Seigle v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1997 FILED
October 1, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
JOE SEIGLE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) No. 03C01-9610-CR-00364
Appellant )
) SULLIVAN COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. Frank L. Slaughter, Judge
OSCAR MASON, Tennessee )
Department of Corrections, ) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
DOUG CLUCK, Tennessee )
Board of Paroles, and )
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Thomas R. Bandy, III Charles W. Burson
P. O. Box 1127 Attorney General and Reporter
Kingsport, TN 37662
Timothy F. Behan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
H. Greeley Wells, Jr.
District Attorney General
Robert M. Montgomery
Asst. District Attorney General
Blountville TN 37617
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Joe Seigle, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition
for writ of habeas corpus. On May 10, 1993, the appellant pled guilty in the
Sullivan County Criminal Court to one count of passing a worthless check in
excess of $60,000, a class B felony. The length and manner of service of the
sentence were to be determined by the trial court. The trial court imposed a ten
year sentence in the Department of Correction. On the date of the sentencing
hearing, the appellant was in federal custody serving a five year sentence. The
record indicates that the appellant had additional federal charges pending. The
appellant is currently confined at the federal correctional facility in Lexington,
Kentucky.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the state and
federal sentences should run consecutive and noted that, if the judgment of
conviction was silent on this issue, under the rules of criminal procedure, the
sentences would be consecutive. We find this to be a correct statement of law.
See Rule 32(c)(2), Tenn. R. Crim. P. Appellant’s trial counsel argued against the
imposition of consecutive sentences. The judgment of conviction entered by the
trial court makes no reference to the appellant’s federal conviction. The
appellant has received notice that the Tennessee Department of Correction
considers his state and federal sentences to be consecutive. On April 1, 1996,
the appellant, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
corpus. On July 11, 1996, the trial court dismissed the petition. After a review,
we affirm. Although the appellant fails to articulate the issue which we are to
review, as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4), we conclude from his brief that
he seeks review of the sentencing court’s decision which resulted in the
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imposition of consecutive sentences.1
Writs of habeas corpus will issue only in the case of a void judgment or to
free a prisoner held in custody after his term of imprisonment has expired.
Const. Art. 1 § 15; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 et seq. (1980); See Potts v.
State, 833 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1992); See also Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157,
164 (Tenn. 1993); Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1994). The appellant’s petition does not allege either of these grounds for relief.2
Second, the appellant is currently in federal custody; therefore, he does not have
standing to petition for habeas corpus relief and will not as long as he remains
incarcerated at the federal penitentiary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-102;
Taylor v. Morgan, 909 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Finally, as we
initially noted, the appellant, in effect, seeks relief from the judgment of
conviction entered by the trial court. Thus, the appellant attempts to utilize
habeas corpus procedure as a vehicle for direct appeal. A petition for habeas
corpus relief is an inappropriate procedure in which to review potential errors of a
trial court. Richmond v. Barksdale, 688 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tenn.Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn. 1979)).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the
appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
1
The appellant’s brief argues, “In ord er to sustain the De fendant’s position, the Co urt will
have to interpret the statement of Judge W itt as evidencing an intent to run the sentences
con currently.”
2
Moreover, we note that the appellant filed this appeal more than thirty days after the
judgment had been entered in violation of Tenn. R. App. P 4(a). However, in the interests of
justice, we waive jurisdiction on the filing of the notice of appeal. Tenn. R . App. P. 4(a).
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
_____________________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge
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