State v. Seals

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
OCTOBER SESSION, 1996 April 28, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9512-CC-00396Clerk
Appellate C ourt
)
Appellee, )
)
) ROANE COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. E. EUGENE EBLEN
ALBERT SEALS, JR., ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Direct Appeal)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
HAROLD D. BALCOM, JR. CHARLES W. BURSON
350 E., Race St., Suite 1 Attorney General and Reporter
P. O. Box 487
Kingston, TN 37763 HUNT S. BROWN
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243
CHARLES HAWK
District Attorney General
D. ROGER DELP
Assistant District Attorney
Ninth Judicial District
P. O. Box 703
Kingston, TN 37763
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
Appellant Albe rt Seals Jr. pled gu ilty in the Roane C ounty Crimina l Court
to driving under the influence of an intoxicant. He received a sentence of eleven
months and twenty-nine days . The trial court ordere d that he serve fou r days in
the county jail with the balance of the sentence served on probation. Pursuant
to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Appellant
reserved the following certified question of law: whether the investigatory stop of
his vehicle was b ased upon a reas onab le suspicion supported by specific and
articulable facts.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The proof shows that, on October 23 , 1994, Dep uty Herbert Ba rnard and
Depu ty Steve Bryant, both of the Roane County Sheriff's Departme nt, were called
to investigate a disturbance in which three allegedly intoxicated individuals, two
males and a female, were arguing outside the Huddle House on Gallaher Road
near K ingston, T ennes see.
When the deputies arrived at the scene, they were told that the individu als
had left in a brown Ford Thunderbird and a blue Nissan Maxima, traveling in the
direction of the interstate. After looking for the vehicles for app roximately five
minutes with no succe ss, the depu ties stopped at a local store to discuss the
situation. Wh ile there and a pprox imate ly twenty minutes after the original
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dispatch, the deputies observed a blue car that appeared to match the
description of the blue Nissan Maxima. As a result, the deputies followed the car,
which traveled a t a speed well below the spee d limit. Based upon the information
received from witnesses at the Huddle House and recognizing that an extrem ely
low rate of speed often indicates drunk driving, Deputy Barnard engaged his blue
lights. However, despite the blue lights, Appellant drove on for another quarter
mile, entered his driveway, and parked beside his house.
When Appellant exited his vehicle, Deputy Barnard detected a strong odor
of alcohol and noticed that Appellant was unsteady on his feet. He then
conducted field so briety te sts an d con clude d that A ppella nt was legally
intoxicated.
II. REASONABLE STOP
Appellant claims that the stop was unreasonable because he did not break
any traffic laws and because his car was a different make than that described by
the witnesses at the Huddle House. Appe llant do es no t ques tion the trial cou rt's
findings of fact but rather questions the trial court's conclusions of law drawn from
the facts.
Stopping an autom obile and deta ining its occupan ts constitutes a seizu re
within the meaning of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Binion, 900
S.W.2d 702, 705 (Ten n. Crim. App . 1994). How ever, a police officer may
conduct an inves tigatory s top of a vehicle when the offic er has a reas onab le
suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a crime has been or
is about to be com mitted. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (196 8); Griffin v. State ,
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604 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn. 1980). An investigatory stop based on re ason able
suspicion requires a lower q uantum of proof tha n proba ble caus e. State v.
Pulley, 863 S.W .2d 29, 31 (Tenn . 1993). In determ ining w hethe r reaso nable
suspicion exists, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). These
circumstances include, but are not limited to, objective observations and the
rational inferences and deductions of trained police office rs. State v. Watkins,
827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 199 2).
In analyzing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, this Court is not
bound or limited in its consideration of the facts. Instead, th is Court is e ntitled to
draw its own conclusions from the facts as fo und. State v. Mars hall, 870 S.W.2d
532,538 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1993).
Mindful of the fo regoin g principles of law, we conclude that, given the
unique circumstances of this case, no investigatory stop occurre d. Not all contact
between the police and a citizen constitutes a seizure. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S.
1, 20 n.16 (19 68); see, e.g., State v. Moore , 776 S.W .2d 933, 935 (Tenn. 198 9).
According to Appellant’s own testimony, he was on his way home when he
noticed the blue lights approximately one hundred yards from his driveway.
Instead of responding, he drove the remaining one hundred yar ds to h is
driveway, proceeded another three hundred yards up his driveway, and parked
next to his house. Presumably Appellant would not have done anything any
differen tly had no police car been following him. It was only at this point that the
officers interacte d with A ppella nt. Th e stron g odo r of alco hol an d App ellant’s
unsteadiness then gave the officers probab le cause to condu ct field sobrie ty
tests. It is our opinion that Appellant stopped his vehicle not because Officer
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Barnard engaged his blu e lights , but be caus e App ellant h ad arriv ed at h is
predetermined destination. Appellant’s decision to stop his vehicle was not
based upon the coercive effect of police conduct; therefore, there was no
restraint on his liberty. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 56 7, 573 (1987 ).
Even assuming that an investigatory stop did occur, the officers’ actions
were reasonable based upon the following facts: (1 ) App ellant’s car matched the
general descriptio n given b y witnesse s at the H uddle H ouse; (2) only a short
period of time transpired between the original dispatch and the observation of the
vehicle; and (3) Appellant was operating his vehicle at an extremely slow rate of
speed given the time of night and the posted speed limit. These specific and
articula ble facts are sufficient to warra nt an investigatory stop. Therefore, the trial
court pro perly den ied App ellant's m otion to su ppress .
Accord ingly, the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt is affirmed .
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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