State v. Charles Smith

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
JULY 1997 SESSION July 18, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
CHARLES R. SMITH, )
) NO. 02C01-9607-CC-00241
Appellant, )
) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
VS. )
) Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge
JIMMY HARRISON, WARDEN, )
) (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CHARLES R. SMITH, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Cold Creek Correctional Facility Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 1000
Henning, TN 38041-1000 DEBORAH A. TULLIS
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Charles R. Smith, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of
Lauderdale County dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He is presently
serving consecutive sentences of twelve (12) years for the offense of rape and one
(1) year for the offense of sexual battery. The trial court dismissed his petition
without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I
Petitioner alleges that he is being illegally confined because: (1) the judge
sitting at petitioner’s trial formerly represented petitioner on criminal charges, thus
making the judge biased against petitioner; (2) he received ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial; and (3) he was tried on a different indictment than that returned
by the grand jury.
Initially, the petition does not have annexed to it a copy of the judgments of
conviction and no reason is given in the petition for their absence. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-21-107(b)(2) provides that if the petitioner in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus is restrained of his liberty “by virtue of any legal process, a copy thereof shall
be annexed, or a satisfactory reason given for its absence.” This provision of the
statute is “mandatory and the failure to comply with same may be grounds for
dismissing the petition.” State ex rel. Wood v. Johnson, 393 S.W.2d 135, 136
(Tenn. 1965); see State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1964).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition.1
Moreover, petitioner’s allegations that the trial judge was biased and his trial
counsel was ineffective do not render the judgment void, but merely raise the
1
Petitioner’s allegation that he was tried on a different indictment is
unsupported by any documentation. We do not understand the nature of this naked
allegation.
2
possibility of a voidable judgment. A petitioner is only entitled to habeas corpus
relief when “‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the
proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was
without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, . . .” or that the sentence
has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). There is nothing
on the face of the record or the pleadings to indicate that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction or authority to sentence the petitioner. Nor is there any indication that
petitioner’s sentence has expired.
The petitioner cannot establish that the judgments convicting him are void or
that his sentence terms have expired. Therefore, we find that the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was properly dismissed.
II
Furthermore, the trial court found that it had no jurisdiction to hear a claim for
post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-205(c) allows a trial court to treat
a petition for habeas corpus as one for post-conviction relief. However, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-204(a) provides that a petition for post-conviction relief shall be filed
in the county of the petitioner's conviction. Smith was convicted in Fayette County
but filed this petition for relief in Lauderdale County. The trial court acted
appropriately in not treating the habeas corpus petition as one for post-conviction
relief.2
III
2
Additionally, it appears that a petition for post-conviction relief would be
barred under the statute of limitations. According to his petition, Smith was
convicted on December 30, 1991. An agreement dismissing his appeal was filed
on October 5, 1992. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on June 13,
1996.
3
We conclude that the petitioner's claims do not show that his judgments are
void or that his sentences have expired, making habeas corpus relief inappropriate.
Furthermore, the trial court properly refused to treat the petition as one for post-
conviction relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
4