DocketNumber: No. 1508-03
Citation Numbers: 2005 T.C. Memo. 113, 89 T.C.M. 1259, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 112
Judges: \"Gale, Joseph H.\"
Filed Date: 5/18/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GALE, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in income taxes and penalties under
Penalty
Year Deficiency
1997 $ 7,702 $ 363.00
1999 6,671 43.60
2000 4,926 58.40
Following concessions, 2 the issues remaining for decision are: (1) Whether $ 23,480, $ 22,450, and $ 13,550 received by petitioner Mary Doxtator (Mrs. *113 Doxtator) in 1997, 1999, and 2000, respectively, from the Oneida Tribeof Indians of Wisconsin (Oneida Tribe or Tribe) for services as a judicial officer are subject to income tax and self-employment tax; (2) whether petitioner Allen Doxtator (Mr. Doxtator) was engaged in a trade or business in 1997 and 2000, entitling petitioners to cost of goods sold of $ 225 in 1997 and trade or business deductions of $ 7,580 and $ 7,748 for 1997 and 2000, respectively; (3) whether petitioners received short-term capital gain of $ 1,000 and long-term capital gain of $ 146 in 1999; (4) whether petitioners received taxable dividends of $ 281 in 1999; (5) whether $ 3,000 petitioners received from the Oneida Tribe in 1999 is taxable; (6) whether petitioners are entitled to charitable contribution deductions of $ 5,899 and $ 3,969 in 1997 and 2000, respectively; (7) whether petitioners are entitled to a casualty loss in 2000 of $ 4,516, or $ 1,090 as conceded by respondent; (8) whether petitioners are liable for an accuracy-related penalty under
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are incorporated by this reference. 3
Petitioners resided in Wisconsin at the time they filed the petition in this case. Petitioners are husband and wife*115 and filed joint Federal income tax returns for 1997, 1999, and 2000. Petitioners are Native Americans and members of the Oneida Tribe.
Compensation for Services as Judicial Officer
In 1997, 1999, and 2000, Mrs. Doxtator worked for the Oneida Tribe as a "judicial officer" of the Oneida Appeals Commission and the Oneida Personnel Commission. The business of the Oneida Tribe is run by a business committee. Mrs. Doxtator was appointed to the position of judicial officer for a 3-year term by the business committee of the Oneida Tribe. In her capacity as a judicial officer, she heard disputes between the Oneida Tribe and its employees. The hearings were conducted at various locations to which Mrs. Doxtator traveled at her own expense. Her decisions were binding on the Tribe and its employees. She controlled her own schedule and heard as many or as few cases as she chose. She received a $ 125 stipend per case heard, regardless of its duration.
Mrs. Doxtator received $ 23,480, $ 22,450, and $ 13,550 in 1997, 1999, and 2000, respectively, as compensation for her services as a judicial officer from the Oneida Tribe. The Oneida Tribe issued Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, reporting*116 these payments to Mrs. Doxtator in each year. Petitioners did not report on their 1997, 1999, or 2000 return, nor pay self-employment taxes with respect to, the foregoing amounts received by Mrs. Doxtator. Respondent determined that the foregoing amounts were subject to income and self-employment tax.
Native American Finance
Petitioners attached to their 1997 and 2000 returns a Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Business, for an undertaking called "Native American Finance". According to Mr. Doxtator, the Native American Finance business consisted of Mr. Doxtator's activities in contacting Native American tribes to advise tribal leaders of a revenue ruling that he believed eliminated liability for employment taxes for elected tribal officials. In return for this information, Mr. Doxtator sought a "finder's fee" equal to 6 percent of the taxes recovered pursuant to the ruling. He contacted tribes seeking meetings to present his advice and requested that the tribes provide him with meals and lodging in connection with his travel to the meetings. Mr. Doxtator traveled as far as 500 miles for such meetings and made repeat visits in some instances.
During the years at issue, Mr. Doxtator*117 never received payment of any finder's fees. He considered there to be oral agreements regarding his fees with the tribes with whom he met. After failing to receive payment, he did not seek written contracts; instead, he sought to recover the fees by requesting payment from newly elected members of the tribal leadership.
On the 1997 Schedule C for Native American Finance, petitioners reported gross receipts of $ 613, cost of goods sold of $ 225, and expenses of $ 7,580. On the 2000 Schedule C for Native American Finance, petitioners reported gross receipts of $ 465 and expenses of $ 7,748. The amount reported as gross receipts comprised reimbursements of travel expenses to Mr. Doxtator by the tribes he visited. Some of the expenses claimed on the 1997 and 2000 Schedules C were Mrs. Doxtator's travel expenses incurred in connection with her duties as a judicial officer.
Respondent determined that Native American Finance was not a trade or business and disallowed the claimed cost of goods sold in 1997 and the deductions for the claimed expenses for 1997 and 2000. The determination shifted the 1997 and 2000 reported gross receipts from Schedule C to line 21, "Other Income", of the Form*118 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return.
Capital Gains
On January 20, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator purchased 600 shares of American Pad & Paper Co. for a total cost of $ 650.50 which she sold on April 21, 1999, for net proceeds of $ 989.46. On February 12, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator purchased 200 shares of Williams Coal Seam Gas for $ 1,850.50 which she sold on March 19, 1999, for net proceeds of $ 1,986.93. On March 19, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator purchased 400 shares of Burnham PAC PPTYS, Inc., for $ 4,188 which she sold on April 23, 1999, for $ 4,586.84. On April 27, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator sold 100 shares of Jevic Transportation, Inc., for net proceeds of $ 899.46. 4 On May 4, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator bought 200 shares of Arkansas Best Corp. Del. for $ 7,263 which she sold on July 6, 1999, for net proceeds of $ 7,249.25. On July 12, 1999, Mrs. Doxtator sold 1 share of Patriot American Hospitality, that was received pursuant to a cash merger on June 20, 1999, for net proceeds of $ 11.61.
*119 On February 8, 1999, a check for $ 5,000, payable to Mr. Doxtator, and drawn by Melinda Doxtator, his mother, cleared her account.
Petitioners reported no capital gains on their 1999 return. Respondent determined that petitioners received $ 15,720 in 1999 from the sale of stocks in which they had a basis of $ 14,720, resulting in short-term capital gain of $ 1,000 in 1999. Respondent further determined that petitioners had long-term capital gain of $ 146 in that year.
Dividend Income
Petitioners reported no dividend income on their 1999 return. Respondent determined that petitioners failed to report $ 281 of taxable dividends in 1999.
Oneida Tribe payments
During 1999, petitioners each received $ 1,500 from the Oneida Tribe and were issued Forms 1099 that reported these payments as nonemployee compensation.
The payments constituted a distribution of the profits from a casino owned and operated by the Oneida Tribe. The casino (and an associated hotel) were built on land purchased by the Oneida Tribe from "noncompetent" 5Tribe members in 1968. The Tribe purchased the land using proceeds it received pursuant to a judgment by the Indian Claims Commission in Docket No. 75 that*120 were distributed pursuant to the Act of September 27, 1967, Pub. L. 90-93, 81 Stat. 229,
Petitioners did not report the two payments (totaling $ 3,000) on their 1999 return. Respondent determined that the payments were taxable per capita payments in that year.
Charitable Contributions
Petitioners claimed deductions for charitable contributions on their 1997 and 2000 returns of $ 5,899 and $ 3,969, respectively. The notice of deficiency disallowed these deductions for failure to substantiate.
Casualty Loss
Petitioners claimed a casualty loss of $ 4,516 on their 2000 return.
In April 2000, a water main adjacent*121 to petitioners' residence broke and their basement was flooded with 4 to 5 feet of water. Petitioners' loss was not covered by insurance. The notice of deficiency disallowed the claimed $ 4,516 casualty loss.
Accuracy-Related Penalties
Petitioners previously appeared before this Court for redetermination of a deficiency with respect to their 1991 taxable year. In that case, at docket No. 6313-95S, petitioners argued that tier II railroad retirement benefits received by Mr. Doxtator were exempt from Federal income tax because of petitioners' status as Native Americans. We concluded, in an unpublished Summary Opinion that has been made part of the record in this case, that petitioners had failed to identify any statute or treaty that would exempt the retirement benefits from tax and accordingly sustained the deficiency. Our opinion was filed on March 20, 1997.
OPINION
Jurisdiction
Petitioners contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction over that portion of their deficiencies that relates to "Treaty rights of the Oneida, income derived from The Sovereign Government of the Oneida, and income from an investment made by the Oneida Government, i.e. enrolled membership." Petitioners*122 concede our jurisdiction with respect to the issues involving their claimed casualty loss and their investment income. In context, as best we can understand petitioners' claim, we believe they are challenging our jurisdiction to redetermine the deficiencies determined with respect to Mrs. Doxtator's compensation as a judicial officer for the Oneida Tribe and their receipt of the $ 1,500 payments from the Oneida Tribe.
We have jurisdiction to redetermine the deficiency of any taxpayer who is issued a valid notice of deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code and who timely files a petition for redetermination.
*123 Nor have petitioners demonstrated any other basis on which this Court lacks jurisdiction, notwithstanding their claim that only Congress has the authority to consider certain of the issues in this case. Native Americans such as petitioners are U.S. citizens and generally are subject to Federal income tax in the same manner as other U.S. citizens, absent specific exemption by a treaty or statute.
Having invoked our jurisdiction by filing their petition, petitioners may not unilaterally oust it.
Burden of Proof
Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown entitlement to a shift in the burden of proof to respondent with regard to any factual issue pursuant to
Judicial Officer Compensation
Respondent determined that the amounts Mrs. Doxtator received as compensation for her services as a judicial officer for the Oneida Tribe were subject to Federal income tax. Petitioners contend that those amounts are exempt from tax.
It is well established that Native Americans, or American Indians, as U.S. citizens are subject to the Federal income tax unless an exemption is created by treaty or statute.
Petitioners argue that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer compensation is exempt from taxation because she was "an elected officer of a sovereign". Petitioners persist in their argument premised on Mrs. Doxtator's status as an elected officer even though the evidence establishes, and they conceded at trial, that she was not an elected official. 7 Regardless, her status as elected or appointed is not significant in determining whether the amounts paid to her for her services as a judicial officer are subject to income tax. A tribal official, whether elected or appointed, is subject to income tax on the compensation received for rendering services to the tribe unless a treaty or statute specifically provides an exemption. See
*127 Respondent also determined that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer compensation is subject to self-employment tax for the years in issue. 9 As best we understand their position, petitioners offer no additional argument directed at the liability for self- employment tax beyond that offered with respect to the income tax; namely, that Mrs. Doxtator's compensation as a judicial officer is exempt because she is an elected officer of a sovereign. 10
For purposes of self-employment income or net earnings from self-employment, the term "trade or business" has "the same meaning as when used in
Petitioners' claim that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer compensation is exempt from self-employment tax because she was an elected officer of a sovereign could be interpreted as invoking the exemption provided in
The regulations under
In 1982, Congress considered the tax status of Indian tribal governments, concluded that "it is appropriate to provide these governments with a status under the Internal Revenue Code similar to what is now provided for the governments of the States of the United States", S. Rept. 97-646, at 11 (1982),
We are unable to discern in petitioners' arguments any other basis for attributing error to respondent's determination that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer*132 compensation is subject to self- employment tax. Moreover, several other factors support the determination. Mrs. Doxtator controlled her own schedule. She had discretion to hear as many or as few cases as she chose. She was paid a flat stipend per case heard, regardless of its duration. She was required to provide her own transportation to the various hearing sites. Her decisions were binding on the Tribe. In sum, the manner in which she performed her duties as a judicial officer supports the conclusion that she was an independent contractor, and the Tribe treated her as such, issuing Forms 1099 with respect to the amounts paid to her for each year in issue. We accordingly sustain respondent's determination that Mrs. Doxtator's compensation as a judicial officer in 1997, 1999, and 2000 is subject to self- employment taxes.
Native American Finance
Respondent disallowed the expenses petitioners claimed on Schedules C for 1997 and 2000 on the grounds that Native American Finance was not a trade or business for purposes of
Profit objective is a question of fact to be determined from all of the*134 facts and circumstances.
Mr. Doxtator did not conduct the Native*135 American Finance activity with continuity and regularity. Although petitioners' 1998 return is not in the record, their 1999 return is, and it contains no Schedule C reporting operations of Native American Finance in 1999. Thus, the activity was not continuous between 1997 and 2000.
Mr. Doxtator also did not conduct the activity in a businesslike fashion. When tribal officials failed to pay his finder's fee, he took no steps to ensure that he would be paid for future transactions, such as switching to written contracts instead of oral agreements. Mr. Doxtator also commingled the expenses of Native American Finance with those of Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer work. Finally, petitioners reported no gross receipts, much less profits, from the enterprise during the years at issue; Mr. Doxtator conceded that the reported gross receipts were actually payments for travel expenses.
Considering all of the foregoing factors, we conclude that petitioners have failed to show error in respondent's determination that the Native American Finance activity was not a trade or business within the meaning of
Capital Gains
Respondent determined that petitioners received $ 15,720 in 1999 from the sale of stocks in which they had a basis of $ 14,720, resulting in short-term capital gain of $ 1,000 in 1999. Respondent further determined that petitioners had long-term capital gain of $ 146 in that year.
Petitioners concede that stocks held in Mrs. Doxtator's name that were sold in 1999 generated the $ 15,720 in proceeds noted above. They also have not challenged, in their testimony or on brief, respondent's computations of the amount of gain. 14 Instead, they argue that the stocks were purchased with*137 funds of Mr. Doxtator's mother, Melinda Doxtator, on her behalf. Therefore, petitioners contend, the gain on the sale of the stocks is not taxable to them.
*138 While the evidence establishes that Melinda Doxtator transferred $ 5,000 to Mr. Doxtator in 1999, in the form of her check made payable to him that cleared her account on February 8, 1999, we nonetheless conclude on the basis of the entire record that petitioners have not shown that the stocks generating the gains at issue were the property of Melinda Doxtator rather than Mrs. Doxtator.
Petitioners' claims that these gains were Melinda Doxtator's rather than petitioners' are inconsistent and confused. First, Mr. Doxtator testified at trial that the stocks generating the gains at issue were purchased with $ 2,000 of petitioners' money and $ 5,000 of Melinda Doxtator's money. For reasons that are not clear, Mr. Doxtator contended that this arrangement resulted in petitioners' having a 40-percent share of any gain, but then persisted in claiming that "any gain went to her [Melinda Doxtator]". On brief, petitioners contended for a different version of the arrangement; namely, that the money for the investment in the stocks was 28 percent from petitioners' funds, 14 percent from a friend (Pearl McLester, mentioned for the first time on brief), and 71 percent from Melinda Doxtator.15*139 As was true of the first version, petitioners offer no explanation concerning why, if they contributed a share of the invested funds, no portion of the gain was theirs. Although Mr. Doxtator testified that all gains in 1999 were paid over to Melinda Doxtator, he offered no evidence to corroborate this contention. We are not required to accept Mr. Doxtator's uncorroborated, self- serving testimony, and we do not. See
Taxable Dividends
Dividends are taxable income.
Oneida Tribe Payments
Respondent determined that petitioners failed to report $ 3,000 in taxable per capita payments in 1999. Petitioners contend that the payments are exempt from tax.
The payments at issue were received by petitioners from the Oneida Tribe and constituted a distribution of the profits from a casino operated by the Tribe. The payments were reported on Forms 1099 by the Tribe as taxable nonemployee compensation.
Petitioners first argue that the payments are not per capita payments because they were not distributed equally to members of the Oneida Tribe and therefore are not per capita payments under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988),
The record in this case is insufficient for us to draw a conclusion regarding whether these payments would constitute per capita payments as that term is used in the IGRA. Mr. Doxtator testified at trial that all Tribe members under age 59-1/2 received identical $ 1,500 payments, while older Tribe members received larger payments. There is no evidence corroborating Mr. *143 Doxtator's testimony that payments to Tribe members varied according to age. Under the IGRA, revenues from Indian gaming activities may be used to make per capita payments to tribe members only under arrangements that have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior. See
In any event, these payments would be subject to Federal income tax regardless of their status as per capita payments. Whether the casino was located on tribal land (as respondent contends) or on allotted land 18 (as petitioners at times appear to contend), the payments, constituting distributions to Tribe members of profits from a casino owned and operated by the Tribe, would*144 be taxable to the Tribe members receiving them. If on tribal land, they would be taxable on receipt.
*145 Petitioners also appear to argue that the payments at issue are subject to a specific exemption from Federal income tax because they are traceable to, or somehow derived from, funds constituting the payment to the Oneida Tribe of a judgment against the United States. On brief, as a basis for exemption, petitioners refer to "Docket No. 75 (Indian Claims Commission 1967)" and an exhibit in the record further clarifies that "Docket No. 75" is often used in reference to litigation known as the New York Emigrant Claim made on behalf of certain tribes that left New York for Wisconsin, including the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin. Provision for payment of a judgment to the Oneida Tribe (and two other tribes) was made pursuant to the Act of September 27, 1967, codified as subchapter LVI of
Petitioners contend, and stipulated exhibits in the record*146 corroborate their contention, that the land on which the casino was located was purchased by the Oneida Tribe in 1968 with $ 60,000 in funds from the judgment received by the Tribe pursuant to 25 U.S.C. subchapter LVI. That subchapter, at
To the extent petitioners may be claiming that the exemption from Federal income taxes provided in
Our conclusion finds further*148 support in the IGRA. In that act, Congress specifically addressed the question of Federal income taxation of the distribution of revenues from Indian gaming activities to tribe members.
(3) Net revenues from any class II [or III ] 20
gaming activities conducted or licensed by any Indian tribe may
be used to make per capita payments to members of the Indian
tribe only if --
* * * * * * *
(D) the per capita payments are subject to Federal taxation
and tribes notify members of such tax liability when payments
are made.
Thus, it was Congress's understanding in permitting*149 distributions to tribe members of revenues from gaming activities conducted by the tribe that such distributions would be subject to Federal taxation. Petitioners' contention that the exemption provided in
Charitable Contributions
Respondent disallowed petitioners' claimed charitable contribution deductions*150 of $ 5,899 and $ 3,969 for 1997 and 2000, respectively, for failure to substantiate the deductions. Petitioners claim to have submitted substantiation of their 1997 and 2000 charitable contribution deductions to respondent's field office in Green Bay, Wisconsin. However, they have not produced any evidence in support of this claim or provided any written evidence to verify or substantiate the claimed deductions. 21
In the absence of evidence to verify or substantiate petitioners' claimed charitable contribution deductions, we sustain respondent's determination disallowing those deductions for the 1997 and 2000 taxable years.
Casualty Loss
Respondent disallowed petitioners' *151 claimed casualty loss of $ 4,516 for 2000. Under
Respondent conceded on brief that petitioners incurred a casualty loss from flooding in April 2000. Respondent further conceded $ 1,090 of casualty losses substantiated by petitioners after the petition was filed. 22 The remaining $ 3,426 in claimed casualty losses is still in dispute, and respondent maintains that these losses should be disallowed because petitioners have failed to substantiate them.
Petitioners describe*152 the unsubstantiated amounts as covering a "box of valuables", two chainsaws, two dehumidifiers, and approximately $ 3,000 in clothing and bedding damaged in the flood. Petitioners have offered no evidence to corroborate these additional losses claimed. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners have failed to substantiate casualty losses greater than the amounts conceded by respondent, and we sustain that portion of respondent's determination that has not been conceded.
Accuracy-Related Penalties
Respondent determined that petitioners were liable for the accuracy-related penalty based on a substantial understatement of income tax, or alternatively, negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, for 1997 and 1999.
A "substantial understatement" exists for this purpose if the amount of tax required to be shown on the return exceeds that shown by the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown or $ 5,000.
Only one accuracy-related penalty may be imposed with respect to any given portion of an underpayment, even if that portion is attributable to more than one of the types of misconduct listed in
The Commissioner has the burden of production under
A penalty under
Petitioners assert that they had reasonable cause for the various positions taken on all their returns. In considering this issue, we note that Mr. Doxtator was a well-informed taxpayer. He was a volunteer tax return preparer for the IRS between 1996 and 1998. In these proceedings, he has cited taxation and Indian law authorities extensively. Moreover, in their previous case before this Court, petitioners claimed an exemption from tax, based on their status as Native Americans, for tier II railroad retirement benefits, but they failed to identify any treaty or statute providing such an exemption. Our opinion to that effect was issued before any of the return positions at issue herein were taken. In this context, we address petitioners' return positions.
We find no reasonable cause for petitioners' position that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer compensation is not subject to income tax in 1997 and 1999. Petitioners disregarded information returns pertaining to this income and claimed*156 without any basis that Mrs. Doxtator was an elected official.
Our conclusion is different regarding petitioners' position that Mrs. Doxtator's judicial officer compensation in 1997 and 1999 was exempt from self-employment tax. We conclude that a taxpayer in petitioners' circumstances could have believed in good faith that Mrs. Doxtator's duties as a judicial officer for the Oneida Tribe were sufficiently similar to "the performance of the functions of a public office" that she was entitled to the exemption from self- employment tax provided in
We do not find reasonable cause for any other positions taken on the 1997 and 1999 returns. Regarding Native American Finance, petitioners provided no substantiation for the deductions claimed in 1997 nor any persuasive reason for their failure to do so, and Mr. Doxtator conceded that*157 the amounts claimed included expenses incurred by Mrs. Doxtator in the performance of her judicial officer duties. Petitioners' claims that the 1999 capital gains and dividend income were actually attributable to Mr. Doxtator's mother were inconsistent and largely uncorroborated. With respect to the Oneida Tribe payments in 1999, petitioners disregarded Forms 1099 indicating that these amounts were taxable. Moreover, petitioners' brief demonstrates extensive study of statutes, treaties, and caselaw affecting Native Americans, including the IGRA, yet they disregarded the specific IGRA provision (
Since we conclude that petitioners had substantial understatements for 1997 and 1999, we address respondent's determination of negligence for 2000 only. We are*158 satisfied that respondent has met his burden of production, and that the evidence supports a finding of negligence or disregard of rules or regulations within the meaning of
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under
1. Unless otherwise noted, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Respondent conceded $ 1,090 of the $ 4,516 casualty loss petitioners claimed in 2000. Petitioners conceded taxable interest income of $ 64 and $ 121 for 1999 and 2000, respectively, at trial.↩
3. A portion of the transcript of the trial proceedings in this case was lost because of errors of the reporting service. As a consequence, the parties entered into a supplemental stipulation of facts as an agreed substitute in lieu of any other remedy.↩
4. The record does not indicate the cost or acquisition date of this stock.↩
5. "A noncompetent Indian is one who holds allotted lands only under a trust patent and may not dispose of his property without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. It does not denote mental incapacity."
6. Respondent issued a notice of deficiency for the taxable years 1997, 1999, and 2000 to petitioners on Oct. 31, 2002, and petitioners timely filed a petition with this Court for redetermination on Jan. 27, 2003.↩
7. Petitioners' emphasis on Mrs. Doxtator's status as an elected official appears to be an attempt to invoke
8. Petitioners at various points claim that Mrs. Doxtator incurred travel expenses in connection with the performance of her duties as a judicial officer. However, petitioners have never identified the amounts of those expenditures, much less substantiated them under the requirements of
9. In connection with that determination, respondent allowed a corresponding deduction in each year of one-half of the self-employment taxes imposed by
10. To the extent that petitioners may again be invoking
11.
12. In 1988, Congress amended
13. This is the effective result of moving the gross receipts from Schedule C to line 21, "Other Income", on the Form 1040 as respondent did in the notice of deficiency.↩
14. The stipulated exhibits contain a worksheet that petitioners prepared covering their 1999 stock transactions. This worksheet indicates that petitioners' gain on the sale of the stocks at issue was $ 919 (versus respondent's determination of $ 1,000 in short-term, and $ 146 in long-term, capital gain). However, the worksheet indicates that the gain on the sale of Mrs. Doxtator's Jevic Transportation, Inc. stock was $ 87.50, without disclosing Mrs. Doxtator's basis in, or holding period for, that stock. There is no evidence of the basis or holding period anywhere else in the record. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that petitioners' worksheet demonstrates any error in respondent's determination. Moreover, nowhere in their testimony or brief do petitioners contend that the worksheet proves error in respondent's determination. Their only argument (considered above) is that the stocks, and therefore the gains from the stocks, belonged to Mr. Doxtator's mother.↩
15. Aside from the facial contradiction in this later version of the allocation (the portions of which total 113 percent), unsupported statements in a brief do not constitute competent evidence.
16. The figure represents the acquisition prices (plus commissions) listed by petitioner for the stocks at issue, which is generally corroborated by the confirmation statements in the record. In the case of the Jevic Transportation, Inc. stock, petitioners' worksheet does not list an acquisition price, but it can be derived by comparing the gain they list for the sale of that stock with the (undisputed) proceeds of sale listed on the Form 1099 issued to Mrs. Doxtator. ↩
17. Petitioners have not alleged the date that the Jevic Transportation, Inc. stock was acquired, except to the extent that an inference may be drawn from their failure to list it on their worksheet among the stocks acquired in 1999. If this stock had been acquired before 1999, it would represent an additional stock acquired before Melinda Doxtator transferred any funds to Mr. Doxtator.↩
18. Under the
In this case, the parties agree that the Oneida Tribe purchased the land on which the casino was located from noncompetent Tribe members in 1968. In respondent's view, the land became tribal land upon this purchase, whereas petitioners, though not clear on this point, appear to take the position that the land retained its character as allotted land.↩
19. On brief, petitioners also cite
20. The IGRA classifies gaming into three categories: class I, generally covering social games for prizes of minimal value; class II, which consists of bingo and certain card games; and class III, which covers all remaining gaming, such as that typically conducted in casinos.↩
21.
22. This amount covers substantiated costs of replacing a water heater, furnace, and sump pump.↩
John A. Maher and Madeline K. Maher v. Commissioner of ... , 680 F.2d 91 ( 1982 )
Herbert A. Dunn and Georgia E. Dunn v. Commissioner of ... , 615 F.2d 578 ( 1980 )
Thomas C. Burger and Marian E. Burger v. Commissioner of ... , 809 F.2d 355 ( 1987 )
International Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Internal ... , 275 F.2d 578 ( 1960 )
Melvin Nickerson and Naomi W. Nickerson v. Commissioner of ... , 700 F.2d 402 ( 1983 )
arlin-m-adams-and-neysa-c-adams-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-in , 841 F.2d 62 ( 1988 )
Lawrence R. Fry and Nellie R. Fry, Husband and Wife v. ... , 557 F.2d 646 ( 1977 )
Bentley L. Holt and Bonnie J. Holt v. Commissioner of ... , 364 F.2d 38 ( 1966 )
William H. Hoptowit v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 709 F.2d 564 ( 1983 )
harry-dillon-sr-faye-dillon-silas-v-cross-millie-cross-silas-a , 792 F.2d 849 ( 1986 )
Donald J. Porter and Harriet J. Porter v. Commissioner of ... , 856 F.2d 1205 ( 1988 )
Roger A. Jourdain and Margaret E. Jourdain v. Commissioner ... , 617 F.2d 507 ( 1980 )
United States v. George Anderson , 625 F.2d 910 ( 1980 )
belinda-anderson-and-kenneth-anderson-geneva-anderson-denny-anderson-asa , 845 F.2d 206 ( 1988 )
Choteau v. Burnet , 51 S. Ct. 598 ( 1931 )
Estate of Robert Poletti, Deceased Labarbara T. Poletti, ... , 34 F.3d 742 ( 1994 )
bryan-l-stevens-and-bryan-l-stevens-as-surviving-spouse-of-alma-stevens , 452 F.2d 741 ( 1971 )
Monge v. Commissioner , 93 T.C. 22 ( 1989 )
Squire v. Capoeman , 76 S. Ct. 611 ( 1956 )