DocketNumber: Docket No. 9634-77.
Citation Numbers: 42 T.C.M. 763, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 308, 1981 T.C. Memo. 437
Filed Date: 8/17/1981
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/21/2020
*308 On medical advice Ps moved their son from a mental hospital into a private apartment in the vicinity of the hospital.
*309 MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
EKMAN,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioners, Irving Seth Levine and Grace F. Levine, husband and wife, resided in New York, New York, at the time they filed their petition herein. They timely filed their joint Federal income tax returns for 1974 and 1975 with the Internal Revenue Service Center in Cincinnati, *310 Ohio.
Petitioners' son, Guy, was born in 1955. Guy suffers from a mental condition in which he has problems maintaining adequate contact with reality. In March 1969, Guy was admitted to the Menninger Clinic (hereinafter Menninger) in Topeka, Kansas, as an inpatient. Guy remained an inpatient in the Children's Hospital at Menninger until February 1973, at which time other arrangements had to be made because Guy was approaching the maximum age level for inpatient status at the Children's Hospital.
Guy was initially discharged from the Children's Hospital into a family care home which provided him with living arrangements, case work services, and public school enrollment. Guy also continued individual psychotherapy on an outpatient basis.
The family care home arrangement lasted only about one month. The pressure of living outside the hospital and attending public school on a full-time basis proved too much for Guy, and he had to be temporarily rehospitalized.
Other treatment alternatives were explored. The Children's Hospital program was no longer available to Guy, and Guy himself was adamant about wanting to get out of a mental institution. Menninger contacted several*311 other residential centers but these other centers were unwilling to accept Guy for further treatment, and Guy was unwilling to consider other institutions as a source of placement. In 1974 and 1975 there were no other places available to Menninger which would accept Guy as a patient and which Guy would accept as a treatment facility. In the opinion of Guy's psychotherapist, it was medically and psychiatrically essential that Guy remain in Topeka in the years at issue. The medical personnel at Menninger believed that Guy's relationship with his psychotherapist was not reproducible elsewhere.
About the only other alternative available was to have Guy move into the community, share an apartment with another former hospital patient, 1 and sever further contact with Menninger's inpatient treatment program Guy would continue individual psychotherapy on an outpatient basis, and the hospital facilities of Menninger as a whole would continue to be available to him, but he would no longer be an inpatient in the hospital.
*312 At the time Guy was discharged from the Children's Hospital at Menninger, the Children's Hospital had no apartment living plan. Guy would not have been accepted into the Adult Hospital's apartment living program because they program required a degree of self-sufficiency which Guy did not possess.
In order for Guy to be treated, a unique situation was created with the assistance of petitioners and Arthur Glassman. The Menninger Social Work Department did not assist in creating this unique living environment for Guy because it did not have the time and in Guy's mind it was associated with the entire hospital treatment program which Guy very much wanted to leave.
Petitioners rented a furnished efficiency-type apartment for Guy. 2 The apartment had a small kitchen, a living area, a bathroom, and a small bedroom. The apartment had no special medical furnishings of any type, but medical treatment was provided to Guy at his apartment on at least one occasion by his psychotherapist. Guy had difficulty maintaining personal hygiene and keeping his apartment clean. On at least two occasions Guy was threatened with eviction because his apartment was not kept properly cleaned. No*313 one connected with Menninger physically supervised Guy on a day-to-day basis at the apartment, nor did anyone else.
Arthur Glassman (hereinafter Glassman) is a Topeka attorney who was approached by petitioners and retained by them to serve as a surrogate parent/ social service worker/ lawyer to help Guy manage his day-to-day affairs. Glassman worked through some problems with Guy's apartment manager, handled various matters pertaining to Guy's insurance, handled various problems Guy encountered with the telephone company, procured employment for Guy, assisted Guy in regulating the purchase of clothes, medical prescriptions, and auto repairs. Glassman also paid Guy's rent, telephone, and utility bills and paid for a cleaning woman out of funds sent by petitioners. During the years at issue Glassman would meet with Guy no less than once a week.
Once Guy became an outpatient, hospital transportation was no longer available to him. He therefore required transportation in*314 and around Topeka, and a car was purchased for him to meet his transportation needs. Guy had been enrolled in a driver's education course at the request of Menninger as part of the plans to prepare him to move out of the hospital and into the community. According to his psychotherapist, Guy and a long-standing need for independence and the car was a symbol of independence. Guy used the car not only to transport himself to and from appointments at Menninger but also to perform tasks such as grocery shopping.
OPINION
"Medical care" encompasses amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body; for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care; and for insurance covering*315 medical care.
The first issue for our consideration is whether amounts expended for maintaining and insuring Guy's automobile are deductible medical expenses. This must be decided in favor of respondent. The burden of proof is upon petitioners.
Whether amounts expended for Guy's meals and lodging are deductible as medical care expenses presents a much more difficult problem. Generally expenses for meals and lodging are non-deductible personal, living, or family expenses.
Moreover, in certain instances expenses for care in an institution other than a hospital will qualify as expenses for care; the extent to which such expenses will qualify is primarily a question of fact which depends upon the condition of the individual and the nature of the services he receives (rather than the nature of the institution).
*318 Respondent urges that Guy's apartment was not specially equipped or furnished in any manner, no medical care or supervision was regularly provided to Guy at his apartment, and the availability of medical care was not a consideration in choosing Guy's apartment.
Petitioners counter that Guy's relationship with his treating psychotherapist was not reproducible elsewhere; Guy's living arrangements became, in fact, part of the treatment plan; and, therefore, Guy's apartment was a therapetuic setting, a type of substitute hospital.
While we can sympathize with petitioners' situation, the weight of authority supports respondent's position. The factual scenario here is quite similar to that in
Whether the costs of remaining in an institution are deductible medical expenses depends upon the condition of the patient and the services furnished by the institution. The costs of lodging in such an institution are deductible only when the principal reason for the patient being at the institution is because of the medical care which it provides for him.
We cannot distinguish Susan's living in either the boarding house or the apartment from her living in any other personal residence. The facilities were neither specially equipped nor specially furnished. There was no medical supervision provided to Susan and neither the boarding house nor the apartment engaged regularly in providing*320 medical care. Although living in the facilities might have been beneficial to Susan, such benefit is not sufficient to make the lodging part of institutional medical care. [
The evidence presented establishes that Guy's apartment was not specially equipped or furnished; he received no regular therapy, medical care, or supervision of any type at the apartment. Guy's apartment was no different from any other personal residence.
Petitioners place heavy reliance on
Petitioners' son, Guy, has received no comparable services at his apartment. He is free to come and go at will, and aside from a few hours each week when he is actually in therapy sessions, he is under no supervision whatever. Nor are medical services offered to Guy at his apartment.
In
One important condition, which petitioner must satisfy if his claim is to succeed, is whether the expenditure would have been made even if there had been no illness. This "but for" test requires petitioner to prove
Clearly Guy's meals and lodging expenses would have been incurred regardless of whether he was receiving psychotherapy treatment. Deductions are a matter of legislative grace.
In enacting
We might add that there is no evidence in the record to indicate the cost of Guy's meals and lodging was more expensive due to his medical condition than the cost of a healthy person's meals and lodging. A medical care expense which increases the cost of a personal expense
The final issue for our decision is whether fees paid by petitioner to Glassman for his assistance to their son in day-to-day activities are a deductible medical care expense.
Legal expenses incident to medical care have been allowed as a medical deduction in the past where the legal expenses were "necessary to legitimate a method of medical treatment".
Glassman was hired by petitioners to act as a surrogate parent, social service worker, lawyer. His role was to help Guy manage his day-to-day affairs. While Glassman's activities may have been invaluable to Guy, such activities were not "necessary to legitimate a method of medical treatment." Gerstacker's expenses were incurred because his wife could not be compulsorily confined to the mental hospital without the requisite guardianship proceedings. The fees paid to Glassman are not essentially bound up with Guy's medical care as were the guardianship fees. We cannot find that the fees paid to Glassman were incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness as required by
In summary then, petitioners may not deduct*326 as medical care expenses amounts expended to maintain and insure their son's automobile, amounts expended for their son's meals and lodging, or amounts expended for a surrogate parent/trustee/advisor for their son. However, due to concessions made by the parties prior to trial,
1. This apartment sharing lasted not more than one month. For the years with which we are concerned, Guy was generally living in an apartment by himself because he was unable to have little more than very superficial social contacts with other people.↩
2. Although the record is unclear as to when exactly the apartment was rented, Guy was living by himself in the apartment at some time in 1973 and during all of 1974 and 1975, the taxable years in issue.↩
3.
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