State v. Michael A. Baskette

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JANUARY SESSION, 1997
September 30, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9604-CC-00167
Appellate Court Clerk
)
Appellee, )
)
) FRANKLIN COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. BUDDY D. PERRY
MICHAEL A. BASKETTE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Direct Appeal-Driving on Revoked
) License)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
PHILIP A. CONDRA JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
12th Judicial District
P. O. Box 220 M. ALLISON THOMPSON
Jasper, TN 37347 Counsel for the State
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
J. MICHAEL TAYLOR
District Attorney General
WILLIAM COPELAND
Assistant District Attorney
1 South Jefferson Street
Winchester, TN 37398
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant Micheal B. Baskette
of driving on a revoked license. As the result of two prior convictions in Davidson
County for driving on a revoked license, Appellant was subsequently convicted in a
bench trial for driving on a revoked license third offense. Appellant was sentenced
to sixty days in the county jail and a fine imposed. In this appeal, Appellant claims
that his conviction for driving on a revoked license third offense was improperly
based upon a prior guilty plea in which there was no effective waiver of counsel. For
the reasons set forth, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 22, 1994, Appellant was stopped at a roadblock on Highway 127 in
Franklin County, Tennessee. When approached by a Tennessee Highway Patrol
officer, Appellant reportedly appeared to be intoxicated. The officer instructed
Appellant to pull his car into a parking lot. Appellant was then given a series of field
sobriety tests by the officer. As a result of these tests, Appellant was arrested and
charged with DUI. When the officer checked Appellant’s identification information
the check revealed that Appellant’s driver’s license was revoked; subsequently
Appellant was charged with driving on a revoked license.
Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Franklin County in a four count
indictment, which charged Appellant with driving under the influence, driving under
the influence, third offense, driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license,
and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, third offense. At trial on
these charges, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the count involving driving
under the influence and guilty on the count involving driving on a canceled,
suspended or revoked license. The fourth count of driving on a canceled,
suspended or revoked license third offense was tried by the judge. During the
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bench trial, Appellant pointed out to the judge that the waiver of attorney which
appeared on the reverse side of the driving on a revoked license citation dated
February 18, 1991 seemed irregular, because it did not list any of the procedural
safeguards that accompany a constitutional waiver. The judge agreed as to the
irregular appearance of the waiver, but stated that the court in which the matter was
heard would have a record of that proceeding. Appellant was found guilty of driving
on a revoked license third offense.
II. ATTACK UPON AN UNDERLYING CONVICTION
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in relying on the February 1991
guilty plea which does not affirmatively establish on the face of the plea that the
statutory and constitutional protections required for an effective plea were ever
undertaken. Appellant argues that because the record does not establish a valid
waiver of the Appellant’s right to counsel at the plea proceeding in February 1991,
this Court should reverse and dismiss his conviction for driving on a revoked license,
third offense.
In State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, the Supreme Court addressed this issue
in holding that a defendant must collaterally attack any infirm underlying convictions
before a he can attack a subsequent conviction based on those prior convictions.
[I]t is incumbent upon a defendant to establish the invalidity of
prior guilty pleas before he can procedurally launch a collateral
attack in a subsequent habitual criminal sentence on that
basis. If he has not previously done so it must be established
at an appropriate hearing for that purpose that he has not
knowingly and understandingly waived any grounds he may
have which would undermine the validity of a prior guilty plea.
The fact cannot be established on a silent record. Boykin, 395
U.S.[238,] at 242, 89 S.Ct.[1709,] at 1712. The petition must
be filed in the court where the earlier conviction took place to
attack the constitutional validity of the prior conviction. A
defendant successful in such a proceeding may then expose
the enhanced sentence on the subsequent conviction to a
collateral attack as well.
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State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tenn. 1989).
Just as the underlying convictions in Prince were facially valid, the
February 1991 conviction Appellant seeks to challenge is facially valid. The
Appellant’s signature does indeed appear under the waiver of counsel portion of
the document. Therefore, it is facially valid. See State v.McClintock, 732
S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Cottrell, 868 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1992). This Court is unable to determine the merit of his allegation regarding the
1991 guilty plea upon this record. The appropriate route for overturning a prior
conviction as a result of an invalid waiver of the right to counsel is to file a post-
conviction proceeding within the statute of limitations.
Because Appellant has failed to follow the procedure set out by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Prince, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
_________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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