HOLMES, Judge: In 1988 Bob and Kay Gregory incorporated their landfill business, Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (TDSL). The Gregorys chose to make TDSL a cash-method taxpayer when they incorporated it. TDSL was successful, and the Gregorys began sifting through the Code to find more deductions. With the help of their accountant they discovered section 468.2Section 468 lets taxpayers who own landfills deduct now a portion of what it will cost to clean them up in the future--even if that future is many years away. Sec. 468(a)(1). A current deduction for a future expense is a good deal for most taxpayers, and the disagreement between the parties here is simple--who counts as a "taxpayer" under section 468? The Gregorys think a "taxpayer" means any taxpayer, including cash-method taxpayers like TDSL. But the Commissioner thinks it means only taxpayers who use the accrual method.
We must answer this novel question.
BackgroundI. TDSL and Its AccountingTDSL is an S corporation for income-tax purposes.3 TDSL is also a closely held family business. Bob Gregory incorporated the business in 1988, and ownership during the years in issue was split among Bob and three other family members. Bob and his wife Kay owned 80% of the company, and Bob's brother, Jim Gregory, Jr., and his wife Janet owned the remaining 20%. Bob and Jim serve as TDSL's directors and are responsible for choosing TDSL's method of accounting.
A few years after it was incorporated, TDSL started operating a solid-waste disposal facility--a fancy way of saying the company puts trash in a landfill. But this landfill is not a dump--it is big, and it is up-to-date. When it opened in 1991 on 730 acres outside of Creedmoor, Texas, just south of Austin, TDSL's was the state's first fully integrated-service landfill. It also recovers resources from its solid-waste disposal, compost production, and recycling. It currently processes anywhere between 2,000 and 3,000 tons of solid waste each day. No matter how modern TDSL's facility is, though, there will come a day when it will close and closing a landfill means having to comply with a great many environmental regulations--federal, state, and local. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality knows how expensive it can be to clean up and restore a site after a landfill closes, and that agency therefore requires waste-disposal companies such as TDSL to keep a standby letter of credit. These letters of credit are designed to ensure companies don't pile up trash in landfills and then go out of business without cleaning up after themselves.4 By the end of 2009 TDSL's letter of credit had grown to a little more than $2 million.
TDSL did not at first claim any deductions for its estimated clean-up costs. But in 1996 TDSL's then CEO asked an outside accountant to look into whether TDSL was eligible to currently deduct these costs under section 468. The accountant advised TDSL that it was eligible, and TDSL made the election and claimed the section 468 deduction for the first time on its 1996 tax return. On its 2008 return, TDSL took a slightly more than $100,000 deduction for estimated clean-up costs; and on its 2009 return, a slightly smaller one. TDSL hadn't actually paid those clean-up costs yet--it simply estimated the costs; and it also hadn't charged the estimated costs against its letter of credit yet either. TDSL also did not just make the numbers up--it hired a professional engineering service to estimate the correct amount. The Gregorys probably thought this meant any controversy about the deduction was safely buried. For years the Commissioner didn't say anything.
But that was soon to change.
II. The Notices of DeficiencyIn April 2013 the Commissioner sent the Gregorys notices of deficiency for their 2008 and 2009 tax years that disallowed these deductions because TDSL is a cash-method taxpayer. Excluding cash-method taxpayers from the benefits of section 468 is not an obvious conclusion: Section 468 says that a "taxpayer" may currently deduct clean-up costs for landfills. Sec. 468(a). The Commissioner says, however, that in context a "taxpayer" really means "a taxpayer who uses the accrual method." TDSL does use the accrual method to prepare its financial statements, but it has always used the cash method for tax-accounting purposes, and no one doubts that this means it should not have claimed a section 468 deduction if that section's benefits depend on whether a taxpayer uses the accrual method. The notices of deficiency determined that without those section 468 deductions, the Gregorys' taxable income was substantially higher.
The Gregorys, residents of Texas when they filed timely petitions with us, argue that when section 468 says "taxpayer" it means all taxpayers, regardless of what method of tax accounting they use. The parties have stipulated the facts and submitted these cases for decision under Rule 122 as a nearly pure issue of law. There is no dispute that TDSL is entitled to keep its accounting books on the accrual method and its tax books on the cash method. And there is no dispute about the amounts of TDSL's deductions--the only dispute is whether it was entitled to the deductions at all.
DiscussionI. Landfill AccountingMost taxpayers are free to choose the cash method, although large C corporations, partnerships, and tax shelters cannot. Sec. 448(a). Cash-method taxpayers report income for the tax year in which they actually or constructively receive it. Seesec. 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs. Cash-method taxpayers also generally deduct an expense for the tax year in which they pay it. Seesec. 1.461-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. A cash-method taxpayer may also deduct the noncash expenses of depreciation, depletion, and losses. Id. The method is fairly simple, which is why many taxpayers choose it.
The accrual method is more complicated. Accrual-method taxpayers must generally report their income for the year in which it is earned and deduct expenses for the year in which they are incurred. Seesec. 461(a); sec. 1.461-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.; see alsosec. 451; sec. 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), 1.451-1(a), Income Tax Regs.Section 461 gives them the general rules too. An expense is incurred under the "all events test." Sec. 1.461-1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs.; see alsosec. 461(h)(1), (4). The all-events test has three requirements: (1) there must be a liability; (2) the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy; and (3) there has been economic performance. Sec. 461(h); sec. 1.461-1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. Accrual-method taxpayers cannot deduct an expense until all three requirements are met. Sec. 1.461-1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. This ensures that income and expenses are matched to the correct year. The regulations make clear that a taxpayer such as TDSL is free to use one method for tax purposes and the other method for financial accounting purposes. Sec. 1.446-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.
II. TextThis is all a backdrop for the key question in these cases: What does "taxpayer" mean in section 468? We start with the words of the section, read in the context of the statute as a whole. Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F.3d 263">508 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2007).5 The Fifth Circuit follows the usual rules: If the statute is plain and unambiguous, we stop. United States v. Shabazz, 633 F.3d 342">633 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2011). We assume the statute was written as Congress intended. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249">503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146">112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391">117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992). It is the text, not the legislative history, that is the most reliable indicator of Congress's intent. Marques v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 549">834 F.3d 549, 553 (5th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532">519 F.3d 532, 543 (5th Cir. 2008). If there is ambiguity and it's necessary to resort to legislative history, we do so with caution. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 286 F.3d 803">286 F.3d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 2002); Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014">857 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988).
Section 468(a)(1) provides: "[I]f a taxpayer elects the application of this section with respect to any mining or solid-waste disposal property, the amount of any deduction for qualified reclamation or closing costs for any taxable year to which such election applies" shall equal the current reclamation or closing costs allocable to that year. Sec. 468(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 468 doesn't limit the election to accrual-method taxpayers--which even the Commissioner acknowledges.6 The section just tells a "taxpayer" who makes a section 468 election how to calculate the deduction.
Even though section 468 doesn't define "taxpayer", we are not left without textual help. The Code has a small dictionary toward its end, and in it we find a default definition of "taxpayer". Sec. 7701(a)(14); see, e.g., Rothkamm v. United States, 802 F.3d 699">802 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 2015). It says:
SEC. 7701(a). When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof--(1) Person.--The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.
* * * * * * *
(14) Taxpayer.--The term "taxpayer" means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.
The definition of taxpayer is simple, broad, and does not distinguish entities that use the accrual method from those that use the cash method. The question is whether the person--which includes corporations like TDSL--is "subject to any internal revenue tax." TDSL is a corporation and like other S corporations it is required to pay Social Security and unemployment (albeit not income) taxes.7Sec. 6037(a); Joseph M. Grey Pub. Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121">119 T.C. 121, 134 (2002) (finding that an S corporation owed employment taxes), aff'd, 93 F. App'x 473 (3d Cir. 2004). So TDSL is a "taxpayer".
Of course this is tax, so there's a possible loophole. The default definition doesn't apply if section 468 "distinctly express[es]" a different definition of taxpayer. Sec. 7701(a); see, e.g., Rothkamm, 802 F.3d at 708 (finding that nothing in the section at issue "specifically express[ed]" a limited definition of "taxpayer" or was "manifestly incompatible" with the definition of section 7701(a)). But we see no loophole here: Section 468 has no definition of "taxpayer". There's nothing in section 468 "manifestly incompatible" with the default definition either. Section 468 simply says a "taxpayer". There's also nothing "manifestly incompatible" with a taxpayer's currently deducting clean-up costs--that's what section 468 is all about.
"Taxpayer" is one of the most basic terms in the Code. It is also one that Congress itself knows how to modify as context requires.8Congress could have--as it has on numerous occasions--said "accrual method taxpayer," but it chose in section 468 to say "taxpayer" instead. It's difficult to believe that Congress forgot to modify such a basic term, and really meant "accrual method taxpayer," when it actually said "taxpayer".
We could stop there, with a holding that the language of section 468 is unambiguous. But the Commissioner has piled up a number of contextual counterarguments. He first points us to section 461, which lists several exceptions to the general pay-before-deduct rule for cash-method taxpayers, and section 468 is not one of them. The section 461 regulations echo this. They say cash-method taxpayers can deduct some expenses before the expenses are paid, "such as * * * for depreciation, depletion, and losses under sections 167, 611, and 165, respectively." Seesec. 1.461-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. (emphasis added). Section 468 isn't on this list either. The Commissioner says that implies section 468 was not meant as an exception to the general pay-before-deduct rule.
The problem here is that the regulation's list is prefaced with the phrase "such as." This phrase is important. It signals that what follows are examples, not an exclusive list. The Code and regulations are full of similar lists. Section 1.170A-2(a)(3), Income Tax Regs., discusses holidays when schools are closed, "such as Christmas and Easter." Schools are obviously closed for holidays other than Christmas and Easter. Other regulations follow a similar pattern. To deduct business expenses, taxpayers must have documents "such as receipts, paid bills, or similar evidence" showing their expenses. Sec. 1.274-5A(c)(2)(iii), Income Tax Regs. (emphasis added). The phrase "or similar evidence" indicates that "such as" means for example, and the list isn't comprehensive. The Commissioner hasn't provided any evidence that the list in section 1.461-1(a), Income Tax Regs., was meant to be an exclusive list of exceptions, and we've found none. This isn't a winning argument.
The Commissioner next argues that the term "incurred" in section 468--which he says is usually used in the context of the accrual method--shows that section 468 was meant to apply only to accrual-method taxpayers. Section 468 uses the term "incurred" twice. Mining reclamation and closing costs are defined as "[a]ny expenses incurred for any land reclamation or closing activity which is conducted in accordance with a reclamation plan." Sec. 468(d)(2)(A). Similarly, solid-waste disposal and closing costs are defined as "[a]ny expense incurred for any land reclamation or closing activity in connection with any solid-waste disposal site." Sec. 468(d)(2)(B).
We agree with the Commissioner that "incurred" often refers to an expense that is deductible under the accrual method while the word "paid" often refers to an expense that is deductible under the cash method. Section 162--one of the most commonly cited Code sections--combines the two by allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses "paid or incurred" in a trade or business. Sec. 162(a). The Supreme Court itself has said "incurred" in this context refers to the accrual method. United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593">476 U.S. 593, 599, 106 S. Ct. 2092">106 S. Ct. 2092, 90 L. Ed. 2d 569">90 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1986) ("An accrual-method taxpayer is entitled to deduct an expense in the year in which it is 'incurred,' [sec.] 162(a), regardless of when it is actually paid"). The Court cited sections 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), 1.451-1(a), and 1.461-1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs., all of which are regulations that determine when an expense is incurred, and all of which govern taxpayers who use the accrual method.9 The Court also noted that the term "paid" in section 162 refers to the cash method. Id. at 599-600 ("Under the 'cash receipts and disbursements method,' * * * a taxpayer is entitled to deduct business expenses only in the year in which they are paid").10
There's a problem, though, with the Commissioner's argument that "incurred" is a subtle signal that "taxpayer" in section 468 must mean "accrual method taxpayer"--section 468 also uses the term "paid" four times. The section says:(C) Reserve to be charged for amounts paid.--Any amount paid by the taxpayer during any taxable year for qualified reclamation or closing costs allocable to portions of the reserve property for which the election under paragraph (1) was in effect shall be charged to the appropriate reserve as of the close of the taxable year.
* * * *
(3) Allowance of deduction for excess amounts paid.--There shall be allowed as a deduction for any taxable year the excess of--(A) the amounts described in paragraph (2)(C) paid during such taxable year, over
(B) the closing balance of the reserve for such taxable year (determined without regard to paragraph (2)(C)).
Sec. 468(a)(2)(C), (3)(A) and (B) (emphasis added). Section 468 uses terms that signal its application to both accrual-and cash-accounting. Reading "taxpayer" in section 468 to mean "all taxpayers"--even if this creates a current deduction for a future expense--just means that this section creates another exception to a general rule for cash-method taxpayers.11 The Code and regulations are filled with general rules and exceptions to them. So this argument doesn't help the Commissioner either.
The Commissioner next fires off another canon of interpretation--noscitur a sociis. Noscitur a sociis is a Latin phrase that means "it is known by its associates."12 Black's Law Dictionary 1087 (8th ed. 2004). The Commissioner's invocation of this doctrine essentially repeats his argument that "incurred" signals that section 468 applies only to accrual-method taxpayers. We already addressed this--section 468 also uses the term "paid", which the Commissioner concedes typically applies to cash-method taxpayers. As they say at the IRS: Ab his sociis publicanus non adjuvatur.
The Commissioner has also found some cases that at least mention section 468. In South Side Landfill, Inc. v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 2d 783">52 F. Supp. 2d 783, 784 (W.D. Mich. 1999), the court described section 468 as allowing "landfill operators who use the accrual-method of accounting" to deduct clean-up costs before the costs are actually incurred. But the court there was not deciding whether section 468 could also apply to cash-method taxpayers, and it didn't analyze the issue. It was deciding only the much narrower issue of whether section 468(a)(2)(B) applies to landfill owners who take deductions and actually set aside funds for future closing obligations. Id. at 784. The taxpayers in South Side Landfill were accrual-method taxpayers, so it's not surprising the court described section 468 in that context, and does not narrow the Code's broad definition of taxpayer.
The Commissioner also cites the principle of ejusdem generis--a fancy way of saying that "[w]here general words follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Text 199 (2012). But section 468 doesn't have a list--it just says "taxpayer". Without a generis, there is no ejusdem and this canon likewise cannot help us.
The Commissioner's final textual argument is that sections 468 and 468A have similar language, and since section 468A applies only to accrual-method taxpayers, section 468 must as well. Sections 468 and 468A are indeed very similar--both allow taxpayers to deduct clean-up costs, both impose reserve requirements, and both have the same general structure. Section 468A allows an electing "taxpayer" to deduct portions of nuclear decommissioning costs. Sec. 468A(a) and (b). Section 468A says:SEC. 468A(a). In General.--If the taxpayer elects the application of this section, there shall be allowed as a deduction for any taxable year the amount of payments made by the taxpayer to a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Fund * * * during such taxable year. [Emphasis added.]
The Commissioner thinks section 468A applies only to accrual-method taxpayers because of section 1.461-1(a)(2)(iii)(B) of the regulations. But that regulation--which also applies to section 468--doesn't say that. It says only that accrual-method taxpayers who make an election under sections 468 or 468A must account for liabilities under those Code sections, and not the general rules for accrual-method taxpayers under section 461 and its regulations. Sec. 1.461-1(a)(2)(iii)(B), Income Tax Regs. The regulation does not say sections 468 and 468A apply only to accrual-method taxpayers.
Section 1.468A-1(a), Income Tax Regs., also says that any "eligible taxpayer" may elect to claim a deduction under section 468A. Sec. 1.468A-1(a), Income Tax Regs.Paragraph (b)(1) defines eligible taxpayer as "any taxpayer that possesses a qualifying interest in a nuclear power plant." (Emphasis added.) This is an example of a section that provides a more specific definition of "taxpayer", but the definition does not limit the application of the section to particular entities based on their accounting method; it limits the section's application to entities with a qualifying interest in a nuclear power plant.
III. Legislative History and PolicyWe think all this should be enough, but the parties discuss what legislative history there is and make some policy arguments too. The Commissioner urges us to use legislative history to define "taxpayer" because, he argues, the term must be ambiguous if we need to jump from section 468 to section 7701 to define it. That's flat out wrong. There are many cases where courts have used section 7701(a)(14) to define the term "taxpayer" without concluding this made the Code ambiguous enough to resort to legislative history. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527">514 U.S. 527, 535, 115 S. Ct. 1611">115 S. Ct. 1611, 131 L. Ed. 2d 608">131 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1995); Rothkamm, 802 F.3d at 708 ("Because the statute is clear, we must conclude that the section 7701(a)(14) definition of 'taxpayer' applies"). The definitions in section 7701 bring clarity to the Code, not ambiguity.
We will nevertheless--out of a supersized abundance of caution--look at the legislative history anyway. That history begins with the Commissioner's original position on clean-up costs--that they couldn't be deducted even by an accrual-method taxpayer until they were actually paid. Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369">77 T.C. 1369, 1375 (1981) (citing Rev. Rul. 72-34, 1 C.B. 132">1972-1 C.B. 132), changed all that. We held there that clean-up costs accrue when these costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Id. at 1372. Congress partially codified this holding in section 461(h) as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 91, 98 Stat. at 598. But that Act also added a third requirement to the all-events test for accrual-method taxpayers generally--economic performance would have to take place before a liability would be considered "incurred". See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239">481 U.S. 239, 243 n.3, 107 S. Ct. 1732">107 S. Ct. 1732, 95 L. Ed. 2d 226">95 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987). That Act also added section 468 to the Code. The Commissioner thinks the legislative history for the Act shows that "taxpayer" in section 468 must mean a taxpayer who uses the accrual method.
His argument relies heavily on the Blue Book. See Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 260 (J. Comm. Print 1985). Blue Books are compiled by the Joint Committee on Taxation and provide commentary on tax laws after Congress enacts them. They "therefore d[o] not inform the decisions of the members of Congress who vot[e] in favor of the [law]." United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 557, 568, 187 L. Ed. 2d 472">187 L. Ed. 2d 472 (2013) (quoting Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d 1174">33 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Supreme Court has told us such "[p]ost-enactment legislative history [a contradiction in terms] is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation." Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223">562 U.S. 223, 242, 131 S. Ct. 1068">131 S. Ct. 1068, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1">179 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2011). Instead, like law review articles, persuasive Blue Books may be helpful. Woods, 571 U.S. at , 134 S. Ct. at 568.
The Blue Book does tell us that Congress passed section 461(h) to ensure that accrual-method taxpayers take deductions only when they economically incur expenses. Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, supra, at 260.13 As a general rule Congress didn't want taxpayers to be able to deduct expenses that hadn't been incurred yet, because any other rule would overstate the economic impact of those expenses on the current income of an accrual-method taxpayer when one considers the time value of money. Id.Section 468 was to be an exception to this general rule for reclamation and closing costs. Id. at 273.
Before section 468 was enacted, companies used different accounting methods to track clean-up costs. DEFRA authorized taxpayers to use a uniform method of accounting for reclamation and closing costs even before economic performance. Id. at 273. This history does show that Congress wanted a more liberal rule for the deductibility of reclamation and closing costs. Id.
The Gregorys join this detour through section 468's legislative history, but look at it in a broader context. They argue that to see a true picture of Congress's intent we need to zoom out and look at history from 1982 as well. In that year Congress considered several bills that would have allowed both cash-and accrual-method taxpayers to deduct estimated clean-up costs for surface mining before the work was actually performed. Mining Reclamation Reserve Bills: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Agricultural Taxation of the Committee on Finance of U.S. Senate 97th Cong. 1 (1982). They argue from this that Congress wanted cash-method taxpayers to benefit from the bills. Congressman Bailey explained to the subcommittee that the bills would allow cash-method taxpayers to elect the accrual method for reclamation costs and to deduct reclamation reserves. Id. at 27. They say that Congress was looking to give both types of taxpayers flexibility. Id. at 28. The explanation of the bills makes this even more clear. Under S. 1911 and S. 2642, cash-method taxpayers "would be allowed to use the accrual method [and that would be the pre-1984 accrual method] for reclamation costs." Id. at 7. This bit of legislative history--admittedly legislative history of bills the relevant provisions of which weren't enacted until the next Congress--uses the term "accrued reclamation expenses," but they would have applied to cash-method taxpayers. Id. Then, when the 1982 statute was marked up and enacted in 1984, the phrase "accrued reclamation expenses" had morphed into "qualified reclamation expenses" and "qualified closing costs." One can see from this that the unfinished 1982 legislation, with its perhaps awkward phrasing about allowing cash-method taxpayers "to use the accrual method," aimed to help both cash-and accrual-method taxpayers. A reasonable inference is that the enacted 1984 statute was a cleaner way of achieving the same end. But one can definitely see how this would be an instance--were we in the era before textualism again became the predominant mode of statutory interpretation--where we'd have to conclude that ambiguities in the legislative history make it "clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402">401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29, 91 S. Ct. 814">91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136">28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971).
The parties move on in their arguments from legislative history to tax policy, and we hesitate to follow, but we will address the Commissioner's final argument--that the Gregorys' position would lead to absurd results. The Commissioner thinks that letting cash-method taxpayers claim deductions under section 468 would lead to double deductions for the same expenses--once now and then again when clean-up actually begins later on. His concern isn't realistic. If a taxpayer elects to claim deductions under section 468, its liability is computed under that section, and it gets no deduction for current clean-up expenses until it exhausts its accumulated reserve for those costs. Sec. 468(a)(3).
Taxpayers like TDSL must comply with numerous environmental-protection laws at the federal, state, and local levels. These costs can be large, and they continue after a landfill, mine, or nuclear-power plant stops earning income. Section 468 lessens the burden of compliance by helping to match income and expenses better in an era where businesses that are messy to run must clean up after themselves and maintain proof that they have the means to do so.
ConclusionThe term "taxpayer" in section 468 includes cash-method taxpayers like TDSL. Since section 468 itself doesn't define the term, we hold that the general definition under section 7701(a)(14) applies. TDSL is eligible to currently deduct its estimated clean-up costs under section 468, and the Gregorys may claim those deductions on their returns.
Decisions will be entered for petitioners.
Reviewed by the Court
FOLEY, VASQUEZ, THORNTON, GOEKE, GUSTAFSON, PARIS, MORRISON, KERRIGAN, BUCH, and PUGH, JJ., agree with this opinion of the Court.