Legal Sense, Done With The Intent To Commit a Crime.'" State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
JANUARY 1998 SESSION
March 25, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
NELSON B. GRAVES, )
)
Appellant, ) No. 01C01-9705-CR-00171
)
) Johnson County
v. )
) Honorable Lynn W. Brown, Judge
)
HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN,) (Habeas Corpus)
and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellees. )
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I
would hold, though, that the indictments sufficiently contain any necessary mens rea by
allegations that the offenses were “feloniously” committed. Historically, the word
“feloniously” has meant “[p]roceeding from an evil heart or purpose; done with a
deliberate intention of committing a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 617 (6th ed. 1990).
As our supreme court has previously noted, “one meaning attached to the word is: ‘In a
legal sense, done with the intent to commit a crime.’” State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521,
526, 105 S.W. 68, 70 (1907). Thus, I believe that the indictments include any required
mens rea.
____________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge