State v. Aaron James

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION
FILED
December 28, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
AARON T. JAMES, ) Appellate Court Clerk
) NO. W1998-00463-CCA-R3-PC
Appellant )
) SHELBY COUNTY No. P-16158
VS. )
) HON. W. FRED AXLEY,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
LINDA KENDALL GARNER PAUL G. SUMMERS
50 North Front Street, Suite 780 Attorney General and Reporter
Memphis, TN 38103-1104
GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
RHEA CLIFT SPEAKE
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Ave. Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED - RULE 20 ORDER
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
ORDER
Appellant, AARON T. JAMES, appeals the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief. On December 15, 1994, appellant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to the Class A felonies of especially aggravated robbery, especially
aggravated kidnapping and second degree murder. Appellant received Range I
sentences of twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery and especially
aggravated kidnapping. He received a Range III persistent offender sentence of
fifty years for second degree murder. The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently.
On December 15, 1995, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
The petition claimed that his plea was involuntary and without understanding of the
consequences of such a plea. It also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.
One of appellant's co-defendants was tried prior to the appellant's guilty
plea. Trial counsel testified that she attended each day of the trial and talked with
appellant about each of the witnesses presented. Appellant's co-defendant
received a sentence of life for first degree murder, plus fifty years consecutively on
the other charges. Trial counsel advised appellant of possible sentences he could
receive if convicted at trial, as well as the full range of punishment based upon the
guilty plea. In the presence of his family, she charted the difference in sentences
on a piece of paper for the defendant and explained to him when he would be
eligible for parole under the sentences offered versus the sentences he could
receive if he proceeded to trial.
Appellant testified that his attorney never explained the ranges of punishment
to him, and he did not understand he was pleading outside of his Range I standard
offender status for second degree murder. He claimed that he was a high school
drop-out and did not understand the math involved in calculating his potential
sentence.
However, at the guilty plea hearing, appellant indicated he understood he
was agreeing to serve fifty years as a persistent offender at forty-five percent for the
2
charge of second degree murder. At the post-conviction hearing, when asked why
he did not ask questions about his sentence when he was given the opportunity,
the appellant replied, “I didn’t want to be bothered with them at the time.”
A review of the record shows that the trial judge clearly advised appellant of
his rights at the guilty plea hearing. She specifically asked defendant if he
understood the charges against him and the Range III sentence he was receiving
for second degree murder. The appellant had ample opportunity to ask questions
or express any dissatisfaction with the plea agreement and its terms. We also note
appellant was indicted for first degree murder; therefore, a Range III sentence for
second degree murder was proper under the plea agreement. See State v. Mahler.
735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
The post-conviction judge conducted a full evidentiary hearing and entered
an excellent written order of findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found
appellant's plea to be both knowing and voluntary and counsel's representation
effective. The evidence does not preponderate against these findings. Appellant's
claims are without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals. It appearing that the appellant is indigent, costs shall be
taxed to the State.
So ordered. Enter:
____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
____________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
3