor (distributor gross), from which all other parties were compensated, i.e., in the instant case Allied, JHE, and CCC.
8. Strauss used the term "sandal and sword" while petitioners on brief describe the film as a "sword and sandal" movie.↩
9. Theatrical sales or rentals are the moneys paid by the movie theaters to the distributor of the film. See footnote 7,
10. Revenues from the theatrical portion of distributor gross were allocated to JHE as follows: on the first $750,000, 35 percent; on the next $500,000, 40 percent; and on the revenues in excess of $1,250,000, 50 percent. ↩
11. At the beginning of the trial respondent asserted that one document produced at the last minute by petitioners indicated a possible defect in the title of the partnership to the Film. After the trial respondent was allowed to continue to develop facts as to title from overseas sources. On May 16, 1984, the Court heard respondent's Motion to Reopen the Record in order to receive a document the authenticity of which was seriously questioned. At that time respondent represented that several more months of effort would be required for his investigation. After consideration of the entire matter, we declined to reopen the record or to grant respondent further time to discover facts as to the alleged defect in title since after more than 5 months of investigation no single piece of admissible evidence had been produced which cast any shadow on the title of the partnership.
12. To avoid unnecessary confusion we have referred to CCC as the seller of the Film to JHE, although apparently prior to closing, title to the Film had been transferred to an entity known as European Producers and Resources Amstalt. The record does not reveal the facts as to the transfer or as to the connection, if any, between CCC and the actual seller.
13. This formula actually would produce depreciation of $786,275.58. This discrepancy was not noted by the parties. ↩
14. The total is composed of expenses for clerical help, typing, stationery, postage and accounting fees. ↩
15. The Film was characterized as new investment tax credit property with a 3-year useful life. A 10 percent investment tax credit was in effect for the 1972 tax year. ↩
16. The 1973 depreciation deduction does not appear to have been made by the income forecast formula. Instead the deduction represents 30 percent of the cost, petitioners contending that the 1972 deduction represented 65 percent of cost and salvage value equaled 5 percent.
17. The other expenses represented expenses for postage, stationery, accounting fees, screening costs, typing and clerical help.↩
18. See footnote 27,
19. Petitioners have argued somewhat interchangeably that JHE was engaged in a trade or business with a profit objective for purposes of
20. The fact that some employees of Allied may internally have referred to JHE as a "tax shelter" is irrelevant.↩
21.
22.
23. See also
24. Conceivably in some circumstances such testimony may help us to arrive at the conclusion that the purchase price represents fair market value, but where that determination is made independently, appraisal evidence becomes immaterial. ↩
25. Respondent's appraisers were far from impressive. They gave every indication that they were simply performing by rote, in a biased fashion, the task for which they had been employed.↩
26. Landro, "Your Money Matters," Wall St. J., May 20, 1985, purporting to quote Larry Scherger, an entertainment-accounting specialist at Arthur Young & Co.↩
27. Many of the older cases are analyzed in the law review article: Simmons, "Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where Are You Now?," 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. (Part 1) (1979-80). ↩
28. See page 17,
29. It is to be noted that the Film was not worth $1,200,000 in cash on September 12, 1972; rather it was worth $280,000 in cash and a nonrecourse obligation of $920,000. That obligation obviously had value (although perhaps undeterminable). It is incorrect to analyze this transaction as if the parties had consciously inflated a cash purchase price in order to generate tax deductions. There is nothing in this record to indicate that CCC ever considered selling the Film, which it had produced, for a cash price approximating $280,000 or less. This is
30. We do not need to decide in this case whether or under what circumstances all or some part of the nonrecourse obligation might be includable in basis. See Simmons, "Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where Are You Now?," 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. (Part 1) (1979-80) at 50.
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