DocketNumber: Docket No. 8675-76.
Filed Date: 5/11/1978
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HALL,
1. Whether petitioners are entitled to deduct certain entertainment expenses incurred at the Dallas Petroleum Club in each of the years in issue; and
2. Whether petitioners are entitled to deduct the cost of a party held in 1974 at the Brook Hollow Golf Club.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated by the parties and are found accordingly.
At the time they filed their petition, J. Howard and Nancy Lennon were residents of Dallas, Texas. Nancy Lennon is a party*340 only by virtue of having filed joint returns with her husband. When we hereafter refer to petitioner, we will be referring to J. Howard Lennon.
Petitioner, an attorney, was a partner in the law firm of Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller ("law firm") during the years in issue. The law firm's offices were located in the First National Bank Building in Dallas, in which is also located the Dallas Petroleum Club ("Club"). During the years in issue, the written partnership agreement of the law firm was silent with regard to whether entertainment expenses incurred by the law firm's partners would be reimbursed by the partnership or be charged against a partnership expense account. The general policy followed by the partners was that each partner would bear his entertainment expenses personally except where such expenses were billed directly to a client.
During the years in issue petitioner ate lunch almost every business day at the Club, which was located upstairs from the law firm's offices. The Club is a businessmen's club which operates primarily as a luncheon club. The club has rooms for meetings. Business is conducted there daily as a matter of course. Although*341 the Club is open in the evenings, petitioner rarely, if ever, had dinner there.
During the years in issue, petitioner sometimes paid only for his own lunch at the Club; *342 During the years in issue petitioner spent the following amounts for food and beverage at lunches where he had one or more guests: 1972 $1,839.94 1973 2,511.91 1974 1,789.86
The invoices identifying petitioner's guest (or from which the identity of the guest can be readily inferred) establish that petitioner spent $102.13 and $298.98 in 1972 and 1973, respectively, to entertain his clients. He spent $17.40 to entertain partners in 1973. Although the invoices for 1974 were misplaced subsequent to the audit, respondent concedes that these invoices indicate the same general type of information as is contained in the invoices for 1972 and 1973.
In December 1974 petitioner, whose returns for 1972 and 1973 were being audited, met with a revenue agent who informed petitioner that his (petitioner's) substantiation provided on the invoices was insufficient. The agent recommended that petitioner write on each bill the name of the individual entertained. Petitioner heeded this advice, and he began recording the names of the individuals entertained on the invoices. During 1975 and 1976, 66 percent and 75 percent, respectively, of petitioner's expenses for Club lunches*343 at which he entertained one or more persons (which was approximately 2/3 of his lunches at the Club) were for lunches at which his guests were clients.
On June 30, 1974, petitioner gave a party costing $3,871 *344 of the party.
OPINION
The first issue is whether petitioner is entitled to deduct entertainment expenses he incurred at the Dallas Petroleum Club ("Club") during the years in issue. Petitioner is a lawyer and partner in the firm of Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller ("law firm"), and his offices were located in the same building as the Club during the years in issue. The Club is a businessmen's private club which provides food and beverages and also has rooms for meetings.
Petitioner regularly ate lunch at the Club, although he rarely, if ever, ate dinner there. Sometimes petitioner would pay only for his own lunch, while other times he would pay for the lunch of one or more guests in addition to his own. The overwhelming majority of guests entertained by petitioner were either clients or partners in his firm, although he apparently entertained "social" friends a few times during the years in question. Petitioner contends that the expenses for entertaining his clients and partners are fully deductible.
Entertainment expenditures are generally*345 deductible if they meet the tests provided in
In his reply brief respondent conceded that expense incurred at the Club for entertaining clients, partners and associates of the law firm were ordinary and necessary expenses within the meaning of
Respondent's second contention, that petitioner has not established that the expenditures were "directly related" to his business as required by
Petitioner must establish two facts to come within the ambit of
However, even if
(3)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
*349 In this case, the parties agree that petitioner has established the time, place and amount of each claimed expense.The disagreement between the parties centers on petitioner's substantiation of the business purpose and, more particularly, the business relationship to petitioner of the individuals entertained.
In this case, the invoices petitioner signed at the Club do not, with a few exceptions, identify the individual entertained or the business purpose of the meeting. It is true, as petitioner contends, that the business purpose of a meal can be inferred from the business relationship of the guest to petitioner,
(3)
(i) By his own statement, whether written or oral, containing specific information in detail as to such element; and
(ii) By other corroborative evidence sufficient to establish such element.
If such*351 element is the description of a gift, or the cost, time, place, or date of an expenditure, the corroborative evidence shall be direct evidence, such as a statement in writing or the oral testimony of persons entertained or other witness setting forth detailed information about such element, or the documentary evidence described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph. If such element is either the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons entertained or the business purpose of an expenditure, the corroborative evidence may be circumstantial evidence.
In essence, petitioner contends that since he has clearly established the amount of his expenditures, his testimony and the circumstantial evidence that a large percentage of his expenditures in later years were made to entertain clients satisfy the remainder of the substantiation requirements.Accordingly, petitioner contends that we should allow him a deduction for at least the percentage of his expenses which, in later years, was incurred entertaining clients.
We must decline petitioner's attempt to return us to the days when this court routinely estimated a taxpayer's entertainment expenses through the
Our view of this*353 regulation is fully supported by the cases which have considered the substantiation requirements of
The substantiation statute says 'the'--not 'a'-- business relationship. And the business relationship*354 cannot be ascertained unless the taxpayer establishes the identity of his entertainee--whether by name, title or other specific designation.
We conclude that
Petitioner's reliance on
In
The factual distinctions between
Moreover, in
However, some of the invoices (either from the bar or restaurant at the Club) presented by petitioner do list the name of the individual entertained, and petitioner testified at trial as to his business relationship to those individuals. This identification provides the otherwise missing element of substantiation of the business relationship to petitioner of the individual entertained. When the guest is one of petitioner's clients, the business purpose of the meeting is also provided from this business relationship. We hold, therefore, that petitioner is entitled to deduct the entertainment expenses incurred for the lunches where petitioner has identified the guest as a client. In addition, we note that these invoices*357 on which the guest is identified are often accompanied by invoices of the same date. Although the accompanying invoices do not list the guest, these accompanying invoices appear to be the bar or restaurant expense which was incurred at the same time as the identified expense. We hold that petitioner has also met the substantiation requirements for these invoices, since the business relationship of the guest can readily be inferred. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to deduct $102.13 and $298.98 in 1972 and 1973, respectively.
We also conclude that the two invoices on December 28, 1973, totalling $17.40, which identify the guests as petitioner's partners Patt and Miller, are deductible. Petitioner testified that he discussed both matters he was working on and law firm operations with his partners over lunch. With respect to this amount he has adequately identified the guests and the business purpose for the entertainment.
We concluded, above, that petitioner is entitled to deduct the expenses incurred entertaining identified clients and partners in 1972 and 1973. As to 1974, after petitioner's records were audited by respondent the records were apparently lost or misplaced. *358 Respondent has conceded, however, that the records for 1974 contain the same general type of information as that appearing on the invoices for 1972 and 1973. Since for those two years we hold that petitioner is entitled to deduct, on the average, 9.05 percent of the expenses incurred entertaining one or more guests, we also allow petitioner to deduct that percentage of his expenses incurred for that purpose in 1974.2. Brook Hollow Golf Club
The next issue is whether petitioner is entitled to deduct the cost of a party held in 1974 at the Brook Hollow Golf Club. The party, which was in honor of petitioner's birthday, cost $3,871. Almost half of petitioner's guests were his clients, and two-thirds of the guests were either his clients or his law partners. However, no business discussions took place at the party. Respondent disallowed*359 petitioner's claimed deduction for the cost of the party in its entirety.
We sustain respondent's determination. We note, first, that unlike the expenses incurred at the Club, this party is not exempted from the requirements of
*360 We also find, however, no merit in petitioner's contention that this party was "associated entertainment."
(ii)
*362 Petitioner contends that although this party was not on the same day as business discussions with his guests, the party directly preceded and followed substantial bona fide business discussions. The basis of petitioner's contention is that we should not read this "directly precede or follow" language restrictively; petitioner contends that business discussions during the three months before and after the party directly preceded and followed it.
We conclude that petitioner misconstrues the purpose of
1. Petitioner concedes that expenses of $579.69, $1,474.91, and $515.77 incurred in 1972, 1973 and 1974, respectively, were nondeductible personal expenses. Apparently these were the expenses incurred when petitioner did not entertain any guests. ↩
2. Petitioner and his partners apparently discussed the routine business involved in management of the partnership during the lunches at the Club.Although petitioner did not always eat with the same partners, he would eat with some more than others. There was some reciprocity in the purchasing of these lunches.↩
3. Expenses incurred at the party were as follows:
Item | Amount |
Food & service charge | $1,924.45 |
Liquor | 851.58 |
Wine | 97.18 |
Beer | 8.97 |
Parking men | 145.62 |
Piano rental | 131.25 |
Tom O'Boyle, pianist | 150.00 |
Pianist room, Fairmont Hotel | 37.21 |
Decorations | 490.64 |
Party calling service | 34.20 |
$3,871.10 |
4.
(d) SUBSTANTIATION REQUIRED.--No deduction shall be allowed--
(1) under
(2) for any item with respect to an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, or with respect to a facility used in connection with such an activity, or
(3) for any expense for gifts,
unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating his own statement (A) the amount of such expense or other item, (B) the time and place of the travel, entertainment, amusement, recreation, or use of the facility, or the date and description of the gift, (C) the business purpose of the expense or other item, and (D) the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons entertained, using the facility, or receiving the gift. The Secretary may by regulations provide that some or all of the requirements of the preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of an expense which does not exceed an amount prescribed pursuant to such regulations.↩
5.
(b)
6. "This limitation supersedes with respect to any such expenditure (travel, entertainment, gifts) the doctrine of
7. Petitioner met the substantiation requirements for 5.5 percent ($102.13/$1,839.94) of his claimed deduction in 1972 and 12.6 percent ($316.38/$2,511.91) of his claimed deduction in 1972. The average (5.5% + 12.6%) / 2 = 9.05 is the figure used here. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to deduct $161.98 (.0905 X $1,789.86) in 1974.↩
8.
(7)
(i) The taxpayer was not present;
(ii) The distractions were substantial, such as--
(a) A meeting or discussion at night clubs, theaters, and sporting events, or during essentially social gatherings such as cocktail parties, or
(b) A meeting or discussion, if the taxpayer meets with a group which includes persons other than business associates, at places such as cocktail lounges, country clubs, golf and athletic clubs, or at vacation resorts.
An expenditure for entertainment in any such case is considered not to be directly related to the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business unless the taxpayer clearly establishes to the contrary.↩
9.
(d) Associated entertainment--(1)
(i) It was associated with the active conduct of trade or business as defined in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, and
(ii) The entertainment directly preceded or followed a substantial and bona fide business discussion as defined in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph.↩
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