State v. Robert Rayford

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
ROBERT LEE RAYFORD, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9702-CR-00079
)
vs.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
) SHELBY COUNTY
)
) No. P-04756
FILED
)
July 1, 1997
Respondent. )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion, pursuant to Rule
20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, to affirm the judgment of the trial court
through an order rather than a formal opinion. The record in this case was filed on
February 26, 1997, and the petitioner filed his brief on April 11, 1997. In 1986, this
Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated rape and status as a habitual
criminal. State v. Rayford, No. 38 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 2, 1986). The
Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. In June of
1987, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming, in part, ineffective
assistance of counsel. The trial court finally dismissed the petition in May 1991, but the
petitioner did not appeal that dismissal.
During the pendency of his petition in the trial court, the petitioner filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal court, in which he raised the same
issues he claimed in his state post-conviction petition. After several hearings in the
district court, the petitioner was ultimately denied relief in December, 1995. The federal
appeals court denied a certificate of probable cause in April, 1996, and the United
States Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s writ of certiorari in October, 1996.
On December 11, 1996, the petitioner filed his second petition for post-
conviction relief in the trial court. The trial court dismissed the petition on January 13,
1997, stating that the petition was barred by the statute of limitation and that the issues
raised had been previously determined. On appeal, the petitioner, citing Sands v.
State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995), argues that the strict application of the statute of
limitation in this case would deny him due process of law. Specifically, the petitioner
contends that he could not have filed his post-conviction petition any earlier because
the United States Supreme Court did not rule upon his petition for writ of certiorari until
October 1996. According to the petitioner, state law prevented him from filing two suits
simultaneously in two different courts.
T.C.A. § 40-30-206(c), upon which the petitioner relies to support his
claim on appeal, provides that the trial judge may summarily dismiss a petition if it
appears the petitioner already has pending a petition in “either the trial court, court of
criminal appeals, or supreme court.” Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the post-
conviction statute does not address pleadings filed in the federal courts. Indeed, the
statute specifically only imposes limits on simultaneous state court filings. T.C.A. § 40-
30-202(c) “contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief [and]
[i]n no event may more than one (1) petition for post-conviction relief be filed attacking a
single judgment.” Moreover, T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a) (emphasis added) mandates that
a person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition
for post-conviction relief . . . within one (1) year of the date of the final
action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal has been
taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the
judgment became final.
This time limit, however, is not tolled by federal proceedings. See § T.C.A. 40-30-
202(b)(1)-(3). In fact, nothing in the language of this statute prevents the petitioner
from filing a petition in the state court when he or she has a federal habeas corpus
petition pending. See T.C.A. §§ 40-30-201-222.
The petitioner already filed one petition for post-conviction relief, which
was dismissed in 1991. The petitioner never appealed that dismissal. In addition, more
than one year has passed since that dismissal by the trial court and, also, since the
final action of the highest state appellate court regarding the petitioner’s conviction.
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Accordingly, the present petition was filed outside the statute of limitation, and the trial
court was therefore without jurisdiction to consider the petition. See T.C.A. § 40-30-
202.
Having reviewed the state’s motion in light of the petitioner’s response
and the entire record on appeal, we find that the motion is well-taken and should
therefore be granted. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition without the
necessity of an evidentiary hearing is affirmed.
Enter, this the ___ day of June, 1997.
______________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
______________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
______________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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