DocketNumber: Docket No. 13544-80.
Citation Numbers: 41 T.C.M. 885, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681, 1981 T.C. Memo. 62
Filed Date: 2/18/1981
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DAWSON,
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
CANTREL,
1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681">*683 Respondent, in his notice of deficiency issued to petitioner on April 10, 1980, has determined the following deficiencies in, and additions to, the petitioner's 1976 and 1977 Federal income taxes:
Additions to Tax, 1954 Code | |||
Year | 3 Deficiency | Sec. 6651(a) | 4 Sec. 6653(a) |
1976 | $ 1,812.00 | $ 312.00 | $ 90.60 |
1977 | 1,679.00 | 114.76 | 83.95 |
Petitioner resided at 8050 S. Main #23, Houston, Texas, on the date he filed his petition herein.
For each of the taxable years 1976 and 1977 petitioner filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Austin, Texas, a Form 1040, on which said forms he refused to disclose his income, deductions, or tax liability. He did, however, sign1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681">*684 his name to the forms, on which he asserted numerous constitutional objections. Since petitioner received gross income in 1976 and 1977 far in excess of $ 750, he was required to file Federal income tax returns for those years. Section 6012. The Forms 1040 submitted by petitioner to the Internal Revenue Service Center, which contained no information relating to petitioner's income from which the tax can be computed, were not valid returns within the intendment of section 6012. See
1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681">*685 As we read petitioner's statement filed on January 21, 1981, he now concedes that respondent is entitled to "a partial summary judgment" with respect to some nine legal issues raised respecting constitutional objections. In making those concessions petitioner advises--
They are not the issues brought into this Court in petitioner's original pleading. They are issues petitioner may have contested 4 - 5 years ago and reflect misconceptions of law still being spread by the self-proclaimed gurus of the "tax-revolt". Petitioner now takes issue with most of what this movement has to say, and does not consider many of its leaders worth paying money to see.
As we view this record, petitioner cannot and does not dispute the income figures determined by respondent. Rather, he asserts that respondent has erred in his interpretation of the tax laws and their applicability to the facts of this case. In short, he contends that as a "common law" employee he did not receive "income" in 1976 and 1977 which is subject to tax. We disagree. 6
1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681">*686 Section 61(a) defines gross income to mean "all income from whatever source derived, including * * * compensation for services, * * *." Furthermore, federal reserve notes constitute legal tender--"money"--which must be reported on a taxpayer's return in accordance with his method of accounting.
1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 681">*687 While not material in view of our disposition of this case, petitioner seeks a trial on the "issues" at dispute as raised in his petition. As we understand this record, those issues are purely legal ones. We addressed a similar plea in
They are entitled to that opportunity only if it could result in a redetermination of the deficiencies found by respondent. In these cases, it would be useless for us to hear the proffered evidence, because we have concluded that the legal theories relied upon by petitioners to reduce their taxes are erroneous.
Respondent filed his answer herein on September 19, 1980, in which at paragraphs IV and V thereof he denied the allegations contained in paragraphs IV and V of the petition. 8
Here, petitioner has not submitted any information which contradicts respondent's factual determinations. On the basis of the pleadings and other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, respondent has amply demonstrated to our satisfaction that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact present in this record and, thus, that respondent is entitled to a decision as a matter of law. 9 In such posture, summary judgment is a proper procedure for disposition of this case. Respondent's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
1. Since this is a pretrial motion and there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court has concluded that the post-trial procedures of Rule 182, Tax CourtRules of Practice and Procedure, are not applicable in these particular circumstances. This conclusion is based on the authority of the "otherwise provided" language of that rule. The parties were afforded a full opportunity to present their views on the law at the hearing at Washington, D.C., on January 21, 1981. Petitioner did not appear. However, he did file a "Statement as Per Rule 50(c)" on January 21, 1981.↩
2. All rule references herein are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3. The deficiencies are predicated upon gross income received by petitioner during 1976 and 1977 in the respective amounts of $ 10,774.86 and $ 11,506.30, in the form of separate property prior to his marriage on June 19, 1976, and in the form of one-half of his and his wife's total community property income after his marriage. Texas is a community property state. ↩
4. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.↩
5. See also
6. Petitioner, in his 16-page statement filed on January 21, 1981, in which he proclaims that he has developed an intense academic interest in tax law, advances numerous contentions to support the "issues" raised in his petition. In our opinion, those contentions are neither relevant nor material to the matter at bar, and we will not burden this opinion with respect thereto.↩
7. We additionally point out that the constitutionality of the Federal income tax laws passed since the enactment of the
8. Upon the filing of that answer, issue was joined. See Rules 38 and 121.↩
9. We are keenly aware of the allegations embodied in paragraph V.I. of the petition. However, they have been thoroughly devitalized by exhibits attached to respondent's motion, which remain uncontroverted.↩
United States v. Arthur J. Porth , 426 F.2d 519 ( 1970 )
United States v. Morris Reid Smith, Jr. , 618 F.2d 280 ( 1980 )
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. , 36 S. Ct. 278 ( 1916 )
United States v. Ronald M. Long , 618 F.2d 74 ( 1980 )
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad , 36 S. Ct. 236 ( 1916 )