State v. Collier Harris

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
SEPTEMBER 1997 SESSION
FILED
January 15, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
APPELLEE, )
) No. 02-C-01-9612-CR-00447
)
) Shelby County
v. )
) W. Fred Axley, Judge
)
) (Rape)
COLLIER V. HARRIS, )
)
APPELLANT. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
W. Mark Ward John Knox Walkup
Assistant Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 2-01 500 Charlotte Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243-0497
(Appeal Only)
Kenneth W. Rucker
Ronald S. Johnson Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Public Defender 450 James Robertson Parkway
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 2-01 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Memphis, TN 38103
(Trial Only) William L. Gibbons
District Attorney General
OF COUNSEL: 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
Memphis, TN 38103
A C Wharton, Jr.
Chief Public Defender Edgar A. Peterson, IV
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 2-01 Assistant District Attorney General
Memphis, TN 38103 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:______________________________
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING
Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Collier V. Harris (defendant), was convicted of rape, a Class B felony,
by a jury of his peers. The trial court, finding the defendant to be a multiple offender,
imposed a Range II sentence consisting of confinement for twenty (20) years in the
Department of Correction. This sentence is to be served consecutively to a sentence for
felony murder in an unrelated case. The defendant presents four issues for review. He
contends the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by (a) ruling the state
could impeach the defendant with a prior conviction for first degree murder; (b) allowing the
state to introduce the testimony of two other women who were also raped by the
defendant; (c) instructing the jury it could consider the two rapes to show intent, motive,
guilt, and knowledge; and (d) finding him to be a multiple offender and imposing a Range
II sentence. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and
the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the
defendant’s conviction for rape should be affirmed. However, this cause is remanded to
the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. However, a
recitation of the salient facts is necessary for an understanding of the issues presented for
review.
The victim, Angela Phillips, lived in a subdivision near the intersection of Navy Road
and Bethel Road in Millington, Tennessee. During the early morning hours of October 11,
1993, the victim walked to a nearby service station to purchase a bag of potato chips. The
defendant, whom she had observed driving through her neighborhood on prior occasions,
offered her a ride from the service station to her home. She did not know the defendant.
While she only lived a short distance from the station, she accepted the defendant’s
invitation because it was raining and cold.
The defendant drove his vehicle away from the victim’s residence. He subsequently
drove his vehicle to Center College Road, drove into a field, and parked behind a grove of
trees. He exited the vehicle, walked to the passenger side of the vehicle, and pulled the
victim from the vehicle. He then placed his arm around her neck and began squeezing.
2
The victim became dizzy and began losing her breath. The defendant told the victim to pull
her pants down. He then forced her to bend over in front of him. He told the victim, “I’m
going to teach you bitches something.” The defendant then vaginally penetrated the victim
with his reproductive organ from behind her as he held her neck.
Subsequently, the victim was taken by law enforcement authorities to the Memphis
Sexual Assault Resource Center. A nurse took samples of the fluids from the genital area
of the victim’s body. Later, blood and hair samples were taken from the defendant. All of
the samples were submitted by the authorities for DNA testing. The samples taken from
the victim revealed the presence of sperm. The DNA profile of the sperm found in the
victim was consistent with the DNA profile of the defendant. The DNA expert testified the
profile for the sperm found in the victim occurs with a frequency of approximately one in
467 million Caucasians and one in 50 million African-Americans. The defendant is an
African-American.
The victim identified the defendant as the person who had raped her. The state
presented two other women who testified the defendant raped them. One was raped on
November 21, 1993, and the other was raped in June of 1991.
The defendant did not testify in support of his defense. Nor did he present any other
witnesses.
I.
The State of Tennessee gave the defendant notice it would use his prior convictions
to impeach him if he opted to testify during the trial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3). The
notice alleged the following convictions would be used to impeach the defendant: assault,
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, possession of a weapon, and murder in the
perpetration of a theft. When the state rested its case-in-chief, the trial court conducted
what is commonly referred to as a “Morgan hearing.”
The assistant district attorney general candidly admitted the three misdemeanor
convictions could not be used to impeach the defendant. However, he argued the felony
murder conviction could be used to impeach the defendant if he testified during the trial.
The defendant objected to the use of this felony conviction to impeach him. He argued
3
rape and murder in the perpetration of a felony were both crimes of violence; and the
probative value of this conviction for impeachment purposes was far outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. The trial court, stating the underlying crime was theft, ruled the state
could use the conviction to impeach the defendant.
In this court, the defendant contends “the trial judge erred in that the probative value
of the first degree murder conviction on the issue of Appellant’s credibility did not outweigh
the unfair prejudicial effect that allowance of the impeachment would have had on the
substantive issues of identity and consent.” He argues a conviction for first degree murder
has “little probative value” and “little or no bearing on credibility” because the mens rea
requirement for this offense is “recklessness.” The state contends the trial court properly
ruled that the first degree murder conviction could be used to impeach the defendant if he
opted to testify during the trial.
A.
The State of Tennessee must establish certain prerequisites before it may use a
prior conviction to impeach an accused in a criminal prosecution. In State v. Farmer, 841
S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1992), this court said:
The State may use a prior adult conviction to impeach the
testimony of an accused in a criminal prosecution if: (a) the
conviction was for a crime that is punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one (1) year or a misdemeanor
involving dishonesty or false statement, Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(2), (b) less than ten (10) years has elapsed between
the date the accused was released from confinement and the
commencement of the prosecution, Tenn. R. Evid. 609(b), (c)
the State gives reasonable written notice of the particular
conviction or convictions it intends to use to impeach the
accused prior to trial, Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3), and (d) the trial
court finds that the probative value of the felony or
misdemeanor on the issue of credibility outweighs its unfair
prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(3).
841 S.W.2d at 839.
In this case, the parties agree the first three prerequisites set forth in Farmer, i.e.,
requirements (a) through (c), have been satisfied. Thus, this court must determine whether
4
the trial court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the prior felony murder
conviction on the question of the defendant’s credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect
upon the substantive issues presented by the evidence: the identity of the defendant as
the person who raped the victim and the consent of the victim to the sexual penetration.
B.
It is a well-established rule of law that the question of whether a prior conviction can
be used to impeach the accused addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 548-49 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Roberts, 943 S.W.2d
403, 408 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1996); State v. Wiggins, 729
S.W.2d 291, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1987). An appellate court
will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion absent clear abuse appearing on the
face of the record. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1046, 114 S. Ct. 1577, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54,
73 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S. Ct. 1368, 122 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1993);
State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154, 163 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1987).
Appellate review of this issue is limited to a determination of whether the trial court
abused its discretion by permitting the use of the felony murder conviction to impeach the
defendant. Roberts, 943 S.W.2d at 408. This court is not permitted to re-weigh or
reevaluate the probative value versus the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction on the
substantive issues which must be resolved by the trier of fact. Id.
C.
The Tennessee Rules of Evidence recognize two classes of prior convictions to
impeach an accused if the prior convictions meet the criteria set forth in Rule 609. The
first class of prior convictions encompasses felony offenses which are punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one (1) year. Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). The second class of
prior convictions includes misdemeanor offenses involving dishonesty or false statement.
5
Id. See Farmer, 841 S.W.2d at 839. There is no requirement that a felony conviction
involve dishonesty or false statement before the conviction may be used to impeach the
accused. State v. Tune, 872 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.
1993). In Tune this court said “a crime committed by the accused which is punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year may be admissible in order to attack his
credibility, regardless of whether the crime involved dishonesty or false statements. . . .”
However, both classifications of prior convictions are subject to the probative value versus
prejudicial effect requirement of Rule 609. State v. Jerry Lee Finch, Lauderdale County
No. 02-C-01-9309-CC-00224, 1995 WL 334350 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, June 7,
1995), per. app. denied (Tenn. November 5, 1995).
The appellate courts have upheld the use of crimes involving violence to impeach
an accused when the prerequisites contained in Rule 609 have been met. In Sheffield, the
supreme court upheld the use of a voluntary manslaughter conviction to impeach the
accused in a capital first degree murder prosecution. 676 S.W.2d at 549-50. In State v.
Ratliff, 673 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1984), this court
ruled a prior conviction for assault with intent to commit second degree murder could be
used to impeach the accused in a prosecution for concealing stolen property. In State v.
Ronnie Dunn, Washington County No. 03-C-01-9102-CR-00042, 1992 WL 167349 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Knoxville, July 21, 1992), rev’d and modified, Washington County No. 03-S-01-
9211-CR-00104, 1993 WL 339919 (Tenn. Sept. 7, 1993) (modifying the conviction to
second degree murder), this court held the use of a prior first degree murder conviction to
impeach the accused was permissible in a prosecution for felony murder. In State v. Burl
Lakins, Claiborne County No. 32, 1991 WL 84947 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 24,
1991), this court held a prior conviction for second degree murder could be used to
impeach the accused in a prosecution for aggravated assault.
This court has also upheld the use of crimes involving violence to impeach an
accused charged with a sex-related offense when the prerequisites contained in Rule 609
have been met. In Wiggins, this court held that prior convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and possession of a controlled substance for resale could be used to
impeach the accused in a prosecution for aggravated rape and aggravated kidnaping. 729
6
S.W.2d at 294. State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 959-60 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app.
denied (Tenn. 1996), this court ruled a prior conviction for second degree murder could be
used to impeach Blanton in a prosecution for aggravated sexual battery if he opted to
testify in support of his defense. In State v. Daniel Strong, Davidson County No. 88-82-III,
1989 WL 34942 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 12, 1989), per. app. denied (Tenn. July
3, 1989), this court approved the use of a prior conviction for malicious shooting to
impeach an accused in a prosecution for assault with intent to commit murder first degree
and assault with intent to commit rape.
D.
Neither the Tennessee Rules of Evidence nor the appellate courts have established
a brightline test or rigid guidelines for determining whether the probative value of a prior
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect upon the substantive issues. Sheffield, 676
S.W.2d at 548-49; Tune, 872 S.W.2d at 927; Wiggins, 729 S.W.2d at 295. In Sheffield,
the supreme court set forth the federal “guidelines that have [e]volved” for determining
whether the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. In holding
that a prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter could be used to impeach the accused
in a capital murder prosecution, the court said:
While examination of those [federal] factors may be useful to
trial judges in some cases, we decline to adopt them. We
think it inappropriate to introduce the rigidity that inevitably
accompanies the mandated use of express guidelines for the
exercise of judicial discretion involving the weighing and
balancing of elusive concepts.
676 S.W.2d at 548.
In Wiggins this court, acknowledging the supreme court’s ruling in Sheffield, stated:
In the final issue, the defendant says that the trial court erred
in permitting evidence of his prior conviction for voluntary
manslaughter and possession of [a] controlled substance for
resale. This evidence was admitted for impeachment
purposes. He says that since these offenses did not involve
dishonesty or false statement, the prejudicial effect of this
7
evidence outweighed probative value and that the trial judge
only gave “lip service” to the law in weighing prejudicial effect
against probative value. . . .
****
[O]ur Supreme Court has rejected the adoption of guidelines
to be followed by trial judges in weighing probative value
against prejudicial effect with regard to evidence of convictions
of crimes that do not involve dishonesty or false statement.
****
We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in
holding that probative value outweighed prejudicial effect with
regard to evidence of these two prior convictions. We
therefore overrule this issue.
729 S.W.2d at 294-95.
E.
The mere fact a prior conviction of the accused is identical or similar to the offense
for which the accused is being tried does not, as a matter of law, bar the use of the
conviction to impeach the accused as a witness. See State v. Miller, 737 S.W.2d 556, 560
(Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1987). Nevertheless, the trial court, when
considering an identical or similar offense, should (a) “assess the similarity between the
crime on trial and the crime underlying the impeaching conviction,” and (b) “analyze the
relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of credibility” when weighing the
probative value of the conviction against its prejudicial effect. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d at 839;
N. Cohen, et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 609.9 at 375 (3d ed. 1995).
In this case, the defendant admits the crimes of felony murder and rape are not
identical or similar in nature. However, the defendant asserts the prejudicial effect of the
felony murder conviction outweighed its probative value because the two offenses are
crimes of violence. As previously stated, crimes of violence may be used to impeach an
accused in a sex-related offense, when, as here, all of the prerequisites of Rule 609 are
met. Blanton, supra; Wiggins, supra; Strong, supra. In short, when the impeaching
offense and the offense for which the accused is being tried are not identical or similar in
nature, the mere fact both are crimes of violence will not result in the exclusion of the
impeaching offense solely on the grounds the two offenses involve violence. Blanton, 926
8
S.W.2d at 959-60. As this court said in Blanton and Strong, “felonies of a violent nature
reflect on the moral character of a witness,” and, as a result, “this evidence is not usually
without probative value.” Blanton, 926 S.W.2d at 960; Strong, slip op. at 2.
The defendant’s reliance upon State v. Farmer, supra, and Long v. State, 607
S.W.2d 482, 485-86 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1980), is misplaced.
These cases are distinguishable upon the facts. Both of these cases involved the use of
identical or similar offenses, and the offenses had minimal, probative value for
impeachment purposes.
F.
This court is of the opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling the
State of Tennessee could use the defendant’s prior felony murder conviction to impeach
him if he had opted to testify in support of his defense. As previously noted, the offenses
of felony murder and rape are dissimilar; and the conviction was probative of the
defendant’s credibility if he had taken the stand and claimed he did not rape the victim, or,
in the alternative, if he had claimed the victim consented to the sexual penetration.
While the defendant did not testify or present any witnesses in support of his
defense, he attempted to establish reasonable doubt by cross-examining the state’s
witnesses, attempting to discredit the scientific evidence, and arguing the weaknesses in
the state’s case to the jury during summation.
In short, if the defendant had testified he was not the perpetrator of the rape or, in
the alternative, the victim consented to the sexual penetration, these two factual issues
would hinge primarily upon the credibility of the victim and the defendant albeit there was
scientific evidence and proof of other similar rapes to establish his guilt.
This issue is without merit.
II.
The defendant contends the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by
9
permitting the State of Tennessee to introduce evidence he had raped two other women
during its case-in-chief. He argues the rapes of these two women were too remote in time
from this case, and the two rapes “were not sufficiently ‘unique’ in their commission so as
to be admissible in the present case.” The State of Tennessee contends the manner in
which the defendant committed the two prior rapes was so unique that the evidence clearly
points to him as the perpetrator.
The State of Tennessee gave the defendant notice that if he opted to testify in
support of his defense, the state would use three prior bad acts, the rape of three other
women, to impeach him pursuant to Rule 608(b)(3), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. During
the course of the trial, the state advised defense counsel it was going to present two of the
women as part of its case-in-chief. A jury-out hearing ensued. The trial court stated in
ruling: “I do recall the facts. I’m going to let them testify.”1 The trial court did not state the
legal basis for admitting this evidence. Furthermore, neither party requested the trial court
to state the reasons why it was introducing the proof of other crimes.
A.
The State of Tennessee presented two witnesses, Sarah Johnson and Angela
Arnold. Johnson testified the defendant raped her on June 13, 1991. Arnold testified the
defendant raped her on November 20, 1993. The defendant raped the victim in this case
on October 11, 1993.
Johnson testified she was walking along Navy Road in Millington when the
defendant stopped and offered her a ride. She had known the defendant for six years.
The defendant turned onto Bethel Road and proceeded to Edmond Orgill Park. They
stopped at the park and talked for a period of time. The defendant then drove toward
Tipton County. He parked his vehicle in a desolate area on a back road. Both the
defendant and Johnson exited the vehicle on their respective sides to urinate. The
defendant then walked around the vehicle and told Johnson to remove her pants. She
1
This same evidence was presented in the defendant’s first degree murder trial.
State v. Collier V. Harris, Shelby County No. 02-C-01-9603-CR-00095 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Jackson, December 3, 1997).
10
thought he was kidding. When she attempted to walk away, the defendant placed his arm
around her neck and squeezed until she lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she was on the ground near the rear of the defendant’s vehicle. She next
remembered being in the back seat of the defendant’s vehicle. Her pants had been
removed. The defendant vaginally penetrated her in the back seat. He then drove to a
boat ramp at Richardson Landing in Tipton County, another desolate area, and the
defendant raped the victim again inside the vehicle. When Johnson refused to have
intercourse with the defendant, he told her, “You know how I can get it. Don’t make me do
it, be that way again.” The defendant then drove the victim to her residence. She arrived
home at 3:00 a.m. He threatened her if she revealed what had occurred.
Arnold had known the defendant for approximately six months. She had gone to
a friend’s apartment after having an argument with her husband. When plans to attend a
nightclub in Memphis failed, the defendant asked Arnold to take him home. Subsequently,
the defendant and Arnold discussed the well-being of a mutual friend. The mutual friend’s
girlfriend had been killed in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant told Arnold their friend
was probably at the “tree” in Edmond Orgill Park. When they arrived at the “tree,” no one
was there. They sat on the hood of the vehicle and listened to music. The defendant
attempted to kiss her. She resisted and attempted to get into the vehicle. The defendant
shut the door so she could not enter the vehicle. The defendant then grabbed Arnold
around the neck, applied a choke hold, and Arnold lost consciousness. When she
regained consciousness, she was lying face down behind the vehicle. The defendant had
pulled her pants down. When Arnold tried to lift herself from the ground, the defendant
applied a choke hold a second time and Arnold again lost consciousness. When she
regained consciousness, the defendant was vaginally penetrating her. The defendant told
her “you’re not any good.” He made her pour vodka on the genital area of her body.
The defendant drove to a store and purchased a package of condoms. He then
drove to another desolate location. He asked Arnold if she wanted to die. He placed a
condom on his sexual organ and raped Arnold a second time. Once he had completed the
act, he removed the condom and placed another condom on his sexual organ. He made
Arnold get on top of him while he vaginally penetrated her a third time. Arnold testified she
11
tried to “just get it over with” so she could go home. The defendant drove Arnold’s vehicle
to his residence. Before exiting the vehicle, he threatened Arnold and told her not to call
the police or reveal what had occurred to anyone.
There are numerous similarities incident to the above rapes and the rape of the
victim in this case. First, Johnson and Arnold knew the defendant. The victim in this case
did not know the defendant by name, but she knew who he was and the type of automobile
he drove. He drove through the victim’s neighborhood frequently. Second, all three rapes
originated and/or occurred in a secluded area outside of Millington, Tennessee. Johnson’s
rape originated in Millington, but the actual rape occurred just across the Tipton County line
just north of Millington. Third, all of the rapes occurred late in the evening or during the
early morning hours. Fourth, the defendant always took the victim to a remote area where
there were no dwellings or lights. Fifth, the defendant never attempted to conceal his
identity. Sixth, the defendant used a choke hold to subdue all three victims. The hold
caused two of the victims to lose consciousness. When one of the victims awakened, the
defendant applied the choke hold a second time to subdue the victim. He threatened a
second victim with the choke hold if she did not cooperate. The victim in this case testified
she became dizzy and short of breath, but she did not lose consciousness. While the
victim was unconscious, the defendant would remove the victim’s clothing. Seventh, the
defendant made efforts to avoid leaving semen. In two of the rapes, the defendant wore
a condom. In the Arnold rape, the defendant made the victim wash the genital area of her
body with vodka. Eighth, the defendant instructed the victims not to tell anyone about the
rapes. If the victims revealed the rapes, he threatened to rape them again.
B.
The admissibility of evidence regarding the Johnson and Arnold rapes involves
Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). This rule states:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity with the
character trait. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes. The conditions which must be satisfied before
12
allowing such evidence are:
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the
jury’s presence;
(2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other
than conduct conforming with a character trait and must upon
request state on the record the material issue, the ruling, and
the reasons for admitting the evidence; and
(3) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value
is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
In Bunch v. State, 605 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn. 1980), the supreme court said proof
of other crimes may be admitted to establish motive, identity, lack of mistake or accident,
or the existence of a common scheme or plan if (a) relevant to one of these issues and (b)
the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
This court must now determine whether the admission of this evidence was relevant
to establish one of the exceptions to Rule 404(b).
(1)
During the jury-out hearing pursuant to Rule 404(b), the state discussed all of the
exceptions outlined in Bunch. The state did not indicate which of these exceptions it
contended was relevant in this case. Much of the hearing was spent discussing the
similarities between all three rapes and the uniqueness of the defendant’s conduct during
the rapes. It appears the state ultimately limited the relevance of the evidence to the
exceptions of identity and the presence of a common scheme or plan. This court is of
opinion that the evidence was also relevant on the issues of intent and identity.
Although the defendant did not testify or present witnesses in support of his
defense, it was his contention the victim in this case consented to the sexual intercourse.
He attempted to establish this through cross-examination. The defendant concedes that
if the evidence of other rapes was properly admitted, it was only admissible to establish his
identity.
The issue of identity was a major issue during the trial. The victim told the
investigating officers the defendant’s name was “Gary Marvin.” She later discovered this
13
was not the defendant’s name. Much was made of this discrepancy. He also attempted
to discredit the DNA evidence presented by the state that linked him to the rape. During
closing argument, defense counsel told the jury the DNA evidence should be “view[ed] with
caution” in an effort to discredit this scientific evidence.
(2)
The appellate courts of this state have approved the use of other acts in a rape
prosecution. In White v. State, 533 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975), cert. denied
(Tenn. 1976), the trial court allowed evidence to establish that White had committed similar
rapes within a two-month period. Id. at 743. The evidence was admitted to establish
White’s identity as well as a course of conduct. Among the similarities were: the
defendant’s use of a knife, forcing the victims into the backseat of a motor vehicle, forcing
the victims to disrobe, discussion of illicit narcotics with the victims, and allowing the victims
to use a tissue. White also rode in a motor vehicle with the victims, took their purses, and
released the victims on a street. Id. at 738. This court noted the rapes were so “strikingly
similar that there [could] be no other conclusion than the fact that the defendant committed
all three rapes. . . .” Id. at 741.
In Bunch v. State, the supreme court approved the use of another armed robbery
in a prosecution for armed robbery because this evidence was relevant to the issue of
identity. 605 S.W.2d at 231. The court stated:
[T]he modus operandi of the other crime and of the crime on
trial must be substantially identical and must be so unique that
proof that the defendant committed the other offense fairly
tends to establish that he also committed the offense with
which he is charged.
605 S.W.2d at 230 (emphasis in original). Among the similarities noted in Bunch: the
robberies were accomplished by two men and one woman, the victims were placed in
restrooms, the two victim businesses were in close proximity, and the robberies occurred
on the same day separated by a few hours. The supreme court further noted:
[I]t is not necessary that the other crime be identical in every
14
detail to the offense on trial; it is sufficient if evidence of the
other crime supports the inference that the perpetrator of it,
shown to be the defendant, is the same person who committed
the offense on trial.
605 S.W.2d at 231.
The same analysis used in determining a 404(b) issue has been used in analyzing
whether severance of similar charges would be proper. State v. Peacock, 638 S.W.2d
837, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1982) (This court affirmed the denial
of severing several armed robberies and rapes because the crimes were part of a common
scheme or plan. Peacock committed several armed robberies at residences in close
proximity to each other. In each instance, he knocked before entering, demanded money,
drugs and jewelry, forced his victims to disrobe, used a pistol and threatened each victim,
threatened the victims if they looked at his face, and threatened the victims if they called
the police.); State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 557-58 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app.
denied (Tenn. 1983) (This court affirmed the joinder of several sex crimes on the grounds
the offenses were similar in modus operandi and occurred within a close proximity of the
time and place. The similarities included: the victims were young white females who lived
in an apartment complex and were alone at the time of the offense; the attacker was in the
apartment when the victim arrived or would enter shortly thereafter; the attacker hid his
face; the attacker performed cunnilingus before penile/vaginal rape; he required the victim
to rub his nipples; and the offenses took place over nineteen months within apartment
complexes in close proximity to each other.); see also State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682,
693-94 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1993) (This court upheld the denial of
severance of multiple rape charges based upon the reasoning of Wooden, Peacock, and
Bunch. The victims were white females between the ages of 21 and 24. The attacks
occurred within a two-mile radius at apartment complexes or duplexes. All the victims were
alone and asleep. Each incident involved a burglary before the rape. He usually took
money. All the victims lived on the ground floor. The attacker instructed all the victims to
remain quiet; he rubbed each victim’s breasts and digitally penetrated the victims. The
crimes occurred over a twenty-month period.).
While the descriptions of the acts committed by the defendant were similar, and
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though there are some differences in the testimony given by Johnson and Arnold, the
similarities between the offenses far outweigh the minor differences. See State v.
McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995).
This court must now address the weighing of the probative value versus the unfair
prejudice in the admission of this evidence.
(3)
Rule 404(b)(3) requires the trial court to weigh the probative value of the other
crimes evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. The record does not reflect why
the trial court found the testimony given by Johnson and Arnold was probative and why it
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
The factors to be considered when undertaking the weighing process mandated by
Rule 404(b)(3) include the prosecution’s need for the evidence, the likelihood the
defendant committed the other crimes, and the degree of relevance to the issues.
Edwards, 868 S.W.2d at 691. Since the defendant attempted to establish the sexual
intercourse with the victim was consensual, and the defendant made an effort to discredit
the DNA scientific evidence, the state needed this evidence to establish the victim did not
consent to the sexual intercourse with the defendant. The evidence was also needed to
establish the defendant was the person who raped the victim in this case.
This court concludes the probative value of the evidence admitted in this case far
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
This issue is without merit.
III.
The defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial dimensions when
instructing the jury regarding the proof of other crimes, i.e., the rape of the two women who
testified as prosecution witnesses. He argues the instruction should have been limited to
proving his identify, if the evidence was admissible. The record reflects the trial court
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included the following categories in the instruction in addition to identity: the complete story
of the crime, a scheme or plan, motive, intent, and guilty knowledge.
The defendant concedes trial counsel did not object to the instruction. In addition,
trial counsel did not include this issue in the motion for a new trial. Since reversal on this
issue would result in a new trial, the issue was required to be included in the motion for a
new trial. Nevertheless, appellate counsel respectfully requests this court to consider this
issue because it constitutes plain error on the face of the record. He cites this court’s
opinion in State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) to support his
argument. The State of Tennessee, citing federal cases, contends the failure to raise this
issue does not constitute plain error on the face of record.
This court is of the opinion the defendant has waived this issue. First, the issue was
not raised in the motion for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); State v. Keel, 882 S.W.2d
410, 417 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1994). Second, assuming arguendo
this court is willing to consider this issue pursuant to Rule 13(b), Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure, or Rule 52(b), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, neither party
has briefed this issue on the merits. Thus, the issue is waived pursuant to Rule 27(a)(7),
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This court parenthetically notes a trial court should limit the scope of the instruction
on proof of other crimes to the specific reason or reasons for its admission into evidence.
The remaining reasons which would justify the admission of such evidence should be
deleted from the pattern jury instruction. This was not done in this case. However, if this
issue was considered on the merits, this court would hold the error was harmless. Tenn.
R. App. P. 36(b).
This issue is without merit.
IV.
The defendant contends the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by
sentencing him as a multiple offender and imposing a Range II sentence. He argues he
is a standard offender, and the sentence imposed should have been within Range I. The
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State of Tennessee correctly confesses error. The state agrees the defendant is a
standard offender, and the trial court should have imposed a Range I sentence.
The record reflects the defendant has been convicted of simple assault, two counts
of simple possession of marijuana, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all
misdemeanors. He was convicted of murder first degree. The offense occurred on
November 29, 1992. He was convicted of the offense on September 25, 1995. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment on November 15, 1995.
In the context of this case, the phrase “multiple offender” is defined in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(2)(1990) in the following manner:
(a) A “multiple offender” is a defendant who has received:
****
(2) One (1) Class A prior felony conviction if the defendant’s
conviction offense is a Class A or B felony.
(b) In determining the number of prior convictions a defendant
has received:
(1) “Prior conviction” means a conviction for an offense
occurring prior to the commission of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced.
The Sentencing Commission Comments accompanying this statute shed light on the
meaning of the phrase “prior felony conviction.” The Commission Comments state:
The prior felony convictions used to trigger the multiple
offender status must have occurred prior to the commission of
the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. In this
sense, the multiple offender classification is a recidivist
provision designed to punish persons who have been
previously convicted and then commit new crimes. . . .
In State v. Blouvett, 904 S.W.2d 111 (Tenn. 1995), the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed the precise issue raised by the defendant. Justice Birch, speaking for a
unanimous court, stated: “[I]t is clear from the comments [accompanying the applicable
statute] that ‘prior conviction’ means a conviction that has been adjudicated prior to the
commission of the more recent offense for which sentence is to be imposed.” 904 S.W.2d
at 113. In other words, before a prior conviction can be used to enhance the sentencing
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range, the offense must have been committed and the accused convicted of the offense
prior to the commission of the offense for which the accused is being sentenced.
In this case, the first degree murder offense was committed prior to the rape of the
victim in this case. However, the defendant was convicted of the murder first degree
offense after the commission of the rape. The rape occurred on October 11, 1993. The
defendant was not convicted of the murder first degree offense until September 25, 1995.
Consequently, the murder first degree conviction could not be used to enhance the
defendant’s sentencing status from a Range I standard offender to a Range II multiple
offender.
This cause is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing and the
imposition of a Range I sentence. If either party is aggrieved by the sentence imposed by
the trial court on remand, the aggrieved party may appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 40-35-401 or -402.
_________________________________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
CONCUR:
______________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
______________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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