DocketNumber: Docket Nos. 17254-85, 17255-85.
Citation Numbers: 53 T.C.M. 1239, 1987 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 317, 1987 T.C. Memo. 317
Filed Date: 6/25/1987
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
RAUM,
SECURITY ASSOCIATES AGENCY INSURANCE CORP., | ||||
Docket No. 17254-85 | ||||
IRC 1954, Sections | ||||
Year | Deficiency | 6651(a) | 6653(a)(1) | 6653(a)(2) |
1980 | 120,005 | 5,936 | 6,470 | |
1981 | 114,599 | 5,730 | 50% of int. on | |
114,599 | ||||
WILLIAM H. YOUNG III and CAROLE S. YOUNG, | ||||
Docket No. 17255-85 | ||||
1980 | 83,892 | 4,195 | ||
1981 | 90,396 | 4,520 | 50% of int. on | |
90,396 |
*319 After concession of many of the substantive issues on which the deficiency determination is based, and all of the additions to tax, several issues remain in dispute. The first is whether amounts received by Security Associates Agency Insurance Corporation from Jefferson National Life Insurance Company are to be treated, on their receipt by Security Associates, as taxable advances on commissions or as nontaxable loans. If the receipts are found to be taxable as advance commissions, we must decide whether a
Some of the facts have been stipulated. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits, to the extent admissable, *320 issues.
I.
Petitioner Security Associates Agency Insurance Corporation (hereinafter petitioner or Security Associates or the corporation or the agency) is a Maryland corporation which was incorporated in 1972. At the time it filed its petition in this case, its principal place of business was in Columbia, Maryland. It is wholly owned by petitioner William H. Young III (hereinafter Young), who is also its president. At the time they filed their petition in this case Young and his wife resided in Lake Park, Florida.
Young has been in the insurance business*321 for many years, and in a number of recent years has acted as a general agent. *322 Jefferson apparently understood that Young intended to assign his commissions to his wholly owned corporation, and Young did subsequently assign to Security Associates his "full and complete rights to all Life Insurance Commissions" generated by him. Jefferson did not object to any such assignment, but it nevertheless continued to deal with Young individually, not with his agency, and its records (even the Forms 1099 filed with the IRS) reflect commissions paid to Young personally, not to Security Associates. The Commissioner has treated the commissions as taxable to Security Associates, rather than to Young individually, and the parties petitioner have not objected, challenging only whether or to what extent the commissions here in question were taxable at all as income in the years involved. In the circumstances, although we feel uneasy about doing so, we will consider the issue as presented to us, *323 The commissions in controversy were first year commissions, and were fixed by the Jefferson contract to be 80 percent of first year premiums. The premiums on most, if not all, of the policies were payable on a monthly basis. The contract provided for the payment of the commissions at the applicable percentage only to the extent of "premiums actually received in cash by [Jefferson]". However, it was the practice of Jefferson to pay the full 80 percent commissions on the entire first year premium immediately upon its approval of an application for the policy, notwithstanding that it had not in fact received the full first year premium. Such advance commissions were received by Security Associates and retained by it under a claim of right without any restriction as to their use or disposition. Security Associates keeps its records on an accrual basis. On its income tax returns for 1980 and 1981, it included in income only those first year commissions that had been "earned" in those years, i.e., only that portion of the commissions that related to premiums that had in fact been paid to Jefferson. Not reported were the "unearned" first year commissions actually paid by Jefferson, *324 i.e., the commissions or portions thereof that were allocable to premiums that had not yet been received by Jefferson. The Forms 1099 issued by Jefferson showed amounts which included only the "earned" commissions and not the total commissions paid by it. In the notice of deficiency the Commissioner increased taxable income of Security Associates in the amounts of $148,149 and $88,425 for 1980 and 1981, respectively. He explained these adjustments as follows: Income received by you and treated as unearned until the following year is determined to be taxable to you in the year received. Therefore, taxable income is increased in the amount of $148,149 for 1980 and in the amount of $88,425 for 1981. The Commissioner obtained these two amounts from Line 17 of the balance sheets that were part of the returns of Security Associates for 1980 and 1981. Line 17 of the printed form of the balance sheets contained the printed words "Other current liabilities", but the word "ADVANCES" had been added by hand. As to the year 1980, the Commissioner treated $148,148.71 (which he rounded to $148,149) as income for that year, namely, the amount outstanding at the end of the year on Line*325 17 of the balance sheet. He did not subtract from that amount the corresponding figure of $72,041.17 for the beginning of the year. The difference between these two figures, $76,107.54 ($148,148.71 minus $72,041.17), represents the alleged net amount of "unearned" advance commissions actually paid by Jefferson during 1980 allocable to those portions of premiums on policies sold in 1980 that Jefferson had not in fact received during 1980. The $72,041.17 figure as of the beginning of the year represented "unearned" items or liabilities relating to prior years. To justify treating the opening balance as reflecting commissions to be taxed in 1980, the Commissioner contends that his action in this respect is an appropriate As to the year 1981, the Commissioner's inclusion of $88,425 in taxable income is based solely upon increase in the Line 17 advances opening figure of $148,148.71 to the closing figure of $236,573.75. That $88,425 increase represents the alleged net amount of "unearned" advance commissions actually paid by Jefferson in 1981 in respect of portions of premiums on policies sold in 1981 that*326 had not yet been received by Jefferson in 1981. Security Associates does not dispute that some parts of the amounts received from Jefferson in 1980 and 1981 (i.e., those parts equal to net advance commissions paid by Jefferson in respect of unpaid premiums) were not reported as income on its respective returns for those years. However, it does contend that no "unearned" advance commissions actually received in respect of premiums unpaid during the respective years were taxable as income in the year received. Although the record is not clear in this respect, it would appear that Security Associates did in fact report such commissions as taxable income for the following year to the extent that the commissions were "earned" as a result of payment of the premiums to Jefferson in such following year. Security Associates also argues that the amounts of the advance commissions in controversy were in fact less than the amounts derived by the Commissioner from Line 17 of the balance sheets, and that, in any event, no (a) (i) An item of income cannot accrue for tax purposes (ii) (iii) The advance commissions on policies upon which payment of first year premiums was completed in the second year plainly did not constitute loans. Petitioner gave no notes therefor, no interest was paid by petitioner or required of it in such circumstances. Petitioner made no "repayment" of any principal on any such alleged loans, but instead merely earned the commissions advanced. The advances were not loans but were income paid ahead of the time earned. Cf. A somewhat different situation is involved in the case of policies that lapsed or were cancelled prior to the end of their first year. There, petitioner would also have received the full first year commissions, but the portion thereof allocable to the unpaid premiums was thus never "earned" and had to be accounted for ultimately to Jefferson. However, the contract with Jefferson contained no requirement for repayment during its existence, which could conceivably continue for a long, indefinite period of years. And there is no dispute that the earliest point at which Jefferson could demand repayment of the unearned commissions was on the date of termination of the contract -- an event which would not occur until two years after written notice of termination was given. Only at that point did there come into being Jefferson's right to repayment, and it was only at that point that interest (at seven percent a year) would begin to accrue on the balance of those unearned commissions. In fact, notice of termination on July 7, 1988, was given*334 here by letter to Young dated July 1, 1986. Thus, it will be on July 7, 1988, that Jefferson's right to recover the unearned commissions together with interest from that date will arise. Prior thereto Jefferson had only an inchoate or conditional right to have the unearned commissions restored to it. Meanwhile, Security Associates used or commingled the unearned commissions with its other assets without any restriction as to their disposition. Unless the 1980 and 1981 commissions involved herein were received by it as the proceeds of a bona fide loan from Jefferson, they were plainly taxable when received, as pointed out above in part (ii) of this section of our opinion. This Court was faced with a like issue involving similar facts in In its effort to prove that the "unearned" advance commissions represented loans to Security Associates, petitioner presented a considerable amount of evidence relating largely to Young's background and his negotiations with Jefferson leading up to his being appointed a general agent for Jefferson. We found it unpersuasive. That evidence chronicled Young's history as a general agent for the Occidental Life Insurance Company, followed by his being a general agent for American*336 Investment Life and then for 12 years with Lafayette Life Insurance Company (Lafayette). By the mid-1960s, his agency produced more business for Lafayette than any other of Lafayette's agents. He desired to expand his business. He found, however, that if he tried to expand by acting as a general agent for other companies, Lafayette would stop advancing his commissions to him. Instead, it would pay him only those commissions that had been earned and it would offset against those earned commissions prior advances on unearned commissions that had been made to him and had not yet been repaid by him. Such course of action on the part of Lafayette would have substantially reduced Young's cash flow and hampered his ability to operate. Around 1967, Jefferson contacted petitioner to discuss a general agency agreement, but Young was not yet ready to enter into an agency agreement with it. When Jefferson contacted petitioner again in 1971, he had by then repaid Lafayette a large portion of the advances it had made to him and was then ready to consider entering into an agreement with Jefferson. Meetings were held in 1971 and 1972 to negotiate such an agreement. Jefferson initially became*337 interested in enlisting Young as a general agent because it understood that he was producing a large volume of profitable business for Lafayette. Jefferson anticipated that Young could increase Jefferson's business by one-third, and that the policies sold through Young's efforts were likely to be renewed at a relatively high rate. In negotiating an agency contract with Jefferson, Young was concerned with reaching an agreement under which he would not be subject to a cash shortage on termination of the contract. In other words, he did not want Jefferson to be able to offset against commissions he was earning or being advanced, any previously advanced commissions that were due to be repaid to the company as a result of lapses in policies written. In addition to this flexibility to terminate his contract with Jefferson, petitioner wanted cash in order to expand his business, control over his business and his clients, and a high rate of both first year and renewal commissions. He also wanted the renewal commissions to continue to be paid even after either his own death or the termination of his contract with Jefferson so long as the policies were renewed. In the initial negotiations*338 with Jefferson, Young requested that he receive a first year commission equal to 90 percent of first year premiums paid to it. He also asked for an agency "allowance" equal to one hundred percent of those premiums. The 90 percent first year commissions requested by Young would be earned by and paid to Young as the policyholder paid his monthly premiums to Jefferson. Thus, under the originally requested terms, Young would presumably be paid his commissions only as they were earned on a monthly basis, not in advance. In addition, Young asked for loans of $10,000 to $50,000 a month. Jefferson was anxious to get Young as a general agent, particularly since Young had a 13-year history of obtaining renewals at a rate of 85 percent in the fifth year after sale of the policy, substantially higher than the rate regarded as prevailing throughout the industry generally. Young was also ready to guarantee that at least 80 percent of the policies would be renewed after the first year. However, instead of the earned commissions and loan package that Young first requested, the parties finally agreed on a different compensation arrangement reflected in the March 22, 1973, contract that is now*339 before us. The compensation arrangement incorporated in the contract *340 received in cash by Jefferson. It was in this context that Young did not insist that Jefferson also lend him a fixed sum monthly as he had originally requested. We have carefully reviewed the extensive evidence, some of the salient features of which were summarized above, and have concluded that the advance commissions were nothing more than advance commissions, not loans as argued by petitioner. To be sure, Young abandoned his request for periodic loans proposed by him in the earlier negotiations. Such loans were perceived by him as essential to the cash flow required to carry on his general agency business. But that is a far cry from concluding that the advance commissions were also loans, negotiated in lieu of the periodic loans previously sought by him. As we evaluate the evidence, the advance commissions merely gave Young the cash flow that he desired. They were, in a sense, the substitute for the loans that he had originally requested. But what he really sought was cash flow and the requested loans were merely a means to that end. He attained that end through the advance commissions instead of through loans. They constituted income when received and were not themselves*341 loans of any kind. In support of its position that the "unearned" advance commissions were loans and not taxable income, petitioner points to the fact that they were not included in the 1099s issued by Jefferson and that Jefferson did not deduct them on its own returns as current expenses. Accordingly, petitioner argues, Jefferson's action, which was contrary to Jefferson's own best interests, reinforces petitioner's treatment of the advance commissions as loans. The argument is faulty. The reason that Jefferson did not deduct such "unearned" advance commissions on its own return is explained by the fact that Jefferson understood (whether correctly or incorrectly) that as an accrual basis taxpayer it was not entitled to the deduction until its obligation to pay the commissions "accrued". This was made clear by the testimony of Jefferson's current vice president and controller. It hardly supports petitioner's claim that the advance commissions were regarded by the parties as "loans" made by Jefferson. Finally, even if the contract between Young and Jefferson could be construed to classify the advance commissions as loans to Young, they certainly were not loans to Security Associates, *342 which had no obligation whatever to Jefferson to "repay" any such "loans". Although the Commissioner has accepted the position of the parties that petitioner is accountable for the commissions assigned to it by Young, there is no showing that Jefferson ever assumed any of Young's obligations under the contract. Indeed, petitioner's understanding of its responsibilities in this respect is evidenced by a Resolution of its Board of Directors that "any indebtedness created by William H. Young, III's individual contracts being assigned to the Security Associates Agency shall be the sole responsibility of William H. Young, III". (b) The Commissioner's determination proceeded on the assumption that the respective increase from the opening to the closing figures on Line 17 for each of the years 1980 and 1981 was equal to the net amount of advance commissions paid by Jefferson in those respective years. As noted earlier in this opinion, those increases amounted to $76,107.54 for 1980 and $88,425 for 1981, or a total of $164,532.54. Petitioner does not disagree that the actual amount of advance commissions was included within those figures, but it contends that the total amount thereof was $139,825. Petitioner's*344 source for the $139,825 figure is an account analysis prepared by the vice president and controller of Jefferson. We were unpersuaded by that analysis. Not only did it not undertake to show what the advance commissions amounted to separately for 1980 and 1981, but even as to the aggregate of $139,825 for both years the underlying materials used for arriving at that figure were highly confusing. Those underlying materials were the year end "Agent's Commission Statements" for 1979 through 1981. The balance of advances used in the analysis for each year was apparently taken from a column on the Agent's Commission Statement which is headed "Net Balance This Month" and is roughly equal to the total of some 50 figures which appear in that column. While the total of that "Net Balance" column presumably represents Jefferson's record of Security Associates' debit balance, neither the components that made up this "Net Balance" nor the manner in which it was calculated are explained in the record. Moreover, still further confusion emerged from the testimony of the person who was petitioner's accountant during 1980 and 1981. He testified that the total cash received by Security Associates*345 exceeded the amounts of the "earned" commissions in those years. He explained that the method used to reconcile the difference between the cash received and the commissions earned was to identify all sources of cash received and then treat the excess cash as "commission advances". It was this "commission advances" figure that made up the Line 17 balance sheet entry relied upon by the Government. An accounting consultant hired by petitioner to review the returns for those years admitted that he did not reconcile the advances shown on the agency's return with the amount that Jefferson showed as a "debit" balance. He suggested that the excess funds categorized as "ADVANCES" could have been the personal funds of Young since Young apparently or allegedly did not carefully distinguish between his personal funds and those of Security Associates. But this conclusion was based on little more than speculation and does not establish that the Commissioner's determination with respect to the excess advances is incorrect. We are thoroughly dissatisfied with the explanations of this discrepancy. On the fuzzy record presented we certainly cannot conclude that petitioner has carried its burden*346 of proof, and we therefore accept as correct the Commissioner's use of the figures on the agency's balance sheets submitted with its tax returns. (c) In the first place, there was convincing evidence that $35,000 of that amount represented seven bona fide loans of $5,000 each made by Jefferson in 1975 and 1976, wholly unrelated to advance commissions. There was no basis whatever for applying As to the remaining $37,041.17 ($72,041.17 minus $35,000), most, if not all, of such remainder probably did relate to pre-1980 advance commissions that had not yet been "earned" by the end of 1979. However, There still remains, however, what could probably be a relatively small amount of "unearned" advance commissions allocable to lapsed or cancelled policies. Those commissions would not be earned in 1980 and therefore were not reported by petitioner. However, as to such commissions, the crux of the matter rests not upon a question of accounting method -- a If the $37,041.17 component of the opening 1980 Line 17 item includes anything else besides advance commissions, there is no indication whatever that any such portion thereof would support a II. On June 18, 1976, Sunshine Cruises, Inc., was incorporated with Young as its sole owner. Later in that year, on*350 December 27, 1976, Sunshine Cruises filed an election to be treated as a small business corporation under Subchapter S. On June 21, 1976, Sunshine Cruises bought the "Mark II", a 58-foot fiberglass yacht for $224,538 and later improved it with equipment costing $94,869. The yacht had a master stateroom, a guest stateroom, crew quarters, a galley, and a salon that opened up to the aft deck. It was air conditioned and could accommodate eight overnight guests. At issue are the deductions taken by Security Associates in connection with the lease of this yacht. From its purchase in 1976 until the years at issue herein, with only one exception, the Mark II was leased exclusively to Security Associates. Nonetheless, in the years 1976 through 1979, Young and his family also used the yacht for personal purposes. It was then kept in Annapolis near Young's residence at that time. The yacht was reported as then used 65 percent for business and 35 percent for family and personal purposes. In 1979 Young learned that tax deductions for yachts which were used in the manner that the Mark II was used would be subject to stricter standards. He was advised to buy another boat for his own use*351 and to refrain from so using the Mark II, but to use it purely for business purposes. In 1979 Young bought a 23-foot Mako sport fishing boat for about $38,000. It was radically different from the Mark II. Young used it in his personal capacity and during breaks from the meetings held on the Mark II. In 1981 Young donated a "23' Mako" boat to "Florida Southern College Marine Research Services, Inc." Young or Sunshine Cruises also owned a 15 foot Boston Whaler. During the tax years, 1980 and 1981, the Mark II's home port was Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Young at that time resided in Florida, and commuted to Maryland to attend to the affairs of petitioner and other business interests. He owned a condominium in Ft. Lauderdale about 90 feet from where the Mark II was moored, but his principal residence was about 45 miles away. Although it had a captain on board throughout the year, the Mark II was used only five times in 1980 and only six times in 1981, for between three and eight days each time. On each such occasion it would be used either in the Ft. Lauderdale waters or in the West Indies. In the latter case, the captain and a mate would bring the yacht the 180 miles from Ft. *352 Lauderdale to Nassau where it would pick up its passengers. The invited guests boarded the Mark II in Nassau and had paid their own way to Nassau. Occasionally, Young would travel with the crew on the trip to Nassau, but he would usually fly there. From Nassau, the Mark II and its passengers would generally travel either to Highborne Key or to Chub Cay. Each of these destinations was about 35 miles from Nassau. Each island was secluded and did not have the usual resort attractions. On each of the five or six trips taken on the Mark II in 1980 and 1981, the "business" guests Young brought aboard the boat for the meetings numbered one, two, or three. Those guests would generally bring their spouses on the trip. On only four of the five trips taken in 1980 and two of the six trips taken in 1981, meetings were held aboard the Mark II that related to Security Associates' insurance business. Agents of Security Associates were aboard on those insurance-related trips. Of the 10 or 11 agents and five other staff members the agency employed in those years, only six of the agents visited the boat. Of that six, Young's association with three was described. One agent (Chenworth) was the*353 supervisor of the other agents and had been an agent affiliated with Young since 1961, another (Corning) had been an agent affiliated with Young since 1960 or 1961, and the last (Waagbo) was during the years at issue a relatively new agent, but had been a secretary to Young since 1969. There was no indication or reason to believe that Young's relationship with the other three agents who were invited on the Mark II in 1980 and 1981 was not equally as long and familiar as was his association with Chenworth, Corning, and Waagbo. Of the four trips in 1980 and the two in 1981 on which the agents were invited on the Mark II, the purpose of the trips was described as training, and particularly, the development of a sales presentation. When an agent was brought aboard the vessel for this training he would either meet alone with Young, or he would meet with Young and one or two other agents, or he would meet with Young, a medical doctor, and sometimes one other agent. Two medical doctors were among the guests on the Mark II on some of the foregoing trips in the years at issue, although only one of them was aboard on any particular trip. Both doctors were described as "friends" of Young, *354 one since 1971 and the other "for a number of years". One was an obstetrician-gynecologist and the other was an anesthesiologist. The manner in which these doctors were able to instruct or train the agents on the Mark II in a way useful to the sale of insurance was not convincingly made clear. The role of the doctors was described as training the agents to better identify insurance risks and better evaluate the insurability and cost to insure prospective clients. However, it was not established that these doctors had any special knowledge of either the risks that Jefferson would agree to insure or the amounts the Company would charge to insure those various risks. During one of the two insurance related trips made in 1981, Young also had aboard the Mark II, Donald Hackett, who was then vice president and controller of Jefferson. The purpose of the meeting with Hackett was to discuss ways to better coordinate the operations and procedures of Security Associates. In addition to the trips on which insurance business was discussed, one other trip was taken in 1980 and four other trips were taken in 1981. These trips had no insurance purpose, but involved only Young's other investments*355 that were completely unrelated to the business of Security Associates. The subjects discussed on these other trips included Young's real estate investments in the British West Indies and Florida. Kept on the Mark II during the years at issue was a log book in which each guest was expected to make an entry. That entry would indicate the guest's name, the date of the meeting, and the business purpose of the meeting. Subsequent to the years at issue the yacht and the log kept of its use were destroyed by fire. After the Mark II burned, petitioner held training seminars for his agents occasionally on other vessels or in Young's Florida condominium, but for the most part at local hotels and restaurants in Maryland. In the latter part of 1984 Young or Sunshine Cruises replaced the Mark II with a 54 foot Striker yacht that cost about $500,000. At that time, Young also bought a 44 foot fishing boat for his personal use. In 1980, Security Associates paid Sunshine Cruises, Inc. $80,000 for the lease of the Mark II. In 1981, it paid Sunshine Cruises, Inc. $95,000. These amounts were deducted by Security Associates as "entertainment and selling expenses". Additionally, in 1981, the*356 agency paid the Mark II's captain $8,400 in salary and $1,400 for expenses incurred in connection with his operation of the yacht. For both 1980 and 1981, the lease payments made by Security Associates were Sunshine Cruise's sole source of income. To lease a boat of the sort that Security Associates was using would cost $5,500 a week plus expenses, which could be expected to range from $3,000 to $5,000 a week. The Commissioner, in his notice of deficiency, disallowed the so-called rental deduction of $80,000 and $95,000 for 1980 and 1981, respectively, not only on the ground that it had not been established that they were "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, but also because the requirements of (a) Although it would appear from the evidence that some portion of the controverted deductions could qualify on this record as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses of Security Associates under (1) In general. -- No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item -- * * * (B) Facility. -- With respect to a facility used in connection with an activity referred to in subparagraph (A). The activity referred to in subparagraph A is "an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation". As can readily be seen from the language used in (1) In general. -- No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item -- * * * (B) Facility. -- With*359 respect to a facility used in connection with an activity referred to in subparagraph (A), The underlined portion of [T]he term "entertainment" means any activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, such as entertaining at night clubs, cocktail lounges, theaters, country clubs, golf and athletic clubs, sporting events, and on The question before us under If all that were at issue were Security Associates' use of the Mark II for agent training and other insurance related meetings, there would be a basis for deciding this issue in petitioner's favor. Agents and other parties involved in these meetings testified at trial and, while their testimony was often rather vague, we find, without strong confidence, that the use of the Mark II in which they were involved was at least in part legitimate business use that did not involve entertainment. *363 the only use of the vessel that is at issue. The reconstructed log of the Mark II that was presented in evidence indicates that of the eleven trips on the Mark II in 1980 and 1981, only six involved the insurance business of Security Associates. The other five were trips on which Young and investors related to Young's other business ventures were passengers. The record is devoid of any explanation of what occurred on the Mark II during the trips on which other investors were present, beyond that there were "discussions on [Young's] investments in the British West Indies and other areas." Without more, we cannot find that those trips did not involve at least some element of disqualifying entertainment. The record thus not only discloses that there were trips on which the business involved was not that of Security Associates, as required by the statute, but also fails to establish in any event that there was in addition no disqualifying entertainment on any of those trips in each year. While Young testified generally that he made sure that no entertainment occurred on the vessel, he never specifically addressed the non-insurance use of the Mark II. In the absence of any testimony, *364 convincing or otherwise, by either Young or the guests involved in this category of use, we conclude that petitioner has not made its case. Even if we accept that business discussions occurred during these non-insurance related uses of the Mark II, we cannot be reasonably confident that the meetings were not essentially social gatherings or even that some incidental pleasure boating did not occur. That the passengers had some business association and engaged in some business discussion does not, in and of itself, establish that they were invited on the Mark II solely for business reasons. See (b) It has long been established that "[e]xpenditures made by a corporation for the personal benefit of its stockholders or the making available of corporate-owned facilities to stockholders for their personal benefit may constitute taxable income in amounts equal to the fair value of the benefits involved". To be sure, we have indicated above that the evidence establishes that the Mark II was used on some occasions for the benefit of the corporation, Security Associates. But the reason that we approved the disallowance in toto of the deductions claimed by Security Associates for these expenditures was that In the circumstances, we are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, Young should not be charged with constructive dividends to the extent that the expenditures were made for the benefit of the corporation, even though they were not deductible by the corporation. On the other hand, Young has failed to prove that some of the Mark II's trips were not exclusively for his personal benefit, nor has he convinced us on this record that at least some portion of the other trips could not reasonably be regarded also as personal to him. All such personal benefits should be treated as constructive dividends. The problem can be solved by following the course taken in In
The principle has been recognized and followed in a variety of cases and situations. See, e.g.,
1. Petitioners' three evidentiary objections were withdrawn over the course of the trial. The Government initially objected to ten exhibits. At trial, it withdrew its objections to five of them. As to the other five, we have considered the hearsay and relevancy objections. We find that each of the Exhibits 29-CC, 32-FF, 33-GG, 41-00, and 46-TT, as introduced with no limits on its use, contains inadmissable hearsay. However, in four of the five cases, the declarant testified at trial and thereby put the same evidence into the record in that form. Consequently, these objections served no purpose.↩
2. The expression "general agent" appears to be a term of art in the insurance industry. It seems that a "general agent" of a particular insurance company not only engages in efforts himself to sell such insurance, but ordinarily has a staff including "agents" who also meet with clients and undertake to sell such insurance to them under the direction of the general agent. The entity used by the general agent to carry on his activities, whether a sole proprietorship, corporation, or otherwise, is often referred to as the "agency". That term will so be used herein. ↩
3. There have been various subsequent amendments to that contract.↩
4. We have no evidence that Young's contract itself was ever assigned to Security Associates, as might have been done under the terms of the contract. All that appears in the record is an assignment of Young's commissions and Jefferson's continuing to deal with Young as an individual, not at all with Security Associates. Potentially serious problems could have arisen here based on the doctrine well established in the long line of cases headed by
5. These cases have generally followed or been in accord with principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
6. In
7. Policies were evidently sold in accordance with two separate contracts in the years at issue. However, the amount sold under the second contract, which contract is not in the record, is so comparatively insignificant that the parties have not argued for different treatment of any amount sold thereunder. ↩
8. The income tax treatment by Security Associates of the agency allowance and the renewal commissions (both of which were reported by it on its returns) is not involved here.↩
9. Petitioner's opening brief makes passing reference, without any development of the point, to
10. It is a wholly separate question whether this business use of the Mark II that did not appear to involve entertainment, might have been such a lavish and extraordinary expense that it would be considered outside of
Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 39 F.2d 540 ( 1930 )
Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Commissioner of ... , 304 F.2d 781 ( 1962 )
Brown v. Helvering , 54 S. Ct. 356 ( 1934 )
Schulde v. Commissioner , 83 S. Ct. 601 ( 1963 )
Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., an Ohio Corporation v. ... , 407 F.2d 1105 ( 1969 )
American Automobile Assn. v. United States , 81 S. Ct. 1727 ( 1961 )
Lucas v. Earl , 50 S. Ct. 241 ( 1930 )
Rca Corporation v. United States , 664 F.2d 881 ( 1981 )
robert-c-mcallister-and-veronica-t-mcallister-v-commissioner-of-internal , 417 F.2d 581 ( 1969 )
Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner , 77 S. Ct. 707 ( 1957 )