DocketNumber: Docket No. 4323-92
Judges: PATE
Filed Date: 12/22/1993
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PATE,
Petitioner purchased a 1988 Ford cargo van (hereinafter the cargo van) on December 21, 1987. He financed the cargo van through Ford Motor Credit Company and made payments on it of approximately $ 400 per month. The unpaid balance on his note on January 27, 1989, was $ 18,124. During 1988, petitioner used the cargo van for business purposes.
Petitioner timely filed a 1988 income tax return on which he reported the $ 11,734 he received from Dial-A-Messenger as wages and the $ 762 he received from Assembled Courier as gross receipts on Schedule C. On his Schedule C, he deducted $ 6,771 of business expenses, which included $ 801 in truck expenses and $ 4,100 of depreciation on the cargo van. The depreciation on the cargo van was based on a $ 18,705 cost. In the notice of*634 deficiency, respondent allowed the truck expenses but disallowed the depreciation deduction because the basis of the cargo van had not been substantiated.
Section 167 allows as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the wear and tear of property used in a trade or business, including the trade or business of being an employee. See
Based on the record in this case, we are convinced that petitioner purchased and operated the van to deliver packages for Dial-A-Messenger, Inc. and Assembled Courier. In fact, respondent conceded as*635 much as, in the notice of deficiency, all of petitioner's truck expenses were allowed. Moreover, we are convinced that the basis used by petitioner to compute his depreciation is substantially correct. Consequently, we hold that he may deduct the depreciation he claimed as a business expense.
To reflect the foregoing,
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. At trial, petitioner also argued that the legal system discriminated against him because he is an African American male, that he was deprived of counsel in this case, and that the Internal Revenue Service was illegally conducting clandestine surveillance of him through a "dummy" corporation. Because these arguments are irrelevant to the resolution of the issue in this case, we decline to address them.↩