Danny Ray Harrell v. The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FOR PUBLICATION
Filed: September 3, 1996
DANNY RAY HARRELL, )
) KNOX CHANCERY
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
) HON. H. DAVID CATE,
Vs. ) CHANCELLOR
)
THE MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
) NO. 03-S-01-9508-CH-00098
Defendant-Appellee. )
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Rufus W. Beamer, Jr. Arthur G. Seymour, Jr.
Knoxville, Tennessee Robert L. Kahn
FRANTZ, McCONNELL & SEYMOUR
Knoxville, Tennessee
OPINION
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED;
REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT. ANDERSON, J
We granted this appeal to determine whether we should retain "the
Distretti Rule1" adopted by this Court sixty-seven years ago. The rule provides
that before a death will be considered accidental under the terms of an insurance
contract, the means, as well as the result, must be involuntary, unexpected, and
unusual.
In this case, the Chancellor held that the plaintiff's death in an automobile
collision was caused by her driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and it
therefore was not "death by an accidental injury which was unintended,
unexpected, and unforeseen" and, as a result, benefits were not payable on the
insurance contract. The Court of Appeals, while noting that the rule had been
criticized and rejected by a number of jurisdictions, nevertheless affirmed.
After careful consideration, we have determined that we should join the
growing number of jurisdictions which have abandoned the distinction between
"accidental means" and "accidental results." W e do so because the distinction is
contrary to the understanding and reasonable expectations of the average
insurance policyholder and contrary to the plain meaning of the terms of the
insurance contract. We also think there is a fundamental flaw in analyzing
insurance contract terms under tort principles, such as foreseeability. We,
therefore, overrule Distretti and its progeny, reverse the Court of Appeals, and
remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
1
Mutua l Life Ins. Co . of New York v. D istretti, 159 Tenn. 138, 17 S.W .2d 11 (1929).
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BACKGROUND
On December 18, 1990, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Robin Denise Harrell
died as a result of injuries she sustained in an automobile collision on
Maynardville Highway, a four-lane road divided by a grass median in Knox
County, Tennessee. The car Robin Harrell was driving crossed the grass
median and struck two southbound cars. Tests performed on a blood sample
taken after Harrell’s death revealed a blood-alcohol level of .20 percent.2
At the time of her death, Robin Harrell and her husband, Danny Ray
Harrell, the plaintiff in this appeal, were insured under a credit life policy issued
by the defendant, The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereafter
“Minnesota Life”). This policy provides for payment of the balance of the
mortgage on the home owned by Robin and Danny Ray Harrell in the event
either suffered death by “accidental injury.” At the time of Robin Harrell’s death,
the mortgage balance was approximately $48,000. With regard to coverage for
accidental death, the policy provided as follows:
What does death by accidental injury mean?
Death by accidental injury as used in this certificate
means that your death results, directly and
independently of all other causes, from an accidental
drowning or from an accidental injury which was
unintended, unexpected and unforeseen. . . .
Danny Ray Harrell filed a claim with Minnesota Life for payment under the
policy, but Minnesota Life denied the claim. Harrell, thereafter, brought this
action seeking to recover under the policy. For answer, Minnesota Life denied
that Robin Harrell died from “an accidental injury which was unintended,
2
That level is more than twice the .08 percent required to “create a presumption” that
Harrell was “under the influence” of an intoxicant and her driving ability was impaired. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 55-10-408(b)(1995 Supp.).
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unexpected, and unforeseen.” Instead, Minnesota Life argued that her death
was the foreseeable consequence of driving an automobile under the influence
of alcohol.
Following a bench trial, the Chancellor, relying upon a prior decision of
this Court, Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138, 17
S.W.2d 11 (1929), and a long line of authority applying “the Distretti rule,”
dismissed the case, finding specifically that Robin Harrell’s death did not result
“directly and independently of all other causes . . . from an accidental injury
which was unintended, unexpected, and unforeseen.” Danny Harrell appealed,
arguing that the Distretti rule should be modified or overturned. While noting that
the rule has been criticized and rejected by a number of jurisdictions, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Chancellor, stating that “Tennessee remains committed
to the rule that before a death will be considered accidental the means as well
as the result must be involuntary, unexpected, and unusual.” (Emphasis
added.)
Thereafter, we granted the plaintiff permission to appeal to consider this
important question of insurance law -- whether recovery under an accidental
death insurance policy requires that the means causing death, as well as the
resulting death, be involuntary, unexpected, and unusual.
ACCIDENTAL DEATH
In this appeal, Danny Harrell urges this court to abandon the Distretti rule
which differentiates between "accidental means" and "accidental results." Harrell
argues that this Court should adopt a rule that would allow recovery if death is
accidental in the common meaning of the word, regardless of the nature of the
means which precipitated the accidental death, and asserts such a rule is
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consistent with the plain understanding and objectively reasonable expectations
of the average insured.
Minnesota Life responds that the longstanding rule established by this
Court in Distretti, that death is not “accidental” if it is a foreseeable result of a
voluntary act, should be reaffirmed, and that Robin Harrell’s death was a
foreseeable result of her driving an automobile under the influence of an
intoxicant.
We begin our analysis of this issue with a review of the case law in this
jurisdiction. The decisions of the lower courts in this case were based upon this
Court’s decision in Distretti interpreting accidental death. There, Distretti was
robbed at gunpoint by bandits. As the bandits were fleeing, Distretti armed
himself, ran outside the store, and opened fire on them. The bandits shot back,
and Distretti was killed. His wife brought suit to recover under a life insurance
policy which paid “upon receipt of due proof that such death resulted from bodily
injury effected solely through external violent and accidental means."
(Emphasis added.) The Distretti court denied recovery, concluding that
Distretti’s death was a foreseeable result of his voluntary act of chasing the
bandits and shooting at them, and therefore, his death was not produced by
“accidental means,” for purposes of the insurance policy.
The distinction adopted by the Distretti court between death by “accidental
means” and “accidental death” was explained succinctly by Professor Couch as
follows:
[A]ccidental death is an unintended and undesigned result arising
from acts voluntarily done, whereas death by accidental means is a
result arising from acts unintentionally done or events undesignedly
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occurring. The term ‘accidental means’ refers to the occurrence or
happening which produces the result, rather than the result; it is
concerned with the cause of the harm rather than the character of
the harm.
10 Couch, Insurance 2d (Rev. ed.) § 41:29, pp. 44-45 (1982 & Supp. 1995)
(footnotes omitted). Therefore, under the Distretti rule, a death that is caused by
an insured’s intentional act, or is a foreseeable consequence of an insured’s
voluntary act, is not considered “accidental.” Though the distinction arose in the
Distretti case and other cases where the specific term “accidental means” was
used in insurance contracts, the distinction has been applied in cases, such as
this one, where the term is not a part of the insurance contract. See, e.g.,
Spears v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 866 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. App.
1993). The Distretti rule has never been overruled and has been approved and
applied in various contexts in later Tennessee cases. See, e.g., Seeley v. Pilot
Fire & Cas. Co., 432 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1968); Baker v. National Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 201 Tenn. 247, 298 S.W.2d 715 (1956); Jones v. Fireman’s Fund American
Life Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. App. 1986); Nicholas v. Provident Life and
Acc. Ins. Co., 61 Tenn. App. 633, 457 S.W.2d 536 (1970). Indeed, the
distinction between “accidental means” and “accidental results” has been applied
in Tennessee in a case similar to the Harrell case to deny recovery under an
accidental death policy for an insured party who had been killed in a one car
accident while intoxicated. Hobbs v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d
864 (Tenn. App. 1975). The Hobbs court concluded that “the danger of injury or
death as result of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a foreseeable
one and the appellate courts of this State have repeatedly held that death is not
caused by accidental means, within the meaning of an insurance policy if it is a
foreseeable result of a voluntary and unnecessary act or course of conduct of
the insured.” Id., 535 S.W.2d at 866.
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While Tennessee has remained committed to the distinction between
“accidental means” and “accidental death,” commentators and many other courts
have criticized the distinction as illusory and contrary to the normal expectations
of the average policy holder.
The rejection of the distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental results" was first articulated by Justice Cardozo more than sixty years
ago in dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 54 S. Ct.
461, 463, 78 L. Ed. 934 (1934). There, the insured died after suffering
sunstroke. The majority said that since the insured voluntarily exposed himself
to the sun and there were no unforeseen intervening causes, the death was not
caused by accidental means. Id., 291 U.S. at 496, 54 S. Ct. at 462. Justice
Cardozo strongly disagreed:
The attempted distinction between accidental results and
accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a
Serbonian Bog. Probably it is true to say that in the strictest sense
and dealing with the region of physical nature there is no such thing
as an accident. . . . On the other hand, the average man is
convinced that there is, and so certainly is the man who takes out a
policy of accident insurance. It is his reading of the policy that is to
be accepted as our guide, with the help of the established rule that
ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved against the
company. . . . When a man has died in such a way that his death
is spoken of as an accident, he has died because of an accident,
and hence by accidental means. . . . If there was no accident in
the means, there was none in the result, for the two are
inseparable. . . . There was an accident throughout, or there was
no accident at all.
Id., 291 U.S. at 499, 54 S. Ct at 463 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Justice Cardozo’s
views in dissent have now gained the support of the great majority of
jurisdictions.
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Professor Appleman also illustrates the fallacy of the distinction as
follows:
Almost every action we take has some element of design; if we
drive an automobile upon the highway, where another collided with
us, could this not have been foreseeable, or at least within the
realm of potential so far as the “means” were concerned? Every
instance where a person walks, or jumps, and slips or falls, comes
within a like category. To permit a rigid construction of such
expressions is to permit a deception to be practiced upon the
public. . . .
1A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 363 at p. 492 (1981 & Supp. 1995).
Although a few courts in other jurisdictions still cling to the distinction,3
most courts have either abolished the distinction or refused to recognize it in the
first place when considering whether a particular death or injury is accidental. 4
Under the more recent cases, the unexpected consequences of an individual’s
voluntary behavior provide the accidental element for purposes of an insurance
policy. Carroll v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 894 P.2d at 751.
3
See, e.g., W eil v. Federa l Kem per Life A ssur. C o., 866 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1994)(In Bank );
Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 203 A.2d 168 (D .C. App . 1964); Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
174 P.2d 961 (W ash. 1946).
4
INA Life In s. Co . v. Bru ndin , 533 P.2d 236 (Ala ska 19 75); Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 437 P.2d 416, 420 (Ariz. 1986 ); Carroll v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 894 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1995);
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1 957); Dawson v. Bankers’ Life Co., 247 N.W .
279, 282 (Iowa 19 33); Fryman for Fryman v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 704 S.W .2d 205, 206 (Ky. 1986);
Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 So . 2d 171 (L a. 1958) ; Collins v. Nationwide Life Ins.
Co., 294 N.W .2d 194, 1 96 (Mic h. 1980) ; Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co. 222 N.W. 912 (Minn.
1929); Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 N.W .2d 576, 5 80 (Ne b. 1942) ; Catania v. State Farm Life
Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 631, 633 (Nev. 19 79); Scott v. New Empire Ins. Co., 400 P.2d 953, 955 (N.M.
1965); Burr v. Co mm ercia l Tra veler s Mu t. Acc . Ass ’n, 67 N.E.2 d 248, 25 2 (N.Y. 19 46); Cooper v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 180 P.2d 654 (O kla. 194 7); Botts v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 585 P.2d
657, 660 (Or. 197 8); Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 532, 534 (Pa. 196 7); W est v.
Comm ercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 528 A.2d 339 (R .I. 1987); Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Heyward, 536 S.W .2d 549, 5 57 (Te x. 1976 ); Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 238 P. 259, 275
(Utah 1 925); W iger v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 236 N.W . 534, 538 (W is. 1931); W ickman v.
Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 908 F.2 d 1077 (1st Cir. 19 90); W hitaker v. State Farm Mu t. Auto Ins.
Co, 768 P.2d 320 (Ka n. App. 19 89); Cons ume rs Life Ins . Co. v. Sm ith, 587 A.2d 1119,1124-25
(Md. Ap p. 1991) ; see also John D . Ingram and Lynn e R. Os tfeld, The Distinction Between
Accidental Means and Accidental Results in Accidental Death Insurance, 12 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1,
9 (1984 ); 1A App lema n, Insurance Law and Practice, § 360, pp. 475-76.
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A good example of the persuasive analysis used in such cases is
provided by the Texas Supreme Court, which abandoned the distinction between
"accidental means" and "accidental results," reasoning as follows:
Texas courts have waded through Justice Cardozo’s Serbonian
bog, and we are now convinced that the terms ‘accidental death’
and ‘death by accidental means’ as those terms are used in
insurance policies, must be regarded as legally synonymous unless
there is a definition in the insurance contract itself which requires a
different construction. These terms in an insurance contract should
be given their ordinary and popular meaning according to the
understanding of the average man; the court’s guide should not be
the technical meaning of the words used, but rather the intention of
the parties as inferred from the contract as a whole. A fine
distinction between means and results would never occur to
an average policyholder, and the insurer should not be able to
escape liability by resort to such a technical definition. If the
insurer wishes to distinguish between accidental results and
injuries caused by accidental means, he should do so
expressly, so as to give the policyholder clear notice of any
limitations of liability which the insurer wishes to impose by
use of the latter term.
Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
Like the Texas Supreme Court, almost every court rejecting or abandoning the
distinction has found the distinction contrary to both the plain meaning of the
terms and the understanding and reasonable expectations of the average
policyholder. See, e.g., Carroll v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 894 P.2d at 753; Buck v.
Gulf Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d at 718. In addition, many courts have concluded
that the distinction itself arises from an inappropriate importation of the tort
concept of foreseeability into private insurance contracts.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Collins v. Nationwide Life
Ins., explained that “neither the level of foreseeability requisite for tort liability nor
for criminal recklessness is sufficient to render a mishap a 'nonaccident' when
conduct is measured against the terms of an accidental death insurance policy.”
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Id., 294 N.W.2d at 196. In a similar fashion, the Kentucky Supreme Court
observed that the “fundamental flaw” with the distinction between accidental
means and accidental results is “that it subjects contract terms to analysis under
tort principles, such as fault and foreseeability.” Fryman v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
704 S.W.2d at 206. In rejecting the distinction, the Kentucky Court said “we are
reluctant to analyze contract terms under principles which have technical
meaning in other areas of the law.” Id.
After careful consideration and a thorough review of the cases on the
subject, we are persuaded that the better reasoned, more logical approach is to
abandon the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results."
Tennessee, therefore, joins the growing number of jurisdictions which have
emerged from the “Serbonian bog.”
The analysis used in construing insurance contracts is well settled. Like
other contracts, insurance contracts should be construed so as to give effect to
the intention and express language of the parties. Tata v. Nichols, 848 S.W.2d
649, 650 (Tenn. 1993). Words in an insurance policy are given their common
and ordinary meaning, with ambiguous language construed against the
insurance company and in favor of the insured. Id. The distinction we had
adopted in Distretti is contrary to those now familiar rules of construction. In our
view, an insured should not have to consult a long line of case law or law review
articles and treatises to determine the coverage he or she is purchasing under
an insurance policy. Policy language should be given its plain meaning, unless a
technical meaning is clearly provided in the insurance policy. Elsner v. Walker,
879 S.W.2d 852 (Tenn. App. 1994). As the Texas Supreme Court recognized, it
is inconceivable that the average insured would understand the fine distinction
between "accidental means" and "accidental results."
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In addition, we agree that the importation of the tort principle of
foreseeability into the interpretation of a private insurance contract is
inappropriate. As Justice Mosk observed in dissent in Weil v. Federal Kemper
Life Assur. Co., “[t]he insurance company does not represent the public safety
concerns of society but the commercial interest of its owners. Nor was the
company forced to issue the policy; it voluntarily did so for the purpose of
profiting from the transaction.” Id., 866 P.2d at 806. Insurance companies draft
the policies they sell and are, therefore, free to exclude injury or death that
results from reckless and foolhardy acts. With simplicity and clarity of expression
they may remove all doubt. Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d at 420.
Accordingly, Distretti, its progenitors and progeny are overruled. From
this day forward, in Tennessee law there is no distinction between "accidental
death" and death by "accidental means" in determining coverage under an
insurance policy. Instead, if death is the unanticipated and unexpected result of
an intentional, voluntary act, it is accidental in the ordinary and plain sense of the
word and recovery is available under an accidental death insurance policy.
Accidental deaths or injuries which are included within this definition, but which
the insurance company does not intend be covered, can be specifically excluded
in the insurance policy.
Where, as here, the insured died as the result of an intentional act, such
as voluntary intoxication, but did not intend or expect death to result, such death
is accidental for the purposes of an accidental death policy. Accordingly, we
conclude that Robin Harrell’s death resulted from an “accidental injury which was
unintended, unexpected and unforeseen.”
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CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the distinction between “accidental means” and
“accidental results” is illusory, for the reasons previously articulated, we abandon
the distinction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is reversed, and the
cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
Danny Ray Harrell. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the defendant, The
Minnesota Life Insurance Company, for which execution may issue if necessary.
________________________________
RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE
CONCUR:
Birch, C.J.
Drowota, Reid, and White, JJ.
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