Jonah L. Gant v. Ricky Bell, Warden and State

FILED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
September 19, 1997
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
JONAH L. GANT, )
)
Appellant, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9609-CR-00405
)
vs. ) Davidson County
)
RICKY BELL, WARDEN and )
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Honorable Seth Norman, Judge
)
Appellees. ) (Habeas Corpus)
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
SHAWN A. TIDWELL JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
Cummins Station
209-10th Ave., Ste. 511 DARYL J. BRAND
Nashville, TN 37203 Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON III
District Attorney General
JAMES W. MILAM
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square
222 Second Ave. North, Ste. 500
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED: ____________________
AFFIRMED
CURWOOD WITT
JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Jonah L. Gant, appeals the denial of the Davidson
County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The
petitioner challenges the constitutionality of a sentence which he completed serving
in 1984, contending (1) the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and its predecessors
should be struck down because they violate separation of powers requirements by
allowing the judicial branch to determine when an offender will first be eligible for
parole, a power belonging to the executive branch, and (2) the current and past
sentencing statutes violate the requirement that all sentences be of determinate
length by mandating minimum percentages that must be served before parole
eligibility accrues, although parole may not be granted once this portion of the
sentence has been served.1 The trial court found the petitioner was not entitled to
habeas corpus relief because he is not being illegally detained as a result of the
sentence of which he complains.2 Following a review of the record, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
In Tennessee, the writ of habeas corpus is available only when the
judgment under attack is void or when the prisoner is held in custody after his term
of imprisonment has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993);
Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992); Rex Winfield Heaton v. Ricky Bell,
No. 01C01-9303-CC-00096, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 24,
1993). Standing to bring such an action is conferred on "[a]ny person imprisoned
or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatsoever," with certain exceptions
not pertinent here. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (1980).
1
The petitioner alleges his sentence was "10 to 20 years" for second
degree murder. No judgment document appears in the record, although the
state does not contest the correctness of the petitioner's uncorroborated
statement. The petitioner's challenge pertaining to determinate sentencing does
not directly attack his "10 to 20 years" sentence.
2
The petitioner is currently incarcerated for other sentences he received in
1985. For a procedural description of the petitioner's earlier proceedings, see
Jonah L. Gant v. State, No. 01C01-9412-CR-00420 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,
Aug. 11, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1995).
2
The appellant complains of an allegedly void sentence. He admits,
however, he has fulfilled the terms of the sentence. He contends he is nevertheless
a proper petitioner because any future punishment he may earn as a result of
criminal activity may be enhanced based upon his 1974 sentence. What the
petitioner fails to address, and what we find determinative, is that the petitioner's
1974 conviction, not sentence, would be used to enhance future punishment. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-106 to -108 (1990) (establishing enhanced punishment
categories based on prior convictions). The petitioner has not alleged constitutional
infirmity of his conviction. Moreover, if his claim of a constitutionally void sentence
was found to have merit, he would be entitled only to a new sentencing proceeding,
not a setting aside of his underlying conviction. See State v. Williams, 575 S.W.2d
948, 949-50 (Tenn. 1978). Because the petitioner has fully satisfied his sentence
and is no longer restrained of his liberty pursuant to that sentence, he is without
grounds to challenge it in habeas corpus proceedings.
The court below properly dismissed the petition, and its judgment is
affirmed.
_______________________________
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________
JOE G. RILEY JR., JUDGE
_______________________________
JOSEPH H. WALKER, III, SPECIAL JUDGE
3