DocketNumber: Docket No. 922-80.
Citation Numbers: 42 T.C.M. 1056, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 238, 1981 T.C. Memo. 503
Filed Date: 9/14/1981
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILBUR,
All of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. A summary of the relevant facts is set forth below.
Petitioner resided in New Port Richey, Florida at the time of filing the petition in this case. He filed his income tax return for the taxable year 1975 with the Internal Revenue Center in Chamblee, Georgia.
On his 1975 tax return, petitioner claimed dependency exemptions for two children, namely Sharon L. Gulvin (born December 20, 1960) and Dennis W. Gulvin (born September 10, 1962), neither of whom lived with the petitioner during 1975. During the calendar year 1975, the gross income of the children was less than $ 750 per child.
Prior*240 to 1975, the children were placed in a foster home by order of the Pasco County (Florida) Juvenile Court. The foster home care of the children was under the jurisdiction of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Division of Family Services, Child Welfare Services, Foster Home Care Program. Throughout the year 1975, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabiliative Services, Division of Family Services, provided funds to the foster parent of the children in the amounts of $ 1,982 for Sharon and $ 1,943 for Dennis. The children received support from no source other than the state of Florida in 1975.
In his statutory notice of deficiency, the respondent disallowed the dependency exemption for Sharon and Dennis.
Petitioner contends that, although the state is paying for his children's foster care, petitioner's estate will be liable to the state under Florida law for such state expenditures and therefore the state's public support payments should be treated as having been received from him. Conversely, respondent argues that since the funds provided by the state constituted the sole support of the children, the dependency exemptions are not allowable since*241 petitioner did not provide over one-half of the support of Sharon and Dennis in 1975 within the meaning of section 152. We agree with respondent.
In computing a taxpayer's taxable income, section 151 allows as a deduction certain personal and dependency exemptions. Section 151(e)(1), as in effect in 1975, provided that a taxpayer is entitled to an exemption of $ 750 for each dependent whose gross income in the particular calendar year is less than $ 750, or who is a child of the taxpayer and either had not reached the age of 19 or was a student. 2 For purposes of section 151(e) the term "dependent" is defined in section 152(a)(1) to include a son or daughter of a taxpayer "over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer beings, was received from the taxpayer."
*242 We note at the outset that petitioner argued this identical issue with virtually identical facts before this Court for the taxable year 1973. 3 See
*243 We have held on various occasions that welfare payments or other types of public assistance payments received by a claimed dependent do not constitute support furnished by the taxpayer.
In the instant case, the parties have stipulated that the Florida Department of the Health and Rehabilitation Services, Division of Family Services, was*244 the sole source of support for Sharon and Dennis. Thus, the support furnished by the state was not "received from the taxpayer" within the meaning of section 152. The fact that the state may have the right to obtain reimbursement of support funds from petitioner or from his estate is immaterial for purposes of determining whether the support was "received from the taxpayer" under section 152(a) unless the state had actually received such a reimbursement in the taxable year.
Even if Mr. Gulvin's estate is potentially liable for the amount of the state's payments, such liability should not be regarded as support having been "received" from the taxpayers. * * * Something more than an unfulfilled duty or obligation on the part of the taxpayer to support his children is required to satisfy the support requirements*245 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Furthermore, in
We think this reasoning equally applicable to the case before us. Section 152(a) states that the term "dependent" includes "individuals over half of whose support * * * was
In accordance with the above, we hold that petitioner's children Sharon and Dennis did not receive more than one-half of their support from petitioner in 1973, and therefore petitioner is not entitled to the claimed dependency deduction for those children.
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and in effect during the year in issue.↩
2. Sec. 151(e) reads in pertinent part as follows:
SEC. 151. ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTIONS FOR PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS.
(e) ADDITIONAL EXEMPTION FOR DEPENDENTS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--An exemption of $ 750 for each dependent (as defined in section 152)--
(A) whose gross income for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins is less than $ 750, or
(B) who is a child of the taxpayer and who (i) has not attained the age of 19 at the close of the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, or (ii) is a student.
(3) CHILD DEFINED.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), the term "child" means an individual who (within the meaning of section 152) is a son, stepson, daughter, or step-daughter of the taxpayer.
(4) STUDENT AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION DEFINED.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(B)(ii), the term "student" means an individual who during each of 5 calendar months during the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins--
(A) is a full-time student at an educational institution; or
(B) is pursuing a full-time course of institutional on-farm training under the supervision of an accredited agent of an educational institution or of a State or political subdivision of a State. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "educational institution" means only an educational institution which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried on.↩
3. Only two minor technical differences exist between the prior case involving the petitioner and this action. In 1973, petitioner claimed dependency exemptions for five of his children who had been placed in foster homes while in the instant case with respect to 1975 he claimed only two of these children as dependents. In addition, while the estate of petitioner's wife, Dorothy Gulvin, was a party to the prior action, we dismissed the present case for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it related to the Estate of Dorothy Gulvin.↩