Donald Easley v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
OCTOBER 1997 SESSION
November 6, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
DONALD WAYNE EASLEY, )
) NO. 01C01-9609-CC-00407
Appellant, )
) WILLIAMSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. DONALD P. HARRIS,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DONALD WAYNE EASLEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
PRO SE Attorney General and Reporter
#98515
Turney Center 4B DARYL J. BRAND
Route 1 Assistant Attorney General
Only, TN 37140-9709 450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOSEPH D. BAUGH, JR.
District Attorney General
P. O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
Appellant, Donald Wayne Easley, appeals the denial of a motion to reopen his
prior petition for post-conviction relief. The motion alleged the “reasonable doubt”
jury instruction given at his 1986 trial was unconstitutional. He also alleged that the
state in 1990 agreed to recommend a sentence reduction to the court in exchange
for his cooperation. The trial court denied relief without a hearing, finding the motion
did not state a colorable claim for relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon in 1986 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court upheld that conviction, State v. Donald
Wayne Easley, C.C.A. No. 87-75-111, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
May 11, 1988, at Nashville), and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission
to appeal in August 1988. Appellant filed his original petition for post-conviction relief
in 1990, which was heard and denied in 1991. In May 1996, appellant filed the
motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-
30-217. That motion was denied without a hearing.
MOTION TO REOPEN POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217 specifies:
(a) A petitioner may file a motion in the trial court to reopen the first
post-conviction petition only if the following applies:
(1) The claim in the motion is based upon a final ruling of an appellate
court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as
existing at the time of trial, if retrospective application of that right is
required. Such motion must be filed within one (1) year of the ruling of
the highest state appellate court or the United States supreme court
establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing
at the time of trial; or
(2) The claim in the motion is based upon new scientific evidence
establishing that such petitioner is actually innocent of the offense or
offenses for which the petitioner was convicted; or
(3) The claim asserted in the motion seeks relief from a sentence that
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was enhanced because of a previous conviction and such conviction
in the case in which the claim is asserted was not a guilty plea with an
agreed sentence, and the previous conviction has subsequently been
held to be invalid, in which case the motion must be filed within one (1)
year of the finality of the ruling holding the previous conviction to be
invalid; and
(4) It appears that the facts underlying the claim, if true, would establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is entitled to have
the conviction set aside or the sentence reduced.
(emphases added).
This statute has been the source of some confusion. A careful reading will
clarify its effects and limitations. The word “only” in the opening sentence shows the
very narrow nature of this statute. Only those events set out in one of the first three
(3) subsections qualifies as a potential basis for reopening a post-conviction
proceeding. However, to ripen into a colorable claim, the ground (or grounds)
alleged must also meet the standard set out in subsection (4); namely, that the facts,
if true, would establish entitlement to relief.
REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his
motion to reopen without first appointing counsel and conducting an evidentiary
hearing. His motion to reopen claimed a new constitutional right not recognized at
the time of the first post-conviction proceeding, specifically, that the “reasonable
doubt” jury instruction given at his trial had since been declared unconstitutional.
Appellant relies upon the federal district court opinion in Rickman v. Dutton,
864 F. Supp. 686 (M. D. Tenn. 1994). Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1)
specifically sets out the only two courts that may establish new constitutional rights
cognizable in a motion to reopen: the highest state appellate court or the United
States Supreme Court. A federal district court is not included.
Furthermore, the challenged “reasonable doubt” instruction is the same
instruction that has consistently been held to be constitutional by the appellate courts
in this State. See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Sexton, 917 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Pettyjohn v. State, 885
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S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 294
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
This issue is without merit.
NONPERFORMANCE BY STATE
Appellant also contends that he has grounds to have his sentence set aside
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(4). This section does not enumerate
a ground for reopening a post-conviction proceeding. This section prescribes the
burden of proof applicable to the grounds which are specified in the preceding three
(3) subsections. Appellant contends that the state, in 1990, promised to recommend
a reduction of sentence to the trial court in exchange for his cooperation. He claims
he performed his part of the bargain, but the state did not. Even if the facts were
proved by clear and convincing evidence, this is not one of the grounds enumerated
in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1), (2), or (3).
CONCLUSION
Appellant did not allege a cognizable ground to reopen his first petition for
post-conviction relief; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
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