*175 Petitioners have failed to produce documents despite a specific order of this Court directing them to do so. Held, petitioners' failure constitutes a default under the circumstances of this case. Respondent's Motion to Impose Sanctions seeking a judgment for default under Rule 104(c)(3), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, is granted.
Alberto Chalmeta and Lucina Chalmeta, pro se.
Richard M. Duncan, for the respondent.
TANNENWALD
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANNENWALD, Chief Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial Judge Francis J. Cantrel for the purpose of conducting the hearing and ruling on respondent's Motion to Impose Sanctions under Rule 104(c)(3). After a review of the record, we agree with and adopt his opinion which is set forth below. *176 OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
CANTREL, Special Trial Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's Motion to Impose Sanctions under Tax Court Rule 104(c)(3) filed on August 17, 1982.
ORDERED that respondent's motion to compel production of documents is granted in that petitioners are directed to produce to respondent's counsel those documents requested in respondent's request for production of documents served on petitioners on April 8, 1982, on or before July 15, 1982.
Petitioners' contention that our Order of June 30, 1982 because it is unsigned is of no "legal value" borders on the frivolous. The Court's official files are public records open to inspection as is the record in this case. The original of the June 30, 1982 Order contained in this record is signed and a conformed copy thereof was served on petitioners on July 2, 1982. Service of the conformed copy on petitioners is valid.
1. Since respondent's motion is a pre-trial motion and there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court has concluded that the post-trial procedures of Rule 182, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure↩, are not applicable in these particular circumstances. This conclusion is based on the authority of the "otherwise provided" language of that rule. The parties were afforded a full opportunity to present their views on the law at the hearing at Washington, D.C. on September 15, 1982. Petitioners did not appear. However, they did file a Notice of Objection to Motion to Impose Sanctions on September 15, 1982.
2. All rule references herein are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.↩
4. In addition, respondent has disallowed an investment credit claimed by petitioners on their 1979 return for carpet and an automobile.↩
5. See International Air Conditioning Corp. v. Commissioner,67 T.C. 89">67 T.C. 89, 93 (1976); Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner,61 T.C. 691">61 T.C. 691, 692↩ (1974); Rule 70(a)(1).
6. Respondent served a copy of his motion on petitioners on June 1, 1982.↩
7. There is absolutely no support for this statement in this record. We note that respondent's determination for the addition to the tax is under section 6653(a) [negligence addition] not section 6653(b) [fraud addition]. We observe further that the burden of proof with respect to each item at dispute is on petitioners [not respondent]. See Rule 142(a) and Welch v. Helvering,290 U.S. 111">290 U.S. 111↩ (1933).
8. Respondent served a copy of his motion on petitioners on August 12, 1982↩
9. See and compare Rule 23(a)(3) and 23(b); Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure↩.
10. See and compare, Miller v. Commissioner,654 F.2d 519">654 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1981); Emigh v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1981-514↩.