DocketNumber: No. 10758-06L
Citation Numbers: 2009 T.C. Memo. 229, 98 T.C.M. 318, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 229
Judges: Chabot
Filed Date: 10/5/2009
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
P submitted a 2001 Form 1040, listing as "-0-" his income, adjusted gross income, tax and credits, other taxes, and amount owed. On this form P claimed three daughters as dependents; he also claimed a refund for the Federal income tax withheld amounts shown on the Form W-2 and the Form 1099-R attached thereto. R made adjustments to P's 2001 Form 1040. R contends that R sent to P a notice of deficiency and P received it; P contends otherwise. R assessed and initiated collection proceedings. P requested a hearing. Ultimately, R sent to P a notice of determination to proceed with collection. P then petitioned this Court. R moved for summary judgment and to impose a penalty under
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHABOT,
Our statements as to the facts are based on the parties' exhibits, those matters that are admitted in the pleadings and other documents in the Court's file (e.g., petitioner's request for admissions and respondent's response thereto), and those matters that are admitted in the motion papers.
When the petition was filed in the instant case, petitioner resided in New Jersey.
In early 2002 petitioner sent to respondent a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2001, hereinafter sometimes referred to as petitioner's 2001 Form 1040. Attached to petitioner's 2001 Form 1040 were (1) a Form 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions, *232 Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., showing a total distribution from a "Thrift and Stock Plan" of $ 9,984.91, with $ 1,996.98 Federal income tax withheld and $ 105 New Jersey State tax withheld, and (2) a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, showing compensation of $ 35,287.17, with $ 159.92 Federal income tax withheld and $ 718.72 New Jersey State income tax withheld.
During 2002 employees of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter collectively referred to as the IRS) and petitioner communicated with each other. On December 1, 2002, the IRS sent a letter to petitioner stating that petitioner's 2001 Form 1040 "cannot be processed". The letter stated there was enclosed a report proposing "tax and penalties" and asked for a response within 30 days. On December 12, 2002, the IRS received a letter in response from petitioner, contending the IRS has no authority to "change" his tax return and stating that he did not intend to "self-assess" any 2001 income tax liability against himself.
The IRS prepared a notice of deficiency addressed to petitioner and dated May 21, 2003. (There is a dispute as to whether this notice of deficiency was sent and, *233 if it was sent, whether petitioner received it.)
Table 1 compares certain items on petitioner's 2001 Form 1040 with corresponding items on the notice of deficiency.
Table | ||
Petitioner's 2001 | Notice | |
Item | Form 1040 | of Deficiency |
Filing status | Single/head n.1 | Single |
of household | ||
Adjusted gross income | -0- | $ 51,991.00 n.2 |
Dependents | 3 | -0- |
Personal exemption | -0- | (2,900.00) |
Deductions | -0- | (4,550.00) n.3 |
Taxable income | -0- | 44,541.00 |
-0- | 8,863.00 | |
Credits | -0- | 300.00 n.4 |
"IRA tax" | -0- | 998.00 n.5 |
Total tax liability | -0- | 9,561.00 |
Withholding | $ 2,156.90 | 2,155.00 n.6 |
Refund | 2,156.90 | -0- |
Balance due | -0- | 7,406.00 |
--- | 1,851.50 | |
--- | 286.40 n.7 | |
Interest (to 12/31/2002) | --- | 404.21 |
Amount due | -0- | 9,948.11 |
*3*n.1 Petitioner showed himself as both "Single" and "Head of | ||
*3*household" on the Filing Status portion of his 2001 Form 1040 | ||
*3*n.2 This is the sum of the five income adjustments in the | ||
*3*notice of deficiency--three Form W-2 wage items, a Form 1099- | ||
*3*R distribution item, and an unemployment compensation item. | ||
*3*n.3 Respondent allowed the standard deduction for a single | ||
*3*taxpayer. The standard deduction for a head of household was | ||
*3*$ 6,650. | ||
*3*n.4 Rate reduction credit. | ||
*3*n.5 We surmise that this is the 10-percent additional tax | ||
*3*under | ||
*3*shown on a Form 1099-R attached to petitioner's 2001 Form 1040. | ||
*3*n.6 At the hearing on respondent's motion, respondent conceded | ||
*3*that petitioner was entitled to the additional $ 1.90 credit | ||
*3*for withholding. | ||
*3*n.7 In the calculation of the | ||
*3*notice of deficiency respondent determined that the prior year | ||
*3*tax liability was "0.00". We draw respondent's attention to | ||
*3* | ||
*3* |
On *234 October 13, 2003, respondent assessed the amounts shown in table 2.
*2*Table 2 | |
Item | Amount |
Additional tax | $ 9,561.00 |
Late filing "penalty" | 1,666.35 |
Failure to pay tax "penalty" n.1 | 666.54 |
Estimated tax "penalty" n.2 | 286.40 |
Interest | 770.90 |
*2*n.1 The notice of deficiency, in the | |
*2*"Explanation of the Delinquency Penalty" | |
*2*portion, states: "5. Failure to Pay penalty | |
*2*rate 0.000" and that the amount of | |
*2*the "penalty" is "0.00". We draw respondent's | |
*2*attention to | |
*2* | |
*2*n.2 See |
The parties agree that respondent sent to petitioner a notice of tax lien for 2001, dated June 28, 2005.
Respondent sent to petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under
On July 24, 2005, petitioner submitted a hearing request identifying the taxable periods as 1996 through 2002 and stating: "1996 and prior we were a family of 5, then from 1996-97 to present day I'm single with three children." In the hearing request, petitioner listed the following reasons for disagreement with respondent: 1. If I had a liability my children were never computed in by the IRS[At this point in the hearing request petitioner set forth the names and Social Security numbers of the three children.] 2. I was never given DPH (Due Process Hearing) when I requested for it, or an audit! IRS is subject to 6320. 3. IRS never responded to my letters or responses to the IRS or my request for a face to face hearings. (Please read your mission statement) 4. IRS has failed to follow their statutory laws and manuals in violation of 7214 *236 title 26, that they are subject to.
Respondent's settlement officer, Darryl Lee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Lee), replied to the hearing request on February 23, 2006. Lee is a settlement officer employed in respondent's Philadelphia Appeals Office; he is not an appeals officer. In that reply, Lee verified receipt of the hearing request and said: "The items that you mention in your CDP request are items that: 1. Courts have determined are frivolous or groundless, or 2. Appeals does not consider. These are moral, religious, political, constitutional, conscientious, or similar grounds." Lee referred petitioner to a Web site containing examples of arguments that are considered frivolous or groundless, and then noted: "Appeals does not provide a face-to-face conference if the only items you wish to discuss are those mentioned above." Lee asked petitioner to write within 15 days to "describe the legitimate issues you will discuss" at a hearing and stated that a telephone conference would be available to petitioner: "I have scheduled a telephone conference for you on March 30, 2006 at 10:00 am." 4*237
Petitioner replied to Lee in a letter apparently sent on or about March 7, 2006, stating that Lee did not specify which of petitioner's arguments were frivolous and asking Lee to do so. Petitioner stated: "I want to have a face to face meeting and be able to record as I have done so for other previous years". Petitioner added: "I do not have a long distance phone to use to call you or anyone available on that date that you placed on your letter to me which is March 30, 2006." In this letter, as in the hearing request and his 2001 Form 1040, petitioner stated that he is a single parent of three daughters.
Lee replied to petitioner on March 23, 2006, again denying petitioner a face-to-face hearing because petitioner did not inform him, "in writing, of the legitimate issues" that petitioner intended *238 to raise at the hearing. Lee stated: "At this time, you are prohibited from recording[5] or having a face to face conference." Lee concluded: "Since you do not have long distance on your telephone, provide me with a contact phone number you can be reached at on March 30, 2006 at
On March 30, 2006, Lee wrote to petitioner about the telephone conference: "The conference was scheduled for March 30, 2006 at
On May 5, 2006, respondent sent to petitioner two documents titled "Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under You did not challenge collection actions. You were sent an appointment letter dated February 23, 2006 for a telephone conference on March 30, 2006. Since you failed to call for your conference, you were sent a final opportunity letter dated March 30, 2006 that provided you 14 days to provide information to be considered for your hearing. You failed to submit any information. The issues you address on your request for a hearing were determined to be frivolous. You were advised of this in your appointment letter. You failed to send in a letter with issues you would like to address other than those determined to be frivolous. No issues were raised.
The notices are signed by Laura Weening, Appeals Team Manager; they state that Lee is the "Person to Contact".
Petitioner then timely filed a petition with this Court.
1.
Respondent contends that respondent mailed and petitioner received the notice of deficiency for 2001. In support of this contention, respondent invokes the presumptions of official regularity and delivery of the mail. In regard to the administrative collection hearing, respondent contends that Lee attempted to call petitioner on the telephone for the administrative collection hearing, but petitioner did not answer. Respondent maintains that Lee then sent a "second chance" letter to petitioner, but petitioner did not respond to that letter. Respondent denies that there was a "default" on respondent's part.
Respondent further contends that a penalty should be imposed on petitioner under *241
Petitioner contends that (1) respondent did not issue and he did not receive a notice of deficiency for 2001; (2) respondent failed to provide him with an administrative collection hearing; (3) he is entitled to a default judgment under
We conclude that (a) respondent is not entitled to summary judgment on the material facts of (1) whether respondent sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner and (2) whether petitioner received any such notice of deficiency; (b) respondent is entitled to summary judgment that (1) Lee, a settlement officer employed in respondent's Appeals Office, was permitted to conduct the administrative collection hearing; (2) Lee was impartial, and (3) respondent timely filed the answer and so the filing of the answer was not a violation of our *242 Rules and so does not lead us to declare a default; (c) other matters that may be subsumed in respondent's summary judgment motion may be moot and so will be denied without prejudice. We will deny respondent's motion to impose a penalty under
2.
Summary judgment is a procedure used to expedite litigation; it is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. However, it is not a substitute for trial; it should not be used to resolve genuine disputes over material factual issues.
Because the effect of granting a motion for summary judgment *243 is to decide the case against a party without allowing that party an opportunity for trial, the procedure should be "cautiously invoked" and the motion should be granted only after a careful consideration of the case.
3.
In general,
When *248 the Appeals Office issues a notice of determination to a taxpayer following an administrative collection hearing regarding a lien or levy action,
4.
The parties dispute whether (1) respondent sent a notice of deficiency and (2) petitioner received one. The analysis of each of these two issues involves examination of many of the same materials that have been presented to us in connection with the other of these issues. But each of these issues has different consequences from the other, and so we consider them separately. We consider first the sending and then the receipt.
(1)
In the setting of the instant case, if a valid notice of deficiency for 2001 was not sent to petitioner, then an assessment of a deficiency would be invalid. See Under
Accordingly, whether respondent mailed the notice of deficiency is a material fact in the instant case and we must determine whether respondent carried the summary judgment burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to this fact.
Respondent asserts that "Respondent properly mailed the statutory notice of deficiency to the petitioner's last known address on May 21, 2003." 11 But Lee's declaration, attached to respondent's motion, does not assert that a notice *250 of deficiency was mailed, much less that it was "properly mailed" or that it was mailed on May 21, 2003. Nor does any of the 17 exhibits attached to Lee's declaration (which we understand to be what respondent asserts are "the relevant documents contained in the administrative record from the CDP hearing") assert any of the foregoing.
Respondent filed a certified copy of the Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, as a supplement to the motion before us. That document shows actions on various dates, including assessments having been made on October 13, 2003, but does not show any event as having occurred on May 21, 2003, and does not reference any mailing of a notice of deficiency. A document described *251 as "a literal transcript for taxable year 2001", attached to Lee's declaration, is similar to the Form 4340; it also does not show any event as having occurred on May 21, 2003, and does not reference any mailing of a notice of deficiency.
In Lee's declaration, he asserts that he verified that all legal and procedural requirements were met.
Lee's declaration does not indicate what he relied on to verify that the notice of deficiency was mailed. Lee attached the notice of determination to his declaration. The entire explanation of this matter in the notice of determination is as follows:
The assessment is valid.
Respondent's analysis in the summary judgment motion is as follows: 17. Respondent properly mailed the statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner's last known address on May 21, 2003. A copy of the notice of deficiency for taxable year 2001 sent certified mail to petitioner is contained in respondent's examination file, and is attached hereto as Declaration Exhibit D. While there is no United States Postal Service Form 3877 in the administrative file, the certified mail number 7112 7667 8555 3616 8042 is located on the first page of the statutory notice *252 of deficiency, reflecting that the letter was sent out by certified mail to the petitioner. Respondent is entitled to rely upon presumptions of official regularity and delivery where the record reflects proper mailing of the statutory notice of deficiency.
Respondent asserts that in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, respondent may rely on a presumption of official regularity. We have held that exact compliance with Postal Service Form 3877 mailing procedures raises a presumption of official regularity in favor of the Commissioner and is sufficient, absent evidence to the contrary, to establish that the notice was properly mailed. * * * * * * * In sum, it is unclear what the Appeals officer relied on to verify that the assessment of petitioner's 1993 tax liability was preceded by a duly mailed notice of deficiency. Because it is not clear from the record that respondent sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner before assessing the deficiencies in issue, we must decide whether it is appropriate for this Court to review petitioner's underlying tax liability de novo or whether instead we should remand to the Appeals Office for clarification of the basis for the Appeals officer's verification that all requirements of applicable law were met. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
In the instant case, as respondent notes, "there is no United States Postal Service Form 3877 in the administrative file". The material submitted does not include any other evidence of any mailing or any assertion that *255 would meet the requirements of
All of the cases respondent relies on in the "presumptions-of-official-regularity-and-delivery" argument have anchored those presumptions in significant evidence; the argument in the instant summary judgment motion is not so anchored.
Respondent's argument in this setting puts us in mind of our response to a taxpayer's argument in Petitioners' explanation of how the intention to make a valid conveyance somehow results in such a conveyance actually being made is strikingly similar to the explanation given by Ko-Ko, the Lord High Executioner, to the Mikado of Japan in Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta. To show how it could be that, although the Mikado had ordered an execution, the would-be victim was not yet deceased, Ko-Ko explained: When your Majesty says, "Let a thing be done," it's as good as done--practically, it
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that respondent failed to show that there is no genuine issue as to the material fact of whether respondent mailed a notice of deficiency to petitioner. Consequently, summary judgment will be denied on this matter.
The parties must understand that this is not a ruling on the underlying issue; this ruling merely restores this matter to consideration under our normal procedures in collection cases. See
(2)
In general the Commissioner must not assess a deficiency until a notice of deficiency has been sent to the taxpayer.
Among the matters petitioner raised on many occasions (see
Accordingly, the issue of whether petitioner received a notice of deficiency appears to be an issue as to a material fact. Cf.
We consider whether the movant, respondent, has shown that in the words of
Respondent's contentions in this regard are essentially the same as those with regard to the mailing issue,
In The record in this case contains a copy of a notice of deficiency dated August 13, 1997, addressed to Davina Sego; a Form 3877 indicating that the notice was sent on the date it bears; corroborating Postal Service forms and testimony indicating attempted delivery of the statutory notice to Davina Sego at the address acknowledged by petitioners to be their residence; and evidence that Davina *261 Sego would not have petitioned the Court in response to the statutory notice of deficiency if she had actually received it. * * * * * * Based on the Court's observation of petitioners, their claims are at best misguided and, in any event, unreliable and improbable. On the preponderance of the evidence, we conclude that the statutory notice of deficiency was sent to Davina Sego and that the notices of attempted delivery of certified mail were left at petitioners' residence as testified by the Postal Service employee. Further, we conclude that each petitioner had an earlier opportunity to dispute in this Court his or her tax liability for 1993, 1994, and 1995 and deliberately declined to do so. See
In
In
In
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that respondent failed to show that there is no genuine issue as to the material fact of whether petitioner received a notice of deficiency. Consequently, summary judgment will be denied on this matter.
The parties must understand that this is not a ruling on the underlying issue; this ruling merely restores this matter to consideration under our normal procedures in collection cases.
Petitioner contends that the use of a settlement officer rather than an appeals officer to conduct his administrative collection hearing violates the Treasury Department's "rules and regulations".
Both
We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law that respondent may have a settlement officer conduct the administrative collection hearing. We will grant summary judgment on this matter.
Petitioner contends Lee was not impartial. Petitioner does not contend that Lee had prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax involved in this case. See Darryl Lee simply picked and choose what would give his employer the Commissioner of the I.R.S. a win rather then being impartial. Which in the case in the *266 federal District Court for the District of New Jersey
Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to a default judgment under stated on her briefs dated February 15, 2006, paragraph one (1) pleadings in this case as being closed on July 20, 2006. Clearly by looking at the trial log one can see that the respondent filed the day after on July 21, 2006 therefore putting the Commissioner in Default under
We gather that the thrust of petitioner's contention is that (1) respondent asserts that the pleadings were closed on July 20, 2006; (2) respondent's answer was not filed until July 21, 2006; (3) accordingly, petitioner contends, respondent may be held to be in default under
The pleadings in the instant case consist of petitioner's petition and respondent's answer. No reply or other responsive pleading has been filed or directed. See
Respondent's answer was filed 6 weeks after service of the petition, well *268 within the 60-day period allowed under
Respondent erred in stating in the summary judgment motion papers that the pleadings were closed on July 20, 2006. That was the date respondent served the answer on petitioner, not the date the answer was filed. Respondent's 1-day misstatement (which appears in a document dated February 15, 2007, not 2006 as stated by petitioner in his default contention) is not a failure to comply with our Rules; it has no effect on any matters, procedural or substantive, in the instant case.
We hold that respondent is entitled to summary judgment that respondent's answer was timely filed in accordance with our Rules.
5.
Respondent further moves that the Court impose a penalty pursuant to
In pertinent part,
Petitioner responds to the penalty motion as follows (reproduced literally): 4. Further the I.R.S. Failure to show why is the very fabric of freedom, the Law of the Land, the definition and limitation of power on the American Government disallowed in this INFEIORIOR lower court and is considered frivolous? 5. Further the I.R.S. Failure to show why are the Federal United States Supreme Court Cases not being allowed into the inferior lower court that has to do with the Federal "Income Tax" and the Sixteen Amendment issues? Such as the 6. Further the I.R.S. Failure to show what exactly is Frivolous and where in the law can a state or federal Citizen of the Republic find the meaning so that it can be understood? Surely it can not be so broad that any argument or defense that is brought up by the Plaintiff (Fernando Powers) that the Internal Revenue Service disagrees with, would, *270 or could be call frivolous, just because the I.R.S. Simply disagrees? This further proving Plaintiffs notorious Default is proper and the I.R.S.'s secret default is not and the issues at hand were decided without all the facts that were submitted to the I.R.S. 7. So as a non-tax payer of the "income Tax" I simply do not understand, especially since no one from the I.R.S. Is welling to explain anything to me, so again how am I suppose to understand?
We do not try to present a comprehensive definition of "frivolous", nor do we try to present a comprehensive list of petitioner's contentions that are frivolous. We list a few items, focusing initially on petitioner's own response to respondent's motion.
Petitioner still regards himself "as a non-tax payer of the 'income Tax'". Petitioner's 2001 Form *271 1040 included a Form 1099R and a Form W-2, which together showed more than $ 45,000 in income subject to tax. Does petitioner really believe that those who annually file more than 100 million income tax returns are merely following a Pied Piper? We draw petitioner's attention to the following warning by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Court to which the instant case is appealable, in We take this opportunity to reiterate that wages are income within the meaning of the
Petitioner directs our attention to
In his *272 petition, petitioner claims violations of his rights under the We perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit. The constitutionality of our income tax system--including the role played within that system by the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court--has long been established. We affirm the dismissal of Crain's spurious "petition" and the assessment of a penalty imposed by the Tax Court for instituting a frivolous proceeding.
Petitioner must understand that his successes as to parts of respondent's summary judgment motion do not insulate him from a
We note that, because of our determination to deny parts of respondent's summary judgment motion, there are to be additional proceedings before this Court in the instant case. Petitioner's conduct in the additional proceedings may affect our ultimate determination regarding a
To reflect the foregoing, 17*275
1. Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2. Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for proceedings commenced on the date the petition in the instant case was filed, except that the section references in table 1 and the footnotes thereto,
3. The notices pertained to 2001 and 2002. Respondent previously moved to dismiss as to 2002 for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court granted that motion. Thus, only 2001 remains before us.↩
4. In the pleadings, the parties agree that Lee's letter scheduled the telephone conference for
5. See
6. Another pair of notices was sent at the same time for 2002. See
7. The notices also state that the notice of filing "was sent to you [petitioner] on July 7, 2005. Your Form-12153 was received on July 29, 2005. The request is not timely." Petitioner's Form 12153 (the hearing request) was timely--the notice of filing directed petitioner to file the form by "08/08/2005", and in this proceeding respondent has consistently admitted the timeliness. The record shows that respondent has proceeded on the basis that the hearing request was timely. Thus this error in the notices has merely been a distraction that has not affected petitioner's rights.
8. July 7, 2005, the date of the notice of filing, was the fourth business day after June 30, 2005, the date respondent filed the notice of tax lien.↩
9. Petitioner submitted the hearing request on July 24, 2005, well within the required 30-day period. See
10. In
11. At another point in the motion papers respondent asserts that "On May 21, 2003, respondent sent a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner,
12. * * * * * * * (d) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required: Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or filed therewith. The Court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by answers to interrogatories, depositions, further affidavits, or other acceptable materials, to the extent that other applicable conditions in these Rules are satisfied for utilizing such procedures. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of such party's pleading, but such party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, then a decision, if appropriate, may be entered against such party. [Emphasis added.]
13. * * * * * * * (c) Matters Considered at Hearing.--In the case of any hearing conducted under this section-- * * * * * * * (2) Issues at hearing. * * * * * * (B) Underlying liability.--The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.↩
14. Respondent directs our attention to
15. Respondent does not contend, in connection with the instant summary judgment motion, that petitioner had any other opportunity to dispute his tax liability, so we focus on the notice of deficiency alternative in
16. We note that the heading of par. (3) of both of these sections is "Impartial officer." However, the text plainly authorizes conduct by "an officer or employee". (Emphasis added.) As we noted in another context in
cannot limit the plain meaning of the statutory provisions themselves.
17. We have not grappled with the dispute as to the telephone hearing. Respondent's materials show Lee was to telephone petitioner. Respondent maintains Lee telephoned, but petitioner did not pick up the telephone. But the notice of determination states that it was petitioner who failed to call. Petitioner maintains he waited at the agreed-upon time, but the call never came. Some of the materials state that the agreed-upon time was 10 a.m. and some that it was 11 a.m. We note that another Court concluded that the agreed-upon time was 10:30 a.m., a time that does not appear in any of the materials the parties submitted in the instant case. At this point, the administrative record appears to be "badly muddled". See
Wheeler v. Commissioner , 521 F.3d 1289 ( 2008 )
Charles Burke v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 929 F.2d 110 ( 1991 )
Paul Sauers, Box 1573, Atlantic City, Nj 08404 v. ... , 771 F.2d 64 ( 1985 )
United States v. Walter A. Connor, Jr. , 898 F.2d 942 ( 1990 )
pennsylvania-coal-association-an-unincorporated-association-v-bruce , 63 F.3d 231 ( 1995 )
ideal-dairy-farms-inc-v-john-labatt-ltd-john-labatt-inc-tuscan-dairy , 90 F.3d 737 ( 1996 )
Lorin G. Sloan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 53 F.3d 799 ( 1995 )
Charlie Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., a ... , 249 F.2d 616 ( 1957 )
Glenn Crain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 737 F.2d 1417 ( 1984 )
Gregory T. Granado v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 792 F.2d 91 ( 1986 )
United States v. Edward M. Zolla , 724 F.2d 808 ( 1984 )
robert-h-dreher-director-prison-legal-aid-project-southern-illinois , 636 F.2d 1141 ( 1980 )
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad , 36 S. Ct. 236 ( 1916 )
Associated Press v. United States , 65 S. Ct. 1416 ( 1945 )
Barbados 6, Ltd. v. Commissioner , 85 T.C. 900 ( 1985 )
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio ... , 331 U.S. 519 ( 1947 )
United States v. Minker , 76 S. Ct. 281 ( 1956 )
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 90 S. Ct. 1598 ( 1970 )
Sego v. Commissioner , 114 T.C. 604 ( 2000 )