State v. AAA Aaron's Action Agency

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JUNE SESSION, 1997 September 30, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9608-CR-00348
)
Appellee, ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
)
) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR.,
V. ) JUDGE
)
AAA AARON’S ACTION AGENCY, ) (PETITION FOR COURT
) APPROVAL TO WRITE
Appellant. ) BAIL BONDS)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
THOMAS L. WHITESIDE JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
172 Second Avenue North
Suite 214 KATHY A. MORANTE
Nashville, TN 37201-1908 Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
District Attorney General
DAN HAMM
Assistant District Attorney General
200 W ashington Square
222 Second Avenue North
Suite 500
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
aaronaaa.opn
OPINION
AAA Aaron’s Action Agency appeals as of right from the Davidson
County Criminal Court’s “Order Granting Approval to W rite Bonds under Specific
Conditions.” The Appellant argues one issue in this appeal: W hether the
Davidson County Criminal Court, sitting en banc, was arbitrary and capricious in
imposing a requirement that Appellant post either a Deed of Trust to
unencumbered real estate located in Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, or
cash, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, or other liquid assets before
authorizing Appellant to perform as a professional bondsman. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The trial court’s order reads as follows:
The petitioners propose to pledge the assets of American
Banker’s Insurance Company of Florida, the assets of which are
located outside the State of Tennessee, as surety to the Court on
bonds which are written by AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bond,
Inc. under a qualifying power of attorney issued by American
Bankers.
The Court recognizes that the petitioners have complied with
the requirements and conditions of doing business as a surety
company authorized to execute bonds as set out by the Tennessee
Department of Commerce and Insurance Statute at T.C.A. § 56-15-
101, et. seq., particularly T.C.A. § 56-15-105. The Court notes,
however, that pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-11-302(b) professional bail
bondsman, as defined at T.C.A. § 40-11-301, are excluded from the
laws governing insurance companies and any regulation by the
Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance.
T.C.A. § 40-11-124(a) and Rule 35 of the Davidson County
Local Rules of Practice grant this Court authority to determine which
bonding companies shall be qualified and approved to write bonds
in this county subject to compliance with the requirements and
regulations set forth by the Court.
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In its Order of October 27, 1982, in the case of State of
Tennessee v. Athens Bonding Company, et al, No. 951, the Court
determined that the bonding capacity for a bonding com pany shall
be calculated yearly as the sum of A.) the current tax assessor’s
valuation of pledged property, multiplied by four (4); and B.) cash
pledged, multiplied by eight (8). The bonding capacity represents
the dollar limit of all bonds that a bonding company may properly
have pending at one time.
In the case of In re: Indem nity Insurance Company of North
America, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that, even
though an insurance company has complied with statutes requiring
posting of assets with the Department of Insurance, there is “legal
authority of local courts to require posting of additional assets to
secure bail bond obligations of any professional bondsman,
insurance carrier or otherwise.” 594 S.W.2d 705 at 708 (Tenn.
1980).
It is therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
upon delivery to the Clerk of the Criminal Court of either a deed of
trust to unencumbered real estate located in Davidson County, or
cash, certificate of deposit, letter of credit or other liquid assets,
petitioners shall be authorized and approved to write bail bonds for
the General Sessions and Criminal Court of Davidson County,
Tennessee, in accordance with the bonding capacity described
above.
W e find that the trial court’s judgment is not arbitrary and capricious.
American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida has given
Appellant a power of attorney and has agreed to guarantee performance on
bonds undertaken by the Appellant up to $500,000. The Appellant has been
approved as bail bondsman in thirteen counties and the Federal courts in
Nashville. American Bankers Insurance Company has complied with the
requirements for doing business in Tennessee. An insurance company which
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deals in the areas that American Bankers deals in must have $200,000 of surety
on deposit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-2-104. This money is on deposit in Florida.
The Appellant argues that the Davidson County Criminal Court’s
order is contrary to this court’s ruling in the case of In re Dale R. Kelley, C.C.A.
No. 5, Henderson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 4, 1990), (no Rule 11
application filed). However, in that case, our court held that the Henderson
County Circuit Court’s policy limiting the bail bond profession to state approved
insurance com panies is arbitrary. The Davison County Criminal Court relied
upon its en banc order of October 1982 wherein all bonding companies (defined
as any entity or individual engaged in the business of securing appearance bonds
in the various courts of Davidson County) must comply with the bonding capacity
described in the order appealed from in the case sub judice. In other words, this
court cannot discern that the Criminal Court of Davidson County is treating
Appellant any differently than any other petitioner seeking to be approved to write
bail bonds under similar circumstances.
This court more recently held in In re Hitt, 910 S.W .2d 900 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995) as follows:
A trial court has full authority to determine who should be allowed to
make bonds in its court. Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 195 Tenn. 528, 260
S.W.2d 276 (1953). . . . Further, a trial court has the inherent power
to administer its affairs, including the right to impose reasonable
regulations regarding the making of bonds. Taylor v. W addey, 206
Tenn. 497, 334 S.W .2d 733 (1960).
Id. at 903-04 (quoting Hull v. State, 543 S.W .2d 611, 612 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1976).
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The trial court was concerned about collecting in the event of a final
forfeiture if the insurance company stopped doing business in Tennessee or went
out of business. W e conclude that this is a valid concern on the part of the trial
court. Therefore, the requirement of a deed of trust or cash, certificate of deposit,
letter of credit, or other liquid assets to be held by the Criminal Court is not
arbitrary and capricious. Because of the sound reasoning set out above in the
trial court’s order, we find that the trial court’s judgment is not arbitrary and
capricious.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge
___________________________________
W ILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge
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