DocketNumber: Docket No. 2069-80.
Filed Date: 7/6/1981
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DAWSON,
Petitioner was divorced from Clarkson in January, 1974. A final decree of dissolution was entered in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District of New Mexico on January 4, 1974 and an Amended Judgment entered on or about December 23, 1974 to divide the common property of petitioner and Clarkson. The Amended Judgment provided, in part, for the division of Clarkson's Naval retirement benefits as follows:
3. * * * (a) Husband shall pay the Wife the sum of $ 325.00 per month. It is understood that this amount shall not be reduced in any manner, or increased in any manner.
(b) Husband shall pay into a trust establish for the education of the children of the parties, the sum of $ 96.74 per month. This trust shall be owned jointly and shall be in the name of both husband and wife. Any monies remaining in this trust shall be divided between husband and wife when the youngest child passes college age or reaches college age and declares in writing that he does not desire to go to college.
4. Husband shall receive all life insurance policies on his own life. Wife shall remain the beneficiary of those policies*397 which are deducted directly from the Husband's retirement benefits.
During the year in question, petitioner received direct payments under this agreement of $ 325 per month, totaling $ 3,900 for the year, and $ 96.74 per month was paid into an educational trust, totaling $ 1,160.88 for the year, according to the terms of the Amended Judgment.
After petitioner encountered difficulties with taxation of Clarkson's retirement benefits, she sought clarification of the Amended Judgment in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District of New Mexico. The resulting court order, filed on May 2, 1979, did not change the amount of petitioner's share of the retirement benefits but did change the trust provision to read:
2. Respondent be, and he is hereby ordered to contribute, towards the education of the youngest child of the parties, for so long as said child is regularly enrolled in an accredited institution of higher learning, and is earning credits towards his first undergraduate degree, as hereinafter limited, a sum to average aver the full calendar year the amount of $ 96.74 per month, to be computed on a cumulative basis. This obligation shall terminate upon the obtaining*398 of the said degree, the declaration in writing by said child that he no longer desires to attend college, or the said child attaining the age of 25 years, whichever first occurs. * * * Upon the termination of Respondent's obligation hereunder, if he has not then contributed towards the said education * * * an amount equal to the said $ 96.74 per month, Respondent will then pay to Petitioner a sum equal to one-half (1/2) of the difference between the total which would have been so paid hereunder calculated at $ 96.74 per month, and the total amount actually paid by Respondent, considering only those payments as hereinabove provided.
In addition, the May 2, 1979 Order clarified the $ 325 amount and specifically stated that it was awarded "as a property interest, and not as alimony," with full "property interest[s] * * * permissible by law."
OPINION
From the pleadings and statements made by petitioner at trial, *400 Court's award of $ 325 per month was in a division of the community, rather than separate, property of petitioner and Clarkson, pursuant to a final divorce decree. The characterization of property as community or separate property is made under New Mexico law. According to the laws of New Mexico, community property is "property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage which is not separate property." Second, petitioner's interest in the educational trust is a part of the community property division and one half of the $ 96.74 monthly payment was used to fulfill what we view as her obligation under the agreement to contribute towards her children's education. Accordingly, $ 48.37 per month is taxable to her. Finally, because respondent's calculations allowed for petitioner's proportionate share of taxes paid from the gross pension, there is no question of double taxation of these benefits. None of the reductions of or exclusions from taxable military retirement benefits apply to petitioner's portion of the community property here. The property was taxable to the community in the proportion it represented compensation for services rendered during marriage. ORDER On August 5, 1981, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the ORDERED: 1. That respondent's motion for reconsideration is granted.
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect during the year at issue, unless otherwise indicated.↩
2. Under the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan or under the Survivor Benefit Plan. See
3. Petitioners did not file a brief in this case.↩
4. Because these payments represent petitioner's interest in community property, they are not alimony.