DocketNumber: Docket Nos. 9177-08, 9178-08
Citation Numbers: 2015 T.C. Memo. 223, 110 T.C.M. 471, 2015 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 231
Judges: HALPERN
Filed Date: 11/19/2015
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
An appropriate order will be issued.
Certain corporations (Cs) simultaneously entered economically offsetting long and short options and subsequently contributed the option spreads to one of two LLCs, ADI or ADG. In less than a year, Cs disposed of their LLC interests and claimed huge tax losses from their investments on the theory that their partnership bases in their LLC interests equaled the cost of the long-option premium not reduced by the offsetting short-option premium received.
HALPERN,
These cases are among the latest in a long line involving a*232 particular tax shelter variant, where a taxpayer uses offsetting options in an attempt to get an artificially high basis in a partnership interest and then claim a significant tax loss from the disposition of that interest.
Such losses have consistently been disallowed, and nothing about these cases warrants a different result. Primarily because we find that the LLCs should not be recognized as entities for Federal tax purposes, we will sustain respondent's adjustments and, to the limited extent that we can do so in this entity-level proceeding, his penalty determinations. We will inquire of the parties how, since we disregard the LLCs as tax-recognized entities, they believe we should treat the items reported by the LLCs.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 2000.
James Haber is the architect behind the*233 LLCs and the transactions at issue. Mr. Haber is a sophisticated tax professional who, from 1978 until 2003, was engaged in the business of providing income tax planning services. In 1992, he *227 founded the Diversified Group, Inc. (DGI) to execute his tax-structured transactions, and, in 2000, he was the sole director, chief executive officer, and president of DGI. Mr. Haber also employed Alpha Consultants LLC (Alpha), formed to consult in his execution of various transactions.
Before and during 2000, DGI marketed the tax avoidance strategy at issue in these cases. DGI called that strategy the foreign currencies (FX) investment strategy (FXIS). FXIS is described in marketing materials prepared by DGI in 1999. Those materials are marked "confidential", and FXIS is described as a proprietary strategy of DGI and Alpha. The strategy involves the purchase and subsequent contribution of one or more option spreads to an entity purportedly classified as a partnership for Federal tax purposes. The marketing material describes the tax benefit to an investor in the strategy as "a permanent taxable loss in excess of its gain or loss for accounting purposes." It describes DGI as having been involved*234 "in over 30 finance and/or acquisition-related strategies in over the last two years alone." It describes Alpha's principals as hedge fund managers having collectively over 50 years of trading experience.
In 2000, Bruce Brier was employed as a tax lawyer by Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. (Lehman). In 2000, Mr. Haber spoke with him and several others at Lehman about FXIS. He presented to Mr. Brier the DGI marketing *228 materials. He wanted Lehman to act as the execution party for option transactions that DGI would bring to it.
Mr. Haber, through various intermediaries, gained control of six different corporations: North American Communications Corp., Warsaw Television Cable Corp. (WTC), Echelon International Corp. (EIC), Community Media, Inc., Warner Enterprises, Inc., and Branch Book, Inc. (collectively, corporations). The corporations all had in common low-basis assets with substantial built-in gains. Mr. Haber caused the corporations to sell their assets, giving rise to recognized gains. For instance, WTC reported on its 2000 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return (WTC Form 1120), a gain of $1,833,384 from the sale of its business. To eliminate the resulting tax*235 liability triggered by the recognized gains, Mr. Haber caused each corporation to engage in FXIS.
The option spreads at issue here involve the simultaneous purchase and sale of European-style digital foreign currency options.*229 one of them, except for EIC, which entered into two, and the mechanics can be illustrated by the following actual transaction.
The option spreads of the corporations were similar in the following senses: The contract durations of the long and short options were identical (74 days in the example) and were always for less*237 than 121 days; the strike prices (0.9933 and 0.9934) were extremely close together such that the theoretical probability of the large payout on the "sweet spot" (0.9933) was extremely low;*231 Mr. Haber formed ADI and ADG as Delaware LLCs in February 2000, with DGI and Alpha as founding*238 members of both. Both DGI and Alpha contributed cash for their membership interests. DGI and Alpha were comanagers of ADG and ADI, although Alpha did not exercise independent authority but merely performed services at Mr. Haber's direction in exchange for a share of each LLC's profits. Through his status with DGI, Mr. Haber was the de facto manager of, and controlled, both LLCs. The operating agreements of the LLCs are nearly identical, stating that, among other things, each was formed to trade in U.S. and foreign currencies and futures contracts relating to currencies. Once Mr. Haber had de facto control over all parties involved (the LLCs and the corporations), he could implement FXIS, the important aspects of which were detailed in the marketing materials he had prepared. After creating the LLCs, he had them each engage in two of their own option spread transactions using the cash contributed by DGI and Alpha. Those option spreads differed from those entered into by the corporations only in that, when the LLCs entered into them, the options were already very deep in the money. That meant that the ultimate net payouts were virtually guaranteed (and indeed were made*239 upon option *232 expiration). The transactions were so deep in the money that they had the characteristics of cash deposits with Lehman. But, given the prevailing bank deposit interest rates at the time, the LLCs would, with less risk, have made more money had they just deposited the cash in interest-bearing bank accounts. As noted Mr. Haber obtained a tax opinion from the law firm Brown & Wood for each corporation. The opinions bless the corporations' decisions to compute tax *234 bases in the LLCs by the costs of the long options without any reduction for the liabilities represented by the short options. The opinions, however, rest on a number of questionable representations by Mr. Haber, namely that the corporations entered into the option spreads for substantial nontax business reasons and that the corporations contributed the option spreads to the LLCs for substantial nontax business reasons. Mr. Haber also represented for purposes of the opinions that purchasing and contributing the option spreads and then resigning from the LLCs were not part of a prearranged plan and that the corporations and the LLCs were in no way related: both false representations. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) identified the essential elements of FXIS*242 as a type of abusive tax shelter, and it warned taxpayers of its illegitimacy when, in August 2000, it issued *235 Like WTC, the other corporations reported income for 2000 on Forms 1120. On account of FXIS, each reported no 2000 tax liability. On its 2000 Form 1065, ADG reported no activity other than the option spread transactions, resulting in a claimed loss of $704,768. On its 2000 Form 1065, ADI also reported the option spread transactions, but it reported that those transactions resulted in a net gain of $161,744. ADI also reported a $772 investment interest expense deduction. Both Forms 1065 were filed with the IRS no earlier than November 5, 2001. In November*243 2007, respondent issued to the tax matters partner of each of the LLCs an FPAA in which he made his adjustments and his accuracy-related penalty determinations. He reversed both the $704,768 loss reported by ADG and the $161,744 gain reported by ADI. He made other adjustments, principally to reported partnership contributions and distributions, that were reflective of his disregard of the LLCs as entities classified as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes. He adjusted to zero the LLCs' members' claimed outside bases. By way of explanation, he stated, among other things, that the LLCs had been "formed and availed of solely for purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." Because the transactions and partnership had "no business purpose other than tax avoidance," they "lacked *236 economic substance", and so respondent would disregard them for tax purposes and disallow the related losses. He reduced to zero the $772 interest deduction claimed by ADI on the ground that it had not been substantiated or, if substantiated, shown to be deductible. Petitioners timely challenged the FPAAs. In the petitions,*244 petitioners claimed the LLCs' principal place of business to be in New York. Trial in these cases was held in New York, New York, in June 2014. Before trial, we excused Mr. Haber from testifying on the basis of his constitutional claim of privilege against self-incrimination. Testimony at trial consisted principally of expert testimony concerning the economics of the option spreads. We summarize the important aspects of that testimony and some of the findings we make on the basis of that testimony. We find that the option spreads at issue here would never have expired on the "sweet spot" (the exchange rate at which the long option is in the money, but the short option is not). All experts agreed that the probability of such an event's even theoretically occurring was extremely small. Thomas P. Murphy, one of respondent's experts, testified that Lehman, as the calculation agent, had discretion *237 to pick from a range of prices wider than the sweet spot.*245 confirmations, the parties (Lehman and the corporations) agree that neither party owes a fiduciary duty to the other. The trade confirmations specify that Lehman is to pick a price in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, and Mr. Murphy has convinced us that Lehman could have done that while ensuring the sweet spot was never hit. Scott D. Hakala, Ph.D., petitioners' expert, insisted that Lehman did not have discretion to pick the price, and he pointed to sections of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) master agreement and supplemental documents published by the ISDA as support. Mr. Murphy testified that in 2000, FX traders acting as calculation agents did not refer to the ISDA documents when picking prices. He further testified that some of the portions of the ISDA agreement referred*246 to by Dr. Hakala did not apply to the option transactions in these cases. Dr. Hakala insisted that the ISDA documents are *238 "unambiguous" in dictating how a calculation agent is to select the price. We disagree. Dr. Hakala pointed us to portions of the ISDA agreement that do not appear to apply here,*247 and we do not find him credible with respect to his opinion regarding Lehman's discretion as calculation agent to pick a price to close out a transaction. Moreover, in response to a question from the Court, Dr. Hakala conceded that, as a practical matter, the option spread would never actually expire on the sweet spot. He added that he had never seen it happen and that, if the option spread was close to being or in the money, the parties would close it out before expiration at an agreed price. The corporations knew or should have known that hitting the sweet spot was not going to happen. Also, Mr. Murphy has convinced us that the option pairs *239 acquired by the corporations were not particularly good investments. He testified that, if the corporations' objectives were to invest in foreign currency European digital options, there were alternatives, not involving paired options with a not-to-be-obtained sweet spot, with higher likelihoods of success. For example, WTC's option spread was a bet that the euro would increase in value relative to the U.S. dollar. It spent $50,000*248 for a maximum payout of ∼$102,305, and, in order to receive that, the EURUSD exchange rate had to go from 0.9705 to 0.9933 or higher (at least a 228-pip increase) in 74 days. Mr. Murphy testified that, if WTC's investment objective was to spend a net premium of $50,000 for a maximum payout of ∼$102,305 based on the EURUSD's going up in price, there was a simpler single option that had a higher probability of achieving that objective. It could have purchased a single EURUSD European digital call for a $50,000 premium that had a payout of $102,305 with a strike price of 0.9722, just 17 pips above the exchange rate price at the time WTC entered into its EURUSD option spread. The probability that the EURUSD rate would increase at least 17 pips (to put that option in the money) was considerably greater than the probability of its increasing at least 228 pips. Dr. Hakala, petitioners' expert, did not explain why the corporations entered into more complicated transactions when simpler ones with higher probabilities of *240 profit were available, even opining that he did not see anything that suggested an "intent of really beating the market at [a] sophisticated level". When asked whether he thought*249 the purpose of the option spreads was actually to profit from foreign currency markets in view of the fact that the purported tax benefits made profiting immaterial, he stated: "I understand that to some extent, as I would say, the tail wagged the dog". John D. Finnerty, the second of respondent's experts, also credibly testified that neither the option spreads nor their contribution to the LLCs provided the corporations with any additional risk diversification, hedging, or profit potential when compared to purchasing a single long option and holding the option outside of the LLC. In essence, he testified, and we find, that FXIS was complex and unnecessary. Any actual diversification achieved was minimal, and it could have easily been achieved without an LLC. He testified, and we find, that the yen, the euro, and the Canadian dollar are "obtained and traded with ease by lay investors without the need for third-party investment management." The LLCs stopped paying State franchise tax to Delaware in 2002. Both lost their entity status in Delaware in 2005. Neither LLC filed income tax returns *241 for 2003 through 2009. Both LLCs filed certificates of revival with*250 the State of Delaware in 2014. Respondent asks that we draw inferences adverse to petitioners from Mr. Haber's invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. In a case involving Mr. Haber with very similar facts, the Court did draw adverse inferences about the entity based on Mr. Haber's decision not to testify, but we do not find it necessary *244 to make that determination. In our review of an FPAA, a partnership's or deemed partnership's principal place of business at the time the petition is filed can determine the venue should a party decide to appeal. Petitioners argue that, on the basis of LLCs' principal place of business in New York, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the proper appellate *245 venue and that, therefore, we are bound to follow that court's enunciation of the economic substance doctrine. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that, because the LLCs had no principal place of business when the petitions were filed, the appropriate appellate venue is the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. We are not convinced that appellate venue is determinative in the resolution of these cases, nor is it clear that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's economic substance jurisprudence differs substantively from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's. Respondent would not, for tax purposes, recognize the LLCs as entities separate from their members. That would eliminate any question of outside basis in a partnership. Petitioners argue that the LLCs meet the test for partnership recognition established by Petitioners further argue that the LLCs should not be disregarded as partnerships on the ground that the transactions lacked "economic substance" or "business purpose". In support they advocate that we analyze the transactions under a disjunctive two-prong test, in which we*258 must respect the LLCs if we find that they had either a business purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit, apart from expected tax benefits. And while advocating a disjunctive test, petitioners argue they meet both prongs. For the first prong, petitioners concede that the transactions were tax motivated but argue that there was also a desire to make a profit and that is sufficient to satisfy the prong. For the second prong, petitioners argue that to fail this test, there had to be "no reasonable possibility" of profit, and it is irrelevant whether any potential profit was far less than the expected tax benefits. Petitioners argue there was a reasonable possibility that the option spread transactions would result in a profit. Respondent has three interrelated arguments for not allowing the LLCs to avail themselves of subchapter K and be treated as partnerships for Federal tax purposes: the sham partnership doctrine, the economic substance doctrine, and the *250 antiabuse rules promulgated under We have made findings consistent with all but respondent's fifth averment, and we are not persuaded by petitioners' arguments to the contrary. Large guaranteed tax benefits combined with the possibility of making a relatively small profit We have several times analyzed nearly identical schemes and have not recognized the entities involved for tax purposes. On its 2000 Form 1065, ADI reported a net gain from its option activity*262 of $161,744 and claimed an investment interest expense deduction of $772. Respondent by the FPAA reversed both items. We have determined that the LLCs are not recognized as entities for Federal tax purposes and, thus, cannot elect to be taxed as partnerships. As discussed A 20% penalty applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. The term "negligence" includes "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the internal revenue laws" or a failure to exercise "ordinary and reasonable care in the preparation of a tax return." The IRS released A 20% penalty applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to any substantial understatement of income tax. The term "understatement" means the excess of the amount*267 of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year, over the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the return, *258 reduced by any rebate. The gross valuation misstatement penalty is a 40% penalty that applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return that is due to the taxpayer's overstating the value of, or his basis in, property by 400% or more of its true value. *261 The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and circumstances. * * * Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of * * * law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer. * * * As to whether the corporations can avoid any accuracy-related penalties on the basis of Mr. Haber's honest misunderstanding of the law, we reach the same conclusion here that we reached in As we reported previously, Petitioners have not shown that, on the basis of Mr. Haber's actions, the corporations acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to any resulting underpayments of income tax.
1. Foreign currency options are always both a "call" option and a "put" option, because the holder is getting the right to simultaneously buy one currency and sell another. European-style options can be exercised only at the option contract's expiration. Digital options are cash-or-nothing options, and so the potential payout is known at the onset of the contract and is not dependent on the degree to which the foreign currency exchange moves.↩
2. Specifically, WTC purchased from Lehman a long option to buy euro and to sell U.S. dollars, and simultaneously sold to Lehman an almost identical short option. The EURUSD nomenclature means a call on euro and a put on U.S. dollars. It also means the exchange rate is quoted in U.S. dollars.↩
3. All of the strike prices were only one "pip" apart. A pip is the smallest price increment that the price of the underlying asset can move. For example, for EURUSD, one pip is $0.0001.↩
4. By "counterparty", we mean Lehman bought the options that the corporations sold (it would receive payouts from the corporations if the options expired in the money) and sold the options that the corporations bought (it would have to make payouts to the corporations if the options expired in the money). By "calculation agent", we mean someone at Lehman was responsible for determining the exchange rate price when the options expired. So, in essence, Lehman was responsible for making the payout if necessary and determining whether it was necessary.↩
5. More specifically, he credibly testified that the market spread on exchange rates was three pips wide, and calculation agents such as Lehman would have discretion to pick a price at least within that range. Because the sweet spot for all of the option spreads was only one pip wide, it, in effect, gave Lehman discretion to always pick a price outside of the sweet spot.↩
6. Dr. Hakala referred us to a section that applies if the trade confirmations specify the use of "Currency-Reference Dealers". The trade confirmations here make no such reference. He also pointed us to a definition of "Market Quotation" that applies more or less in situations of breached contracts and would not appear applicable, especially at the time of contract execution. The ISDA documents appear to provide considerable flexibility, depending on the terms in a trade confirmation. The trade confirmations here place no requirements on the calculation agent other than that it pick a price in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Dr. Hakala has not pointed us to any portions of the ISDA documents that provide guidance on the "good faith and commercially reasonable" standard, and we have found none. Mr. Murphy credibly testified to bank practices in 2000, and Dr. Hakala has not convinced us that the ISDA documents are inconsistent with those practices.
7. Petitioners argue that we cannot rely on
8. The only noncorporate member of the LLCs was Alpha, which, respondent represents, received only negligible allocations of partnership items, the disallowance of which would not result in a substantial understatement of its income tax, so that the noncorporate tax shelter standard,
9. It is unclear whether respondent considers zero to be the base for determining whether any of the corporations overstated its outside basis. Respondent states on brief that he "would decrease the outside bases claimed by the ADI and ADG Investors to an amount reflecting their actual economic investment." He provides a table of those amounts (ranging from $50,000 to $1,000,000), and he claims that the corporations "claimed artificial tax benefits ranging from 29 to 389 times their respective economic investments." The determination of any underpayment due to a valuation misstatement is not made in this entity-level proceeding.↩
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Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States , 822 F. Supp. 2d 968 ( 2011 )
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