Engen Robert Nurumbi

T.C. Memo. 2021-79UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ENGEN ROBERT NURUMBI, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 13445-18. Filed June 30, 2021.
Engen Robert Nurumbi, pro se.
Rebecca E. da Costa, John R. Gordon, and Michael R. Harrel, for
respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
PUGH, Judge: In a notice of deficiency dated May 23, 2018, respondent
determined the following income tax deficiency, addition to tax, and accuracy-
related penalty: 1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
1
Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Served 06/30/21
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[*2]
Addition to tax Accuracy-related penalty
Year Deficiency sec. 6651(a)(1) sec. 6662(a)
2015 $193,784 $46,597 1
$38,757
1
Respondent conceded this penalty.
The issues for decision for the year in issue are whether petitioner: (1) failed
to report gross receipts of $542,420 from Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), on his
Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business; (2) failed to report other income of
$755 from Uber; (3) overreported wages by $18,810; (4) is entitled to a Schedule C
deduction in an amount greater than respondent allowed; 2 and (5) is liable for the
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for failure to file a timely return.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulated facts
are incorporated in our findings by this reference. Petitioner was a resident of
Arizona when he timely filed his petition.
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All monetary amounts are rounded to the
nearest dollar.
2
Respondent allowed Schedule C deductions of $157,803 for amounts paid
to others, $143,665 for fees paid to Uber, and $12,389 for interest paid on vehicle
title loans. Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to a greater amount of Schedule
C deductions.
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[*3] I. Background
During 2015 petitioner maintained an Uber account in his own name. He
connected it to a Bank of America account (BoA account) owned by Auto
Electronics, Parts and More, LLC (Auto LLC), an entity which he formed under
Arizona law in September 2013. He and his wife were the only members listed on
Auto LLC’s articles of organization until those articles were amended in May 2015
to remove his wife, leaving petitioner as the sole member of Auto LLC for the
remainder of 2015. During 2015 Auto LLC also maintained a BBVA USA
account (BBVA account). Petitioner maintained control over both accounts during
the year in issue.
The Uber account and mobile application (Uber app) allowed petitioner to
provide transportation to passengers in exchange for variable fares. Various
individuals drove under petitioner’s Uber account during the year in issue. He
recruited friends and family to sign up for Uber under his account, and they rented
his vehicles, which he had purchased using car title loans or at auctions. The
drivers could access the Uber app to see their trips driven and fares collected, but
all fare proceeds (net of Uber’s fee as explained below) were paid directly to
petitioner’s Uber account. There were no written contracts between petitioner and
the drivers.
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[*4] Every week Uber would pay petitioner for his own driving activity and for
that of the drivers under his Uber account, subtracting its fee3 and depositing the
remaining funds into the BoA account. Petitioner would withdraw funds from the
BoA account, deposit some of the withdrawn funds into the BBVA account, and
retain the remainder as cash. Then he would pay the drivers their individual
earnings, as shown on the Uber weekly statements, routinely withholding $250 as a
vehicle rental charge and occasionally reimbursing the drivers for gas, vehicle
maintenance, and other miscellaneous expenses. Some of these payments were
made by electronic transfer from the BBVA account and others were made in cash.
Petitioner did not provide the drivers any documentation indicating their
payment, and the drivers did not submit receipts for gas, vehicle maintenance, or
other miscellaneous expenses. The drivers did not otherwise keep logs of expenses
incurred while driving under petitioner’s Uber account. Petitioner did not keep a
log or other document recording how much he paid the drivers, whether by BBVA
transfer or in cash.4 Petitioner used the BBVA account not only for driver
3
Respondent added up all of these fees, as shown on the Uber weekly
statements, to allow a $143,665 Schedule C deduction for fees paid to Uber. See
supra note 2.
4
Petitioner introduced Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income,
worksheets for amounts paid to the drivers, but he did not provide evidence of how
he computed the amounts listed on the worksheets other than his testimony that he
referenced the weekly Uber statements. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
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[*5] payments and vehicle expenses, but also for meal, entertainment, residential,
and other miscellaneous expenses.
II. Petitioner’s Tax Return
Petitioner prepared and untimely filed his 2015 Form 1040, U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return, on April 27, 2017. He filed as head of household, reported
wages of $18,810, and claimed the earned income and child tax credits.5
Petitioner attached Schedule C for Auto LLC to his 2014 Form 1040. Auto
LLC did not file Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for tax year 2015.
Auto LLC did not file Form 8832, Entity Classification Election, in 2015.
III. Respondent’s Determination
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner failed to
report $542,420 in gross receipts and $755 in other income from Uber. Uber
issued a Form 1099-K, Payment Card and Third Party Network Transactions,
no record of any Forms 1099 issued by petitioner or Auto LLC for the year in
issue. Respondent did, however, use the Uber weekly statements and the BBVA
account statements to allow petitioner the $157,803 Schedule C deduction for
amounts paid to others. See supra note 2.
5
The notice of deficiency did not adjust petitioner’s filing status. Petitioner
was married throughout the year in issue. After trial he informally raised the
question of whether Arizona’s status as a community property State should cause
some of the unreported income to be allocated to his wife. Petitioner did not
present facts or evidence challenging the notice of deficiency’s use of his head of
household filing status or supporting an allocation of any tax items to his wife on
the basis of community property law.
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[*6] reporting payment of $542,420 to “Engen Nurumbi”. It listed petitioner’s
taxpayer identification number and his home address. Uber also issued petitioner a
Form 1099-MISC reporting payment of $755.
Respondent removed petitioner’s reported wage income of $18,810 and
made computational adjustments for the self-employment tax and earned income
and child tax credits. This resulted in the deficiency of $193,784.
Respondent further determined that petitioner is liable for the late-filing
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1). Petitioner’s 2015 Form 1040 was due
April 15, 2016; it was signed by petitioner on April 25, 2017, and mailed to the
IRS on April 27, 2017.
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof
Generally, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner’s
determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933). Under section 7491(a)(1), “[i]f, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer
introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to
ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the
Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.” Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001). Petitioner has neither claimed nor
shown that he has introduced credible evidence sufficient to shift the burden of
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[*7] proof to respondent under section 7491(a) as to any relevant factual issue.
Therefore, petitioner generally bears the burden of proof.
In cases involving unreported income the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, to which any appeal in this case would ordinarily lie, see sec.
7482(b)(1)(A), has held that the Commissioner must introduce some evidence
linking the taxpayer with an alleged income-producing activity or demonstrate that
the taxpayer actually received unreported income before the presumption of
correctness attaches to the deficiency determination, Rapp v. Commissioner, 774
F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1985); Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270-
1271 (9th Cir. 1982). The requisite evidentiary foundation is minimal and need not
include direct evidence. See Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 360-
362 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’g 67 T.C. 672 (1977). Once the Commissioner has
established this foundation, the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Commissioner’s determinations were
arbitrary or erroneous. See Hardy v. Commissioner, 181 F.3d 1002, 1004-1005
(9th Cir. 1999), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1997-97. As discussed below, respondent has
established a sufficient evidentiary foundation to satisfy this threshold burden as it
relates to his determination of petitioner’s unreported income.
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[*8] II. Evidentiary Issues
Before we turn to our analysis, we must address the admissibility of
documents petitioner offered in his posttrial motion to reopen the record.
Respondent objected to certain documents on grounds of relevance, unfair
prejudice, hearsay, and summaries to prove content.6
Reopening the record for a party to submit additional evidence lies within
the Court’s discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 331 (1971); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 286-287 (2000); see also
Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he
Tax Court’s ruling [denying a motion to reopen the record] is not subject to review
except upon a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances which reveal a clear
abuse of discretion.”), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1971-200. We will not grant a motion to
reopen the record unless, among other requirements, the evidence a party is
submitting is not merely cumulative or impeaching, is material to the issues
involved, and probably would change some aspect of the outcome of the case.
Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 287; see also SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450,
1460 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the trial court “should take into account, in
6
Respondent did not object to other documents, including those showing
2015 interest expenses petitioner incurred for vehicle title loans. This led
respondent to concede an additional $12,389 in Schedule C deductions for interest
expenses. See supra note 2.
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[*9] considering a motion to hold open the trial record, the character of the
additional * * * [evidence] and the effect of granting the motion”), overruled on
other grounds by Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Zolghadr v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2017-49, at *20 (holding that the additional evidence a taxpayer
submitted after trial was “little more than a digital shoebox: To the extent these
documents substantiate any expenses, they substantiate expenses the IRS had
already allowed”).
In deciding motions to reopen the record, courts have considered when the
moving party knew that a fact was disputed, whether the evidentiary issue was
foreseeable, and whether the moving party had reason for the failure to produce the
evidence earlier. See, e.g., George v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 225, 229-230 (5th
Cir. 1988) (and cases cited thereat) (holding that refusal to reopen the case was not
an abuse of discretion because the issue was foreseeable to the taxpayers and the
Court could see no excuse for the taxpayers’ failure to produce evidence earlier),
aff’g Frink v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-669. We also balance the moving
party’s diligence against the possible prejudice to the nonmoving party. Donoghue
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-71, at *44. In particular we consider whether
reopening the record after trial would prevent the nonmoving party from
examining and questioning the evidence as it would have during the proceeding.
See, e.g., Estate of Freedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-61, 2007 WL
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[*10] 831802, at *12; Megibow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-41, 2004 WL
309153, at *7.
These considerations weigh against granting petitioner’s motion to reopen
the record. The character of the evidence petitioner attached to his motion is that
of hearsay and impermissible summary. See Fed. R. Evid. 802, 1006. He offers it
to prove facts that were foreseeably at issue at trial, namely the substantiation of
business expenses and how he organized his Uber driving operation. And to the
extent petitioner does not use it to prove relevant facts, he uses it to impeach the
credibility of the revenue agent who testified at trial. Petitioner cites his medical
history as reason for failure to produce evidence at trial, and respondent does not
object to certain medical history documents petitioner attached to his motion. We
are sympathetic to petitioner’s health issues, but to the extent the documents
discuss petitioner’s health, they cover periods in early 2018, before respondent
issued the notice of deficiency and well before the trial in this case. And petitioner
understood the issues to be addressed at trial, even bringing a supporting witness to
testify. Finally, and most importantly, respondent could not examine this evidence
at or before trial. In his response to petitioner’s motion, respondent lists relevant
questions he would have asked on cross-examination had he been given the
opportunity; the effect of granting petitioner’s motion would be to deny respondent
that opportunity.
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[*11] Accordingly, we will grant petitioner’s motion only to the extent of
concessions made by respondent. We will deny his motion in all other respects.
III. Unreported Income
Section 61(a) provides that gross income means “all income from whatever
source derived”. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
A taxpayer is responsible for maintaining adequate books and records sufficient to
establish his income. See sec. 6001; DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 867
(1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). As stated above, the Commissioner
must base his determination that the taxpayer received unreported income on
“some substantive evidence” for the presumption of correctness to attach. Hardy
v. Commissioner, 181 F.3d at 1004-1005.
During the year in issue petitioner earned income by driving for Uber and by
having others drive for Uber under his account. The Forms 1099-K and 1099-
MISC that Uber issued to petitioner are supported by the Uber weekly statements
and deposits into the BoA account. In his petition, petitioner does not dispute that
the Forms 1099-K and 1099-MISC accurately reflect the amounts Uber paid him.7
7
While petitioner does not dispute the amount paid by Uber, he does argue
that those payments should not be includable in his gross income but rather in the
gross income of Auto LLC. This argument is unavailing. The Forms 1099-K and
1099-MISC and the Uber weekly statements list Mr. Nurumbi, not Auto LLC, as
the recipient of the payments. Moreover, petitioner maintained the Uber account
in his own name. That he linked his Uber account to a bank account owned by
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[*12] We find that respondent based his determination that petitioner received
unreported income on sufficient evidence. Petitioner did not meet his burden of
proving that the adjustments to his Schedule C gross income or other income were
erroneous, and he did not provide evidence refuting the corresponding adjustment
to his reported wage income. We therefore sustain respondent’s determination that
for the year in issue petitioner failed to report gross receipts of $542,420 and other
income of $755, and we sustain the corresponding determination that petitioner
overreported his wage income by $18,810.
IV. Schedule C Deductions
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to Schedule C deductions greater than the
amounts respondent allowed.
Auto LLC--a link he could change and an account over which he exercised
control--does not shift the income to Auto LLC. See Frey v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2019-62, at *7 (“The determination of the proper taxpayer depends upon
which person or entity in fact controls the earning of the income rather than who
ultimately receives the income.”).
And even if the income were taxable to Auto LLC, petitioner has not shown
that 100% of Auto LLC’s income would not be reported by or allocable to him
individually anyway. If Auto LLC were a disregarded entity for 2015, the income
would still be reported on petitioner’s Schedule C, as he reported it for tax year
2014. See 6611, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-49, *49-*50 (analyzing
classification of entity owned by husband and wife in community property State);
Rev. Proc. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 831. If Auto LLC were a partnership for 2015,
petitioner has not shown that his distributive share of Auto LLC’s income would
be anything less than 100%.
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[*13] A. Legal Background
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business”. An expense is “ordinary” if it is “normal, usual, or customary” in the
taxpayer’s trade or business or it arises from a transaction “of common or frequent
occurrence in the type of business involved.” Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,
495 (1940). An expense is “necessary” if it is “appropriate and helpful” to the
taxpayer’s business, but it need not be absolutely essential. Commissioner v.
Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. at 113).
In contrast, a taxpayer may not deduct personal, living, or family expenses unless
the law expressly provides otherwise. Sec. 262(a). The determination of whether
an expense satisfies the requirements of section 162 is a question of fact. Cloud v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 613, 618 (1991) (citing Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467, 473-475 (1943)).
Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to any deductions
claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992);
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Taxpayers,
therefore, are required to substantiate expenses underlying each claimed deduction
by maintaining records sufficient to establish the amount of the deduction and to
enable the Commissioner to determine the correct tax liability. Sec. 6001; Higbee
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[*14] v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 440. Under the Cohan rule, the Court may
estimate the amount of the expense if the taxpayer is able to demonstrate that he
has paid or incurred a deductible expense but cannot substantiate the precise
amount, as long as he produces credible evidence providing a basis for the Court to
do so. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930). For the Court to
estimate the amount of an expense, there must be some basis upon which an
estimate can be made. Norgaard v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir.
1991), aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 1989-390. Otherwise an allowance
would amount to “unguided largesse.” Id. (quoting Williams v. United States, 245
F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957)).
Certain business expenses are subject to the heightened substantiation
requirements of section 274(d). Section 274(d) supersedes the Cohan rule. Sec.
1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Section 274(d) contemplates that no deduction or credit shall be allowed on the
basis of the taxpayer’s mere approximations or unsupported testimony. To meet
the requirements of section 274(d), a taxpayer must substantiate the following by
adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s own
statement: (1) the amount of the expense, (2) the time and place of the travel or
use, and (3) the business purpose of the expense.
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[*15] To substantiate by adequate records, the taxpayer must provide: (1) an
account book, log, or similar record, and (2) documentary evidence, which together
are sufficient to establish each element with respect to an expenditure. Sec. 1.274-
5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Although a contemporaneous log is not required, corroborative evidence to support
a taxpayer’s reconstruction “must have a high degree of probative value to elevate
such statement” to the level of credibility of a contemporaneous record. Id.subpara. (1). If a taxpayer cannot substantiate each element of an expense with
adequate records, he may do so “by other sufficient evidence”, namely “[b]y his
own statement, whether written or oral, containing specific information in detail as
to such element” and “[b]y other corroborative evidence sufficient to establish such
element.” Id. subpara. (3), 50 Fed. Reg. 46020.
A taxpayer must meet these heightened substantiation requirements to claim
a deduction “with respect to any listed property (as defined in section 280F(d)(4))”.
Sec. 274(d)(4). Section 280F(d)(4)(A)(ii) defines listed property to include “any
* * * property used as a means of transportation”. Section 280F(d)(4)(C) provides,
however, that listed property does not include “property substantially all of the use
of which is in a trade or business of providing to unrelated persons services
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[*16] consisting of the transportation of persons or property for compensation or
hire.” 8 See Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-38, at *11-*12 (holding
that a taxpayer’s expenses incurred with respect to a truck used in long-distance
trucking were not subject to heightened substantiation requirements of section
274(d)(4)); Baker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-122, at *6 (holding that a
taxpayer’s expenses incurred with respect to a Mack Truck tractor used to haul
tank trailers were not subject to heightened substantiation requirements of section
274(d)(4)).
B. Vehicle Expenses
We begin by deciding whether the section 280F(d)(4)(C) exception to the
heightened substantiation requirement applies because the parties do not dispute
that, at least in part, petitioner’s expenses related to vehicles used to transport
persons and property for compensation or hire.
Petitioner has not shown that “substantially all of the use” of his vehicles
was “in a trade or business of providing to unrelated persons services consisting of
the transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire.” Sec.
8
The applicability of sec. 280F(d)(4)(C) was not addressed by the parties
before or at trial. We therefore ordered the parties to file posttrial briefs. We
asked respondent to address whether the application of the exception would affect
admissibility of, and weight given to, any of the documents attached to petitioner’s
motion to reopen the record. We asked petitioner to explain how the documents he
offered would allow the Court to make a reasonable estimate of the expenses
incurred.
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[*17] 280F(d)(4)(C). Unlike the taxpayers’ vehicles in Baker and Howard, which
were used in commercial trucking and therefore less likely to be used for personal
purposes, petitioner’s vehicles were SUVs or passenger trucks. Petitioner did not
introduce evidence that he had a separate vehicle for personal use. He did not keep
track of how the drivers used his vehicles, did not have a contract with those
drivers restricting their use of his vehicles, and stored vehicles at his personal
residence. Therefore, petitioner failed to show that his vehicle expenses satisfy the
section 280F(d)(4)(C) exception. Accordingly, his vehicles are listed property
under section 280F(d)(4)(A)(ii) and he must satisfy the heightened substantiation
requirements under section 274(d).
Petitioner failed to meet this heightened substantiation requirement. While
some of petitioner’s documents show expenses that may have related to his
business, he failed to do the work necessary to separate personal expenses from
business expenses or provide the underlying documents for those expenses. See
Rutz v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 879, 882-886 (1976) (disallowing business expense
deductions because the taxpayer could not establish the business purpose for each
expense); Longino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-80 (disallowing travel-
related business expense deductions because the taxpayer did not differentiate his
travel purposes between business and personal), aff’d, 593 F. App’x 965 (11th Cir.
2014). To the extent these documents substantiate any expenses, they substantiate
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[*18] expenses the IRS had already allowed. See Zolghadr v. Commissioner,
at *20. Thus, petitioner has not satisfied his burden to maintain sufficient records,
and he is not entitled to Schedule C deductions in an amount greater than
respondent has already allowed.
C. Payments to Drivers
Finally, we do not allow a deduction or offset against gross receipts in an
amount greater than respondent already conceded for the payments petitioner made
to his drivers from the amounts he was paid by Uber. Respondent conceded that
petitioner is entitled to a $157,803 Schedule C deduction for payments to drivers
made through the BBVA account (computed by comparing weekly payments from
Uber to corresponding transfers out of the BBVA account). While petitioner
testified credibly that he also paid his drivers in cash out of those proceeds, he gave
us no basis on which to estimate how much he paid, and we are unable to hazard a
guess as to what additional amounts might be properly deducted or excluded from
his gross receipts. Without such a basis, any additional allowance would amount
to unguided largesse. See Williams, 245 F.2d at 560.
V. Addition to Tax
Section 6651(a)(1) authorizes an addition to tax for failure to file a timely
return unless a taxpayer shows that such failure was due to reasonable cause and
not willful neglect. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). The
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[*19] Commissioner bears the burden of production for this addition to tax for
individuals. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-447. We
have held that, as part of that burden, the Commissioner must introduce evidence
showing that the taxpayer did not file his return (or a request for extension of time)
by the original due date of the return. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200,
207-208 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008).
Petitioner’s Form 1040 was due April 15, 2016. Respondent produced
petitioner’s 2015 Form 1040, and petitioner confirmed that he did not sign and
mail it until over a year after the deadline, on April 25, 2017 and April 27, 2017,
respectively. This is consistent with the IRS’ Form 4340, Certificate of
Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, which shows that it did not
process petitioner’s return until May 1, 2017. Respondent has satisfied his burden
of production.
Petitioner argues that we should apply the reasonable cause exception
because he believed he had already timely filed a 2015 Form 1040 before filing the
late-filed return. Whether a taxpayer has “reasonable cause” within the meaning of
section 6651(a)(1) depends on whether the taxpayer “exercised ‘ordinary business
care and prudence’ but nevertheless was ‘unable to file the return within the
prescribed time.’” Boyle, 469 U.S. at 246 (quoting section 301.6651-1(c)(1),
Proced. & Admin. Regs.). Petitioner’s mistaken belief that he had already filed a
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[*20] return within the prescribed time does not constitute reasonable cause. See
Henningsen v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 528, 536 (1956) (“Mere uninformed and
unsupported belief by a taxpayer, no matter how sincere that belief may be, that he
is not required to file a tax return, is insufficient to constitute reasonable cause for
his failure so to file.”), aff’d, 243 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1957). Therefore, we hold that
petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax in issue as determined
by respondent.
Any contentions we have not addressed we deem irrelevant, moot, or
meritless.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued,
and decision will be entered under Rule 155.